Snap Shot
- The question: Could an allegation of nighttime abuse reflect a sleep-transition experience later interpreted as abuse, and what does a complainant’s sleep disturbance mean?
- What the research shows: Hypnagogic and hypnopompic hallucinations and sleep paralysis are common (one review found about 7.6% of the general population report at least one lifetime episode of sleep paralysis) and often involve a sensed presence, pressure, or being held down. Sleep paralysis is elevated among adults reporting abuse, including those with continuous memories, and in the one small study that measured it directly (6 recovered-memory participants with sleep paralysis, 1 of whom linked it to abuse), misattribution occurred but was uncommon.
- What it does not show: No study has measured how often allegations arise from a misinterpreted sleep experience, and no test can determine after the fact whether a remembered nighttime event was external or internally generated. Sleep disturbance does not show that abuse occurred, and sleep paralysis does not suggest fabrication.
- The law: Experts may describe these phenomena under Rule 702 (Daubert, Kumho, Houser) and Rule 403 but may not tell the factfinder which explanation is true (Brooks, Lindsey, Moran); Arizona excludes hypnotically induced recall (Collins), and an accused’s claim of sleep turns on the voluntary-act requirement (A.R.S. §§ 13-201, 13-105).
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors should not present sleep problems as corroboration and can show which features of an account fall outside the sleep literature; defense counsel can show that sincerity and vividness do not distinguish a sleep experience from an external event, but should tie any misinterpretation theory to specific features of the account.
Child sexual abuse (CSA) is common and substantially underreported, and some allegations describe abuse that occurred at night, in a bedroom, or while the child was asleep or falling asleep. Disturbed sleep is also a documented longer-term correlate of substantiated abuse. At the same time, the transitions into and out of sleep produce some of the most vivid and frightening experiences people have: a sense that someone is in the room, an inability to move, pressure on the chest, or the feeling of being touched or held down. These experiences are ordinary features of human sleep, they are reported by a substantial minority of the general population, and they occur more often in people who have been traumatized.
That overlap is why sleep-related experiences sometimes reach court. When an allegation describes an event at night or on awakening, the defense may ask whether a sleep-transition experience was later interpreted as abuse, and the prosecution may ask whether a complainant’s sleep disturbance is consistent with trauma. A separate question arises when an accused claims to have been asleep during sexual conduct. In each case the research answer is narrower than either side might wish.
This paper defines hypnagogic and hypnopompic experiences and sleep paralysis, summarizes their prevalence, content, and interpretation, reviews the research linking them to abuse and trauma, addresses parasomnias in children and the separate issue of sexual behavior during sleep by an accused, and then turns to the limits of the evidence, the governing legal standards, and the recurring issues for each side.
Definitions and Mechanisms
Hypnagogic experiences occur during the transition from wakefulness into sleep; hypnopompic experiences occur during the transition from sleep into wakefulness. Both are hallucination-like perceptions, most often visual, auditory, or tactile, that arise while the person is partly awake. In practice an episode cannot always be assigned to one transition or the other, because the same kinds of imagery occur in both and a person may drift in and out of sleep several times. They overlap in content and brain mechanisms with dream imagery and some clinical hallucinations, but sleep-related perceptions tend to be immersive and largely cut off from external reality rather than superimposed on accurate perception of the room (Waters et al., 2016). They are not, by themselves, a sign of psychosis.
Sleep paralysis is a related state in which a person becomes conscious while the muscle atonia that normally accompanies rapid eye movement (REM) sleep persists, so that the person is aware but unable to move or speak for a period of seconds to minutes. Episodes are usually frightening and are often accompanied by vivid hypnagogic or hypnopompic hallucinations, which some writers describe as waking dreams (Sharpless, 2016). When sleep paralysis occurs apart from narcolepsy or another medical condition it is called isolated sleep paralysis, and recurrent isolated sleep paralysis is a recognized sleep-wake disorder (Sharpless, 2016).
A different class of nighttime events, the disorders of arousal, arises from deep non-REM sleep rather than from REM intrusion. Confusional arousals, sleep terrors, and sleepwalking involve partial awakening with confusion, disorientation, slowed thinking, and often little or no memory of the episode afterward. In a telephone survey of 13,057 people in three European countries, 2.9% reported confusional arousals, which were more common among people under 35 and shift workers and were often accompanied by memory deficits and disorientation (Ohayon et al., 2000). These states can impair a person’s ability to perceive and later recall what happened around them.
