Snap Shot
- The question: Whom do children tell about sexual abuse, why do they tell, and what do those patterns say about whether an account is accurate?
- What the research shows: Children weigh barriers such as fear of disbelief, shame, and loyalty to the person responsible against facilitators such as a trusted person and being asked. Older children and adolescents often tell a peer first; younger children more often tell a parent, usually the mother. In one sample of 257 substantiated cases, 23.1% of children recanted, more often when the nonoffending caregiver was unsupportive.
- What it does not show: None of these patterns is diagnostic. A child’s reasons for telling and choice of confidant explain behavior but do not establish that abuse occurred, and most studies draw on substantiated or clinical cases, much of it on retrospective self-report. A supportive listener can also shape the account through repeated or specific questioning.
- The law: Courts allow general educational testimony (Flesher, Lindsey, Salazar-Mercado) but bar vouching (Mullins, Brooks); Haskie cautions against categorical claims about what is “common.” First-recipient testimony raises confrontation questions (Crawford, Ohio v. Clark) and prior-consistent-statement timing rules (Tome, Frost).
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors should keep testimony general and document every person the child told, what was asked, and when, before the forensic interview; defense counsel should examine the conversations between first disclosure and interview without treating ordinary disclosure circumstances as evidence of fabrication.
Child sexual abuse (CSA) is common, and much of it never comes to the attention of anyone in authority. When children do tell, they rarely tell a police officer or a child protection worker first. They tell a friend, a sibling, a parent, or another trusted person, often after a period of silence, and often only when something in the conversation gives them an opening. Who heard the first disclosure, why the child chose that person and that moment, and how the listener responded are recurring questions in litigation. The first recipient is frequently a witness; the circumstances of the first disclosure shape what a forensic interviewer later hears; and the reaction the child received may help explain later reluctance, inconsistency, or recantation.
The research on these questions is extensive; its broad themes are consistent, although many specific predictors are not. It shows that children weigh identifiable reasons to tell against identifiable reasons to stay silent, that the choice of confidant follows developmental and relational patterns, and that a believing, supportive response is associated with fuller disclosure and better adjustment. It also has firm limits. The reasons a child had for telling or not telling explain behavior; they do not establish whether the reported events occurred. And the same believing adult whose support helps a child talk can, by questioning or prompting, shape what the child says.
This paper summarizes the barriers and facilitators of disclosure, the reasons children give for telling, the patterns in whom they tell, the effects of the response a disclosure receives, and the distinction between support and suggestion. It then describes the limits of the evidence, the law governing expert testimony and children’s out-of-court disclosures in federal, military, and Arizona courts, and the recurring issues for prosecutors and defense counsel. A companion paper addresses how long children wait to tell and how timing varies with age and gender.
Disclosure as a Balance of Barriers and Facilitators
Reviews of the disclosure literature describe telling as an interactive process rather than a single event. A systematic review of 33 studies published between 2000 and 2016 concluded that disclosure is iterative and best understood in its relational and social context, and that barriers continue to be identified more often than facilitators (Alaggia et al., 2019). A systematic review of 13 studies of children and adolescents identified limited support, anticipated negative consequences, and self-blame, shame, and guilt as barriers, and found that being asked or prompted with developmentally appropriate information helped children tell (Lemaigre et al., 2017). A 2024 systematic review of 27 quantitative studies identified 17 significant predictors of disclosure, including caregiver support, older age, and being female as facilitators and intellectual disability, a romantic relationship with the perpetrator, and domestic violence in the home as barriers; the authors cautioned that the associations were often mixed, contradictory, or indirect and depend on social context (Abdul Latiff et al., 2024).
Qualitative studies with young people describe the same tension from the inside. In interviews with 22 young people aged 8 to 18 and 14 parents, researchers described the active withholding of the secret, a “pressure cooker” conflict between wanting to tell and wanting to keep it hidden, and confiding that often occurred in a moment of shared intimacy (McElvaney et al., 2012). In focus groups with 34 preadolescent and adolescent girls in treatment, disclosure was described as a sequence of decisions about when, where, and whom to tell, with the girls adjusting later decisions to the reactions they received (Staller & Nelson-Gardell, 2005). These studies draw on children whose abuse was accepted by clinicians or researchers, a limit discussed below.
