Snap Shot
- The question: When may a child’s out-of-court statements be used at trial, and when may a child testify outside the defendant’s presence?
- What the research shows: Testifying is stressful for many children, and fear of facing the defendant is the most common concern. In one transcript study, self-contradictions appeared in 95 percent of cases, and suggestive questions produced more than any other question type. Mock-trial studies suggest closed-circuit testimony may reduce anxiety and, for some younger children, suggestibility, without impairing jurors’ already limited ability to detect inaccuracy, though it may lead jurors to view the children somewhat less favorably.
- What it does not show: These are group tendencies, mostly from mock-trial and observational studies. They cannot show whether a particular child’s statement is accurate, whether a particular child will be traumatized by the defendant’s presence, or whether a contradiction on cross-examination means the original account was wrong.
- The law: Testimonial statements of a child who is not cross-examined are barred (Crawford), but statements to teachers and others not charged with law enforcement are often nontestimonial (Clark, Squire). Remote testimony requires a case-specific necessity finding (Craig, Coy, McCollum, Vincent, Padilla); Arizona has no child-specific hearsay exception (Robinson, Taylor).
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors should support remote testimony with evidence about the particular child and not offer a law-enforcement interview in place of cross-examined testimony; defense counsel should test each statement’s primary purpose, recognizing that many child statements are nontestimonial.
Child sexual abuse (CSA) is common and underreported, and when it does come to light it often reaches the legal system through something a child said outside the courtroom: a remark to a parent, an answer to a teacher’s question, a history given to a physician, or a recorded forensic interview. By the time of trial, months or years later, the child may be frightened of testifying, may remember less, may be too young to be found competent, or may be unwilling to repeat the account. Children interviewed well can give accurate, detailed accounts, and many do testify effectively. But in a substantial share of cases the question whether the child’s earlier words may be heard, and how the child may testify, becomes as important as anything the child says on the stand.
Two bodies of law govern these questions. The rules of evidence decide whether a child’s out-of-court statement fits a hearsay exception. The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, and its Arizona counterpart, decide whether a statement that fits an exception may nonetheless be used against the accused without the child’s live, cross-examined testimony, and whether the child may testify outside the defendant’s physical presence. A third body of knowledge, the developmental and legal-psychology research on child witnesses, bears on both: it describes what testifying is like for children, how courtroom questioning affects the accuracy of their answers, and what closed-circuit and recorded testimony do and do not change.
This paper summarizes that research and its limits, then reviews the constitutional framework from Ohio v. Roberts through Crawford v. Washington and Ohio v. Clark, the face-to-face confrontation cases, and the federal, military, and Arizona provisions on child hearsay and remote testimony. It is a summary for orientation; the doctrine is intricate and continues to develop; in 2025, when the Supreme Court declined review in Franklin v. New York, two Justices wrote that the testimonial framework should be reconsidered.
Why Children’s Out-of-Court Statements Reach Court
Many children who disclose abuse first tell someone in their everyday lives, such as a parent or another trusted adult, and only later speak to investigators; adolescents more often tell a friend first (see the adolescent complainants paper and the paper on why and to whom children disclose). Those first conversations are usually unplanned and unrecorded. The adult’s later account of what the child said may be the only evidence of how the allegation arose, and it is often offered under the hearsay exceptions for excited utterances, statements for medical diagnosis or treatment, or the residual exception. Each exception has its own foundation requirements, and none turns on whether the account is true.
The recorded forensic interview occupies a different position. It is conducted by a trained interviewer, often at a child advocacy center and in coordination with law enforcement or child protective services, for the purpose of learning what happened in a form that can be reviewed later. A recording preserves the questions as well as the answers, which allows any party, any expert, and the factfinder to evaluate whether the child’s account was produced in response to open invitations or to leading and suggestive questions. That feature is what makes the recording valuable to both sides. It is also what makes the recording, in most cases, the kind of statement the Confrontation Clause regulates most closely, because its primary purpose is usually to establish past events for possible use in a prosecution.
The legal analysis of an out-of-court statement is separate from the scientific evaluation of its reliability, which other papers in this hub address. A statement may be admissible yet elicited under conditions that weaken it, or excluded on confrontation grounds though obtained with care. Neither ruling resolves whether the abuse occurred.
