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What Jurors Understand About Child Witnesses

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Snap Shot

  • The question: What do jurors believe about how children remember, disclose, and behave when testifying, and do those beliefs match the research?
  • What the research shows: Lay knowledge matches the research on some points and diverges on others, with errors in both directions. In one survey, only 43% recognized that abused children may deny abuse when asked by a trusted adult, while 52% believed that disclosures growing more detailed over time indicate truthfulness. Mock jurors tended to credit a teary child over a calm one and, in one study, to discount incremental disclosure; in a meta-analysis, adults identified children’s lies at a rate not different from chance.
  • What it does not show: Most studies use students or community volunteers in simulations. The research cannot show what a particular juror believes or whether a particular child’s account is accurate, and near-chance lie detection does not mean children’s reports are generally unreliable. Education changed verdicts in simulations, which does not show the verdicts were more accurate.
  • The law: Juror knowledge bears on whether expert testimony will help (Rule 702, Houser, Salazar-Mercado, J.L.G.); vouching remains barred (Lindsey, Moran, Brooks, Mullins). Remote testimony requires case-specific findings (Craig, Coy), and sex may not be used to strike jurors (J.E.B.).
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors can address expectations about prompt disclosure, distress, and resistance through voir dire and general education, without endorsing the child; defense counsel can address beliefs that confident or growing accounts must be accurate, without relying on misconceptions about delay, demeanor, or continued contact.

Child sexual abuse (CSA) prosecutions often rest heavily on a child’s account. Abuse usually happens in private, medical findings are frequently normal even when abuse has occurred, and many children disclose late or in stages. Abuse of children occurs and is underreported, and children who are interviewed well can give accurate, detailed accounts. At trial, jurors, or court-martial members, must decide how much weight to give a child’s words, and they decide with whatever beliefs they bring about how children remember, disclose, respond to questioning, and look and sound when telling the truth.

Whether those beliefs match the research matters for two reasons. Expert testimony is admissible only when it will help the trier of fact, so courts regularly ask whether a subject is already within jurors’ common understanding. And beliefs that do not match the research can lead jurors to discount an accurate account or to credit an inaccurate one, possibilities that attorneys on both sides must anticipate in voir dire, examination, argument, and requests for instructions.

This paper reviews surveys of lay knowledge about child witnesses; studies of how demeanor, disclosure patterns, age, and courtroom accommodations affect mock jurors; research on whether adults can tell accurate from inaccurate child reports; and studies of whether expert testimony and judicial directions change jurors’ understanding. It then sets out the federal, military, and Arizona law. Juror attitudes in adult and child sexual offense trials more generally are treated in “Juror Beliefs in Sexual Assault and Child Abuse Trials” in the Jurors and Jury Decision-Making resource.

What Surveys Show About Lay Knowledge

An early study gave prospective jurors and CSA experts the same questionnaire (Morison & Greene, 1992). The experts agreed strongly with one another on 29 of 40 items, and the jurors showed limited knowledge relative to the experts, leading the authors to conclude that much of the relevant research was reliable and often beyond common knowledge. The study is more than 30 years old, and public knowledge of some topics may have changed since.

A more detailed study compared the answers of 169 college students and 148 people reporting for jury duty in California with the research literature (Quas et al., 2005). Answers matched the research on some issues, such as the finding that children can be led to report events that did not happen, and diverged from it on others, with errors running in different directions. Only 43% recognized that abused children may deny abuse when asked by a trusted adult, a gap that could lead a juror to discount the account of a child whose first answer was a denial. At the same time, 48% believed that children can remember painful abuse from infancy, which the research does not support; only 55% correctly disagreed that children are no more influenced by leading questions than adults; only 30% agreed that asking children to show “what bad things happened” with anatomically detailed dolls is likely to lead to false reports, a classification the authors acknowledged is debated; 52% believed that disclosures growing more detailed over time indicate truthfulness; and 68% believed that a psychologist can tell whether an adult has influenced a child’s account. Accuracy varied with participants’ gender, education, and ethnicity, and when asked to predict the results of well-known suggestibility experiments, participants sometimes overestimated and sometimes underestimated the suggestibility those studies found. Most participants did correctly recognize that abused children often do not tell right away (84%), that retracting an allegation does not mean the child was lying (69%), and that inconsistencies do not show a report is false (67%).

