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Alcohol Blackout

Alcohol Blackouts: Series Overview

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Snap Shot

  • The question: What does the research on alcohol-induced blackouts and related effects of alcohol establish, how is this series of papers organized, and where should an attorney start for a particular question?
  • What the research shows: A blackout is a period of amnesia for events during drinking in which the person is awake and may act in complex ways but does not form lasting memories. Blackouts are common among young adult drinkers, are tied to high and rapidly rising blood alcohol concentration (BAC), and vary widely between people. In college samples, women and men now report past-year blackouts at nearly equal rates, although, on average, women reach higher BACs than men from the same dose.
  • What it does not show: No single validated behavioral sign or test confirms or rules out a blackout, during the episode or afterward (convergent evidence can make a claim more or less plausible but cannot verify it), no BAC serves as a cutoff for blackout or as a screen for the plausibility of any person’s claim, and a blackout is not the same as unconsciousness or legal incapacity. Group research cannot establish whether a particular person was in a blackout, could consent, or remembers accurately.
  • The law: Expert testimony is governed by Rule 702 (as amended in 2023), Daubert, Kumho, Mil. R. Evid. 702 and Houser, and Ariz. R. Evid. 702. Incapacity to consent is defined by Article 120(g)(8), UCMJ, and A.R.S. § 13-1401(A)(7)(b), and voluntary intoxication is not a defense under R.C.M. 916(l)(2) or A.R.S. § 13-503, with the military rule allowing it on specified mental elements.
  • Issues for each side: Each party can use blackout research to explain why a person who was drinking may remember little, and each should take care not to treat a memory gap as proof of incapacity, consent, fabrication, or innocence, or to apply the research to only one party’s account.

Alcohol is present in many of the cases that reach criminal and military courts, and memory is often the first thing it affects. A complainant may remember arriving at a party and then nothing until morning; an accused may describe the same night in detail or report gaps of his or her own; friends may remember fragments that neither party recalls. The research on alcohol-induced blackouts, which began with interviews of hospitalized patients in the 1960s and now includes studies in which young adults report their drinking and memory loss on their phones night by night, explains much about how such gaps arise. It also sets limits on what any gap can show.

This series collects that research for practicing attorneys, judges, and military justice practitioners. Each paper presents the findings that help the prosecution and the findings that help the defense, applies them equally to complainants, accused persons, and other witnesses, and separates what the science can say about memory from the legal questions, such as capacity to consent and criminal responsibility, that it informs but does not answer. Readers will not read every paper, so the papers overlap by design: a finding treated in depth in one paper is restated briefly in others, with the same sources.

This overview describes how the series is organized, summarizes the core findings, lists several points that are often misstated in court and in older summaries, and suggests where to start for common questions. Its law and practice sections are brief; the papers it names treat each topic more fully.

How the Series Is Organized

The papers fall into eight groups. The first, Overview and Foundations, contains this paper; Introduction to Alcohol Blackouts: A Primer, a single-paper introduction for readers who want one place to begin; A History of Blackout Research, which traces how the field moved from hospitalized patients to young social drinkers; How Common Are Blackouts? Youth, College Students, and Service Members; and Blackout, Passing Out, and Incapacity: How They Overlap, a one-figure page showing that memory, consciousness, and legal capacity are separate questions.

The second group, What a Blackout Is, covers the phenomenon itself: Blacked Out Versus Passed Out; Can Observers Tell When Someone Is in a Blackout?; Fragmentary and En Bloc Blackouts; Unknown Blackouts, Reconstruction, and Later Recall; “Waking Up” During a Blackout and Islands of Memory; and The Hippocampus and Memory Formation During a Blackout. The third, Causes, Dose, and Risk Factors, contains papers on blood alcohol concentration, drinking pattern and individual risk, the ascending limb of the BAC curve, acute tolerance, sex differences, genetic and family risk, the relation of past blackouts to later memory, medications, benzodiazepines, cannabis, and the accuracy of self-reported drinking.

The fourth group, Toxicology and Measurement, explains absorption, distribution, and elimination, retrograde extrapolation and the Widmark formula, and breath versus blood testing. The fifth, Alcohol, Memory, and Behavior, addresses effects short of blackout: alcohol’s effects on memory and on the brain, memory for crimes, alcohol myopia, disinhibition and sexual decision-making, aggression, and intoxicated suspects’ statements. The sixth, Sleep and Mental Health, covers alcohol and sleep, parasomnia claims, alcohol-related psychosis, and the co-occurrence of substance use with PTSD, bipolar disorder, and anxiety disorders.