How Common These Experiences Are
The prevalence figures depend heavily on definitions and methods, and they should be stated with those details. In a representative telephone survey of 4,972 people aged 15 to 100 in the United Kingdom, 37% reported hypnagogic hallucinations and 12.5% reported hypnopompic hallucinations; both were more common among people with insomnia, excessive daytime sleepiness, or mental disorders (Ohayon et al., 1996). In a survey of 8,085 people in Germany and Italy, 6.2% reported at least one lifetime episode of sleep paralysis, with episodes at least weekly in 0.8%; anxiolytic medication use, bipolar disorder, physical disease, hypnopompic hallucinations, and nonrestorative sleep were among the significant predictors (Ohayon et al., 1999).
A systematic review aggregating 35 studies with a combined sample of 36,533 found that about 7.6% of the general population, 28.3% of students, and 31.9% of psychiatric patients reported at least one lifetime episode of sleep paralysis, with higher rates among patients with panic disorder (Sharpless & Barber, 2011). A later review of 42 studies identified many associated variables, including stress and trauma, substance use, sleep problems, anxiety, and psychiatric disorders, and found sleep paralysis particularly prevalent in posttraumatic stress disorder (Denis et al., 2018). An intuition that these experiences are rare, or occur only with serious mental illness, is not supported.
Content: The Sensed Presence, the Intruder, and Pressure
The content of sleep-paralysis hallucinations is strikingly consistent across time and cultures. In a structural analysis of large samples, Cheyne and colleagues identified three clusters: an “intruder” cluster of sensed presence, fear, and auditory and visual hallucinations; an “incubus” cluster of pressure on the chest, breathing difficulty, and pain; and a cluster of unusual bodily experiences such as floating or out-of-body sensations (Cheyne et al., 1999). The authors’ proposed neural mechanisms are hypotheses; the descriptive clusters are the better-supported finding.
Historical and cross-cultural accounts describe the same experience. A seventeenth-century Dutch physician described a woman who reported that the devil lay upon her and held her down at night, an account now recognizable as sleep paralysis with hypnagogic hallucinations (Kompanje, 2008). Among Mexican adolescents, a folk expression describing a dead body climbing on top of the sleeper was familiar to most respondents and corresponded to sleep paralysis (Jiménez-Genchi et al., 2009).
This content can resemble the sensory experience of a nighttime assault: waking unable to move, sensing someone at the bedside, feeling pressure, or feeling touched. That resemblance is a reason to examine the circumstances of an allegation carefully, not evidence that a particular account describes a sleep experience. Some accounts of nighttime abuse contain features, such as an identified person, a sequence of actions, conversation, or later conduct, that the sleep-paralysis literature does not describe; no study has counted how often.
Interpretation: How People Make Sense of These Experiences
Because sleep-paralysis episodes are vivid and puzzling, people tend to explain them with whatever narratives are available and personally plausible to them. Depending on culture and belief, the same experience has been understood as a supernatural visitation, a ghost, an alien abduction, or a medical event. McNally and Clancy (2005a) studied ten people who reported abduction by space aliens and found that their accounts were linked to apparent episodes of sleep paralysis with hypnopompic hallucinations that they had interpreted as alien beings. In a related study, people reporting recovered memories of alien abduction showed higher rates of false recall and false recognition on a word-list memory task than comparison participants, with no difference in accurate memory (Clancy et al., 2002). These studies concern adults reporting experiences that are very unlikely to have occurred; they illustrate how meaning can be attached to an ambiguous experience, not how often abuse reports arise this way.
The question whether sleep paralysis is misinterpreted as recovered memory of CSA was raised in the recovered-memory debate of the 1990s and tested directly. McNally and Clancy (2005b) administered a sleep-paralysis questionnaire to adults reporting repressed (n = 18), recovered (n = 14), or continuous (n = 36) memories of CSA and to a control group reporting no abuse history (n = 16). Sleep paralysis was reported by 44%, 43%, and 47% of the three abuse-report groups and by 13% of controls. Among the six recovered-memory participants who had experienced sleep paralysis, one interpreted it as related to abuse; every other participant who reported sleep paralysis gave a different interpretation, such as seeing a ghost. The finding supports two propositions at once. Misattribution of sleep paralysis to abuse can occur, and it was observed. It was also uncommon in this sample, which was small and recruited by advertisement. The published exchange that followed reflects a genuine scientific disagreement about how much weight these data can bear (Pendergrast, 2006; McNally & Clancy, 2006).
