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Alcohol Blackout

“Waking Up” During a Blackout and Islands of Memory

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Snap Shot

  • The question: What does it mean when a person describes “waking up” or “coming to” during or after a night of heavy drinking, what are islands of memory, and what can such an account show about what happened and about consent?
  • What the research shows: Fragmentary blackouts leave islands of memory separated by gaps, and an en bloc blackout may end in sleep. In interviews with 50 college students about their last blackout, about half said their first full memory afterward was of waking up in the morning. A report of “waking up” may reflect actual sleep or loss of consciousness, the return of memory formation, or a later interpretation of the boundary of a gap (the second and third explanations are plausible but untested); heavy drinking shortens the time to fall asleep and disrupts sleep later in the night, and in one laboratory study of 93 young adults at moderate doses, sleep disruption was greater in women.
  • What it does not show: The research has not documented a reliable way for a person to recognize, while it is happening, that memories are not being stored, and it cannot tell from an account alone which explanation applies. A moment of awareness does not by itself show that the person was capable of consenting, or that the person was not.
  • The law: Military law addresses a person who is asleep or unaware (Art. 120(b)(2)(B)), incapable of consenting (Art. 120(b)(3)(A)), or capable but not consenting (Art. 120(b)(2)(A)); Casillas and Hennessy address a complainant who was asleep when an act began and woke during it, and Moore a person who did not consent before falling asleep. Arizona’s definition of “without consent” covers incapacity from alcohol or sleep known or reasonably knowable to the defendant (A.R.S. § 13-1401(A)(7)(b)).
  • Issues for each side: Both sides can legitimately ask what the person remembers before and after each gap and what other evidence shows about the gaps; neither can treat “waking up” language as proof of sleep, of blackout, of consent, or of its absence.

People who drank heavily often describe their memory of a night in terms of waking: “I woke up and he was there,” “I came to in the car,” “I went back to sleep.” Sometimes the words are literal, and the person was asleep or unconscious. Sometimes the person may have been awake throughout but in a blackout, and the “waking” marks the point where memory resumed. And sometimes the person may be describing, in familiar terms, the edges of a gap whose nature he or she does not know. Accounts of this kind are common in alcohol-involved sexual assault cases, and they are often misunderstood in both directions.

This paper describes islands of memory, the experience of waking after or during a blackout, the competing explanations for a report of “waking up,” what is known about whether a person can notice a blackout while it is happening, how these questions bear on consent and capacity, and the governing military and Arizona law. A public court-martial decision illustrates how the issue reaches court.

Islands of Memory

In a fragmentary blackout, memory formation is partly blocked, leaving islands of memory separated by gaps, and the person may learn of missing events only when reminded of them (a pattern described in interviews with hospitalized patients in the 1960s, as summarized in White, 2003, p. 188; how often it occurs has not been measured). In an en bloc blackout, a period is missing despite efforts to cue recall; such blackouts usually have a distinct onset and a less clear end, because the person typically falls asleep before the blackout is over (White, 2003, p. 188). In interviews with 50 college students who had experienced blackouts, fragmentary episodes were far more common than en bloc ones, four of five students eventually recalled bits and pieces of the missing period, and about half said that their first full memory after the blackout began was of waking up in the morning, often in an unfamiliar place (White et al., 2004, as described by White, 2003). In a mixed-methods study, college students described partial “brownouts” and complete “blackouts” as points along a continuum (Miller et al., 2018).

What the islands contain, and how they are ordered, has not been studied directly. Because the gaps remove the surrounding context, a person may remember a moment without knowing what came immediately before or after it, how long the gap lasted, or how he or she came to be where the moment occurred. That is a description of what a gap implies, not a research finding about any particular kind of content. In fragmentary blackouts some partly encoded information may return with cues (a 1969 interview study of hospitalized patients, described in a later review: Goodwin et al., 1969a, as described by White, 2003, p. 188); in en bloc blackouts cues generally fail, although the research does not show that no fragment can ever return. A returned detail may be genuine or reconstructed, and the accuracy of what returns cannot be assumed, especially after exposure to others’ accounts, photos, or questioning (Nash & Takarangi, 2011; Kloft et al., 2021).