Children as Courtroom Witnesses: Stress and Fear
Research on children who testify in criminal cases, much of it from Goodman et al. (1992) and later reviews, has generally found that the experience is stressful for many children and that fear of facing the defendant is the most commonly expressed concern. In a study of 218 children in sexual abuse prosecutions, Goodman et al. (1992) compared children who testified with matched children who did not. Seven months after testimony, the children who testified showed more behavioral disturbance, particularly those who testified more than once, lacked maternal support, or had little corroboration for their accounts; once the prosecutions ended, the differences diminished. In courthouse interviews, the children’s main fear was having to face the defendant, and children who appeared more frightened of the defendant while testifying were less able to answer the prosecutor’s questions. Age and severity of the alleged abuse were the most pervasive predictors of the children’s courtroom experiences.
Quas and Goodman (2012) later reviewed the research on the consequences of criminal court involvement for child victims, which identifies features of the legal process associated with better and worse outcomes for children. Lyon and Dente (2012) drew on this research in a legal analysis of the Confrontation Clause, arguing that the dynamics of many abuse cases, including the child’s dependence on or relationship with the accused, can make a child’s inability or unwillingness to testify foreseeable.
These findings describe group tendencies: testifying is difficult for many children, and fear of the defendant can impair some children’s ability to communicate. They do not show that any particular child will be unable to testify, that a particular child’s reluctance reflects fear of the accused rather than another cause, or that a child who testifies with difficulty is less accurate. Those are case-specific questions, which is why the constitutional standard for remote testimony requires a case-specific finding.
Questioning Children in Court
The courtroom differs sharply from a well-conducted forensic interview, and transcript research shows that attorneys on both sides rely heavily on closed-ended questions. Andrews et al. (2015) examined 120 transcripts of children aged 6 to 12 testifying about sexual abuse in U.S. criminal trials, comprising nearly 49,000 question-and-answer pairs. Open-ended invitations were rare from either side. Prosecutors used more invitations, directives, and option-posing questions; defense attorneys used more suggestive questions; children were less responsive to defense questioning. Self-contradictions appeared in 95 percent of the cases. Defense questioning elicited more of them, but most prosecutors also elicited at least one, and suggestive questions produced more self-contradictions than any other question type. The authors concluded that neither side generally questioned children in developmentally appropriate ways.
Experimental research helps interpret what such contradictions mean. In a study of 5- and 6-year-old children questioned about a staged event, Zajac and Hayne (2003) found that cross-examination-style questioning led children to change their earlier answers whether those answers had been accurate or inaccurate, so that cross-examination lowered overall accuracy rather than reliably correcting errors. A follow-up study reported that older children were not immune to the effect (Zajac & Hayne, 2006), and a later review of the research reached similar conclusions (Zajac et al., 2012). These findings cut in more than one direction. They suggest that changes elicited by leading or confusing cross-examination are not a dependable measure of whether the original account was true. They also confirm that suggestive questioning can produce inaccurate answers from children, a principle that applies equally to the forensic interview and to direct examination.
None of this suggests that cross-examining children is improper. Cross-examination is a constitutional guarantee and can expose genuine gaps, contamination, and inconsistencies. What the research supports is that the form of questioning matters, and that developmentally appropriate questions produce more informative answers for both sides.
Remote Testimony and Recorded Statements
Closed-circuit television allows a child to testify from another room while counsel question the child and the courtroom watches; two-way systems also show the courtroom or the defendant to the child. Mock-trial research gives a partial picture of the effects. In Goodman et al. (1998), children aged 5 to 6 and 8 to 9 played with an unfamiliar adult and about two weeks later testified about it in a real courtroom, live or by closed-circuit television, before community mock juries. Testifying in open court was associated with greater pretrial anxiety, and closed-circuit testimony was associated with reduced suggestibility among the younger children. Closed-circuit technology did not reduce the mock jurors’ ability to distinguish accurate from inaccurate testimony and did not directly bias them against the defendant, but it did lead jurors to view the child witnesses less favorably. In a follow-up study, Orcutt et al. (2001) had children aged 7 to 9 testify truthfully or deceptively about an event and found no support for the view that jurors detect children’s deception better in open court than over closed-circuit television. Before deliberation, mock jurors were less likely to convict when the child testified deceptively than when the child described the event truthfully, but that difference disappeared after deliberation.
Landström and Granhag (2010) compared live testimony, two-way closed-circuit television, and prerecorded video among 108 children describing an experienced or imagined event, observed by 240 adult mock jurors. Observers perceived children more positively the closer the presentation mode was to live testimony, while fewer of the children who testified on video reported being nervous. Taken together, these studies suggest that remote testimony may reduce children’s anxiety and, for some younger children, suggestibility, without impairing jurors’ already limited ability to detect inaccuracy, but that it may modestly reduce how favorably jurors view the child. Both effects bear on how each side evaluates a request for remote testimony.