Barriers: Development, Fear, Shame, and Loyalty
For young children, the first barrier is understanding. A preschool child may not recognize sexual contact as wrong, may lack words to describe it, and may accept an adult’s explanation that it was a game or ordinary care. Such a child has no reason to report and, if the abuse comes to light, often does so through an unplanned remark or another person’s observation rather than a decision to tell (Alaggia et al., 2019; McElvaney, 2015). As children acquire the concepts and vocabulary to recognize what happened, the barriers shift toward the emotional and relational.
Among older children and adolescents, the reasons for silence are consistent across studies. In a study of 218 children whose cases had been referred for prosecution, children who felt more responsible for the abuse and who feared negative consequences of telling took longer to disclose, and abuse by a family member was associated with longer delay (Goodman-Brown et al., 2003). In anonymous telephone interviews with 36 Italian adolescents who had been sexually abused, the main obstacles to telling a family member were fear of not being believed, shame, and fear of causing trouble for the family; obstacles to seeking professional help included not knowing that protective agencies existed, not recognizing the experience as abuse, mistrust of adults, and fear of the consequences (Crisma et al., 2004). Threats, bribes, persuasion that the contact was normal, and loyalty to or dependence on the person responsible recur throughout this literature, and these barriers are strongest when that person is a family member or trusted adult.
Shame often operates without being named. In a thematic analysis of disclosure narratives from 47 young people aged 15 to 25 in Ireland and Canada, all of whom had received services for CSA, the words shame and ashamed rarely appeared, but implicit shame was evident in descriptions of feeling dirty or embarrassed, in self-blame, in not wanting others to know, and in indirect wording that avoided the term sexual abuse when they did tell; the authors linked this avoidance to nondisclosure, delayed disclosure, and reluctance to talk about the abuse (McElvaney et al., 2022). The study is qualitative and drawn from a service-connected sample, so it describes how shame can shape disclosure rather than how often it does.
Why Children Tell
When children tell deliberately, they usually have an identifiable reason. In interviews with 60 adult survivors about their childhood disclosures, reasons included wanting the abuse to stop, seeking support or help, closeness with the listener, reacting to something that evoked the memory, encouragement, and being asked directly (Lamb & Edgar-Smith, 1994). A qualitative meta-analysis of 20 studies identified six facilitators: access to a trusted person, realizing that the experience was not normal, being unable to contain emotional distress, wanting something done, expecting to be believed, and being asked (Brennan & McElvaney, 2020). Some children tell once the person responsible has left the household or is otherwise no longer a present threat.
The circumstances of telling matter as much as the motive. In a Norwegian study of 22 children whose caregivers had raised concerns about possible abuse, children described difficulty finding a private moment and a way to begin, sensitivity to how adults might react, and disclosure that became possible when they perceived an opportunity to talk, a purpose for speaking, and a connection between the conversation and their experience (Jensen et al., 2005).
That gives being asked a central and double-edged role. Many children disclose only when someone raises the subject, and a single open, nonleading question can give a child both permission and an opening to tell. The same research tradition that documents this facilitator also documents that leading, repeated, or pressured questioning can shape a child’s report. The value of being asked depends on how the child was asked, a subject addressed in the companion papers on question types and on misinformation and pre-interview contamination.
To Whom Children Disclose
Children tend to tell people they expect to be supportive, and who that is changes with age. A systematic review of 37 studies published between 1990 and 2017 found that children and youth tend to follow a gradual pathway, often confiding first in peers before telling a parent or other trusted adult who can help bring the matter to authorities; older children and adolescents were significantly more likely to turn to peers, which keeps much abuse hidden from adults; girls were more likely to tell a peer for emotional support, while boys were less likely to disclose at all and, when they did, more often did so for practical reasons such as protection or access to services (Manay & Collin-Vézina, 2021).
Population surveys of adolescents show the same pattern. In a Swedish survey of 4,339 high school seniors, most of those who reported sexual abuse and had told someone had told a friend of their own age, and few had told a professional or reported to the authorities (Priebe & Svedin, 2008). In a nationally representative Swiss survey of 6,787 ninth-grade students, disclosure rates ranged from about 44% to 58% among girls and from about 6% to 38% among boys depending on the type of event, and those who disclosed told peers most often; the survey counted noncontact events such as online harassment, and many reported perpetrators were themselves juveniles (Mohler-Kuo et al., 2014). Younger children who disclose are more likely to tell a parent, usually the mother, and the relationship between that parent and the alleged perpetrator affects both whether the child tells and how the parent responds (Elliott & Carnes, 2001; Everson et al., 1989).