The seventh group, Blackouts in the Courtroom, addresses admissibility, the recurring tension between heavy intoxication and capacity (The Goldilocks Challenge), practice issues for each side, assessment of a claimed blackout, reconstruction of a blackout period from records, and voluntary intoxication and criminal responsibility. The eighth group contains four Key Readings pages, on alcohol blackouts; alcohol, memory, and witnesses; alcohol, sexual behavior, and aggression; and alcohol, other drugs, and mental health. Each lists the principal studies by subtopic with a short summary of each.

Core Findings in Brief

Memory, Consciousness, and Capacity Are Different Questions

Alcohol mainly impairs the formation of new long-term memories while leaving memories formed before drinking, and the ability to hold new information for a short time, largely intact; the impairment grows with dose, and large amounts consumed quickly can produce partial (fragmentary) or complete (en bloc) blackouts (White, 2003, p. 186). A person in a blackout is conscious and interacting with the surroundings, whereas a person who has passed out has lost consciousness (Wetherill & Fromme, 2016, p. 922). In an interview study of 136 heavy-drinking young adults, fragmentary blackouts were reported more than three times as often as en bloc blackouts (Hartzler & Fromme, 2003b); the ratio is a sample finding, not a probability for any person, and en bloc blackouts occur and cannot be excluded. How loss of consciousness relates to peak BAC has not been well studied; the usual clinical expectation is that it comes as BAC rises or later as sedation and sleep develop, but the timing varies and has not been measured.

Legal capacity to consent is a third question. It turns on whether a person could appraise the conduct or could decide and communicate a decision, and, in Arizona, on whether the condition was known or should reasonably have been known to the accused. A person can be in a blackout and capable of consenting, or incapable without a blackout, and later non-recall alone does not establish either. The figure page and the Goldilocks paper develop this point.

Dose, Speed, and Individual Differences

Reported blackouts occur across a wide range of blood alcohol concentrations. The lowest level reported in these sources is about 0.06 g/dL (an estimate from self-reported drinking in 136 heavy-drinking young adults; Hartzler & Fromme, 2003b); in seven hospitalized men with alcoholism, blackouts began at about 0.14 (Ryback, 1970); a 2016 review reports that most blackouts occurred around 0.20, citing Ryback (1970) (Wetherill & Fromme, 2016, p. 923); and in one sample of arrestees (actively drinking people arrested for public intoxication, driving under the influence, or underage drinking, with BAC above 0.08 documented at arrest and an interview afterward about the episode), the estimated probability of a blackout (complete memory loss, as distinct from a partial “grayout”) reached 50% at about 0.31 g/dL, and of a grayout or a blackout at about 0.22 (Perry et al., 2006). These are group figures from different samples and methods; none is a cutoff, none is a screen for the plausibility of any person’s claim, and none shows whether a particular person had a blackout. Estimated BACs are uncertain, and a BAC figure does not show whether a blackout occurred. Rapid drinking matters: gulping drinks and drinking on an empty stomach preceded blackouts in early interview studies (White, 2003, p. 189). In Swiss event-level data (369 young people reporting 3,554 weekend nights), the number of drinks that best distinguished nights with a blackout was up to three drinks higher than the common 4+/5+ binge threshold, and one to two drinks lower for women than for men (Labhart et al., 2018). The Swiss figures are optimal statistical cut points across groups, not a measure of any one night.

People differ in susceptibility at the same level of drinking. In recent day-by-day studies of young adults who drink heavily, blackouts were more likely among those with a stronger subjective response to alcohol and, for fragmentary blackouts, among younger participants, after accounting for estimated BAC (Merrill et al., 2025), and poorer sleep the night before drinking raised the odds of next-day memory loss (Merrill et al., 2026). On average, women reach higher BACs than men from the same dose, mainly because of differences in body water (Mumenthaler et al., 1999); body size, food, drinking speed, tolerance, and timing also matter, so equal drink counts do not show equal intoxication in either direction, and whether women are more impaired at the same BAC is less settled. Among U.S. college drinkers, past-year blackout rates are now nearly equal by sex, 29.2% of women and 28.8% of men, even though women drink less on average (White, 2020). Group differences of this kind say nothing about how impaired a particular woman or man was.