What “Waking Up” Can Mean

At least three explanations can produce an account of waking up, and they are not mutually exclusive.

The first is literal sleep or loss of consciousness followed by awakening. Heavy drinking shortens the time it takes to fall asleep and consolidates sleep in the first half of the night but disrupts it in the second half (Ebrahim et al., 2013). In a laboratory study of 93 healthy young adults (59 women) dosed to a peak breath alcohol of about 0.11 g/dL, alcohol increased wakefulness across the night compared with placebo and disrupted sleep, including nighttime awakenings, more in women than in men (Arnedt et al., 2011). A person who has been drinking heavily may therefore fall asleep quickly and wake during the night, sometimes repeatedly. Passing out from alcohol is a deeper loss of consciousness. How loss of consciousness relates to peak BAC has not been well studied; the usual clinical expectation is that it comes as BAC rises or later as sedation and sleep develop, but the timing varies and has not been measured (see Blacked Out Versus Passed Out). Brief perceptual experiences at the boundaries of sleep, described in the Child Abuse Allegations paper Sleep-Related Experiences: Hypnagogic and Hypnopompic Phenomena, are a further consideration when an account begins at the moment of waking.

The second is the return of memory formation in a person who was awake. A person in a blackout is conscious and interacting with the surroundings (Wetherill & Fromme, 2016, p. 922). When memory formation resumes, whether because blood alcohol has fallen or for other reasons, the person’s first stored memory may be of a moment in the middle of an activity, with no memory of how it began. To the person, that experience may feel like waking up, even though he or she had been awake throughout.

The third is a later interpretation. When a person reviews a night with gaps, the boundary of each gap is experienced as a sudden transition, and “I fell asleep and woke up” is a familiar way to describe it. This explanation is plausible, but it has not been tested, and it should not be presented as an established research finding. The research does not provide a way to determine, from an account alone, which of the three explanations, or what combination, applies. Evidence about the person’s appearance and behavior during the gap (eyes open or closed, speech, movement, responsiveness), messages sent or calls made, and the accounts of others present bears on the question in a way that the person’s words alone cannot.

Can a Person Notice a Blackout While It Is Happening?

A related question is whether a person in a blackout can realize, at the time, that memories are not being stored. Because short-term memory continues to work during a blackout, a person can follow a conversation and keep track of the last minute or two; in an early laboratory study, men who later had no memory of testing sessions had shown intact memory for up to two minutes while the sessions were under way (Goodwin et al., 1970, as described by White, 2003, p. 188). The research has not documented any reliable signal by which a person recognizes, in the moment, that a blackout is occurring, and no validated behavioral sign identifies a blackout to an observer (Wetherill & Fromme, 2016, pp. 922–923). Neither has the research shown that such awareness never occurs; the question has simply not been studied in a way that would answer it. In a recent study, brief memory tests on participants’ phones during drinking were associated with blackouts the participants reported the next day but were not diagnostic of them (Miller et al., 2026); the study measured memory performance, not whether participants realized at the time that they were forgetting.

Case Example. In United States v. Hennessy (2026), the complainant testified that she became intoxicated at a base club, that the accused gave her a piggyback ride, and that her next memory was of waking in his bed during intercourse; she pretended to be asleep to make him stop, he stopped, and she reported the assault that night. A defense psychologist testified that a person in an alcohol blackout is not necessarily too intoxicated to engage in consensual sexual activity. Relying on Mendoza and citing the gap before she woke, the Air Force court found the conviction factually insufficient. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held that the lower court had not considered whether her testimony about waking during the act and trying to stop it could prove lack of consent, and remanded without expressing a view on the outcome. The case illustrates that a gap before waking can leave some questions open while evidence about what followed may bear on others; it does not show how such a case should be resolved.