A 2014 study added professionals (Buck et al., 2014). Jury-eligible students were the least knowledgeable about research on interviewing children; interviewers and public defenders did better but lacked substantial knowledge on certain topics, including anatomical dolls; forensic psychologists were the most knowledgeable. The attorneys and judges who frame questions for jurors are thus not immune to the same gaps. More generally, in a representative survey of U.S. adults, 63% agreed that memory works like a video camera, 48% that memory is permanent, and 37% that one confident eyewitness should be enough to convict, propositions memory researchers reject (Simons & Chabris, 2011). In three U.K. samples (N = 717), repression was endorsed by more than 78%, and dissociative amnesia by more than 87%, of lay, legal, and clinical respondents, including judges and barristers (Radcliffe & Patihis, 2024); both concepts remain disputed among memory researchers. Those beliefs concern memory in general, but they bear on how jurors may read a child’s confident account, inconsistencies, or changes over time.

Expectations About Demeanor and Disclosure

Asked what a child first facing the defendant in court would do, participants most often named crying, fear, and confusion, and mock jurors who read about a child who cried judged her more honest and credible, and were more likely to convict, than those who read about a calm child (Regan & Baker, 1998). The relationship is not linear: among 133 undergraduates, a teary child produced more guilty verdicts than either a calm child or one who cried hysterically (Golding et al., 2003). In a Norwegian study of 465 laypersons, child actors telling the same account were rated most credible when sad, whether the account was presented as a transcript, audio, or video (Melinder et al., 2016). These findings describe observers, not abused children, whose emotional presentation varies widely; calm presentation occurs in substantiated cases, so a calm or flat demeanor is not a reliable sign of fabrication, and visible distress is not a reliable sign that the account is accurate. Field data show how much emotional display depends on context: in 100 Israeli forensic interviews of children alleging abuse by a family member, nonverbal signs of emotion appeared in about half of children’s utterances while emotion put into words appeared in about 4%, and both were more frequent when interviewers were more supportive (Karni-Visel et al., 2023). A child’s visible emotion therefore reflects the questioning as well as the child, which is a further reason not to treat its presence or absence as a marker of credibility.

Expectations about disclosure show a similar pattern. Community participants reading about a 6-year-old returned more guilty verdicts when the child gave a complete account on two occasions than when her first account was incomplete and the full account came later (Yozwiak et al., 2004). Among 328 jury-eligible adults reading a summary of a case involving a 7-year-old, a 10-month delay before disclosure, compared with a 1-day delay, produced fewer guilty verdicts and lower ratings of the child’s believability and memory accuracy; the delay also lowered judged likelihood of abuse when the accused was a neighbor but not when he was a stepfather (Miller et al., 2022). Incremental and delayed disclosure are common in substantiated cases, so treating them as signs of fabrication applies an expectation the disclosure research does not support. A later account with more detail is not by itself a sign of fabrication or of accuracy; accounts can also grow through suggestion, which is why the circumstances in which new details emerged, rather than growth itself, deserve scrutiny.

The most direct evidence of real jurors’ thinking comes from questions jurors submitted to 134 children aged 5 to 17 testifying about alleged sexual abuse (St. George et al., 2020). Jurors often asked about the abuse itself, its context, the child’s reactions, the child’s delay in telling, and the child’s continued contact with the accused, which the authors read as reflecting doubts about whether delay and continued contact are consistent with abuse. The questions also show jurors probing what they find puzzling, as the law permits, and do not reveal how they affected verdicts. Content analyses of defense cross-examination in U.S. trials are consistent with these expectations being raised in court: CSA-specific misconceptions, most often about disclosure, appeared in more than 10% of defense lines of questioning of 122 children (Denne et al., 2023), and among 134 children aged 5 to 17, drawing on jurors’ misconceptions was the most common way defense attorneys questioned the plausibility of an account (St. George et al., 2024). These studies classify questions; they do not measure effects on verdicts, and testing the plausibility of an account is a legitimate function of cross-examination. Professional factfinders are not immune: in 145 Swedish trial and appellate decisions involving children aged 7 and younger, courts relied mainly on richness of detail and spontaneity, usually in the child’s favor, but treated short testimony as weighing against reliability, although young children’s testimony is typically brief (Ernberg et al., 2018).

