Snap Shot
- The question: When may an expert testify in a child sexual abuse case, and what may the expert say, under Daubert, Frye, and Arizona’s cold-expert cases?
- What the research shows: Jurors hold a mix of accurate and inaccurate beliefs about child witnesses, with errors running in both directions, and professionals on both sides may not know the research as well as they assume. Mock-jury studies suggest the form of expert testimony affects whether it informs or merely persuades, and surveys suggest behavioral testimony is admitted more often than it is challenged.
- What it does not show: A behavior common among abused children is not diagnostic, and research on suggestive interviewing does not show a particular account is false. No admissibility standard turns group-level research into a conclusion about whether a particular child was abused or is truthful.
- The law: Amended Rule 702 places the burden on the proponent in federal, military, and Arizona courts (Daubert, Houser). General testimony correcting misconceptions may be admitted (Lindsey, Salazar-Mercado, Flesher), but not vouching (Moran, Brooks, Mullins), profile evidence (Ketchner, Escalante), or categorical claims about what is common without empirical support (Haskie).
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors should ground each proposition in current research, state its qualifications, and avoid “consistent with abuse” opinions; either side may challenge weak testimony by timely motion or on cross-examination, and defense experts face the same limits, including no testimony that a child’s account is false or coached.
Child sexual abuse (CSA) is common and substantially underreported, and many prosecutions rest largely on a child’s account. Physical findings are often absent, disclosure is frequently delayed or incremental, and children’s behavior may not match what jurors expect. At the same time, the reliability of a child’s account depends heavily on how it was elicited. Both features lead the parties to call experts: prosecutors to explain delayed disclosure, recantation, or demeanor; defense counsel to explain suggestibility, interviewer bias, contamination, or the limits of medical and behavioral findings.
Whether an expert may testify, and what the expert may say, is decided under evidentiary rules that differ by forum. Federal courts, courts-martial, and Arizona apply a reliability standard derived from Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and codified in Rule 702; a minority of states still ask whether a method is generally accepted under Frye v. United States (1923). Separate rules, which apply under either standard, forbid an expert from vouching for a witness or presenting a profile of offenders or victims as proof of guilt. Arizona has developed a distinctive body of law on the “cold” expert who teaches general principles without applying them to the case.
This paper describes what expert testimony in these cases addresses and the forms it takes, summarizes research on what jurors and professionals know and how expert testimony affects decisions, reviews research on how courts evaluate behavioral science, and then sets out the limits of the evidence, the admissibility standards, the federal, military, and Arizona case law, and the recurring issues for each side.
What Expert Testimony in These Cases Addresses
Expert testimony in CSA cases falls into several recurring categories. Testimony about disclosure explains that many abused children delay telling, disclose incrementally, or recant. Testimony about forensic interviews addresses research-based protocols, the relative reliability of open-ended and focused questions, and how interviewer behavior affects children’s reports. Testimony about memory and suggestibility addresses what children of different ages can remember, how memories change with time and questioning, and the conditions under which children can be led to report events that did not happen. Testimony about medical findings explains that most children with substantiated abuse have normal examinations. Testimony about behavior addresses symptoms and behaviors seen in abused children and their non-specificity. Testimony about grooming describes ways an offender may gain a child’s trust and reduce the chance of disclosure. In an online survey of 51 attorneys from 23 states, 88% reported having used the concept of grooming in their cases and 55% reported using expert testimony on it, which they rated as highly helpful (Winters et al., 2026). The sample was small, and the ratings reflect attorneys’ views rather than any measure of accuracy or effect on verdicts; because grooming testimony describes offender behavior, it also raises the profile-evidence concerns discussed below.
None of these subjects belongs to one side. The research showing that children interviewed well can give accurate, detailed accounts, and that children can resist misleading questions under good conditions, is the same body of work that identifies the conditions under which children’s reports become unreliable. A prosecution expert who explains delayed disclosure and a defense expert who explains suggestive interviewing are each describing part of a single literature, and each is subject to the same evidentiary limits.
Forms of Testimony: Educational, Case-Specific, and Rebuttal
Three forms of testimony recur. Social-framework testimony, a term introduced by Walker and Monahan (1987), presents general research findings as context for the factfinder’s evaluation of case-specific facts, without the expert drawing the connection. The “cold” or “blind” expert is the courtroom form of this approach: the expert usually has not met the child, has not reviewed the case file, and testifies only to general patterns. Case-specific testimony, by contrast, comes from an expert who has evaluated a child or a party, or reviewed the interviews and records, and offers opinions about that material, such as whether particular questions in a recorded interview were leading or whether a medical finding is diagnostic.
