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Misinformation and Pre-Interview Contamination

Published

Snap Shot

  • The question: Can conversations with parents and other adults before a forensic interview introduce details into a child’s account, and how can that be judged from the record?
  • What the research shows: In many studies, misleading post-event information has altered what witnesses report, and children, especially preschoolers, are on average more susceptible than adults. In experiments, children’s later accounts absorbed a parent’s mistaken beliefs, and in one study of 169 mothers and their preschoolers, mothers told to focus on getting an accurate account of an event they had not witnessed showed more bias in conversation, and their children, on average, made more false reports. In one study of a specific touch, suggestion changed children’s memory of the touch but did not significantly plant one.
  • What it does not show: A prior conversation is not itself evidence of contamination; children usually tell someone close first. Most of the experimental work involves preschoolers, non-abusive events, and peripheral details, no study has measured how often pre-interview conversations introduce false allegations in real cases, and no expert can tell from a statement alone where a particular detail came from.
  • The law: Expert testimony is assessed under Rule 702 (Daubert, Houser) and Arizona’s cold-expert rule (Salazar-Mercado); Idaho v. Wright treats adult prompting, and Michaels suggestive interviewing, as reliability concerns, and experts may not vouch for or against a child’s account (Brooks, Lindsey, Moran).
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors should document what the child first said, to whom, and in response to what, and rely on the earliest statements; defense counsel should link specific suggestive conversations to specific details and acknowledge what the child supplied in the child’s own words.

Most allegations of child sexual abuse (CSA) do not begin in a forensic interview. They begin when a child says something to a parent, teacher, or friend, or when an adult notices something and asks. By the time a trained interviewer meets the child, the child may have been questioned by several adults, heard what those adults believe, and repeated the account more than once. CSA is common and underreported, children who disclose usually tell someone close to them first, and many abused children disclose only after delay or in stages (London et al., 2005; Stoltenborgh et al., 2011). Conversations before a forensic interview are therefore a normal part of how true allegations come to light. They are also a well-documented route by which inaccurate information can enter a child’s account.

The research on this issue rests on one of the most replicated findings in memory science, the misinformation effect: information encountered after an event can be incorporated into a person’s later report of that event and reported as if it had been experienced (Loftus, 2005). Applied to children, this research asks what happens when the post-event information comes from a parent’s questions, an overheard conversation, or a caregiver’s beliefs about what happened. It reaches court when one party argues that details in a child’s account came from someone other than the child and the other party argues that the child’s account was the child’s own, sometimes in the same case and about different details.

This paper describes the misinformation effect and its mechanisms, summarizes research on misinformation in children, reviews studies of how parents and other adults shape what children later report, and discusses what the pre-interview history of an allegation can and cannot show. It then addresses the limits of the evidence and the governing law.

The Misinformation Effect

The effect was established in a series of experiments in the 1970s. Participants who watched a filmed car crash gave higher speed estimates when asked how fast the cars were going when they “smashed” into each other than when asked about the cars that “hit” each other, and a week later those asked with “smashed” were more likely to report having seen broken glass, although there was none (Loftus & Palmer, 1974). Questions that presupposed an object not present in a filmed event, such as a barn, increased later reports of having seen it (Loftus, 1975). Participants who saw a traffic scene with one kind of sign and later received information referring to a different sign often reported the suggested sign (Loftus et al., 1978). These studies established the standard three-phase design: a witness experiences an event, receives post-event information some of which is misleading, and is then tested on memory for the event. Across hundreds of later studies, misleading post-event information has reliably altered what witnesses report (Frenda et al., 2011; Loftus, 2005).

Two features of the effect matter for legal practice. First, the misleading information need not be dramatic or deliberate. A single word in a question, an assumption embedded in a question, or a remark by another person can be enough, and neither the person who introduced the information nor the witness may recognize that it entered the account. Second, the effect is a matter of degree. Its size depends on how strongly the original detail was encoded, how much time has passed, how central the detail was, and how the misleading information was delivered. In one adult study, for example, dividing participants’ attention while they watched an event made them more likely to claim later that they had seen details they had only read about in post-event questions (Lane & Houston, 2021, pp. 65–66). Peripheral details are generally more vulnerable than central ones.