The Child’s Age and the Juror’s Characteristics

The effect of a child’s age is less consistent than intuition suggests. In three early experiments, complainant age was inversely related or unrelated to credibility, and corroborating testimony from a second child raised the first child’s credibility (Bottoms & Goodman, 1994). Later mock jurors blamed a 14-year-old complainant more than a 5-year-old for her own abuse, while 5- and 10-year-olds were perceived similarly (Bottoms et al., 2014).

The more consistent finding concerns the juror. A systematic review found that women generally rate child complainants as more credible than men do, that the difference shrinks when the alleged perpetrator is not the child’s biological parent, and that the child’s gender has little consistent effect (Voogt & Klettke, 2017). Women’s greater empathy for child victims and belief in children’s reports explain much of the difference, and the strength of the case evidence is a powerful determinant of judgments (Bottoms et al., 2014). A meta-analysis of nine studies with 2,447 mock jurors found that jurors reporting their own sexual abuse histories were more empathic toward child victims and more likely to favor guilt, with small to moderate effects (Jones et al., 2020). Follow-up meta-analyses of seven mock-trial studies (361 undergraduate jurors with abuse histories) found that more severe abuse was associated with more empathy for child victims but had no additional effect on guilt judgments (Jones-Cieminski et al., 2026). Differences of this size cannot predict how any individual will decide.

Can Jurors Tell Accurate From Inaccurate Child Testimony?

A meta-analysis of 45 experiments involving 7,893 adult judges and 1,858 children found that adults correctly classified children’s true and false statements 54% of the time, slightly but significantly above chance (Gongola et al., 2017). True statements were correctly judged honest 63.8% of the time, but lies were identified at a rate not different from chance (47.5%). Confidence was only weakly related to accuracy, professionals did slightly better than laypersons, and the child’s age did not significantly affect discrimination.

Deliberate lies are only one source of error; a child can also sincerely report something that did not happen or sincerely deny something that did. Adults watching interviews of 3- and 5-year-olds judged accurate reports, accurate denials, and false reports better than false denials, and were on average confident that events the child falsely denied had not occurred (Block et al., 2012). With similar interviews, both police officers and laypersons in the eastern United States overbelieved false denials, officers had better odds than laypersons of judging false reports correctly relative to false denials, and the child’s age and race predicted accuracy (Johnson et al., 2024). Adults’ errors, including those of police officers, are thus not confined to believing false allegations; they also accept false denials.

Staged trials, in which children testified about events the researchers had recorded, offer the most realistic tests. When 5- to 6-year-olds and 8- to 9-year-olds testified in a real courtroom about a play session with an unfamiliar man, older children were more accurate, and jurors based credibility judgments on the child’s perceived confidence and consistency (Goodman et al., 1998). In a companion study, jurors were less likely to convict before deliberation when 7- to 9-year-olds testified deceptively, but the difference disappeared after deliberation (Orcutt et al., 2001). Field data show how claimed inconsistencies arise in real trials. In 120 U.S. prosecutions with child witnesses aged 6 to 12, attorneys impeached children with allegedly inconsistent prior statements in 96 cases; in 11% the statements were not in fact inconsistent, and in 94% of the rest the questioning involved at least one recognized developmental difficulty, most often time and number, distinguishing among incidents, sexual terminology, or “any” and “ever” questions, with suggestive tag questions in 45% (Sullivan et al., 2026). The study identified possible sources of inconsistency, not which account was accurate. Together, these studies indicate that jurors’ ability to detect inaccuracy from the testimony alone is limited, that confidence and consistency carry weight whether or not they track accuracy, and that deliberation does not reliably improve discrimination. Those limits apply to truthful and untruthful accounts alike, which is why how an account was obtained, and evidence independent of it, matter so much in both directions.