Rebuttal testimony is defined by purpose: testimony about disclosure or demeanor often answers an inference that a child who waited to tell must be fabricating, and testimony about suggestibility often answers the opposite inference, that a detailed and confident account must be accurate.
Each form carries distinct risks. Cold testimony avoids comment on the parties, but it can invite jurors to match general patterns to case facts in ways the expert never examined, which is the concern underlying the rule against profile evidence. Case-specific testimony draws on actual data but comes closer to the questions of credibility and guilt that the law reserves for the factfinder. Rebuttal testimony can drift from explaining that a behavior is consistent with either conclusion into implying that it supports one.
Probative Value: What a Behavioral Finding Can and Cannot Show
Lyon and Koehler (1996) framed the probative value of behavioral testimony in terms of a relevance ratio: how often a behavior occurs among abused children compared with non-abused children. A behavior that occurs equally often in both groups carries no information about whether abuse occurred. A behavior somewhat more common among abused children raises the probability modestly, depending on the base rate. The authors also showed that testimony can be relevant for a narrower purpose: when jurors believe a behavior such as delayed disclosure is rare among true victims, testimony that it is common corrects a mistaken inference even though the behavior does little to prove that abuse occurred.
This framework explains why courts distinguish testimony that dispels a misconception from testimony offered as proof. That delayed disclosure is common among abused children does not show that a particular child who delayed was abused, because delay also occurs when allegations are inaccurate. In the same way, that suggestive interviewing increases error rates in research samples does not show that a particular child’s account is false. Testimony framed in either direction as diagnostic of the individual case exceeds what the research supports.
What Jurors and Professionals Know
The case for expert testimony rests partly on the claim that the subject is beyond common understanding. Research supports that claim in both directions. Quas et al. (2005) surveyed students and jury-pool members and found a mix of accurate and inaccurate beliefs about children’s memory, suggestibility, and disclosure. Respondents’ errors ran in both directions, with participants on average overestimating the suggestibility found in three well-known experiments and underestimating it in a fourth, so that misconceptions could favor either side, and accuracy varied with respondents’ gender, education, and ethnicity.
Buck et al. (2014) compared jury-eligible college students (n = 192), investigative interviewers (n = 44), forensic psychologists (n = 39), and public defenders (n = 137) on items drawn from research on interviewing children. Students were the least knowledgeable; interviewers and public defenders performed better but lacked substantial knowledge on some topics, such as anatomical dolls; forensic psychologists were the most knowledgeable. The study supports the conclusion that jurors often lack basic information about the reliability of children’s reports, and also that professionals on both sides of a case may not know the research as well as they assume.
The same pattern appears for adult memory. In a U.K. survey of 717 laypeople, legal professionals including judges and barristers, and mental health professionals, more than 78% of participants across the samples endorsed repression and more than 87% endorsed dissociative amnesia (Radcliffe & Patihis, 2024). The authors regard those beliefs as inconsistent with memory science, a position other researchers contest, as the companion paper on adults reporting historical abuse describes; either way, the survey indicates that judges and lawyers may share the beliefs that expert testimony on memory addresses.
Mock-jury research shows how such beliefs can affect judgments. In one study, 328 jury-eligible participants read a trial summary involving a 7-year-old girl; a 10-month delay in disclosure, compared with a 1-day delay, produced fewer guilty verdicts and lower ratings of the child’s believability and memory, and on some measures the delay effect appeared when the accused was a neighbor but not a stepfather (Miller et al., 2022). The study used a written summary without deliberation. It shows that jurors give weight to delay, not whether that weight is misplaced in a given case, which turns on the base-rate questions discussed above.
How Expert Testimony Affects Decisions
Mock-jury research suggests that expert testimony in CSA cases can educate, but that its effects depend on how it is presented. Kovera et al. (1997) showed mock jurors a simulated trial in which a child witness was either calm and composed or emotional and uncertain, and varied the expert testimony. Testimony that repeated a summary of the research bolstered the child’s credibility, while standard and concrete testimony did not; concrete testimony linking the research to a hypothetical scenario sensitized jurors to behavioral correlates of victimization, while standard and repetitive testimony desensitized them. The authors framed the findings as evidence that form of presentation can determine whether testimony informs or merely persuades.