Why It Happens

Researchers agree that the effect is real but have debated its mechanism. The original view was that misleading information overwrites or impairs the original memory. McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) showed that the standard test could not distinguish impairment from other explanations and that the original information often remains available. Later accounts identified several processes that can operate alone or together: the witness never encoded the original detail and fills the gap with the suggested one; the original and suggested details coexist and compete at retrieval; the witness accepts the suggested detail for social reasons without any change in memory; or the witness remembers the suggested detail but misattributes its source.

The last process is described by the source-monitoring framework, under which people infer where a memory came from based on its characteristics rather than retrieving a stored label (Johnson et al., 1993). When a suggested detail feels familiar and fits the event, a person may attribute it to the event itself. Zaragoza and Lane (1994) found that participants sometimes claimed to remember seeing details that they had in fact encountered only in post-event information. For legal purposes, the mechanism in a particular case usually cannot be identified and often does not need to be. Under each account, a confident report can include details that came from somewhere other than the event.

Misinformation in Children

Children are, on average, more susceptible to misinformation than adults, and preschool children are more susceptible than older children. In a foundational developmental study, younger children, especially preschoolers, were more likely than older children and adults to incorporate misleading post-event information into their reports (Ceci et al., 1987). Sutherland and Hayne (2001) found that 11- and 12-year-olds were more likely than adults to incorporate misleading information into later accounts, particularly about peripheral aspects of an event, and that this difference was not explained by differences in how much the groups retained. Younger children are, on average, more affected by externally supplied suggestion, whereas errors that arise from a child’s own inferences can increase with age; differences from adults tend to narrow by adolescence but can persist for peripheral details at ages 11 to 12.

Misinformation can persist. London et al. (2009) gave 4- to 6-year-olds true and false information about an experienced event and tested them two weeks and fifteen months later. Misinformation that appeared in children’s free recall at the first test had largely disappeared from free recall by the later test, but misinformation effects on recognition questions persisted at both tests, and a second experiment with 4- to 9-year-olds found lasting effects about ten months later. The pattern suggests that the form of questioning affects whether post-event information surfaces: recognition and yes/no questions may elicit it after it has faded from a child’s spontaneous recall.

The research also identifies limits. In one study, suggestions changed 4- and 10-year-olds’ reports of the kind of touch they had received but did not significantly plant a touch that had not occurred or erase one that had (Pezdek & Roe, 1997); studies using repeated suggestion found that some preschoolers assent to false events. In studies with adults, warning witnesses after exposure that some information may have been misleading reduced the misinformation effect substantially but did not eliminate it (Blank & Launay, 2014). Whether and how such warnings work with young children is less well established, which is one reason interview protocols emphasize preventing contamination rather than correcting it.

Parents and Other Adults as Sources of Information

Parents talk with children about past events as a normal part of development, and those conversations shape what children remember. A line of experimental research shows that when the parent holds a mistaken belief, the child’s later account can absorb it. In the “Mr. Science” study, children aged 3 to 8 took part in science demonstrations, and their parents later read them a story describing those demonstrations and others the children had not experienced. Many children subsequently reported the nonexperienced activities as things that had happened, and younger children were less likely to retract them when asked about the source of their knowledge (Poole & Lindsay, 2001).

Principe and colleagues have studied natural conversations between parents and preschool children. Their review concludes that the content of such conversations can intrude into children’s later memory and that conversations can prompt entirely false narratives that are more detailed than accounts of experienced events, particularly when children participate actively and creatively in the conversation (Principe & Schindewolf, 2012). Children whose mothers had received misinformation about an event the mothers did not witness later reported the suggested activities, and a highly elaborative maternal conversational style, with many questions and embellishments, was associated with more false reporting (Principe et al., 2013).

A counterintuitive finding concerns the goal of the conversation. In a study of 169 mothers and their preschool children, mothers instructed to focus on getting an accurate account of an event they had not witnessed showed more bias in their conversations than mothers told to talk naturally, and their children later made more false reports and recalled fewer correct details. The effect appeared even when mothers had not been given misinformation (Principe et al., 2022). An adult who tries hard to find out exactly what happened may ask more questions and more specific questions, and in doing so may communicate more of the adult’s own expectations.