Interpretation is also sensitive to context. A person who has come to believe that frightening nighttime experiences can be fragments of hidden abuse memories may interpret a later episode in that light, and suggestive questioning can shape both interpretation and detail, as discussed in this hub’s papers on suggestibility and contamination. The sleep research adds one point: sincerity, vividness, and confidence do not distinguish an external event from a sleep-transition experience, because such hallucinations are themselves vivid and feel real.
Sleep Disturbance as a Consequence of Abuse and Trauma
The same literature shows that sleep disturbance, including sleep paralysis, is associated with a history of abuse and with posttraumatic symptoms. In the McNally and Clancy (2005b) study, every abuse-report group, including people who said they had always remembered the abuse, reported sleep paralysis at more than three times the control rate. Abrams et al. (2008) grouped 263 participants by self-reported CSA history (described as confirmed, unconfirmed, or none) and found that those reporting CSA described more frequent and more distressing sleep-paralysis episodes; participants with clinically significant posttraumatic symptoms, regardless of CSA history, also reported more frequent and distressing episodes. Among Cambodian refugees attending a psychiatric clinic, sleep paralysis was far more frequent in patients with posttraumatic stress disorder than in those without it, and most who reported it described hallucinating an approaching figure (Hinton et al., 2005).
Prospective data come from a longitudinal study that assessed 147 young women ten years after disclosure of substantiated sexual abuse (78 abused, 69 comparison). Sexually abused participants reported significantly more sleep disturbance than comparison participants, and the difference remained after accounting for depression and posttraumatic stress disorder (Noll et al., 2006). That study did not separately measure sleep paralysis or hypnagogic experiences, but it establishes that disturbed sleep is a documented longer-term correlate of substantiated CSA.
These findings cut against any assumption that a complainant’s sleep paralysis or nighttime fear suggests that an allegation arose from a sleep experience. Sleep paralysis is elevated among people reporting abuse, including those with continuous memories, and it may be a consequence of trauma rather than a source of a mistaken report. The findings also have a limit in the other direction: sleep disturbance occurs after many kinds of stress, in many psychiatric conditions, and in people with no abuse history, so its presence does not show that abuse occurred.
Children and Adolescents
In children, the most common nighttime events are the disorders of arousal rather than sleep paralysis. In a population-based Quebec cohort of 1,940 children followed from early childhood to age 13 through yearly maternal reports, the prevalence of sleep terrors peaked at 34.4% at age 1½ and the prevalence of sleepwalking peaked at 13.4% at age 10; about one-third of children with early sleep terrors later sleepwalked, and sleepwalking was strongly associated with parental history (Petit et al., 2015). Parasomnias are common in childhood and adolescence and have long been classified with indications for clinical evaluation (Mahowald & Rosen, 1990). A child in a sleep terror or confusional arousal may scream, appear terrified, speak incoherently, resist comfort, and have little or no memory of the event the next morning. An adult observing such an episode may reasonably be alarmed. The behavior itself carries no information about whether the child has been abused.
Sleep paralysis with hallucinations becomes more frequent in adolescence. In a survey of 322 high-school students in Mexico City (mean age 15.9), 25.5% reported sleep paralysis and 22% reported hypnagogic or hypnopompic hallucinations; the mean age of onset was 12.5, most episodes combined paralysis with hallucination, and most of those affected had experienced two or more episodes (Jiménez-Genchi et al., 2009). That study used a single school-based sample and a culturally specific description, and its rates may not generalize, but it indicates that these experiences are not confined to adults.
For a child, the forensic question is usually how a nighttime experience was discussed afterward. A young child’s report of something frightening at night may be fragmentary, and the meaning the child and surrounding adults attach to it can be shaped by the questions asked. A forensic interview that elicits the child’s own account in free recall, explores what the child saw, heard, and felt, and records the child’s words gives the factfinder the best basis for evaluation, and protects a genuine account against later challenge.