Other research questions whether the adversarial safeguards on which courts rely work as intended. Chorn and Kovera (2019) found that variations in the reliability and validity of psychological testing underlying an expert’s opinion did not affect judges’ admissibility decisions or attorneys’ decisions about whether to move to exclude the evidence, and that a scientifically informed cross-examination did not help mock jurors evaluate the test. That study concerned intelligence testing rather than CSA, but it bears on any assumption that cross-examination will reliably expose weak expert evidence.
How Courts Evaluate Behavioral Science
Research on gatekeeping suggests that courts apply the reliability factors unevenly. In a national survey of 400 state trial judges, Gatowski et al. (2001) found that judges overwhelmingly supported the gatekeeping role, but few demonstrated a clear understanding of falsifiability or error rate, and judges tended to give the most weight to general acceptance regardless of which standard their state followed. Neal et al. (2019) reviewed 364 psychological assessment tools reported in surveys of forensic practitioners and a sample of court decisions. Nearly all of the tools had been subjected to empirical testing, but only about two-thirds could be identified as generally accepted and about 40% had generally favorable psychometric reviews; challenges to the admission of assessment evidence occurred in about 5% of cases and succeeded about a third of the time.
These findings concern psychological testing generally and predate the 2023 amendment to Rule 702, but they support two points for both sides: behavioral testimony is admitted more often than it is scrutinized, so a party who wishes to challenge it must raise the issue; and gatekeeping depends on the record the parties make about the research, its methods, and its connection to the opinion offered.
Limits of the Evidence
Most research on expert testimony uses mock jurors, often students or online participants, who read or watch simulated trials and do not deliberate; effects in real trials may differ. Surveys of juror knowledge measure beliefs with questionnaire items whose correct answers are themselves drawn from a research literature that continues to develop. Studies of judicial gatekeeping rely on surveys and samples of reported decisions, which overrepresent appealed cases.
No admissibility standard converts group-level research into a conclusion about an individual. An expert can explain what research shows about children in general, about interviewing practices, or about the frequency of behaviors in abused and non-abused samples. An expert cannot tell a court whether a particular child was abused, whether a particular child is telling the truth, or whether a particular accused committed the offense, and testimony that implies any of those conclusions is improper under the law described below regardless of which side offers it.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When prosecution testimony explains that delayed disclosure is common among abused children, counsel should ask about the base rate, which Lyon and Koehler (1996) framed as a relevance ratio: how often the behavior occurs among abused compared with non-abused children, since a behavior common in both groups can correct a misconception without proving abuse. When a witness cites Quas et al. (2005) to show that jurors misunderstand child witnesses, counsel should ask what exactly was counted, because respondents’ errors ran in both directions and could favor either side. When the defense cites Chorn and Kovera (2019) to argue that cross-examination will not expose weak expert evidence, counsel should ask whether the finding applies here, since the study concerned intelligence testing rather than CSA. When either side cites the finding that challenges to assessment evidence occurred in about 5% of cases and succeeded about a third of the time (Neal et al., 2019), counsel should ask who was studied, since the research concerned psychological testing generally, drew on reported decisions that overrepresent appealed cases, and predates the 2023 amendment to Rule 702. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Expert Testimony and the Law
General Acceptance: The Frye Standard
In Frye v. United States (1923), the court held that expert testimony based on a scientific technique is admissible only if the technique has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community. The court asks whether the relevant field accepts the method, not whether the science is sound. Many jurisdictions apply the test only to novel scientific evidence, so that established methods and experience-based testimony receive little threshold scrutiny.
Reliability: Daubert, Joiner, Kumho, and Rule 702
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993), the Supreme Court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded Frye and that the trial judge must ensure that expert testimony is both relevant and reliable, considering such factors as testability, peer review and publication, known or potential error rate, standards controlling the technique, and general acceptance. General Electric Co. v. Joiner (1997) held that admissibility rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion and that a court may exclude an opinion when there is too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion offered. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999) held that the gatekeeping obligation extends to technical and other specialized knowledge, which brings clinical and behavioral testimony within the inquiry.
