Snap Shot
- The question: What is the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, what has research confirmed about its components, and how may it be used in court?
- What the research shows: CSAAS was a 1983 clinical description, not a validated diagnostic method; its author later called it “a clinical opinion, not a scientific instrument.” Secrecy and delayed disclosure are well documented. How often abused children deny abuse is genuinely contested, and recantation was reported in about 4% to about 27% of children in the substantiated samples reviewed here, depending on the sample and definition (4% of 234 validated cases in which the child had already disclosed; 23.1% in a dependency-court sample), and was associated in one sample with younger age, abuse by a parent figure, and an unsupportive caregiver.
- What it does not show: The behaviors CSAAS describes occur in both abused and nonabused children, so they cannot prove or disprove abuse. No study supports a figure for how often children who show them are truthful.
- The law: Testimony may explain specific behaviors but not prove abuse or vouch (Lindsey, Salazar-Mercado, Flesher, Mullins, Brooks), and Haskie bars categorical claims about what is common without empirical support. California admits limited testimony (McAlpin); New Jersey now admits only delayed-disclosure testimony (J.L.G.).
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors should ground each proposition in current research on the specific behavior, without the syndrome label or a sequence of stages; defense counsel should challenge syndrome-based testimony by its content rather than its label, without arguing that delay or recantation shows fabrication.
Child sexual abuse (CSA) is underreported, and many children who are abused keep it secret, delay telling, or disclose gradually (citations appear in the delayed disclosure paper). Jurors and other adults may expect the opposite: that a child who was abused would tell promptly, resist, and give a consistent account. For four decades, prosecutors have offered expert testimony to explain why children’s behavior after abuse may not match those expectations, and for much of that period the testimony was framed around the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS), a model described by the psychiatrist Roland Summit in 1983.
CSAAS has a contested place in the courtroom. Its author described it as a clinical observation intended to help adults understand and support children, not as a test for whether abuse occurred, and courts have generally barred its use as proof of abuse. Research since 1983 has supported some of its propositions, most clearly that secrecy and delayed disclosure are common, while the empirical status of others, particularly how often abused children deny abuse or recant, remains the subject of active scientific debate. Courts have responded in different ways, from admitting limited testimony to explain a child’s behavior, to excluding everything but testimony on delayed disclosure.
This paper describes what CSAAS is and what it was proposed to do, Summit’s later clarification of its limits, what research has shown about each of its components, the current scientific debate about denial and recantation, and the shift from syndrome-based testimony toward testimony about specific, documented behaviors. It then sets out the limits of the evidence, reviews how federal, military, Arizona, and other courts have treated CSAAS testimony, and identifies the recurring issues for prosecutors and defense counsel.
Origins and Purpose of the Model
Summit’s 1983 article drew on clinical experience with children and families rather than on a controlled study. He described five categories of reaction that he regarded as common among sexually abused children: secrecy; helplessness; entrapment and accommodation; delayed, conflicted, and unconvincing disclosure; and retraction. He presented the first two as reflecting the basic vulnerability of children in relation to adults, and the last three as consequences that tend to follow sexual abuse (Summit, 1983). The model’s central argument was that a child abused by a trusted adult is placed in a position of dependence and secrecy, adapts to continuing abuse in ways that adults may misread, and, when the abuse comes to light, may disclose in a manner that seems unconvincing and may later take the disclosure back under family pressure.
The model was written for clinicians and others responsible for protecting children. Its purpose was to correct the assumption that a genuine victim would promptly and consistently report, and to encourage adults to listen to children whose accounts were halting or inconsistent. It was not developed as a diagnostic instrument, it was not validated as one, and it does not describe a psychiatric disorder. It does not appear in the diagnostic manuals.
Summit’s Later Clarification
By the early 1990s, CSAAS was being cited in courtrooms for purposes Summit had not intended, including as evidence that a child had been abused. In a later article, Summit wrote that CSAAS is “a clinical opinion, not a scientific instrument,” and acknowledged that it does not provide a method for distinguishing valid allegations from false ones (Summit, 1992). He described the proper role of the model in court as limited to helping a factfinder understand a child’s behavior when a disputed disclosure is at issue, with the question of whether abuse occurred left entirely to the trier of fact.
That clarification is central to an accurate description of the construct. It concerned the use of the model in court rather than the clinical observations on which the model rested, and it means that, on its author’s own account, CSAAS cannot be used to determine whether a particular child was abused, and that behaviors it describes cannot be reasoned from backward to a conclusion that abuse occurred.