Sexual Behavior During Sleep by an Accused
A distinct issue arises when an accused person asserts that sexual conduct occurred during sleep. Sleep medicine recognizes abnormal sexual behaviors arising from sleep, most often from non-REM parasomnias such as confusional arousals. In the first systematic classification of the literature, Schenck et al. (2007) identified 31 published parasomnia cases (25 male), in all of which the person reported amnesia for the behavior; confusional arousals accounted for most cases, and legal consequences followed in 11, of which 9 involved minors. A systematic review of medical-legal case reports identified 18 published cases in which a sleep disorder was raised as a defense, 9 involving violence and 9 involving sexual behavior in sleep, with charges in the latter ranging from sexual touching to rape; outcomes favored the defendant in 14 of the 18 cases (6 of the 9 violence cases and 8 of the 9 sexual-behavior cases, the ninth outcome being unknown), although the authors could not exclude publication bias toward acquittals; the forensic evaluations differed widely from case to case, and the authors called for an international consensus on evaluation (Ingravallo et al., 2014, pp. 927, 930–932).
Case reports cannot establish how often such a defense is valid. A history of parasomnia and sleep-laboratory evaluation are central to any claim, and an assertion of sleep made only after an allegation is difficult to test.
Limits of the Evidence
Most of the prevalence research relies on retrospective self-report through telephone interviews, questionnaires, or online surveys, and definitions of sleep paralysis and hallucinations vary from study to study. The studies linking sleep paralysis to abuse histories use small samples recruited by advertisement or from clinics, rely on self-reported abuse that was not independently verified, and cannot determine whether sleep paralysis followed the abuse, preceded it, or shares a common cause with posttraumatic symptoms. The research on interpretation is largely drawn from adults reporting alien abduction or recovered memories, populations very different from children making a first disclosure. Research on sexual behavior during sleep consists of case reports.
No study has measured how often an allegation of CSA arises from a misinterpreted sleep experience, and no test can determine after the fact whether a particular remembered nighttime event was external or internally generated. A polysomnogram can document a sleep disorder, but it cannot show what happened on a particular night months or years earlier. An expert can explain what these phenomena are, how common they are, what features they typically include, and what circumstances have been associated with their misinterpretation. An expert cannot tell a court whether a particular complainant’s account describes a sleep experience or an assault, or whether a particular accused was asleep.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When a witness cites findings that about 7.6% of the general population report at least one lifetime episode of sleep paralysis (Sharpless & Barber, 2011), or that 37% report hypnagogic hallucinations (Ohayon et al., 1996), to suggest a nighttime allegation arose from a sleep experience, counsel should ask what exactly was counted: these are rates of having the experience, not of allegations arising from it, which no study has measured. When the finding that one of six recovered-memory participants with sleep paralysis attributed it to abuse (McNally & Clancy, 2005b) is offered to show misattribution is uncommon, the question is how much evidence it rests on, since the groups were small and recruited by advertisement. When a complainant’s sleep disturbance is offered as consistent with abuse (Noll et al., 2006), counsel should ask compared with whom, because it also occurs after other stress and in people with no abuse history. And when a sleep defense relies on the 14 of 18 published cases with favorable outcomes (Ingravallo et al., 2014), counsel should ask whether case reports show how often such a defense is valid. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Sleep-Related Experiences and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
Expert testimony about sleep phenomena is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702 as construed in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999), which extends the gatekeeping duty to clinical and other specialized knowledge. Rule 702 was amended effective December 1, 2023, to state that the proponent must establish each requirement by a preponderance of the evidence and that each opinion must reflect a reliable application of the expert’s principles and methods to the facts. Under that standard, testimony describing the prevalence and features of sleep paralysis rests on a substantial epidemiological literature; an opinion that a particular report probably originated in a sleep experience would require a reliable method connecting the research to the facts, and no such validated method exists. Rule 403 applies to both.
Military Rule of Evidence 702 tracks the federal rule, and the 2023 federal amendment was incorporated through the 2025 amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025). United States v. Houser (1993) sets out the factors military judges apply to expert testimony. Testimony that functions as an opinion on a complainant’s truthfulness is barred, and expert testimony quantifying how rarely allegations like the complainant’s are false is the functional equivalent of vouching (United States v. Brooks, 2007). By the same reasoning, an expert offered to suggest that a complainant’s account is the product of a sleep experience may describe the phenomena but may not tell the members which explanation is true. Offenses against children are charged under Article 120b, UCMJ.