Where a recording stands in for some of the child’s live testimony, its quality matters to every party. In England and Wales, a recorded investigative interview may serve as the child’s evidence-in-chief. In 80 such interviews of 7- to 15-year-olds who disclosed sexual abuse, the first event the child described was more coherent than later ones, interviewer support was associated with clearer chronology, and generic “script” accounts of repeated abuse were associated with lower consistency and chronology (VanMeter et al., 2023). The study measured the coherence of the narrative, not its accuracy, and comes from one country’s interview practice.
Limits of the Evidence
The courtroom research has important limits. Mock-trial studies use staged, non-abusive events, short delays, and simulated proceedings; their participants know that no one will be punished, and the children are not testifying about events involving a trusted adult or a family member. Field studies of real child witnesses are observational and cannot randomly assign children to testify or not, so differences between groups may reflect case characteristics rather than the effects of testifying. Transcript studies describe how attorneys question children but cannot determine which answers were accurate, because the underlying facts are unknown. Much of the research is now decades old, and courtroom technology, victim-support practices, and legal procedures have changed.
Most important, no study can tell a court whether a particular child’s out-of-court statement is accurate, whether a particular child will be traumatized by testifying in the defendant’s presence, or whether a particular contradiction on cross-examination reflects error in the original account. Those determinations depend on the facts of the case and, where the law requires a finding, on case-specific evidence such as the testimony of a clinician who has evaluated the child. Group-level research can inform such testimony; it cannot substitute for it.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When the finding that children who testified showed more behavioral disturbance (Goodman et al., 1992) is offered to support remote testimony, ask who was compared with whom and whether it applies to this child: the study was observational, differences may reflect case characteristics, and the law requires a case-specific finding. When a contradiction elicited on cross-examination is offered as showing that the original account was wrong, ask whether that conclusion follows, since self-contradictions appeared in 95 percent of the cases studied (Andrews et al., 2015) and cross-examination-style questioning led 5- and 6-year-olds to change accurate and inaccurate answers alike (Zajac & Hayne, 2003). When mock-trial studies are cited to show that closed-circuit testimony does not impair jurors’ ability to detect inaccuracy (Goodman et al., 1998; Orcutt et al., 2001), ask whether they fit this case, given staged events, short delays, and simulated proceedings. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Confrontation, Child Hearsay, and the Law
The Constitutional Framework
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” Under Ohio v. Roberts (1980), an unavailable declarant’s statement could be admitted if it bore adequate indicia of reliability, either by falling within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or by showing particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Idaho v. Wright (1990) applied that test to a young child’s statements to a pediatrician, holding that reliability had to be shown from the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement rather than from corroborating evidence, and noting the interviewer’s use of leading questions and the absence of a recording. White v. Illinois (1992) held that a child’s spontaneous declarations and statements for medical treatment could be admitted without a showing of unavailability.
Crawford v. Washington (2004) replaced the Roberts reliability test for testimonial statements. Testimonial statements of a witness who does not testify are admissible only if the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination, however reliable they may appear. Davis v. Washington (2006) supplied the primary-purpose test: statements are nontestimonial when made under circumstances objectively indicating that their primary purpose is to enable assistance in an ongoing emergency, and testimonial when the primary purpose is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to a later prosecution. Michigan v. Bryant (2011) directed courts to assess primary purpose objectively, considering the circumstances, the formality of the encounter, and the statements and actions of both declarant and questioner.
Ohio v. Clark (2015) applied the framework to a child. A three-year-old, whom the trial court had found incompetent to testify, identified the defendant to his preschool teachers as the person who had injured him. The Court unanimously held the statements nontestimonial, reasoning that the teachers’ primary purpose was to identify and end a threat to the child’s safety; that statements to persons not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting crime are significantly less likely to be testimonial; that, in the Court’s words, “[s]tatements by very young children will rarely, if ever, implicate the Confrontation Clause”; and that a teacher’s mandatory-reporting duty does not by itself make the exchange testimonial. The Court declined to adopt a categorical rule for statements to persons other than law enforcement.