What the Research Shows: Secrecy and Delay
The component of CSAAS with the strongest empirical support is that many abused children keep the abuse secret and delay disclosure, sometimes for years and sometimes into adulthood. National surveys, retrospective studies of adults, and forensic samples consistently document substantial delay and nondisclosure, and reviews that are otherwise critical of CSAAS agree on this point (London et al., 2005, 2008; Pipe et al., 2007). The research on how long children wait, which children wait longer, and why, is summarized in the companion paper on delayed disclosure.
The research on secrecy summarized in that paper is also consistent with Summit’s description of the circumstances that inhibit disclosure. Abuse by family members or other trusted adults is associated with longer delay; children report fear of consequences, shame, self-blame, and concern for the family as reasons for waiting; and abusers’ efforts to secure secrecy appear throughout the literature. These findings are now usually presented on their own empirical footing rather than as confirmation of a syndrome.
The helplessness and entrapment components are more difficult to test directly. They describe a child’s psychological situation rather than a discrete behavior, and research on grooming, dependence, and continued contact with an abuser is relevant to them, but no study has validated them as features that distinguish abused from nonabused children.
Denial, Tentative Disclosure, and Recantation: A Contested Literature
The components of CSAAS concerning unconvincing disclosure and retraction have been the subject of sustained scientific disagreement. An influential review concluded that although most abused children do not disclose during childhood, the research did not support the view that denial, tentative disclosure, and recantation characterize the disclosure patterns of children whose abuse has been validated, and that the high rates of denial and recantation reported in some earlier studies came from clinical samples in which suggestive questioning or assumptions of abuse may have played a role (London et al., 2005). A later review reached the same conclusion and detailed the methodological problems in the disclosure literature (London et al., 2008). In a sample of 234 cases validated by a child protective services agency, denial occurred in 6% of cases and recantation in 4% of cases in which the child had already disclosed, and the authors concluded that the pattern Summit described was infrequent among such cases and that disclosure did not follow sequential stages (Bradley & Wood, 1996).
Other researchers have argued that these conclusions understate denial. Common methods of classifying cases as substantiated depend heavily on whether the child disclosed, which tends to exclude abused children who deny and can make denial appear rare (Lyon, 2007). After the New Jersey Supreme Court relied in part on the reviews’ conclusions in limiting CSAAS testimony, one group of authors argued that studies drawing on children who came to the attention of authorities are affected by what they called the ground truth problem, disclosure suspicion bias, and disclosure substantiation bias, and that research on groups of children whose abuse can be established without relying on their disclosure shows that denial is common among abused children (Lyon et al., 2020). The authors of the earlier reviews replied that they had acknowledged these sampling difficulties, that the alternative studies were mostly decades old and had their own methodological flaws, and that the field needs studies that combine validity and generalizability rather than reliance on the syndrome’s original clinical suppositions (London et al., 2020).
Research on recantation shows a similar pattern. Recantation is uncommon in some agency samples and more common in samples dominated by intrafamilial abuse and dependency court involvement; in one such sample of substantiated cases, 23.1% of children recanted, and recantation was associated with younger age, abuse by a parent figure, and an unsupportive nonoffending caregiver (Bradley & Wood, 1996; Malloy et al., 2007). Across the studies discussed in this hub, reported recantation rates range from about 4% to about 27% depending on how the sample was drawn and how recantation was defined, and none shows what share of recantations in contested cases are accurate. These findings support the observation that some abused children retract true allegations under family pressure, but they do not support describing recantation as a typical stage of disclosure. The research is summarized in the companion paper on recantation.
The fair summary is that delay and secrecy are well documented; that the frequency of denial among abused children is genuinely contested, with credible researchers disagreeing about which samples best answer the question; and that recantation was reported in a minority of substantiated cases in the samples reviewed (about 4% to about 27%, depending on the sample and definition) and was associated, in some samples, with identifiable family circumstances. None of these findings converts the model into a means of determining whether abuse occurred.