A first disclosure is therefore often made to an informal recipient and may reach authorities only after passing through intermediaries. That sequence is ordinary. The identity of the first person told reflects whom the child trusted, had access to, or happened to be with when an opportunity arose; it does not, by itself, bear on whether the account is accurate. What can bear on accuracy is what happened in the conversations between the first disclosure and the first recorded interview, a question of documentation rather than of who the recipient was.
Reactions to Disclosure and Their Effects
How a disclosure is received is among the most consistent findings in this literature. A review of research on nonoffending parents concluded that most mothers believe their children’s allegations at least in part and that most are supportive or protective, but that a substantial number are not, that even generally supportive mothers often respond inconsistently or with ambivalence, that predictors of parental belief and support are inconsistent across studies, and that parental support is consistently associated with children’s adjustment (Elliott & Carnes, 2001). An early study of incest cases found that maternal support was more closely related to the mother’s relationship with the perpetrator than to characteristics of the child, and that lack of support was associated with foster placement and higher psychopathology scores (Everson et al., 1989). A critical review of research on reactions to disclosure, drawn mostly from adults recalling childhood disclosures, found clear evidence that negative social reactions are harmful to survivors’ well-being (Ullman, 2003).
Reactions also shape what children say next. In an Israeli study of 30 children abused by non-family members, half reported fearing their parents’ reactions, children who anticipated negative reactions were less willing to tell promptly, and their expectations closely matched how their parents actually responded (Hershkowitz et al., 2007). In a random sample of 257 substantiated cases that reached dependency court, 23.1% of children recanted at some point, and recantation was more likely among younger children, children abused by a parent figure, and children who lacked support from the nonoffending caregiver; the authors tested and did not find support for the alternative explanation that recantations reflected the inclusion of false allegations (Malloy et al., 2007). Across the studies discussed in this hub, reported recantation rates range from about 4% to about 27% depending on how the sample was drawn and how recantation was defined, and none shows what share of recantations in contested cases are accurate. Recantation is addressed in its own companion paper.
The response of professionals matters as well. A U.S. study analyzed hotline staff’s descriptions of 124 anonymous chats with youths whose abuse continued after they had told a mandated reporter. In 71% of cases the abuse was apparently not reported or not investigated, in some cases because the adult doubted or minimized the account; in 24% an investigation did not result in protection; and some youths described recanting, often out of fear (Kamke et al., 2024). The sample was selected for cases in which protection failed, and the accounts were anonymous and second-hand, so the study shows how a disclosure can go unheeded, not how often that happens.
Support Is Not Suggestion
A supportive response and a suggestive one can come from the same person in the same conversation. A parent who believes a child and calmly gives the child an opportunity to talk helps an account emerge. A parent who believes a child and then asks repeated or specific questions, names a suspect, expresses alarm at certain answers, or returns to the subject over days can, without intending to, introduce information that the child later reports. A review of research on parent-child conversations concluded that conversations with parents before formal interviews can shape what young children remember and report, and that such influence can operate without the parent’s awareness (Principe & London, 2022).
Research on adjustment links calm, supportive responses with better outcomes; research on pre-interview conversations indicates that repeated or specific questioning can shape what children later report. The distinction matters for both sides. Evidence that a caregiver was supportive does not show that the caregiver’s questioning was neutral, and evidence that a caregiver asked questions does not show that the child’s account was shaped by them. The useful inquiry is factual: what the child said first, in the child’s own words; what the adult asked and said in response; how many conversations occurred before the forensic interview; and whether any of this was recorded or promptly written down.
Limits of the Evidence
Most of this literature describes children whose abuse was substantiated, accepted by clinicians, or assumed by researchers. That makes it informative about how abused children tell, but it cannot show that a particular child’s reasons for telling, choice of confidant, or later withholding indicate that abuse occurred. Case classification can also be circular, because a child’s disclosure is often the evidence used to classify a case as abuse (London et al., 2005; Lyon, 2007). Much of the research on motives and reactions is retrospective, relying on adults recalling childhood events years later; qualitative studies use small samples, often recruited through treatment programs; and surveys depend on self-report without independent confirmation. Findings about predictors such as age, gender, relationship to the perpetrator, and caregiver support are group-level associations that are intercorrelated and inconsistent across studies.