No Test Identifies a Blackout

No objective marker of a blackout in progress has been validated, and an observer generally cannot know whether a drinker is forming memories (Wetherill & Fromme, 2016, pp. 922–923). A 2013 review of 26 empirical studies, nine of which induced and directly observed a blackout, found no objective or scientific method to verify a blackout during or after the fact (Pressman & Caudill, 2013). No single test can confirm or rule out a blackout after the fact; evaluators look to convergent evidence (the drinking and its timing, observations, records, and the pattern and consistency of later recall), which can make a claim more or less plausible but cannot verify it. Researchers have begun testing brief memory tasks given on a phone during drinking; failing such a task was associated with later-reported blackout but did not diagnose it, and a memory test given during the episode may help show whether a blackout is likely, but no equivalent exists for a past event (Miller et al., 2026). These limits apply to anyone, complainant, accused, or witness, who later says “I blacked out.”

Later Recall and Reconstruction

In fragmentary blackouts some partly encoded information may return with cues; in en bloc blackouts cues generally fail, although the research does not show that no fragment can ever return, and a returned detail may be genuine or reconstructed. The cue finding comes from a 1969 interview study of hospitalized patients, described in a later review (Goodwin et al., 1969a, as described by White, 2003, p. 188). The accuracy of details that emerge later cannot be assumed, however, especially after a person has heard others’ accounts, seen photographs or messages, or been questioned: people reconstructing a blackout rely heavily on outside sources and may relax their standards for accepting a recollection as their own (Nash & Takarangi, 2011), and alcohol’s effects on suggestibility appear most likely at high intoxication or after a delay (Kloft et al., 2021). An account that grows over time is therefore consistent with genuine retrieval and with reconstruction, and the research does not say which has occurred in a particular case.

Points That Are Often Misstated

Several claims appear in older summaries and in testimony that the research does not support as stated. Prenatal alcohol exposure predicted young-adult drinking problems in a 21-year longitudinal study (Baer et al., 2003); that is evidence about an environmental, prenatal exposure, not genetic or epigenetic inheritance. Variants of the ALDH2 and ADH1B genes change acetaldehyde levels and flushing rather than BAC, and among Asian American college students the ALDH2∗2 variant was associated with a lower likelihood of blackouts (Luczak et al., 2006); the research does not support the claim that an ethnic group “lacks an enzyme” that raises its blackout risk. The finding that alcohol consumed after an event can improve memory for that event, retrograde facilitation, is usually explained by reduced interference from new learning, not by stress hormones (Gawrylowicz et al., 2017). A frequently cited study of intoxicated men’s acceptance of sexual aggression used written scenarios, not brain imaging (Noel et al., 2009).

On acute tolerance, people feel less intoxicated and are more willing to drive as BAC falls, but objective skills are generally as bad or worse at the same BAC on the descending limb (Holland & Ferner, 2017). In some laboratory studies, alcohol shortened the time to fall asleep and deepened early sleep but disrupted the second half of the night (Ebrahim et al., 2013); the doses were moderate, the findings vary, and the same caveat applies to any person. Korsakoff’s syndrome is a severe amnestic and encephalopathic condition caused principally by thiamine deficiency, not a psychosis (Arts et al., 2017). Detection windows for drugs such as GHB are short; the U.S. standard for urine testing in drug-facilitated crime investigations does not call for GHB testing of urine collected more than 12 hours after the event (AAFS Standards Board, 2021), and the Counterintuitive Testimony paper on drug-facilitated sexual assault discusses windows, cut-offs, and specimens from forensic toxicology sources.

Where to Start

For a general introduction, start with Introduction to Alcohol Blackouts: A Primer. For a witness who says a person “passed out,” read Blacked Out Versus Passed Out and the figure page. For an argument that a person “seemed fine” and so could not have been in a blackout, or the reverse, read Can Observers Tell When Someone Is in a Blackout? For an account that changed or grew over time, read Fragmentary and En Bloc Blackouts and Unknown Blackouts, Reconstruction, and Later Recall. For estimated BAC, drink counts, and timing, read Blackouts and Blood Alcohol Concentration, Self-Reports of Drinking: Underestimation and Counting Drinks, and Retrograde Extrapolation and the Limits of the Widmark Formula. For capacity to consent, read The Goldilocks Challenge: Intoxicated Enough to Lose Memory, but Capable of Consent? and the Counterintuitive Testimony paper on alcohol, blackouts, and memory, which treats the law in depth. For an accused’s claimed blackout, read Assessing a Claimed Blackout: Convergent Evidence, Malingering, and Limits and Voluntary Intoxication, Blackout, and Criminal Responsibility. For admissibility, read Alcohol Blackouts in the Courtroom: Expert Testimony and Admissibility.