Several further principles recur in child cases. When the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination, the Clause places no constraint on the use of the declarant’s prior statements (Crawford, 2004, n.9; California v. Green, 1970), and a witness’s claimed lack of memory does not by itself make the witness unavailable for cross-examination (United States v. Owens, 1988); whether a child who takes the stand but cannot or will not answer substantive questions has been subject to cross-examination is a question on which courts have differed. Forfeiture by wrongdoing applies only where the defendant engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifying (Giles v. California, 2008). Smith v. Arizona (2024) held that when an expert conveys an absent declarant’s statements in support of an opinion, and the opinion supports the prosecution only if the statements are true, the statements are offered for their truth; an expert may not serve as a conduit for testimonial statements of a non-testifying child. Kentucky v. Stincer (1987) held that excluding the defendant from a child’s competency hearing did not violate the Clause where full cross-examination at trial was available, and Pennsylvania v. Ritchie (1987) held that the Clause creates no pretrial right to child protective services records, although due process required in camera review for material information.
The face-to-face element of confrontation is addressed separately. Coy v. Iowa (1988) held that placing a screen between the defendant and child complainants, under a statute presuming trauma without any individualized finding, violated the Clause. Maryland v. Craig (1990) upheld one-way closed-circuit testimony where the trial court found, on case-specific evidence, that the procedure was necessary to protect the welfare of the particular child, that the child would be traumatized by the defendant’s presence rather than by the courtroom generally, and that the distress would be more than de minimis. Because the child testifies under oath, is cross-examined, and is observed by the factfinder, Craig procedures do not involve the out-of-court statements with which Crawford is concerned.
Federal and Military Standards
Federal courts evaluate child statements under the general hearsay exceptions, including Federal Rules of Evidence 803(2) (excited utterance), 803(4) (statements for medical diagnosis or treatment), 801(d)(1)(B) (prior consistent statements of a testifying witness), and the residual exception in Rule 807, subject to Rule 403. The Federal Rules contain no child-specific hearsay exception. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b), the court may order a child’s testimony taken by two-way closed-circuit television, or by videotaped deposition, if it finds on the record that the child cannot testify in open court in the defendant’s presence because of fear, a substantial likelihood established by expert testimony that the child would suffer emotional trauma, a mental or other infirmity, or conduct by the defendant or defense counsel that causes the child to be unable to continue.
In courts-martial, Military Rule of Evidence 611(d) and Rule for Courts-Martial 914A authorize remote live testimony of a child on findings on the record that remote testimony is necessary to protect the welfare of the particular child, that the child would be traumatized by the accused’s presence rather than by the courtroom generally, and that the child’s distress is more than de minimis (Mil. R. Evid. 611(d)(3)). The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has required a case-specific necessity finding showing that the child’s distress stems from the accused’s presence and is more than de minimis (United States v. McCollum, 2003); held that Craig remains good law after Crawford (United States v. Pack, 2007); and found no plain error under the Confrontation Clause where a child testifying remotely was told, inaccurately, that the accused was not watching, while leaving open whether the practice violates the Sixth Amendment (United States v. Bench, 2022). On child hearsay, the court has held that a child’s statements to a sexual assault nurse examiner during an examination arranged by law enforcement were testimonial (United States v. Gardinier, 2007, applying the testimonial factors of United States v. Rankin, 2007), and that a child’s statements to an emergency physician and to a pediatrician performing a forensic examination were nontestimonial where the histories were taken primarily for medical purposes (United States v. Squire, 2013). Military Rules of Evidence 803(4) and 807 parallel the federal rules, and these issues arise most often in prosecutions under Article 120b, UCMJ.
Arizona
The Arizona Constitution guarantees the accused the right “to meet the witnesses against him face to face” (Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24). In State v. Robinson (1987), the Arizona Supreme Court held unconstitutional A.R.S. § 13-1416, a statutory child-hearsay exception, because it conflicted with and displaced the rules of evidence, which are within the court’s rulemaking authority (153 Ariz. at 196–98). The court directed that the admissibility of child hearsay be determined under the rules of evidence and upheld admission of the child’s statements under the medical-diagnosis exception, including statements identifying the abuser where identity was relevant to diagnosis and treatment (153 Ariz. at 199–200), and the residual exceptions (now Ariz. R. Evid. 807; 153 Ariz. at 200–02). Arizona’s rules contain no child-specific hearsay exception.