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 was amended in 2000 to codify these decisions and again effective December 1, 2023. As amended, the rule permits expert testimony only if the proponent demonstrates to the court that it is more likely than not that the expert’s knowledge will help the trier of fact, that the testimony rests on sufficient facts or data, that it is the product of reliable principles and methods, and that the expert’s opinion reflects a reliable application of those principles and methods to the facts. The committee note states that courts treating the sufficiency of an expert’s basis and the application of the methodology as questions of weight had misapplied the rule. Rule 403 permits exclusion when probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or misleading the jury, and Rule 704(b) bars an expert in a criminal case from stating an opinion on whether the defendant had the mental state constituting an element of the offense.
The standards differ in emphasis, and testimony resting on a contested construct may be excluded in one forum for want of general acceptance, in another for unreliability, or admitted in a Frye jurisdiction that asks only whether the underlying discipline is accepted. Federal courts and courts-martial apply the Daubert framework uniformly. Most states follow Daubert or a version of it, while a minority, including California, Illinois, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington, retain a general-acceptance test in some form. Several states have moved recently: Florida adopted the Daubert amendment to its evidence code in 2019 (In re Amendments to the Florida Evidence Code, 2019), Maryland adopted Daubert in Rochkind v. Stevenson (2020), and New Jersey adopted a Daubert-type standard for criminal cases in State v. Olenowski (2023). The governing standard must be confirmed in the current law of each forum.
Federal and Military Standards
Federal appellate courts have generally permitted general testimony about the behavior of abused children while barring testimony that abuse occurred or that a child is credible. In United States v. Bighead (1997), the Ninth Circuit upheld general testimony about characteristics of abused children from an expert who had not examined the child. In United States v. Charley (1999), the Tenth Circuit held that a pediatrician’s unconditional opinion that two girls had been sexually abused was erroneously admitted, because an opinion based on the girls’ statements was vouching and one based on their symptoms lacked the required reliability showing; the court permitted general testimony and testimony that symptoms were consistent with those of abused children, and found the errors harmless.
Military Rule of Evidence 702 tracks the federal rule. Under Military Rule of Evidence 1102, amendments to the Federal Rules generally apply in courts-martial eighteen months after their effective date unless the President directs otherwise, and the 2023 amendment to Rule 702 was incorporated through the 2025 amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025). For covered offenses committed after December 27, 2023, including offenses under Article 120b, prosecution decisions rest with independent special trial counsel rather than commanders (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022), which affects who retains and prepares government experts. In United States v. Houser (1993), the Court of Military Appeals identified six factors the proponent of expert testimony must establish: the expert’s qualifications, the subject matter of the testimony, its basis, its legal relevance, its reliability, and whether its probative value outweighs other considerations. United States v. Griffin (1999) applied Daubert and Houser together, and United States v. Sanchez (2007) confirmed that general acceptance is not required.
The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has developed a detailed body of law on “human lie detector” testimony. Expert testimony that a child is truthful usurps the members’ exclusive role in determining credibility (United States v. Birdsall, 1998). Testimony quantifying how rarely allegations like the complainant’s prove false is the functional equivalent of vouching (United States v. Brooks, 2007). An expert may describe symptoms or behaviors associated with abuse and whether the complainant exhibits them, but may not testify to the complainant’s credibility or the accused’s guilt (United States v. Mullins, 2010). In United States v. Flesher (2014), the court reaffirmed that expert testimony on counterintuitive victim behavior may be admitted to correct widely held misconceptions, but held that testimony from an expert whose qualifications and experience-based reliability were not established, and which mirrored and bolstered the complainant’s account, was erroneously admitted. These decisions apply to prosecutions under Article 120b, UCMJ, and they apply equally to defense experts.
Arizona
Arizona applied Frye for decades. In Logerquist v. McVey (2000), the Arizona Supreme Court held that Frye applied only when an expert reached a conclusion by deduction from novel scientific principles, not to testimony about human behavior based on the witness’s clinical experience and observation, and it declined to adopt the Joiner and Kumho interpretation of Rule 702 (196 Ariz. 470, ¶¶ 30, 61–62, 65). In 2012 the court amended Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 to conform to the federal rule and Daubert, superseding that approach, and effective January 1, 2024, it amended the rule again to conform to the 2023 federal amendment (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004). Because Arizona’s rule mirrors the federal rule, Arizona courts may look to federal decisions for guidance, and the proponent bears the burden of establishing admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence (State v. Salazar-Mercado, 2014).