Courtroom Accommodations and Juror Perceptions

In the staged-trial study, closed-circuit television reduced younger children’s suggestibility, and open-court testimony was associated with greater pretrial anxiety; closed-circuit testimony did not impair jurors’ ability to discriminate accurate from inaccurate testimony or directly bias them against the defendant, but it did bias them against the child witnesses (Goodman et al., 1998). The companion study found no support for the idea that jurors reach the truth better when children testify in open court (Orcutt et al., 2001).

A survey of 261 people reporting for jury duty suggests why (McAuliff & Kovera, 2012). Participants expected a child testifying live to be more nervous and tearful, and less confident and fluent, than a child using an alternative form of testimony, and they believed live testimony made it easiest to judge truthfulness and was fairest to the defendant but most stressful for the child. The authors proposed that jurors expect accommodations to change a child’s behavior and may judge the child negatively when it does not. In two experiments, a facility dog did not prejudice mock jurors against the defendant or change perceptions of the child, while a teddy bear was prejudicial in one experiment but not the other (Burd & McQuiston, 2019).

Expert Testimony and Judicial Directions

Early simulations found that expert testimony on children’s cognitive development changed jurors’ ratings of the child on the topics addressed, including memory and susceptibility to suggestion, and that jurors rated the testimony as helpful and impartial (Crowley et al., 1994). Another experiment found participants less persuaded by testimony based on probabilistic group data, such as syndrome evidence, than by testimony describing the individual case, regardless of the strength of cross-examination (Kovera et al., 1994). That is a caution: the testimony jurors found most persuasive is the kind courts restrict, because it comes closest to vouching.

In Australian simulations, endorsement of CSA misconceptions lowered complainant credibility and guilty verdicts among 130 community volunteers, and a judicial direction given before the child testified raised credibility, which predicted guilty verdicts (Goodman-Delahunty et al., 2010). Among 885 jurors, half deliberating in groups, greater post-trial knowledge about CSA was associated with higher credibility ratings and higher odds of conviction, and a judicial direction produced more knowledge than expert interventions (Goodman-Delahunty et al., 2021). An American study of a case involving recantation found that expert testimony grounded in current research produced higher credibility and rigor ratings than testimony framed around the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, which the authors characterized as not grounded in scientific testing, and more guilty verdicts than no expert (Denne et al., 2021).

Two qualifications apply. These studies show that education changes knowledge, credibility ratings, and verdicts, not that the changed verdicts are more accurate, because simulated cases have no ground truth. And most of this work tested education addressing beliefs that disadvantage complainants; education addressing beliefs that can disadvantage defendants, such as the belief that growing detail signals truthfulness, has received less study, and it is not known how jurors respond to it.

Limits of the Evidence

Most of this research uses college students or community volunteers reading summaries or watching brief simulations, without the stakes or full record of a real trial. A systematic review of credibility research in child sexual assault cases found that about two-thirds of experiments were American and used undergraduates, about 60% measured credibility with a single item, and 53% used materials not based on a child’s actual testimony (Voogt et al., 2019). Many foundational studies are 20 to 30 years old. The real-juror study shows what jurors asked, not what they concluded, and the Swedish study concerns judges.

The research describes group tendencies. It cannot show what a particular juror believes, whether a belief would affect a verdict, or whether a particular child’s account is accurate. Nor does near-chance lie detection mean that children’s reports are generally unreliable; the experiments use laboratory paradigms rather than reports of abuse, and they show only that a factfinder’s impression of a child, standing alone, is a weak guide to accuracy in either direction.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When the finding that only 43% of respondents recognized that abused children may deny abuse when asked by a trusted adult is offered (Quas et al., 2005), an attorney can ask who was studied and whether it applies to these members: the sample was 169 college students and 148 people reporting for jury duty in California. When the finding that adults identified children’s lies at a rate not different from chance (47.5%) is cited (Gongola et al., 2017), the question is whether the conclusion follows from the design, since laboratory paradigms show that demeanor is a weak guide in either direction, not that children’s reports are generally unreliable. When simulations in which a judicial direction raised credibility and guilty verdicts are cited (Goodman-Delahunty et al., 2010; Goodman-Delahunty et al., 2021), the question is what exactly was counted: changed verdicts in cases with no ground truth, not more accurate ones. When the 52% figure on growing detail is cited to support education on beliefs that can disadvantage defendants, the question is how much evidence rests on such education, which has received less study. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Juror Knowledge and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as amended effective December 1, 2023, requires the proponent to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the expert’s specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact and that the opinion reflects a reliable application of reliable methods to sufficient facts. Research on juror knowledge bears on helpfulness: a proponent can point to surveys showing that a subject is not common knowledge, and an opponent can argue that a point is within ordinary experience. Military Rule of Evidence 702 tracks the federal rule, and the 2023 amendment was incorporated in the 2025 Military Rules of Evidence amendments (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025). United States v. Houser (1993) sets out six factors for admitting expert testimony in courts-martial, including the subject matter of the testimony and whether it will assist the members.