The central limit is that none of these patterns is diagnostic. Children who were abused may tell a parent, a friend, or no one, and may tell for many reasons or none they can articulate; children who were not abused may also make statements to friends or parents for a variety of reasons, and a reason to tell, such as wanting something done or being asked, can exist whether or not abuse occurred. No study can tell a court whether a particular child confided in a particular person because of abuse, whether a particular reaction caused a particular recantation, or whether a particular disclosure is accurate.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When the finding that 23.1% of children recanted, more often without support from the nonoffending caregiver, is offered to explain a retraction (Malloy et al., 2007), an attorney can ask who was studied and whether the conclusion follows from the design: the sample was 257 substantiated dependency-court cases, and an association cannot show that a particular retraction reflects pressure rather than correction. When the finding that older children and adolescents often confide first in peers is cited (Manay & Collin-Vézina, 2021), the question is who was studied, because case classification can be circular when the disclosure is the evidence used to classify the case (London et al., 2005; Lyon, 2007). When the Swiss disclosure rates of about 44% to 58% among girls and 6% to 38% among boys are cited (Mohler-Kuo et al., 2014), the question is what exactly was counted, since the survey included noncontact events. When research on parental influence is cited to challenge an account (Principe & London, 2022), the question is whether it applies to this person: it shows that pre-interview conversations can shape reports, not that these conversations did. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Disclosure Recipients, Outcry Statements, and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
Expert testimony about why and to whom children disclose is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702 as construed in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999). Rule 702 was amended effective December 1, 2023, to require the proponent to show by a preponderance of the evidence that each requirement is met and that each opinion reflects a reliable application of the expert’s methods to the facts. In courts-martial, Military Rule of Evidence 702 governs, the 2023 federal amendment has been incorporated into the Military Rules of Evidence (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025), and United States v. Houser (1993) sets out the admissibility factors. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces permits qualified expert testimony explaining behavior of sexual abuse victims that members might find counterintuitive, provided it does not exceed the witness’s expertise or merely bolster a witness (United States v. Flesher, 2014). An expert may describe behaviors associated with abuse and whether a child exhibited them but may not opine on the child’s credibility or the accused’s guilt (United States v. Mullins, 2010), and testimony quantifying how rarely allegations like the child’s prove false is the functional equivalent of vouching (United States v. Brooks, 2007).
The first recipient of a disclosure is often called to repeat what the child said, which raises hearsay and confrontation questions. Crawford v. Washington (2004) bars testimonial hearsay from a witness who does not testify unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. In Ohio v. Clark (2015), the Supreme Court held that a three-year-old’s statements to his preschool teachers identifying the person who had injured him were not testimonial, emphasizing the informal setting, the teachers’ immediate concern for the child’s safety, the child’s young age, and that statements to persons other than law enforcement are much less likely to be testimonial; the teachers’ mandatory reporting obligations did not convert them into agents of the police. Statements to friends, parents, and teachers therefore present different confrontation questions than statements in a forensic interview conducted as part of an investigation. Admissibility under the hearsay rules remains a separate question. In Idaho v. Wright (1990), decided under the earlier confrontation framework, the Court identified spontaneity and consistent repetition among factors bearing on the reliability of a young child’s statements and found the statements at issue unreliable in part because the questioning that produced them was leading and unrecorded.
When a child testifies and the account is attacked, earlier disclosures may be offered as prior consistent statements. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B)(i), a consistent statement offered to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive is admissible only if it was made before the alleged motive or influence arose (Tome v. United States, 1995). The rule was amended effective December 1, 2014, to add 801(d)(1)(B)(ii), which permits substantive use of a consistent statement offered to rehabilitate a witness attacked on another ground, such as inconsistency or faulty memory; the amendment did not alter the timing requirement for statements offered under clause (i). In United States v. Frost (2019), the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held that a six-year-old’s statement was improperly admitted under Military Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) because the improper influence the defense alleged, by the child’s mother, predated the statement, and it set aside the affected finding. The chronology of who heard what, and when, can therefore be decisive.