Arizona’s limits on the content of CSA testimony predate the rule change. In State v. Lindsey (1986), the Arizona Supreme Court held that an expert may describe general behavioral characteristics of sexually abused children that bear on their credibility or accuracy, because those patterns are not matters of common experience, but may not opine on the truthfulness of a particular witness or of witnesses of that type, and may not quantify the proportion of such complainants who tell the truth (149 Ariz. at 473–75); the court reversed the incest convictions in which such testimony had been admitted (149 Ariz. at 477). In State v. Moran (1986), a case in which the child recanted at trial and the prosecution relied on her earlier statements, the court held that experts could explain general patterns such as delayed reporting, anger, and recantation, but could not offer particularized opinions that the child was truthful, that she had been abused, or that her behavior was consistent with abuse; once the behavior is explained, the court reasoned, the jury needs nothing further from the expert. The court reversed and ordered a new trial. That limit is narrower than the military rule in Mullins, which permits an expert to say whether a complainant exhibits behaviors associated with abuse.
State v. Salazar-Mercado (2014) addressed the cold expert under the amended rule. The State’s expert had no knowledge of the two children and offered no opinion specific to them; she testified generally about how children perceive sexual abuse, about disclosure, and about circumstances in which children may make false allegations. The defense argued that Rule 702(d), which requires reliable application of methods to the facts, barred testimony that applied nothing to the facts. The court held that Rule 702(d) applies only when an expert applies principles and methods to the facts, that it does not bar cold expert testimony, and that such testimony may be admitted if it satisfies Rule 702(a) through (c), including the requirement that it fit the issues in the case, and survives Rule 403. The court reiterated the Lindsey and Moran limits and found no abuse of discretion.
The Arizona Supreme Court has also limited profile evidence. In State v. Ketchner (2014), a capital domestic-violence murder case, the court held that an expert’s testimony about separation violence, lethality factors, and characteristics common to domestic abusers was impermissible profile evidence because it served only to invite the jury to find that the defendant’s character matched that of an abuser. The court reversed the felony-murder and burglary convictions and the resulting sentences, including the death sentence, and affirmed the remaining convictions. In State v. Haskie (2017), the court held that the State may not use profile evidence as substantive proof of guilt, but that cold expert testimony primarily explaining a victim’s seemingly inconsistent behavior, such as recantation or remaining with an abuser, is not inadmissible merely because it touches on offender characteristics. The court directed trial courts to use great caution in screening, admitting, and limiting such evidence, to give a limiting instruction on request, to keep experts within their expertise, and not to allow experts to speak in broad, categorical terms about what is common without empirical support. In State v. Escalante (2018), the court held that admission of testimony implying that a defendant fit a criminal profile was fundamental, prejudicial error. In State v. Hussak (2026), an unpublished memorandum decision citable only for persuasive value under Arizona Supreme Court Rule 111(c), the court of appeals held that a detective who was not disclosed or qualified as an expert, and who answered juror questions about grooming in general terms while disclaiming expertise, did not exceed the Moran and Lindsey limits, and that any error under Rules 701 and 702 was harmless.
Together, these cases define the Arizona cold expert’s lane, for either side. An expert may teach general, empirically supported principles that help the jury evaluate a child’s behavior or an interview. The expert may not say or imply that a particular child is truthful or was abused, quantify truthfulness, describe offender characteristics as evidence of guilt, or, under Haskie, present general patterns as categorical rules; and a case-specific opinion must reflect a reliable application of the expert’s methods to the facts.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research and the case law support educational testimony explaining that delayed and incremental disclosure, recantation, continued contact with an abuser, and a calm or flat demeanor occur among abused children, and Lindsey, Salazar-Mercado, Flesher, and the federal cases permit such testimony when it is reliable and confined. Prosecutors can support that testimony by grounding each proposition in current empirical research rather than a syndrome label, stating findings with the qualifications the research attaches, tying the testimony to a misconception the defense has raised or the jury is likely to hold, and building a record on each Rule 702 requirement, because the 2024 Arizona amendment and the 2025 military amendment place the burden squarely on the proponent.
The research and the case law also counsel caution. Testimony that a behavior is common among abused children does not make it diagnostic, and an expert who says or implies that the child’s behavior is consistent with abuse, quantifies how often children lie, or describes offender characteristics risks reversal under Moran, Ketchner, Brooks, and Mullins. Haskie‘s warning against categorical statements about what is common applies with particular force when the research shows wide variation. When the State calls an expert who has reviewed the case, the case-specific opinion must meet Rule 702(d), and testimony that mirrors the child’s account invites the bolstering problem identified in Flesher.