Information can also reach children indirectly. Preschoolers who overheard an adult conversation alleging that an event had occurred, or who heard about it from classmates who had overheard it, were as likely to report experiencing the rumored event as children who had actually experienced it, often in free recall and with fictitious elaboration (Principe et al., 2006). The role of peers is addressed in the companion paper on co-witness and peer contamination.

Conversation can also change later recall without introducing anything new. In adult studies, people who listened while a partner recalled a shared experience later had more difficulty recalling the details the partner had left out, an effect called socially shared retrieval-induced forgetting; and witnesses who wrote a detailed review of a filmed crime after answering misleading questions attributed more of the suggested details to the film than witnesses who wrote only a summary, an effect that may depend on the suggested details, which in that study were peripheral (Lane & Houston, 2021, pp. 133–137). These studies used adults and filmed or written material rather than children, so they describe mechanisms that may operate in pre-interview conversations, not how often they do.

Informal Questioning Before the Forensic Interview

Principe and London (2022) argue that understanding the effect of informal conversations with parents on children’s memory is “the single most important challenge facing contemporary investigations of child sexual abuse” (p. 290), because children almost always talk with a parent or other concerned adult before reaching authorities and those conversations can shape what children later report. Such conversations are rarely recorded, and in the small sample described below, parents tended to use the directive questioning that trained forensic interviewers are taught to avoid (Korkman et al., 2014); this is described as usually arising out of genuine concern rather than any intent to mislead, and good faith does not prevent a question from supplying a detail. The authors also caution that a child’s report should not be discredited simply because the first disclosure occurred in an informal, unrecorded conversation. Field evidence is limited but consistent with the experimental work. Korkman et al. (2014) analyzed 19 recorded conversations between parents and children that had been given to police as evidence of suspected physical or sexual abuse. Parents’ questioning was highly leading, in most cases the parents supplied all the new information, and the parents nonetheless regarded the recordings as records of the children’s own accounts. The authors noted that the sample was small and probably not representative.

Three implications follow. First, a forensic interview cannot reverse what happened before it. A recorded, protocol-based interview protects against contamination in the interview room, but if information was introduced earlier, the interview may faithfully record an account that already contains it. Second, contamination is usually not visible in the account itself. Children, especially young children, may report suggested content as their own memory and may not recall or acknowledge prior conversations, so asking a child whether anyone told the child what to say does not reliably detect it (Poole & Lindsay, 2001; Principe & London, 2022). Third, the risk may be greater where an adult is strongly motivated to obtain a particular account, which can occur in high-conflict custody disputes, and where conversations are repeated over time, although no study cited here measures the effect of custody disputes. That observation does not mean that allegations arising in custody disputes are generally false; it means that the history of conversations in such cases deserves particular attention.

What the Pre-Interview History Can and Cannot Show

The pre-interview history bears on the reliability of particular details, not on whether the underlying events occurred. A child who was abused may also have been questioned by a worried parent before the interview, and much of what a parent asks a distressed child is ordinary and appropriate. The existence of a prior conversation is not evidence of contamination, and the absence of a documented conversation does not show that none occurred, because these conversations are usually informal and unrecorded.

The useful analysis is specific. It asks what the child said first, to whom, in what words, and in response to what question; what the adult believed and said before and during the conversation; how many times the subject was revisited and by whom; whether the child heard adults discussing the allegation; and which details in the forensic interview first appeared in the child’s own words and which first appeared in an adult’s question or statement. Details the child volunteered early, in response to open questions, and before extensive adult involvement rest on firmer ground than details that first appeared in an adult’s question or after repeated conversations. Central details are generally more resistant to misinformation than peripheral ones, but resistance is not immunity.

Limits of the Evidence

Most misinformation research uses adults or school-age children, brief filmed or staged events, and peripheral details. The developmental studies of parental influence use preschool children, ordinary events such as science demonstrations or classroom visits, and mothers in laboratory or home settings, often from one research program. None involves abuse, and the stakes and emotional context of a real disclosure differ in ways that could increase or decrease the effects. Field studies of actual pre-interview conversations are few and small, and they cannot establish what happened. No study has measured how often pre-interview conversations introduce false allegations of abuse in real cases.