Arizona
Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 adopted the Daubert standard in 2012 and was amended effective January 1, 2024, to conform to the 2023 federal amendment (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004). In State v. Lindsey (1986), the Arizona Supreme Court held that an expert may describe general behavioral characteristics of sexually abused children but may not opine on the truthfulness of a particular complainant or of complainants of that type, or quantify the proportion who are truthful (149 Ariz. at 473–75); State v. Moran (1986) applied the same rule to indirect opinions. State v. Salazar-Mercado (2014) permits “cold” expert testimony educating jurors about general behavioral patterns of child sexual abuse victims without applying them to the facts, if the testimony satisfies Rule 702 and Rule 403. State v. Haskie (2017) cautioned trial courts not to allow experts to speak in broad, categorical terms about what is “common” or “usual” without empirical support, a caution that applies to testimony about whom children typically tell and why.
The Arizona Supreme Court held in State v. Robinson (1987) that a statute creating a special hearsay exception for children’s statements, A.R.S. § 13-1416, unconstitutionally intruded on the court’s rulemaking authority (153 Ariz. at 196–98). As a result, the admissibility of a child’s statements to the first recipients of a disclosure ordinarily turns on the general provisions of the Arizona Rules of Evidence, including Rule 801(d)(1)(B) for prior consistent statements, together with the confrontation principles described above.
Other Jurisdictions
In State v. Michaels (1994), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that when a defendant produces some evidence that a child’s statements were the product of suggestive or coercive interviewing, the trial court must hold a pretrial hearing at which the State must establish the reliability of the statements by clear and convincing evidence (136 N.J. at 320–21). The hearing focuses on investigatory interviews, but the court counted a failure to control for earlier conversations with parents or peers among the sources of suggestion (136 N.J. at 309), so questioning by a parent or other first recipient bears on the inquiry; taint hearings are addressed in a companion paper.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports educational testimony correcting several assumptions that can unfairly undermine a child’s credibility: that a child who was abused would have told a parent or the police first; that telling a friend first, or telling only when asked, is unusual; and that a later withholding or retraction necessarily means the first account was false. Reviews and surveys show that children commonly confide first in peers, that adolescents often keep abuse hidden from adults, that boys disclose less often, and that fear of disbelief, shame, and anticipated family reactions shape whether and when children tell (Manay & Collin-Vézina, 2021; Priebe & Svedin, 2008). Research in substantiated cases links unsupportive caregiver responses to recantation (Malloy et al., 2007). Lindsey, Salazar-Mercado, and Flesher permit general testimony of this kind, and prosecutors can keep it general, qualified as the research qualifies it, and tied to the specific behavior at issue.
The research also counsels caution. Reasons for telling and patterns of confidant choice explain behavior but do not establish that abuse occurred, and testimony implying that they do approaches the lines drawn in Lindsey, Brooks, and Mullins; Haskie warns against categorical claims about what is “common.” The most frequent vulnerability in these cases is not the science but the record of the first disclosure. Identifying every person the child told, what each recipient asked and said, and when each conversation occurred, before a forensic interview, protects the case against a suggestion challenge and determines whether earlier statements are admissible under Tome and Frost. Either party can ask whether the first disclosure was documented promptly in the child’s own words and followed by a single, recorded, protocol-based interview and any independent evidence.
Special Issues for Defense
The research supports careful examination of how a disclosure developed between the first conversation and the forensic interview. Where the first recipient was a motivated adult, such as a parent in a custody dispute, or where the child was questioned repeatedly or specifically before any formal interview, research on parental influence supports scrutinizing those conversations (Principe & London, 2022), and Michaels provides one framework for doing so. The limits of the research are legitimate subjects of examination: samples drawn from substantiated or clinical cases, retrospective self-report, small qualitative studies, and inconsistent predictors. An expert who explains that unsupportive reactions are associated with recantation can be asked to acknowledge that the research comes from substantiated cases and cannot show that a particular retraction reflects pressure rather than correction. The timing rules for prior consistent statements make the chronology of each disclosure a proper focus.