Awareness, Consent, and Capacity

A moment of awareness during or after a blackout raises legal questions that the research cannot resolve. A blackout is a failure of memory formation; legal incapacity to consent turns on the ability to appraise the conduct or to make or communicate a decision. A person can be in a blackout and capable of consenting, or incapable of consenting without a blackout, and later non-recall alone does not establish either. The same is true of a moment of awareness. A person who becomes aware in the middle of a sexual act may lack the context that would ordinarily inform a decision, such as how he or she came to be there and what was said earlier, and heavy intoxication impairs judgment and attention; those facts bear on capacity. Equally, the gap before that moment may have been a period in which the person was awake and interacting, and memory loss for that period does not show what the person said or did during it. Whether the person was capable, whether the person consented, and what the accused knew or reasonably should have known are questions for the factfinder on the whole record.

These points apply to accused persons as well. An accused who says he or she “came to” in the middle of an encounter, or remembers only fragments, is describing the same phenomena, and the same questions about what happened during the gaps, and about the sources of any later-reported details, apply. The Goldilocks Challenge: Intoxicated Enough to Lose Memory, but Capable of Consent? and the Counterintuitive Testimony paper Alcohol, Blackouts, and Memory in Sexual Assault Cases treat consent and capacity in depth.

Limits of the Evidence

Nearly everything known about islands of memory and waking comes from retrospective self-report: interviews with hospitalized patients in the 1960s (Goodwin et al., 1969a, as described by White, 2003) and with college students (White et al., 2004; Miller et al., 2018). No study has examined what kinds of moments are retained as islands, whether people can tell sleep from a blackout gap in retrospect, or how often “waking up” accounts reflect each explanation. The sleep studies used moderate doses in a laboratory, well below many blackout levels (Arnedt et al., 2011), and the review of sleep research summarized studies of healthy volunteers (Ebrahim et al., 2013). The student interview sample was mostly women (34 of 50), and more women (59%) than men (25%) said their last blackout frightened them (White et al., 2004, as described by White, 2003); the sleep study found greater disruption in women (Arnedt et al., 2011). These are group findings that do not show how a particular woman or man experienced a particular night. Above all, the research cannot establish whether a particular person was asleep, unconscious, or awake in a blackout during a gap.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When the finding that about half of students’ first full memory after a blackout was of waking in the morning (White et al., 2004) is offered, counsel can ask who was studied and what exactly was counted: 50 students describing their most recent blackout from memory. When Arnedt et al. (2011) or Ebrahim et al. (2013) is cited to show that a person woke repeatedly, counsel can ask whether the conclusion follows from the design, since the laboratory doses were moderate and the studies measured sleep in a sleep laboratory, not memory for awakenings. When an expert says that a person cannot become aware of a blackout while it is happening, or that “waking up” language reflects a blackout rather than sleep, counsel can ask how much evidence the statement rests on and whether the claim is testable: what observation would distinguish sleep from a blackout gap in this case? These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Waking, Blackouts, and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

Article 120, UCMJ, defines sexual assault to include a sexual act committed without the consent of the other person (Art. 120(b)(2)(A)); when the accused knows or reasonably should know that the other person is asleep, unconscious, or otherwise unaware that the act is occurring (Art. 120(b)(2)(B)); and when the other person is incapable of consenting due to impairment by any drug, intoxicant, or other similar substance, and that condition is known or reasonably should be known by the accused (Art. 120(b)(3)(A)). A sleeping, unconscious, or incompetent person cannot consent (Art. 120(g)(7)(B)), and “incapable of consenting” means incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct at issue, or physically incapable of declining participation in, or communicating unwillingness to engage in, the sexual act (Art. 120(g)(8)). The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has held that lack of consent and incapacity are separate theories, and that absence of consent under Article 120(b)(2)(A) cannot be proved merely by showing that the person was too intoxicated to consent (United States v. Mendoza, 2024). Evidence may be legally sufficient to prove lack of consent if the person was asleep when the act began, awoke before it was complete, and did not consent while awake (United States v. Casillas, 2025), or if a rational factfinder could find that the person did not consent before falling asleep and that the act occurred while the person was asleep (United States v. Moore, 2026); United States v. Hennessy (2026) held that a factual sufficiency review must consider the Casillas principle when a complainant testifies to waking during the act after a gap in memory.