No expert can determine from a child’s statement alone whether a particular detail came from the child’s experience or from a conversation. The research identifies the circumstances under which post-event information is most likely to have entered an account; whether it did in a particular case depends on the record of the child’s statements and conversations and on the rest of the evidence. An interview analysis by an expert for either side describes the questioning and the order in which details appeared and what research says about those conditions; it gives no opinion on whether the account is true or false or whether abuse occurred.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When the study of 169 mothers and their preschool children (Principe et al., 2022) is cited to show that a parent’s questioning produced this child’s account, a use the defense commonly makes, an attorney can ask who was studied and whether it applies to this person: preschoolers, an event the mothers had not witnessed, and group findings rather than a particular conversation. When the 19 recorded parent-child conversations (Korkman et al., 2014) are offered as typical, ask how much evidence the finding rests on, since the authors described the sample as small and probably not representative. When Pezdek and Roe (1997) is cited to show that suggestion cannot plant an experience of being touched, a use the prosecution commonly makes, ask whether the conclusion follows from the design: finding no significant planting under the study’s conditions differs from showing that planting cannot occur, and the study also found that the kind of touch reported could be changed. When either side describes how often pre-interview conversations produce false allegations, ask what was counted, because no study has measured that rate in real cases. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Misinformation, Pre-Interview Contamination, and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

Expert testimony on the misinformation effect and parental influence is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993), extended to all expert testimony by Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999). Rule 702 was amended effective December 1, 2023, to state that the proponent must show by a preponderance of the evidence that each requirement is met and that each opinion reflects a reliable application of the expert’s methods to the facts. General testimony about the research is distinct from an opinion that a particular detail was or was not introduced by an adult, which approaches the credibility determination reserved to the factfinder and is subject to Rule 403.

In Idaho v. Wright (1990), the Supreme Court identified spontaneity and consistent repetition, the child’s mental state, terminology unexpected of a child of similar age, and lack of motive to fabricate as factors bearing on the reliability of a child’s hearsay statement, and it observed that spontaneity may be misleading if the child was prompted or manipulated by adults. The Court also held that corroborating evidence cannot supply the trustworthiness the statement itself lacks, while declining to require any particular interview procedure. Wright‘s confrontation framework was displaced for testimonial statements by Crawford v. Washington (2004), but its reliability factors remain influential under hearsay rules such as Federal Rule of Evidence 807. Whether a child’s terminology is unexpected for the child’s age, for example, depends in part on what the child heard from adults beforehand.

In State v. Michaels (1994), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that when a defendant produces some evidence that a child’s statements resulted from suggestive or coercive interviewing, the State must prove at a pretrial hearing, by clear and convincing evidence, that the statements and anticipated testimony remain sufficiently reliable (136 N.J. at 320–21). Jurisdictions differ on whether they recognize such hearings and on whether influences outside formal interviews fall within them; the topic is addressed in the companion paper on taint hearings. In federal prosecutions, 18 U.S.C. § 3509(g) provides for the use of multidisciplinary child abuse teams when feasible, which bears on coordinated, early interviewing.

In courts-martial, Military Rule of Evidence 702 governs expert testimony, the 2023 federal amendment has been incorporated into the Military Rules of Evidence (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025), and United States v. Houser (1993) sets out the admissibility factors. Under United States v. Brooks (2007) and related decisions, an expert may not offer testimony that is the functional equivalent of vouching for or against a complainant’s credibility, which limits both an opinion that a child’s account was contaminated and an opinion that it was not.

Arizona

Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 adopted the Daubert standard in 2012 and was amended effective January 1, 2024, to conform to the 2023 federal amendment (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004). Under State v. Salazar-Mercado (2014), a “cold” expert may educate the jury about general principles, such as the misinformation effect and parental influence, without applying them to the facts. Under State v. Lindsey (1986) and State v. Moran (1986), an expert may not opine, directly or indirectly, on the truthfulness of a particular witness (Lindsey, 149 Ariz. at 475).