From Syndrome to Specific Behaviors
Much of the modern debate concerns not whether children delay, deny, or recant, but how testimony about those behaviors should be framed. Some scholars argued that research supported expert testimony on several accommodation components when offered to explain a child’s behavior rather than to prove abuse (Lyon, 2002). Others have cautioned against statistical testimony derived from CSAAS, noting that figures about how often abused children delay or recant cannot establish the probability that a particular child is truthful and should not be used to draw inferences about credibility or guilt (Weiss & Curcio Alexander, 2013). A New Zealand legal scholar, analyzing R v Ellis, a case the author describes as a wrongful conviction, argued that the admission of CSAAS evidence there shows the danger of syndrome reasoning in judicial fact-finding, and that the same danger arises when parental alienation syndrome is used in family courts (Leonetti, 2024). The article is a legal analysis, not an empirical study.
Many experts now testify about specific behaviors, such as delayed disclosure, without using the syndrome label, and cite the empirical literature on each behavior rather than the 1983 model. That approach can be more accurate, because it allows the expert to state what the research shows about each behavior, including its limits. It also raises a question that courts and counsel must address directly: testimony that presents the same five components as a typical sequence under another name carries the same limitations as testimony expressly labeled CSAAS. The relevant question is the content of the testimony and the research behind each proposition, not its title.
Mock-jury research suggests the framing matters to factfinders. In two studies of a case involving a child’s recantation, expert testimony grounded in current empirical research led participants to rate the child as more credible and the evidence as more scientifically rigorous than testimony based on CSAAS, and, in these studies, evidence-based testimony was also associated with more guilty verdicts than a no-expert control (Denne et al., 2021). The studies used online participants, written trial summaries, and no deliberation, and research on what jurors believe about child witnesses is summarized in the Jurors and Jury Decision-Making resource.
Transcript research shows how often these behaviors become trial issues. In the testimony of 122 children in U.S. criminal CSA cases (6,384 lines of questioning), themes the authors classified as CSA-specific myths appeared in more than 10% of defense attorneys’ lines of questioning; questions about disclosure were the most frequent, followed by questions about witnesses and privacy, assumptions of harm, and the child’s positive relationship with the accused (Denne et al., 2023). The study coded questioning qualitatively; it did not measure effects on jurors or verdicts, and questions about the timing and circumstances of disclosure can be a legitimate subject of cross-examination.
Limits of the Evidence
Summit’s model was based on clinical observation of children in treatment, without a comparison group of nonabused children or of children who made inaccurate allegations, and it has not been validated as a means of distinguishing abused from nonabused children. The disclosure research that tests its components faces a ground-truth problem in both directions. Samples defined by substantiation may exclude abused children who deny, and samples drawn from therapy may include children whose reports were shaped by questioning or whose abuse was not independently established. Retrospective surveys rely on adults’ recall of childhood events. Studies using independent evidence of abuse, such as medical findings, are small and often old, and the circumstances in which such evidence arises may not generalize to other cases.
The central limit is that the behaviors CSAAS describes are not diagnostic. Secrecy, delay, tentative disclosure, and recantation occur among children who were abused, and they can also occur among children who were not. Behaviors that occur in both groups cannot prove that abuse occurred, and they cannot disprove it either. No research supports using a child’s display, or absence, of accommodation behaviors to conclude whether that child was abused, and no study supports a figure for how often children who show those behaviors are truthful.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When the figures of 6% denial and 4% recantation among 234 validated cases (Bradley & Wood, 1996) are cited to show that the pattern Summit described is infrequent, ask what exactly was counted and who was studied, because classifying cases as substantiated can depend on whether the child disclosed, which can make denial appear rare (Lyon, 2007). When the 23.1% recantation figure (Malloy et al., 2007) is offered to show that retraction is common, ask who was studied, since the sample was dominated by intrafamilial abuse and dependency court involvement. When the model itself (Summit, 1983) is offered to explain a child’s behavior, ask whether the claim is testable and whether the conclusion follows from the design: it rested on clinical observation without a comparison group, and secrecy, delay, and recantation occur among children who were abused and among children who were not. When the mock-jury findings on evidence-based testimony (Denne et al., 2021) are cited, ask whether they apply to a real trial, given online participants, written trial summaries, and no deliberation. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
CSAAS and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
Expert testimony framed around CSAAS or its components is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702 as construed in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999). Rule 702 was amended effective December 1, 2023, to require the proponent to show by a preponderance of the evidence that each requirement is met and that each opinion reflects a reliable application of the expert’s methods to the facts. Because CSAAS was not designed or validated as a method for determining whether abuse occurred, testimony offered for that purpose cannot satisfy the rule; testimony offered to explain specific behaviors must rest on reliable research about those behaviors and fit the issues in the case, and remains subject to Rule 403.