Arizona’s statutes on child testimony apply to a “minor,” defined as a person under fifteen or a person with a specified developmental disability and a tested intelligence quotient below seventy-five (A.R.S. § 13-4251). On the prosecution’s motion, A.R.S. § 13-4253 permits a minor’s testimony to be taken outside the courtroom and televised by closed-circuit equipment or recorded for later showing, with the defendant able to observe and hear the testimony but the minor unable to see or hear the defendant. A.R.S. § 13-4252 sets conditions for admitting a recording of a minor’s pretrial statement, including that the interviewer be available for cross-examination, the minor be available to testify, and the questioning not have been calculated to lead the minor to a particular statement. Applying Robinson‘s reasoning, the Arizona Court of Appeals held § 13-4252 unconstitutional in State v. Taylor (1999, ¶ 11), because it expands on and conflicts with the hearsay rules adopted by the Arizona Supreme Court; a recorded statement must instead qualify under the Arizona Rules of Evidence (one judge, concurring in the result, would have found the statute unconstitutional only as applied, ¶ 22). Applying Coy, the Arizona Supreme Court held in State v. Vincent (1989) that taking children’s testimony by the recorded procedure of § 13-4253 violated the defendant’s confrontation rights where the trial court made no particularized findings that the procedure was necessary for those children and relied instead on generalized conclusions. In State ex rel. Montgomery v. Padilla (2016), the Court of Appeals, applying Craig, held that restrictions on face-to-face confrontation of a child witness, including restrictions on a self-represented defendant’s personal cross-examination, require an individualized, case-specific showing of necessity for each child by clear and convincing evidence. Smith v. Arizona (2024), an Arizona case, governs expert testimony that relays absent declarants’ statements.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The law and research support several approaches that protect both the child and the record. A child’s spontaneous statements to parents, teachers, and other adults not charged with law enforcement, statements made to address an ongoing emergency, and histories taken primarily for medical treatment are often nontestimonial under Clark, Squire, and similar decisions, and may be admitted under a properly founded hearsay exception. Where a child is frightened of the defendant, remote testimony under Craig, 18 U.S.C. § 3509, Mil. R. Evid. 611(d), or A.R.S. § 13-4253 is available on a case-specific showing, and the research suggests it can reduce anxiety and, for some younger children, suggestibility. The showing is strongest when it rests on evidence about the particular child, often from a clinician who has evaluated the child, tied to the defendant’s presence rather than to the courtroom in general. A well-conducted, fully recorded forensic interview allows the factfinder and experts to evaluate how the questions shaped the answers, which supports the reliability of the account when the interviewer used open-ended questions.
The research and case law also counsel caution. A recorded forensic interview conducted in coordination with law enforcement is frequently testimonial, and offering it in place of the testimony of a child who was never cross-examined invites exclusion or reversal; under Smith v. Arizona, an expert who relays such statements as the basis for an opinion is treated as offering them for their truth. Generalized findings that children fear testifying cannot substitute for the individualized showing that Coy, Craig, McCollum, and Padilla require. Mock-jury research indicates that remote testimony may lead jurors to view a child somewhat less favorably, which is a factor in deciding whether to seek it. And because research shows that suggestive questioning produces contradictions on direct as well as cross-examination, developmentally appropriate questioning on direct protects the testimony that is given.
Special Issues for Defense
The Confrontation Clause is a core protection for the accused, and it applies directly when the prosecution offers a non-testifying child’s testimonial statements. The primary purpose of each exchange, including who arranged it, who was present, and how it was documented, should be examined statement by statement; Gardinier illustrates that a nominally medical examination arranged by law enforcement may be testimonial. Defense counsel can hold the prosecution to the individualized necessity finding required for remote testimony, to Giles‘s intent requirement for forfeiture, and to Smith v. Arizona‘s limits on experts who relay testimonial statements. Where hearsay is admitted, the recording of the interview, or its absence, and the questioning that produced each statement are legitimate subjects for scrutiny, consistent with Idaho v. Wright‘s attention to the circumstances in which a statement was made.