Expert testimony on these issues is governed by Military Rule of Evidence 702, which tracks Federal Rule of Evidence 702 as amended December 1, 2023, and was amended to track it in 2025 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025); practitioners should confirm current text. Military judges also apply the factors in United States v. Houser (1993), and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999) extend the gatekeeping obligation to all expert testimony. An expert may explain the possible meanings of a “waking up” account; an opinion that a particular person was asleep, in a blackout, or capable of consenting at a particular moment goes beyond what the research can supply.

Arizona

Arizona defines sexual assault as intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact with any person without that person’s consent (A.R.S. § 13-1406). “Without consent” includes a victim incapable of consent by reason of mental disorder, mental defect, drugs, alcohol, sleep, or any other similar impairment of cognition, where the condition is known or should reasonably have been known to the defendant (A.R.S. § 13-1401(A)(7)(b)). Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 was amended effective January 1, 2024, to track the 2023 federal amendment (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004); general educational testimony that satisfies Rules 702 and 403 is permitted (State v. Salazar-Mercado, 2014), but experts may not opine on whether a particular witness is truthful (State v. Lindsey, 1986, 149 Ariz. at 475; State v. Moran, 1986).

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports several propositions prosecutors can legitimately present. Islands of memory separated by gaps, and a first memory that begins in the middle of events, are consistent with fragmentary blackouts and alcohol-disrupted sleep, and an account built from such fragments is not, by itself, a sign of fabrication. Heavy drinking shortens the time to fall asleep and disrupts later sleep, so a complainant’s description of falling asleep and waking more than once is consistent with the research. Courts have recognized that what a complainant perceived and did after waking may be evidence on lack of consent (Casillas, 2025; Hennessy, 2026), a point for counsel to verify.

The research also counsels caution. “Waking up” language does not establish that the complainant was asleep or unconscious during the gap; the complainant may have been awake in a blackout, and the charging theory matters after Mendoza. Testimony that a complainant could not have been aware during a blackout, or that “waking up” accounts reflect a blackout rather than sleep, goes beyond what has been studied. Details of the gap that the complainant later reports may be genuine fragments or reconstruction, so early, recorded accounts and a record of what the complainant learned from others are important.

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports several propositions defense counsel can legitimately present. A person who describes “waking up” may have been awake and interacting during the preceding gap, in a blackout, and the absence of memory for that period does not show what the person said or did. Islands of memory lack the surrounding context, and details reported later may have been learned from others. Testimony explaining these possibilities can help the factfinder identify what evidence other than the gap bears on the complainant’s condition before the remembered moment.

The research also counsels caution about the limits that apply to the defense. A blackout does not show that a person was capable of consenting, and the research does not show that a person in a blackout during the gap consented, only that the gap does not settle the question; Hennessy illustrates that what happened after the complainant woke can carry independent weight. Heavy drinking does shorten the time to fall asleep, so literal sleep is a real possibility. The same principles apply to an accused who reports coming to during an encounter or remembers only fragments: the accused’s account of the gaps, and any detail added later, raises the same questions about sources.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

Arnedt, J. T., Rohsenow, D. J., Almeida, A. B., Hunt, S. K., Gokhale, M., Gottlieb, D. J., & Howland, J. (2011). Sleep following alcohol intoxication in healthy, young adults: Effects of sex and family history of alcoholism. Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research, 35(5), 870–878. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-0277.2010.01417.x