Where memory was refreshed by hypnosis, Rock v. Arkansas (1987) held that a per se rule excluding a criminal defendant’s own hypnotically refreshed testimony violated the right to testify; the holding does not reach other witnesses.
Arizona
Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 adopted the Daubert standard in 2012 and was amended effective January 1, 2024, to conform to the 2023 federal amendment (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004). Before 2012, in Logerquist v. McVey (2000), the Arizona Supreme Court held that the Frye general-acceptance test did not apply to expert testimony on repressed memory based on the witness’s clinical experience and observation, and declined to adopt the Joiner and Kumho interpretation of Rule 702 (196 Ariz. 470, ¶¶ 30, 61–62, 65). The 2012 amendment superseded that approach, so reliability challenges to memory and sleep testimony now proceed under the amended rule. Under State v. Salazar-Mercado (2014), a “cold” expert may educate the jury about general principles without applying them to the facts, provided the testimony satisfies Rule 702 and survives Rule 403. State v. Lindsey (1986) and State v. Moran (1986) bar an expert from opining, directly or indirectly, on the truthfulness of a particular witness or class of witnesses (Lindsey, 149 Ariz. at 475).
Arizona has long excluded hypnotically induced recall. In State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court (1982), the Arizona Supreme Court held that testimony recalled under hypnosis is inadmissible, while allowing a previously hypnotized witness to testify to facts recalled before hypnosis. Where an allegation emerged after hypnosis or a similar memory-recovery procedure, the timing and documentation of what the witness reported beforehand become central.
When an accused claims to have been asleep, Arizona’s voluntary-act requirement governs. A.R.S. § 13-201 makes a voluntary act, or an omission to perform a legal duty, the minimum requirement for criminal liability, and A.R.S. § 13-105 defines a voluntary act as a bodily movement performed consciously and as a result of effort and determination. Whether conduct during a documented parasomnia meets that definition will ordinarily turn on expert evidence about the disorder and the circumstances of the event.
Other Jurisdictions
State v. Michaels (1994) established New Jersey’s pretrial taint hearing for children’s statements obtained through suggestive interviewing, discussed in this hub’s paper on taint hearings. In Commonwealth v. Shanley (2010), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld the admission of expert testimony on dissociative amnesia and affirmed a conviction resting on recovered memories, illustrating that courts continue to differ on recovered-memory evidence. In R. v. Luedecke (2008), the Court of Appeal for Ontario overturned an acquittal in a sexual assault case based on sexsomnia; the appeal turned on whether parasomnia automatism is a non-mental-disorder or a mental-disorder automatism.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports explaining that sleep disturbance, nightmares, and sleep paralysis are documented correlates of trauma and of substantiated CSA, that people reporting abuse, including those who have always remembered it, report sleep paralysis at elevated rates, and that misattribution of sleep paralysis to abuse was uncommon in the one small study that measured it directly. When the defense suggests that a nighttime account reflects a sleep experience, prosecutors can show which features of the account, such as an identified person, a sequence of actions, speech, events before and after, or contemporaneous disclosure, fall outside what the sleep literature describes. A forensic interview that elicited the child’s own words in free recall and documented when and how the account first emerged is the most effective answer to a misinterpretation theory.
The research also counsels caution. A complainant’s sleep disturbance is not evidence that abuse occurred, because sleep problems follow many forms of stress and occur in many conditions, and testimony presenting nightmares or sleep paralysis as corroboration of a particular allegation would exceed the research and risk the profile and vouching limits in Lindsey, Haskie, and Brooks. Where an account first emerged through hypnosis, memory-recovery techniques, or repeated suggestive questioning about nighttime fears, prosecutors should anticipate admissibility challenges, including under Collins in Arizona, and should identify what the witness reported before those procedures.
Special Issues for Defense
The research supports explaining that hypnagogic and hypnopompic hallucinations and sleep paralysis are common, that their typical content includes a sensed presence, an intruder, pressure, and the feeling of being touched or held down, that they feel real, and that people interpret them through the narratives available to them. Where the facts support it, such as an account that originated on awakening, consists mainly of sensations of presence and paralysis, lacks independent detail, or first emerged after suggestion or a memory-recovery process, defense counsel can ensure the factfinder understands that sincerity and vividness do not distinguish an internally generated experience from an external event. In children, a history of sleep terrors or confusional arousals, and how a nighttime episode was later discussed with the child, are legitimate subjects of inquiry.