The research and case law also counsel caution about overreading. Clark holds that many statements by young children to parents, teachers, and others are nontestimonial, so a confrontation objection is not a general bar to child hearsay; when the child testifies and is cross-examined, the objection shifts to hearsay law. Research on cross-examination shows that young children often change accurate answers under leading or repetitive questioning, so contradictions produced that way may not show that the original account was false, and factfinders may weigh them accordingly. An objection that remote testimony prejudices jurors against the accused finds limited support in the mock-trial research, which found no direct bias against the defendant and no loss in jurors’ ability to detect inaccurate testimony. Cross-examination is most informative when its questions are clear and developmentally appropriate.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Andrews, S. J., Lamb, M. E., & Lyon, T. D. (2015). Question types, responsiveness and self-contradictions when prosecutors and defense attorneys question alleged victims of child sexual abuse. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 29(2), 253–261. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3103
Goodman, G. S., Taub, E. P., Jones, D. P., England, P., Port, L. K., Rudy, L., & Prado, L. (1992). Testifying in criminal court: Emotional effects on child sexual assault victims. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 57(5), 1–142. https://doi.org/10.2307/1166127
Goodman, G. S., Tobey, A. E., Batterman-Faunce, J. M., Orcutt, H., Thomas, S., Shapiro, C., & Sachsenmaier, T. (1998). Face-to-face confrontation: Effects of closed-circuit technology on children’s eyewitness testimony and jurors’ decisions. Law and Human Behavior, 22(2), 165–203. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1025742119977
Landström, S., & Granhag, P. A. (2010). In-court versus out-of-court testimonies: Children’s experiences and adults’ assessments. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 24(7), 941–955. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.1606
Lyon, T. D., & Dente, J. A. (2012). Child witnesses and the Confrontation Clause. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 102(4), 1181–1232.
Orcutt, H. K., Goodman, G. S., Tobey, A. E., Batterman-Faunce, J. M., & Thomas, S. (2001). Detecting deception in children’s testimony: Factfinders’ abilities to reach the truth in open court and closed-circuit trials. Law and Human Behavior, 25(4), 339–372. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010603618330
Quas, J. A., & Goodman, G. S. (2012). Consequences of criminal court involvement for child victims. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 18(3), 392–414. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0026146
VanMeter, F., Henderson, H., Konovalov, H., Karni-Visel, Y., & Blasbalg, U. (2023). Children’s narrative coherence in “Achieving Best Evidence” forensic interviews and courtroom testimony. Psychology, Crime & Law, 29(2), 203–221. https://doi.org/10.1080/1068316X.2021.2018438
Zajac, R., & Hayne, H. (2003). I don’t think that’s what really happened: The effect of cross-examination on the accuracy of children’s reports. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 9(3), 187–195. https://doi.org/10.1037/1076-898X.9.3.187
Zajac, R., & Hayne, H. (2006). The negative effect of cross-examination style questioning on children’s accuracy: Older children are not immune. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 20(1), 3–16. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.1169
Zajac, R., O’Neill, S., & Hayne, H. (2012). Disorder in the courtroom? Child witnesses under cross-examination. Developmental Review, 32(3), 181–204. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dr.2012.06.006
Legal Authorities
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (decided with Hammon v. Indiana).
Franklin v. New York, No. 24-330 (U.S. Mar. 24, 2025) (cert. denied) (statements of Alito, J., and Gorsuch, J.).
Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008).
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987).
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011).
Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237 (2015).
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779 (2024).
State ex rel. Montgomery v. Padilla, 239 Ariz. 314, 371 P.3d 642 (App. 2016).
State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191, 735 P.2d 801 (1987).
State v. Taylor, 196 Ariz. 584, 2 P.3d 674 (App. 1999).
State v. Vincent, 159 Ariz. 418, 768 P.2d 150 (1989).
United States v. Bench, 82 M.J. 388 (C.A.A.F. 2022).
United States v. Gardinier, 65 M.J. 60 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
United States v. McCollum, 58 M.J. 323 (C.A.A.F. 2003).
United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988).
United States v. Pack, 65 M.J. 381 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
United States v. Rankin, 64 M.J. 348 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
United States v. Squire, 72 M.J. 285 (C.A.A.F. 2013).
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
U.S. Const. amend. VI.
Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24.
10 U.S.C. § 920b (Article 120b, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
18 U.S.C. § 3509.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1416 (held unconstitutional in State v. Robinson).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-4251 to 13-4253.
Fed. R. Evid. 403, 801(d)(1)(B), 803(2), 803(4), 807.
Ariz. R. Evid. 803(4), 807.
Mil. R. Evid. 611(d), 803(4), 807.
R.C.M. 914A.
Related topic papers: Forensic Interviews of Children: Purpose, Protocols, and Practice · Question Types and Evaluating a Forensic Interview from the Record · Taint Hearings and Child Witness Competency · Vouching, Bolstering, and Profile Evidence · Repeated Interviews of Children · Why and to Whom Children Disclose · Recantation in Child Sexual Abuse Cases
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Courts-Martial · Memory in the Courtroom