Ebrahim, I. O., Shapiro, C. M., Williams, A. J., & Fenwick, P. B. (2013). Alcohol and sleep I: Effects on normal sleep. Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research, 37(4), 539–549. https://doi.org/10.1111/acer.12006

Goodwin, D. W., Crane, J. B., & Guze, S. B. (1969a). Alcoholic “blackouts”: A review and clinical study of 100 alcoholics. American Journal of Psychiatry, 126(2), 191–198. https://doi.org/10.1176/ajp.126.2.191

Goodwin, D. W., Othmer, E., Halikas, J. A., & Freemon, F. (1970). Loss of short term memory as a predictor of the alcoholic “blackout.” Nature, 227(5254), 201–202. https://doi.org/10.1038/227201a0

Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf

Kloft, L., Monds, L. A., Blokland, A., Ramaekers, J. G., & Otgaar, H. (2021). Hazy memories in the courtroom: A review of alcohol and other drug effects on false memory and suggestibility. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 124, 291–307. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2021.02.012

Miller, M. B., Merrill, J. E., DiBello, A. M., & Carey, K. B. (2018). Distinctions in alcohol-induced memory impairment: A mixed methods study of en bloc versus fragmentary blackouts. Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research, 42(10), 2000–2010. https://doi.org/10.1111/acer.13850

Miller, M. B., Shoemaker, S. D., Freeman, L. K., Curtis, A. F., Merrill, J. E., & Merkle, E. C. (2026). Predictive value of real-time memory tests in identifying alcohol-induced blackouts in situ. Addiction, 121(8), 2166–2175. https://doi.org/10.1111/add.70446

Nash, R. A., & Takarangi, M. K. T. (2011). Reconstructing alcohol-induced memory blackouts. Memory, 19(6), 566–573. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2011.590508

Wetherill, R. R., & Fromme, K. (2016). Alcohol-induced blackouts: A review of recent clinical research with practical implications and recommendations for future studies. Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research, 40(5), 922–935. https://doi.org/10.1111/acer.13051

White, A. M. (2003). What happened? Alcohol, memory blackouts, and the brain. Alcohol Research & Health, 27(2), 186–196.

White, A. M., Signer, M. L., Kraus, C. L., & Swartzwelder, H. S. (2004). Experiential aspects of alcohol-induced blackouts among college students. American Journal of Drug and Alcohol Abuse, 30(1), 205–224. https://doi.org/10.1081/ADA-120029874

Legal Authorities

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).

State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).

State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986).

State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).

United States v. Casillas, 86 M.J. 94 (C.A.A.F. 2025).

United States v. Hennessy, 86 M.J. 315 (C.A.A.F. 2026).

United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).

United States v. Mendoza, 85 M.J. 213 (C.A.A.F. 2024).

United States v. Moore, 86 M.J. 308 (C.A.A.F. 2026).

10 U.S.C. § 920 (Article 120, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1401.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1406.

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

Mil. R. Evid. 702, 1102.

Ariz. R. Evid. 702.

Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004 (amending Ariz. R. Evid. 702, effective Jan. 1, 2024).

Related topic papers: Fragmentary and En Bloc Blackouts · Blacked Out Versus Passed Out · Unknown Blackouts, Reconstruction, and Later Recall · Alcohol, Sleep, and Memory · Sleep, Parasomnia, and “Sexsomnia” Versus Blackout · The Goldilocks Challenge: Intoxicated Enough to Lose Memory, but Capable of Consent?

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Memory in the Courtroom: Intoxication and Memory · Child Abuse Allegations: Sleep-Related Experiences: Hypnagogic and Hypnopompic Phenomena · Counterintuitive Testimony: Alcohol, Blackouts, and Memory in Sexual Assault Cases