Limits of the Evidence

Most blackout research relies on retrospective self-report, often a single survey question about waking unable to remember, and the field lacks a standardized assessment (Wetherill & Fromme, 2016). The foundational laboratory studies involved small numbers of hospitalized, mostly middle-aged men with alcoholism; later research has relied mainly on college students and young adults, with fewer studies of older adults, service members, or people who do not attend college. For ethical reasons, laboratory studies rarely dose participants to the levels described in many cases, so the highest-dose evidence comes from field, arrest, and survey samples that give up experimental control. Even the newest real-time studies use participants’ own later reports of memory loss as the reference standard (Miller et al., 2026). Many studies did not compare women and men, and those that did have produced inconsistent results (Wetherill & Fromme, 2016). Above all, group findings describe probabilities; they cannot establish whether a particular person was in a blackout, could consent, or is remembering accurately.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When an expert cites the finding that about half of college students who drink report a blackout, counsel can ask what was counted, whether lifetime, past year, or past two weeks, and whether a prevalence figure says anything about this person on this night. When a BAC figure is offered as a threshold, counsel can ask whether it is an observed range, a probability from one arrest sample (Perry et al., 2006), or a cutoff the research does not support, and how the BAC itself was estimated. When Pressman and Caudill (2013) are cited, counsel can ask what they concluded and about what: their review addressed blackout offered as a criminal defense or mitigating factor, not testimony explaining a complainant’s or witness’s memory gap, and the absence of a verifying test applies to every party’s claim. When a recent real-time study (Miller et al., 2026) is cited, counsel can ask whether any such test was given in this case. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Alcohol Blackouts and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

Expert testimony about blackouts is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as amended December 1, 2023, which requires the proponent to show that it is more likely than not that the testimony rests on sufficient facts or data, reflects reliable principles and methods, and reflects a reliable application of those methods to the case. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) makes the trial judge a gatekeeper, and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999) extends that obligation to all expert testimony. In courts-martial, Military Rule of Evidence 702 tracks the federal rule; the 2023 federal amendment took effect in the military rule in 2025 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025), and practitioners should confirm current text. Military judges also apply the factors of United States v. Houser (1993).

Article 120, UCMJ, defines “incapable of consenting” to mean incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct at issue, or physically incapable of declining participation in, or communicating unwillingness to engage in, the sexual act (Art. 120(g)(8)); under the earlier statute, United States v. Pease (2016) approved a definition centered on the ability to appreciate the conduct and to make or communicate a decision about it. United States v. Mendoza (2024) held that lack of consent and incapacity are separate theories of liability. For an accused, voluntary intoxication is not a defense, although evidence of it may be considered on elements of actual knowledge, specific intent, willfulness, or premeditation (R.C.M. 916(l)(2)).

Arizona

Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 adopted the federal formulation in 2012 and was amended effective January 1, 2024, to track the 2023 federal amendment (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004); general educational testimony that satisfies Rules 702 and 403 is permitted (State v. Salazar-Mercado, 2014), and experts may not opine on a particular witness’s credibility (State v. Lindsey, 1986, 149 Ariz. at 475). Sexual assault “without consent” includes a victim incapable of consent by reason of drugs, alcohol, sleep, or similar impairment of cognition, where the condition is known or should reasonably have been known to the defendant (A.R.S. § 13-1401(A)(7)(b)). Temporary intoxication from voluntary use of alcohol is not a defense to any criminal act or requisite state of mind (A.R.S. § 13-503). The Voluntary Intoxication paper and the Counterintuitive Testimony alcohol paper treat this law in more detail.

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports several propositions prosecutors can legitimately present. For any party, memory gaps after heavy drinking are common and do not by themselves show whether an account is accurate or inaccurate, and after a fragmentary blackout some recall may return with cues. A person may appear to function while forming no lasting memories, so a witness’s impression that someone “seemed fine” does not show that the person was encoding normally, and apparent coordination does not settle capacity. On average, women reach higher BACs than men from the same dose, so equal drink counts do not show equal intoxication in either direction. A claimed blackout, whether by an accused or a complainant, cannot be verified by any single test; for an accused, voluntary intoxication cannot negate a required mental state in Arizona (A.R.S. § 13-503) and in courts-martial is not a defense but may be considered on actual knowledge, specific intent, willfulness, or premeditation (R.C.M. 916(l)(2)). Counsel should confirm current authority.