In courts-martial, Military Rule of Evidence 702 governs, and the 2023 federal amendment has been incorporated into the Military Rules of Evidence (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025). United States v. Houser (1993) sets out the factors the proponent must establish. United States v. Flesher (2014) permits expert testimony about the sometimes counterintuitive behavior of victims to help members set aside misconceptions, but held that testimony from a witness whose qualifications and experience-based basis were not established, and which served to bolster the complainant, was erroneously admitted. In United States v. Rynning (1998), the court found no plain error in testimony that delayed reporting is common among abuse victims where the defense had attacked the complainant’s credibility on that ground and the expert did not comment on credibility or place the accused within a profile. An expert may describe behaviors associated with abuse and whether a child exhibited them but may not opine on the child’s credibility or the accused’s guilt (United States v. Mullins, 2010), and testimony quantifying how rarely allegations like the child’s prove false is the functional equivalent of vouching (United States v. Brooks, 2007).
Arizona
Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 adopted the Daubert standard in 2012 and was amended effective January 1, 2024, to conform to the 2023 federal amendment (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004). In State v. Lindsey (1986), the Arizona Supreme Court held that an expert may describe general behavioral characteristics of sexually abused children, such as recantation and inconsistent accounts, but may not opine on the truthfulness of a particular complainant or of complainants of that type, and may not quantify the proportion who are truthful (149 Ariz. at 473–75); State v. Moran (1986) applied the same rule to indirect opinions. In State v. Salazar-Mercado (2014), the expert testified generally about how children perceive sexual abuse, the process of disclosure, and circumstances in which children may make false allegations, and the opinion described CSAAS as a model purporting to explain behaviors commonly exhibited by child sexual abuse victims. The court held that Rule 702 permits such “cold” testimony when it satisfies the rule and survives Rule 403, reiterated the Lindsey and Moran limits, and declined to take a fresh look at CSAAS on the record before it.
The Arizona Supreme Court has also limited profile evidence. Testimony that a defendant shares characteristics of offenders may not be used as substantive proof of guilt (State v. Ketchner, 2014). In State v. Haskie (2017), the court held that testimony primarily explaining victim behavior is not inadmissible merely because it touches on offender characteristics, but directed trial courts to screen such testimony carefully, give limiting instructions on request, and not permit experts to speak in broad, categorical terms about what is common or usual without empirical support. That caution bears directly on testimony describing the CSAAS components as typical of abused children. Because Salazar-Mercado left the scientific status of CSAAS open, the reliability of syndrome-based testimony remains a question for Arizona trial courts under the amended rule.
Other Jurisdictions
State courts have taken different approaches. In People v. Bowker (1988), a California appellate court held that CSAAS testimony must be limited to explaining that a child’s reactions are not inconsistent with having been molested, and may not be used to prove that abuse occurred. In People v. McAlpin (1991), the California Supreme Court approved testimony on common reactions of child molestation victims to disabuse jurors of misconceptions when a child’s conduct is said to be inconsistent with abuse, while holding that such evidence is not admissible to prove that the child was abused. California appellate courts have since held that McAlpin remains binding and have continued to admit limited CSAAS testimony despite other jurisdictions’ contrary conclusions (People v. Munch, 2020; People v. Lapenias, 2021).
New Jersey has moved in the opposite direction. In State v. J.Q. (1993), the New Jersey Supreme Court permitted CSAAS testimony to explain behaviors such as secrecy and delayed disclosure, but not to prove that abuse occurred or to vouch for the child, on a reliability premise that later decisions rejected. In State v. J.L.G. (2018), after a hearing on the current science, the court held that CSAAS lacks a sufficiently reliable scientific basis, that testimony about the syndrome and its component behaviors other than delayed disclosure is no longer admissible, and that testimony about delayed disclosure is admissible only if it satisfies the evidence rules, including a showing that it is beyond the understanding of the average juror; the court noted that expert testimony may not be needed when a child can offer a rational explanation for the delay. In State v. G.E.P. (2020), the court applied J.L.G. to cases on direct appeal, affirming the reversal of three convictions in which CSAAS testimony had bolstered the children’s accounts and finding no denial of a fair trial in a fourth.