The research also counsels caution. Sleep paralysis is more common among people reporting abuse, including people with continuous memories, so its presence does not suggest fabrication, and the only small study measuring misattribution directly found it uncommon. A misinterpretation theory not tied to specific features of the account is likely to be viewed as speculative, and no expert can reliably testify that a particular report originated in sleep. A claim that an accused was asleep requires documented sleep pathology and careful evaluation, rests on a case-report literature, and may, depending on the jurisdiction, lead to a mental-disorder disposition rather than acquittal.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Abrams, M. P., Mulligan, A. D., Carleton, R. N., & Asmundson, G. J. G. (2008). Prevalence and correlates of sleep paralysis in adults reporting childhood sexual abuse. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 22(8), 1535–1541. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.janxdis.2008.03.007
Cheyne, J. A., Rueffer, S. D., & Newby-Clark, I. R. (1999). Hypnagogic and hypnopompic hallucinations during sleep paralysis: Neurological and cultural construction of the night-mare. Consciousness and Cognition, 8(3), 319–337. https://doi.org/10.1006/ccog.1999.0404
Clancy, S. A., McNally, R. J., Schacter, D. L., Lenzenweger, M. F., & Pitman, R. K. (2002). Memory distortion in people reporting abduction by aliens. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 111(3), 455–461. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-843X.111.3.455
Denis, D., French, C. C., & Gregory, A. M. (2018). A systematic review of variables associated with sleep paralysis. Sleep Medicine Reviews, 38, 141–157. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.smrv.2017.05.005
Hinton, D. E., Pich, V., Chhean, D., Pollack, M. H., & McNally, R. J. (2005). Sleep paralysis among Cambodian refugees: Association with PTSD diagnosis and severity. Depression and Anxiety, 22(2), 47–51. https://doi.org/10.1002/da.20084
Ingravallo, F., Poli, F., Gilmore, E. V., Pizza, F., Vignatelli, L., Schenck, C. H., & Plazzi, G. (2014). Sleep-related violence and sexual behavior in sleep: A systematic review of medical-legal case reports. Journal of Clinical Sleep Medicine, 10(8), 927–935. https://doi.org/10.5664/jcsm.3976
Jiménez-Genchi, A., Ávila-Rodríguez, V. M., Sánchez-Rojas, F., Vargas Terrez, B. E., & Nenclares-Portocarrero, A. (2009). Sleep paralysis in adolescents: The “a dead body climbed on top of me” phenomenon in Mexico. Psychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences, 63(4), 546–549. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1440-1819.2009.01984.x
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Mahowald, M. W., & Rosen, G. M. (1990). Parasomnias in children. Pediatrician, 17(1), 21–31.
McNally, R. J., & Clancy, S. A. (2005a). Sleep paralysis, sexual abuse, and space alien abduction. Transcultural Psychiatry, 42(1), 113–122. https://doi.org/10.1177/1363461505050715
McNally, R. J., & Clancy, S. A. (2005b). Sleep paralysis in adults reporting repressed, recovered, or continuous memories of childhood sexual abuse. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 19(5), 595–602. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.janxdis.2004.05.003
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Legal Authorities
Commonwealth v. Shanley, 455 Mass. 752, 919 N.E.2d 1254 (2010).
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
Logerquist v. McVey, 196 Ariz. 470, 1 P.3d 113 (2000).
R. v. Luedecke, 2008 ONCA 716, 93 O.R. (3d) 89 (Ont. C.A.).
Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982).
State v. Haskie, 242 Ariz. 582, 399 P.3d 657 (2017).
State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).
State v. Michaels, 136 N.J. 299, 642 A.2d 1372 (1994).
State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986).
State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).
United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).
10 U.S.C. § 920b (Article 120b, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-105.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-201.
Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Ariz. R. Evid. 403.
Ariz. R. Evid. 702.
Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004 (amending Ariz. R. Evid. 702, effective Jan. 1, 2024).
Mil. R. Evid. 403.
Mil. R. Evid. 702.
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