The research also counsels caution. A complainant’s blackout is not by itself evidence of incapacity, and after Mendoza the charging theory matters. Details that emerge after a blackout may reflect genuine retrieval or reconstruction from others’ accounts, so early, recorded, non-leading interviews and a record of what the complainant learned from others, and when, protect the value of a later account. No BAC is a cutoff for blackout or incapacity, and estimates built from reported drinks carry substantial uncertainty for a complainant, an accused, or any witness.

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports several propositions defense counsel can legitimately present. A blackout is a failure of memory formation, not unconsciousness, and a person in a blackout may engage in conversation and other complex behavior; a complainant’s absence of memory therefore does not by itself establish that the complainant was unconscious or incapable. Accounts reconstructed after a blackout may rest partly on what others said, and at high intoxication some studies find increased suggestibility. Expert testimony on these general principles, and on the uncertainty of BAC estimates, can help the factfinder weigh an account.

The research also counsels caution about the limits that apply to the defense. Memory gaps are common and do not by themselves show whether an account is accurate or inaccurate, and alcohol’s effects on suggestibility appear mainly at high intoxication or after a delay rather than in every intoxicated witness (Kloft et al., 2021). A blackout does not establish capacity any more than it establishes incapacity. For any party, a memory gap after heavy drinking is common, is consistent with a range of events (including events that did and did not occur), and cannot by itself show what happened or whether an account is accurate. The same principles apply to the accused: a claimed blackout cannot be verified by any single test, it does not by itself show that conduct was involuntary, and an accused’s detailed account of a heavily intoxicated period raises the same questions about sources and reconstruction as anyone else’s.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

AAFS Standards Board. (2021). Standard for the analytical scope and sensitivity of forensic toxicological testing of urine in drug-facilitated crime investigations (ANSI/ASB Standard 121, 1st ed.). American Academy of Forensic Sciences. https://www.aafs.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/121_Std_e1.pdf

Arts, N. J. M., Walvoort, S. J. W., & Kessels, R. P. C. (2017). Korsakoff’s syndrome: A critical review. Neuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment, 13, 2875–2890. https://doi.org/10.2147/NDT.S130078

Baer, J. S., Sampson, P. D., Barr, H. M., Connor, P. D., & Streissguth, A. P. (2003). A 21-year longitudinal analysis of the effects of prenatal alcohol exposure on young adult drinking. Archives of General Psychiatry, 60(4), 377–385. https://doi.org/10.1001/archpsyc.60.4.377

Ebrahim, I. O., Shapiro, C. M., Williams, A. J., & Fenwick, P. B. (2013). Alcohol and sleep I: Effects on normal sleep. Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research, 37(4), 539–549. https://doi.org/10.1111/acer.12006

Gawrylowicz, J., Ridley, A. M., Albery, I. P., Barnoth, E., & Young, J. (2017). Alcohol-induced retrograde facilitation renders witnesses of crime less suggestible to misinformation. Psychopharmacology, 234(8), 1267–1275. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00213-017-4564-2

Goodwin, D. W., Crane, J. B., & Guze, S. B. (1969a). Alcoholic “blackouts”: A review and clinical study of 100 alcoholics. American Journal of Psychiatry, 126(2), 191–198. https://doi.org/10.1176/ajp.126.2.191

Hartzler, B., & Fromme, K. (2003b). Fragmentary and en bloc blackouts: Similarity and distinction among episodes of alcohol-induced memory loss. Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 64(4), 547–550. https://doi.org/10.15288/jsa.2003.64.547

Holland, M. G., & Ferner, R. E. (2017). A systematic review of the evidence for acute tolerance to alcohol – the “Mellanby effect.” Clinical Toxicology, 55(6), 545–556. https://doi.org/10.1080/15563650.2017.1296576

Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf

Kloft, L., Monds, L. A., Blokland, A., Ramaekers, J. G., & Otgaar, H. (2021). Hazy memories in the courtroom: A review of alcohol and other drug effects on false memory and suggestibility. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 124, 291–307. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2021.02.012

Labhart, F., Livingston, M., Engels, R., & Kuntsche, E. (2018). After how many drinks does someone experience acute consequences—determining thresholds for binge drinking based on two event-level studies. Addiction, 113(12), 2235–2244. https://doi.org/10.1111/add.14370