Pennsylvania illustrates a legislative response. In Commonwealth v. Dunkle (1992), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court excluded expert testimony about the behavior of sexually abused children, including delayed reporting and incomplete recall. The legislature then enacted a statute permitting qualified experts to testify about specific types of victim responses and behaviors in sexual offense prosecutions while barring opinions about the credibility of any witness, including the victim (42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5920), and in Commonwealth v. Jones (2020) the court held that Dunkle was effectively overruled to the extent it categorically barred such testimony as within jurors’ ordinary understanding, while Dunkle remains valid as to testimony touching witness credibility; Jones did not address Dunkle‘s separate ruling on child sexual abuse syndrome. Across these jurisdictions, the common ground is that CSAAS and its components may not be used to prove that abuse occurred or to vouch for a child; the disagreement concerns how much explanatory testimony is reliable and helpful.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports educational testimony explaining that abused children often keep abuse secret and delay disclosure, that delay is associated with abuse by family members and trusted adults and with fear, shame, and self-blame, and that some children whose abuse was substantiated recant under family pressure. Where a child’s delay, reluctance, or retraction is used to argue fabrication, Arizona law under Lindsey and Salazar-Mercado and military law under Flesher and Rynning permit reliable testimony confined to that explanatory role. Prosecutors can support that testimony: grounding each proposition in the current empirical literature on the specific behavior rather than in the 1983 model, stating findings with the qualifications the research attaches, acknowledging the scientific debate about denial where it is relevant, and avoiding the syndrome label and a sequence of stages. Mock-jury research found that participants evaluated evidence-based testimony differently from syndrome-based testimony (Denne et al., 2021); the studies used online participants and written summaries.
The research also counsels caution. Testimony that presents the five components as a typical sequence, or that a child’s behavior is consistent with abuse in a way that invites jurors to reason backward to a conclusion that abuse occurred, exceeds what the model’s author said it could do and approaches the limits drawn in Lindsey, Brooks, and Mullins. Haskie cautions against categorical statements about what is common, J.L.G. shows that some courts now exclude all but delayed-disclosure testimony, and presenting the same components under a different name does not cure the problem. Either party can ask whether a case rests on a well-documented disclosure, a protocol-based forensic interview, and independent evidence, with expert testimony used only to address specific misconceptions.
Special Issues for Defense
The research supports careful scrutiny of syndrome-based testimony. CSAAS is a clinical description that its author said cannot determine whether abuse occurred, it has not been validated as a diagnostic method, and its components are not diagnostic because they occur in both abused and nonabused children. Where an expert presents the components as typical of abused children, the defense can examine the research behind each proposition, including the reviews finding that denial and recantation are not the typical course in validated samples, the sampling problems in clinical studies, and the absence of a comparison group in the original model. Challenges under the amended Rule 702, requests for limiting instructions, and objections to testimony that mirrors the complainant’s conduct or implies that abuse occurred are appropriate, and attention to content rather than labels addresses testimony that presents the same components without naming the syndrome.
The research also counsels caution about overreading. That CSAAS is not a diagnostic syndrome does not make the opposite inference available: delayed, reluctant, and incremental disclosure are well documented among abused children, so an argument that a child’s delay or hesitance shows fabrication is not supported by the research and can be answered by the same literature. The frequency of denial among abused children is genuinely contested, and recantation in substantiated cases is associated with family pressure, so neither denial nor recantation proves that an allegation was false. A defense expert is bound by the same limits on credibility opinions as a prosecution expert. The most persuasive analysis is precise about what the research does and does not support, rather than treating the limits of a syndrome as proof about the child.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Bradley, A. R., & Wood, J. M. (1996). How do children tell? The disclosure process in child sexual abuse. Child Abuse & Neglect, 20(9), 881–891. https://doi.org/10.1016/0145-2134(96)00077-4
Denne, E., St George, S., & Stolzenberg, S. N. (2023). Myths and misunderstandings about child sexual abuse in criminal investigations. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 38(1–2), NP1893–NP1919. https://doi.org/10.1177/08862605221093679