The limits are well established. United States v. Brooks (2007) held that expert testimony quantifying how rarely allegations like the complainant’s prove false was the functional equivalent of vouching, and United States v. Mullins (2010) held that an expert may describe behaviors associated with abuse but may not testify to the complainant’s credibility or the accused’s guilt. The mock-jury finding that case-specific testimony persuades more than general education is consistent with the reason courts confine experts to the general.

Federal law presumes that a child is competent to testify (18 U.S.C. § 3509(c)). Under Maryland v. Craig (1990), a child may testify by one-way closed-circuit television if the court finds, on a case-specific showing, that the procedure is necessary to protect the child’s welfare, that the child would be traumatized by the defendant’s presence rather than by the courtroom generally, and that the distress would be more than minimal, while the oath, cross-examination, and the factfinder’s observation of demeanor are preserved; Coy v. Iowa (1988) held that a screen used without individualized findings violated the right to face-to-face confrontation. Section 3509(b) implements these principles in federal court, Military Rule of Evidence 611(d) governs remote child testimony in courts-martial. The finding that closed-circuit testimony did not impair discrimination but lowered evaluations of the child bears on both sides of the arguments these provisions generate. Members may submit questions to witnesses, a long-recognized practice that does not by itself make members partial (United States v. Gray, 1999). Finally, sex may not be used to select or strike jurors (J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 1994), so the gender research cannot guide selection; questions about a prospective juror’s own beliefs and experiences remain permissible and fit the research, which finds that attitudes explain much of the gender difference.

Arizona

Arizona adopted a Daubert-based Rule 702 in 2012 and conformed it to the 2023 federal amendment effective January 1, 2024 (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004). In State v. Salazar-Mercado (2014), the Arizona Supreme Court held that Rule 702 permits “cold” expert testimony educating jurors about general behavioral characteristics of child sexual abuse victims without applying them to the facts, if the testimony satisfies Rule 702(a) through (c) and survives Rule 403. State v. Haskie (2017) cautioned that such experts should not speak in broad, categorical terms about what is common without empirical support. The older anti-vouching cases remain controlling: an expert may describe general behavioral characteristics but may not opine on the truthfulness of a particular witness or of witnesses of that type, or quantify how often such complainants tell the truth (State v. Lindsey, 1986, 149 Ariz. at 473–75; State v. Moran, 1986).

In Arizona criminal trials every person is competent to be a witness (A.R.S. § 13-4061), and A.R.S. § 13-4253 provides for a minor’s testimony by closed-circuit television or videotape on the required findings. Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 18.6(e) requires that jurors be instructed that they may submit written questions to witnesses, subject to the court’s authority to limit or prohibit them for good cause. Arizona jurors’ questions to a child or an expert can therefore reveal, during trial, the very expectations the research describes, such as doubts about delay or continued contact, and the court and parties can respond to them within the rules.

Other Jurisdictions

Other courts have relied on the premise that jurors hold misconceptions about child victims while confining experts to education. People v. McAlpin (1991) held that expert testimony on common reactions of child molestation victims is not admissible to prove abuse but may rehabilitate a child’s credibility when the defense suggests that conduct such as delayed reporting is inconsistent with the allegation, because such testimony helps disabuse jurors of commonly held misconceptions. State v. J.L.G. (2018) held that testimony about the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome is no longer admissible in New Jersey except as to delayed disclosure, and then only when beyond the understanding of the average juror, making juror knowledge an explicit admissibility question.