Special Issues for Defense
The research and the case law support educational testimony about suggestibility, interviewer bias, contamination, repeated interviewing, and the non-specificity of behavioral and medical findings, and the same rules that admit prosecution cold experts admit defense experts who meet Rule 702 and Rule 403. Defense counsel can test the reliability of the State’s expert testimony by identifying the research behind each proposition, its samples and methods, whether it supports the generalization offered, and whether the testimony addresses a genuine misconception or merely rehearses the State’s theory. In one study of intelligence testing, variations in scientific quality did not influence judges’ admissibility decisions or attorneys’ decisions about whether to move to exclude, and informed cross-examination did not help mock jurors evaluate the test (Chorn & Kovera, 2019); that research was not on CSA cases, so either party may wish to raise reliability questions by timely motion and a request for a hearing under the amended Rule 702 as well as on cross-examination. An interview analysis by an expert for either side describes the questioning and the order in which details appeared and what research says about those conditions; it gives no opinion on whether the account is true or false or whether abuse occurred.
The research and the case law also counsel caution. A defense expert is subject to the same limits as a prosecution expert: testimony that a particular child’s account is false, that the child was coached, or that allegations of a given type are usually false or fabricated is vouching in reverse, and a statistic about false allegations offered to suggest that this complainant is untruthful raises the problem Brooks identified. Testimony that suggestive techniques increase error rates in research samples does not show that a particular account is inaccurate, and an expert who analyzes the actual interviews must apply a reliable method to them under Rule 702(d). A challenge is most persuasive when it identifies the governing standard precisely and addresses the specific proposition offered.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Buck, J. A., Warren, A. R., Bruck, M., & Kuehnle, K. (2014). How common is “common knowledge” about child witnesses among legal professionals? Comparing interviewers, public defenders, and forensic psychologists with laypeople. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 32(6), 867–883. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.2150
Chorn, J. A., & Kovera, M. B. (2019). Variations in reliability and validity do not influence judge, attorney, and mock juror decisions about psychological expert evidence. Law and Human Behavior, 43(6), 542–557. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000345
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Legal Authorities
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
In re Amendments to the Florida Evidence Code, 278 So. 3d 551 (Fla. 2019) (per curiam) (No. SC19-107, May 23, 2019).
Logerquist v. McVey, 196 Ariz. 470, 1 P.3d 113 (2000).
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-81, 135 Stat. 1541 (2021).
Rochkind v. Stevenson, 471 Md. 1, 236 A.3d 630 (2020).
State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 425 P.3d 1078 (2018).
State v. Haskie, 242 Ariz. 582, 399 P.3d 657 (2017).
State v. Hussak, No. 2 CA-CR 2025-0006 (Ariz. App. July 28, 2026) (mem. decision).
State v. Ketchner, 236 Ariz. 262, 339 P.3d 645 (2014).
State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).
State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986).
State v. Olenowski, 253 N.J. 133, 304 A.3d 598 (2023).
State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).
United States v. Bighead, 128 F.3d 1329 (9th Cir. 1997).
United States v. Birdsall, 47 M.J. 404 (C.A.A.F. 1998).
United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 1999).
United States v. Flesher, 73 M.J. 303 (C.A.A.F. 2014).
United States v. Griffin, 50 M.J. 278 (C.A.A.F. 1999).
United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).
United States v. Mullins, 69 M.J. 113 (C.A.A.F. 2010).
United States v. Sanchez, 65 M.J. 145 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
10 U.S.C. § 920b (Article 120b, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Fed. R. Evid. 704(b).
Ariz. R. Evid. 403.
Ariz. R. Evid. 702.
Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004 (amending Ariz. R. Evid. 702, effective Jan. 1, 2024).
Mil. R. Evid. 403.
Mil. R. Evid. 702.
Mil. R. Evid. 1102.
Related topic papers: Vouching, Bolstering, and Profile Evidence · The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS) · Behavioral Indicators, Base Rates, and the Limits of Inference · Content-Based Credibility Assessment: CBCA and SVA · Taint Hearings and Child Witness Competency · What Jurors Understand About Child Witnesses
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Counterintuitive Testimony · Courts-Martial · Memory in the Courtroom