Denne, E., Stolzenberg, S. N., & Neal, T. M. S. (2021). The effects of evidence-based expert testimony on perceptions of child sexual abuse involving recantation. PLoS ONE, 16(8), Article e0254961. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0254961
Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf
Leonetti, C. (2024). Opposite sides of the same coin: Syndrome evidence, child abuse and the wrongful conviction of Peter Hugh McGregor Ellis. Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 31(4), 612–637. https://doi.org/10.1080/13218719.2023.2206856
London, K., Bruck, M., Ceci, S. J., & Shuman, D. W. (2005). Disclosure of child sexual abuse: What does the research tell us about the ways that children tell? Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 11(1), 194–226. https://doi.org/10.1037/1076-8971.11.1.194
London, K., Bruck, M., Miller, Q. C., & Ceci, S. J. (2020). Analyzing the scientific foundation of Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome: A reply to Lyon et al. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 38(6), 648–653. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.2489
London, K., Bruck, M., Wright, D. B., & Ceci, S. J. (2008). Review of the contemporary literature on how children report sexual abuse to others: Findings, methodological issues, and implications for forensic interviewers. Memory, 16(1), 29–47. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658210701725732
Lyon, T. D. (2002). Scientific support for expert testimony on child sexual abuse accommodation. In J. R. Conte (Ed.), Critical issues in child sexual abuse: Historical, legal, and psychological perspectives (pp. 107–138). Sage. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781483328645.n4
Lyon, T. D. (2007). False denials: Overcoming methodological biases in abuse disclosure research. In M.-E. Pipe, M. E. Lamb, Y. Orbach, & A.-C. Cederborg (Eds.), Child sexual abuse: Disclosure, delay, and denial (pp. 41–62). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Lyon, T. D., Williams, S., & Stolzenberg, S. N. (2020). Understanding expert testimony on child sexual abuse denial after New Jersey v. J.L.G.: Ground truth, disclosure suspicion bias, and disclosure substantiation bias. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 38(6), 630–647. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.2490
Malloy, L. C., Lyon, T. D., & Quas, J. A. (2007). Filial dependency and recantation of child sexual abuse allegations. Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 46(2), 162–170. https://doi.org/10.1097/01.chi.0000246067.77953.f7
Pipe, M.-E., Lamb, M. E., Orbach, Y., & Cederborg, A.-C. (Eds.). (2007). Child sexual abuse: Disclosure, delay, and denial. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Summit, R. C. (1983). The child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. Child Abuse & Neglect, 7(2), 177–193. https://doi.org/10.1016/0145-2134(83)90070-4
Summit, R. C. (1992). Abuse of the child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. Journal of Child Sexual Abuse, 1(4), 153–164. https://doi.org/10.1300/J070v01n04_13
Weiss, K. J., & Curcio Alexander, J. (2013). Sex, lies, and statistics: Inferences from the child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 41(3), 412–420.
Legal Authorities
Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 529 Pa. 168, 602 A.2d 830 (1992), superseded in part by 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5920, as recognized in Commonwealth v. Jones, 240 A.3d 881, 895-97 (Pa. 2020).
Commonwealth v. Jones, 240 A.3d 881, 891, 895-97 (Pa. 2020).
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
People v. Bowker, 203 Cal. App. 3d 385 (1988).
People v. Lapenias, 67 Cal. App. 5th 162 (2021).
People v. McAlpin, 53 Cal. 3d 1289, 812 P.2d 563 (1991).
People v. Munch, 52 Cal. App. 5th 464 (2020).
State v. G.E.P., 243 N.J. 362, 235 A.3d 157 (2020).
State v. Haskie, 242 Ariz. 582, 399 P.3d 657 (2017).
State v. J.L.G., 234 N.J. 265, 190 A.3d 442 (2018).
State v. J.Q., 130 N.J. 554, 617 A.2d 1196 (1993), superseded as to the reliability of CSAAS by State v. J.L.G., 234 N.J. 265, 190 A.3d 442 (2018), and State v. G.E.P., 243 N.J. 362, 235 A.3d 157 (2020).
State v. Ketchner, 236 Ariz. 262, 339 P.3d 645 (2014).
State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).
State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986).
State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).
United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
United States v. Flesher, 73 M.J. 303 (C.A.A.F. 2014).
United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).
United States v. Mullins, 69 M.J. 113 (C.A.A.F. 2010).
United States v. Rynning, 47 M.J. 420 (C.A.A.F. 1998).
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5920.
Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Ariz. R. Evid. 403.
Ariz. R. Evid. 702.
Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004 (amending Ariz. R. Evid. 702, effective Jan. 1, 2024).
Mil. R. Evid. 702.
Related topic papers: Recantation in Child Sexual Abuse Cases · Delayed Disclosure: Timing, Age, and Gender · Types of Disclosure: Piecemeal, Tentative, and Under-Disclosure · Behavioral Indicators, Base Rates, and the Limits of Inference · Grooming and the Process of Victimization · Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: Daubert, Frye, and Arizona’s Cold-Expert Cases · Vouching, Bolstering, and Profile Evidence
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Counterintuitive Testimony · Courts-Martial