Luczak, S. E., Shea, S. H., Hsueh, A. C., Chang, J., Carr, L. G., & Wall, T. L. (2006). ALDH2∗2 is associated with a decreased likelihood of alcohol-induced blackouts in Asian American college students. Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 67(3), 349–353. https://doi.org/10.15288/jsa.2006.67.349

Merrill, J. E., Boyle, H. K., Peterson, R., Belitsos, O. A., Miller, M. B., Carey, K. B., Jackson, K. M., & Barnett, N. P. (2025). Factors that increase risk for alcohol-induced blackouts in high-intensity drinking young adults. Alcohol, Clinical and Experimental Research, 49(7), 1530–1541. https://doi.org/10.1111/acer.70074

Merrill, J. E., Miller, M. B., Berey, B. L., Carey, K. B., Barnett, N. P., & Jackson, K. M. (2026). Prior-night sleep as an event-level predictor of alcohol-induced memory loss. Sleep, 49(5), Article zsaf400. https://doi.org/10.1093/sleep/zsaf400

Miller, M. B., Shoemaker, S. D., Freeman, L. K., Curtis, A. F., Merrill, J. E., & Merkle, E. C. (2026). Predictive value of real-time memory tests in identifying alcohol-induced blackouts in situ. Addiction, 121(8), 2166–2175. https://doi.org/10.1111/add.70446

Mumenthaler, M. S., Taylor, J. L., O’Hara, R., & Yesavage, J. A. (1999). Gender differences in moderate drinking effects. Alcohol Research & Health, 23(1), 55–64.

Nash, R. A., & Takarangi, M. K. T. (2011). Reconstructing alcohol-induced memory blackouts. Memory, 19(6), 566–573. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2011.590508

Noel, N. E., Maisto, S. A., Johnson, J. D., & Jackson, L. A. (2009). The effects of alcohol and cue salience on young men’s acceptance of sexual aggression. Addictive Behaviors, 34(4), 386–394. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.addbeh.2008.11.016

Perry, P. J., Argo, T. R., Barnett, M. J., Liesveld, J. L., Liskow, B., Hernan, J. M., Trnka, M. G., & Brabson, M. A. (2006). The association of alcohol-induced blackouts and grayouts to blood alcohol concentrations. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 51(4), 896–899. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1556-4029.2006.00161.x

Pressman, M. R., & Caudill, D. S. (2013). Alcohol-induced blackout as a criminal defense or mitigating factor: An evidence-based review and admissibility as scientific evidence. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 58(4), 932–940. https://doi.org/10.1111/1556-4029.12134

Ryback, R. S. (1970). Alcohol amnesia: Observations in seven drinking inpatient alcoholics. Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 31(3), 616–632. https://doi.org/10.15288/qjsa.1970.31.616

Wetherill, R. R., & Fromme, K. (2016). Alcohol-induced blackouts: A review of recent clinical research with practical implications and recommendations for future studies. Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research, 40(5), 922–935. https://doi.org/10.1111/acer.13051

White, A. M. (2003). What happened? Alcohol, memory blackouts, and the brain. Alcohol Research & Health, 27(2), 186–196.

White, A. M. (2020). Gender differences in the epidemiology of alcohol use and related harms in the United States. Alcohol Research: Current Reviews, 40(2), Article 01. https://doi.org/10.35946/arcr.v40.2.01

Legal Authorities

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).

State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).

State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).

United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).

United States v. Mendoza, 85 M.J. 213 (C.A.A.F. 2024).

United States v. Pease, 75 M.J. 180 (C.A.A.F. 2016).

10 U.S.C. § 920 (Article 120, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-503.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1401.

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

Mil. R. Evid. 702.

Ariz. R. Evid. 702.

Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004 (amending Ariz. R. Evid. 702, effective Jan. 1, 2024).

Rule for Courts-Martial 916(l)(2).

Related topic papers: Introduction to Alcohol Blackouts: A Primer · Blackout, Passing Out, and Incapacity: How They Overlap · Blackouts and Blood Alcohol Concentration · Can Observers Tell When Someone Is in a Blackout? · Alcohol Blackouts in the Courtroom: Expert Testimony and Admissibility

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Counterintuitive Testimony: Alcohol, Blackouts, and Memory in Sexual Assault Cases · Memory in the Courtroom: Intoxication and Memory · Courts-Martial