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports the view that many jurors expect a child who was abused to disclose promptly and completely, to show visible but moderate distress, to resist, and to avoid the accused, and that these expectations lower mock jurors’ credibility ratings and guilty verdicts when a child’s account does not fit them. Real jurors’ questions about delay, resistance, and continued contact show the same expectations at work in actual trials. Prosecutors can identify which expectations a particular case raises, to address them in voir dire, and to offer general educational testimony or seek an educative instruction on those specific points; the Australian simulations suggest that a judicial direction may be at least as effective as an expert. Testimony confined to general research findings, stated with appropriate qualification and without categorical claims, is the form that Arizona, federal, and military courts permit and the form least likely to create appellate risk.

The research also counsels caution. The same surveys show that substantial minorities of jurors overestimate children’s memory for very early events and underestimate how much more children are influenced by leading questions than adults, and that most overestimate a psychologist’s ability to tell whether a child’s account was influenced, so jurors’ intuitions do not uniformly favor complainants. The mock-jury evidence that case-specific credibility testimony is especially persuasive is the reason courts bar it, and testimony that drifts from education toward endorsement of the child’s account invites reversal under Lindsey, Brooks, and Mullins. Because jurors detect inaccuracy poorly from demeanor alone, a case is strongest when it rests on how the account was obtained and on independent corroboration rather than on the child’s presentation.

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports attention to beliefs that can disadvantage defendants: that confident, consistent, or increasingly detailed accounts must be accurate, that memory works like a recording, that children are no more suggestible than adults, and that an expert can tell whether a child’s account has been influenced. Defense counsel can explore these beliefs in voir dire, to offer or request education on memory and suggestibility where the record shows suggestive questioning or pre-interview contamination, and to ensure that any expert’s claims about a child’s account stay within what the science supports, whichever party calls the expert. The finding that adults identify children’s lies at near-chance rates, and are confidently wrong about false denials, supports focusing jurors on the interview record and independent evidence rather than on impressions of the child.

The research also counsels caution. Misconceptions about delayed and incremental disclosure, demeanor, and continued contact are documented across surveys, simulations, and real jurors’ questions, and arguments that rely on them, such as suggesting that a child who was abused would have told at once, cried, or fought back, are not supported by the research and can be answered by it. Detection research does not show that children’s reports are generally unreliable; it shows that impressions of demeanor are a weak guide in either direction. Challenges to prospective jurors should rest on their own answers about beliefs and experiences, not on their sex or on a history of abuse, which the research associates with modest differences in judgments; it does not show that such jurors cannot be fair, and the severity of a juror’s own abuse added nothing to guilt judgments in mock trials (Jones-Cieminski et al., 2026).

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

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Legal Authorities

Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).

J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).

Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990).

People v. McAlpin, 53 Cal. 3d 1289, 812 P.2d 563 (1991).

State v. Haskie, 242 Ariz. 582, 399 P.3d 657 (2017).

State v. J.L.G., 234 N.J. 265, 190 A.3d 442 (2018).

State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).

State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986).

State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).

United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).

United States v. Gray, 51 M.J. 1 (C.A.A.F. 1999).

United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).

United States v. Mullins, 69 M.J. 113 (C.A.A.F. 2010).

U.S. Const. amend. VI.

18 U.S.C. § 3509.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4061.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4253.

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

Mil. R. Evid. 611(d), 702.

Ariz. R. Evid. 702.

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.6(e).

Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004 (amending Ariz. R. Evid. 702, effective Jan. 1, 2024).

Related topic papers: Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: Daubert, Frye, and Arizona’s Cold-Expert Cases · Vouching, Bolstering, and Profile Evidence · Confrontation, Child Hearsay, and Remote Testimony · Delayed Disclosure: Timing, Age, and Gender · Children’s Suggestibility: What the Research Shows · The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS)

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Memory in the Courtroom · Counterintuitive Testimony · Courts-Martial