The research also counsels caution about overreading ordinary patterns. Telling a friend first, telling only when asked, disclosing to someone other than the obvious protective adult, and meeting a skeptical or distressed reaction are all documented features of cases in which abuse occurred, so none of them, by itself, suggests fabrication. That a caregiver was supportive or believing is not evidence that the caregiver contaminated the account. A defense expert who implies that a particular child’s choice of confidant or reasons for telling show that an allegation is untrue faces the same anti-vouching limits that apply to prosecution experts. The most persuasive analysis is specific: it identifies what was actually asked and said in particular conversations and how the child’s account changed afterward, rather than treating the ordinary circumstances of disclosure as evidence in either direction.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
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Alaggia, R., Collin-Vézina, D., & Lateef, R. (2019). Facilitators and barriers to child sexual abuse (CSA) disclosures: A research update (2000–2016). Trauma, Violence, & Abuse, 20(2), 260–283. https://doi.org/10.1177/1524838017697312
Brennan, E., & McElvaney, R. (2020). What helps children tell? A qualitative meta-analysis of child sexual abuse disclosure. Child Abuse Review, 29(2), 97–113. https://doi.org/10.1002/car.2617
Crisma, M., Bascelli, E., Paci, D., & Romito, P. (2004). Adolescents who experienced sexual abuse: Fears, needs and impediments to disclosure. Child Abuse & Neglect, 28(10), 1035–1048. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chiabu.2004.03.015
Elliott, A. N., & Carnes, C. N. (2001). Reactions of nonoffending parents to the sexual abuse of their child: A review of the literature. Child Maltreatment, 6(4), 314–331. https://doi.org/10.1177/1077559501006004005
Everson, M. D., Hunter, W. M., Runyan, D. K., Edelsohn, G. A., & Coulter, M. L. (1989). Maternal support following disclosure of incest. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 59(2), 197–207. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1939-0025.1989.tb01651.x
Goodman-Brown, T. B., Edelstein, R. S., Goodman, G. S., Jones, D. P. H., & Gordon, D. S. (2003). Why children tell: A model of children’s disclosure of sexual abuse. Child Abuse & Neglect, 27(5), 525–540. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0145-2134(03)00037-1
Hershkowitz, I., Lanes, O., & Lamb, M. E. (2007). Exploring the disclosure of child sexual abuse with alleged victims and their parents. Child Abuse & Neglect, 31(2), 111–123. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chiabu.2006.09.004
Jensen, T. K., Gulbrandsen, W., Mossige, S., Reichelt, S., & Tjersland, O. A. (2005). Reporting possible sexual abuse: A qualitative study on children’s perspectives and the context for disclosure. Child Abuse & Neglect, 29(12), 1395–1413. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chiabu.2005.07.004
Kamke, K., Kirkner, A., & Goodman, K. L. (2024). “Nothing was done”: Experiences of continued sexual abuse after disclosing to a mandated reporter among youth in the United States. Child Abuse & Neglect, 155, Article 106959. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chiabu.2024.106959
Lamb, S., & Edgar-Smith, S. (1994). Aspects of disclosure: Mediators of outcome of childhood sexual abuse. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 9(3), 307–326. https://doi.org/10.1177/088626094009003002
Lemaigre, C., Taylor, E. P., & Gittoes, C. (2017). Barriers and facilitators to disclosing sexual abuse in childhood and adolescence: A systematic review. Child Abuse & Neglect, 70, 39–52. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chiabu.2017.05.009
London, K., Bruck, M., Ceci, S. J., & Shuman, D. W. (2005). Disclosure of child sexual abuse: What does the research tell us about the ways that children tell? Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 11(1), 194–226. https://doi.org/10.1037/1076-8971.11.1.194
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Legal Authorities
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237 (2015).
State v. Haskie, 242 Ariz. 582, 399 P.3d 657 (2017).
State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).
State v. Michaels, 136 N.J. 299, 642 A.2d 1372 (1994).
State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986).
State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191, 735 P.2d 801 (1987).
State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).
Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995).
United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
United States v. Flesher, 73 M.J. 303 (C.A.A.F. 2014).
United States v. Frost, 79 M.J. 104 (C.A.A.F. 2019).
United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).
United States v. Mullins, 69 M.J. 113 (C.A.A.F. 2010).
U.S. Const. amend. VI.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1416 (held unconstitutional in State v. Robinson).
Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B).
Ariz. R. Evid. 403.
Ariz. R. Evid. 702.
Ariz. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B).
Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004 (amending Ariz. R. Evid. 702, effective Jan. 1, 2024).
Mil. R. Evid. 702.
Mil. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B).
Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf
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