Arizona statutes bear on the timing and recording of a child’s account. A.R.S. § 8-817 requires county attorneys, law enforcement, and the Department of Child Safety to implement joint investigation protocols and generally requires that a child who is the subject of a sexual abuse report be interviewed by a person trained in forensic interviewing, generally within 72 hours, subject to good-cause exceptions. The 72-hour forensic-interview requirement and its good-cause exceptions were added by a 2026 amendment (Laws 2026, ch. 185), so interviews conducted before the amendment took effect were not subject to them; the amendment also provides that a failure to meet the section’s requirements does not affect the admissibility of a child’s statements in any criminal, civil, or dependency proceeding. Prompt, recorded interviewing limits the interval in which informal questioning can occur. On its face, A.R.S. § 13-4252 conditions admission of a recorded pretrial statement of a minor on several requirements including that the statement was not elicited by questions calculated to lead the minor to make a particular statement; it addresses the questioning in the recorded statement, not earlier conversations. In State v. Taylor (1999), however, the Arizona Court of Appeals held § 13-4252 unconstitutional (¶ 11) because it expands on and conflicts with the hearsay rules adopted by the Arizona Supreme Court, so a recorded statement must instead qualify under the Arizona Rules of Evidence (one judge, concurring in the result, would have found the statute unconstitutional only as applied, ¶ 22). Because every person is competent to testify in an Arizona criminal trial (A.R.S. § 13-4061), concerns about pre-interview influence are usually addressed through Rules 403 and 702, the hearsay rules, and cross-examination.

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports several points the prosecution can legitimately make. Children who disclose abuse usually tell a parent or other trusted person first, so a conversation before the forensic interview is expected and is not itself evidence of contamination (London et al., 2005). The misinformation effect concerns particular details with an identifiable post-event source; it is generally weaker for central than for peripheral details, and in one study of a specific touch, suggestion changed children’s memory of the touch but did not significantly plant one (Pezdek & Roe, 1997). Where the record shows that the child’s first statement was spontaneous or made in response to an open question, and that the key details appeared in the child’s own words before extensive adult involvement, an expert can explain why the research does not suggest those details came from adults.

The research also counsels caution. Where a parent or other adult questioned the child repeatedly, used leading questions, expressed firm beliefs, or set out to get an accurate account through persistent questioning, the forensic interview cannot remove what was introduced earlier, and details that first appeared in an adult’s words are open to serious challenge (Principe et al., 2022). Prosecutors and investigators can address this: arranging a prompt, recorded forensic interview under the multidisciplinary protocol; documenting in detail what the child first said, to whom, and in response to what; advising caregivers not to question the child further; and relying on the earliest, least-influenced statements and on independent evidence rather than on the detail and consistency of a later account.

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports careful examination of what happened before the forensic interview. Where the record shows that a parent or other adult questioned the child before the interview, communicated beliefs about what happened, revisited the subject repeatedly, or did so in the setting of a custody dispute, an expert can explain how post-event information can enter a child’s account, why the resulting report may be detailed and confidently given, and why the child’s failure to recall those conversations does not show they had no effect (Poole & Lindsay, 2001; Principe & Schindewolf, 2012). Counsel can reconstruct the chronology of conversations from witness interviews, messages, and recordings, and trace which details first appeared in an adult’s words.

The research also counsels caution about overreading. Not every conversation is contaminating; a parent asking a distressed child what is wrong is ordinary and expected, and most of the experimental work involves preschool children, non-abusive events, and peripheral details. That information could have reached a child does not show that a given detail came from it. A pre-interview-contamination argument is most persuasive when it identifies specific suggestive conversations, links them to specific details in the account, and acknowledges the details that the child supplied in the child’s own words. An expert who opines that a particular account was contaminated faces the same anti-vouching limits that apply to prosecution experts.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

Blank, H., & Launay, C. (2014). How to protect eyewitness memory against the misinformation effect: A meta-analysis of post-warning studies. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 3(2), 77–88. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0101798

Ceci, S. J., Ross, D. F., & Toglia, M. P. (1987). Suggestibility of children’s memory: Psycholegal implications. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 116(1), 38–49. https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.116.1.38

Frenda, S. J., Nichols, R. M., & Loftus, E. F. (2011). Current issues and advances in misinformation research. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 20(1), 20–23. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721410396620

Johnson, M. K., Hashtroudi, S., & Lindsay, D. S. (1993). Source monitoring. Psychological Bulletin, 114(1), 3–28. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.114.1.3

Korkman, J., Juusola, A., & Santtila, P. (2014). Who made the disclosure? Recorded discussions between children and caretakers suspecting child abuse. Psychology, Crime & Law, 20(10), 994–1004. https://doi.org/10.1080/1068316X.2014.902455

Lane, S. M., & Houston, K. A. (2021). Understanding eyewitness memory: Theory and applications. New York University Press.

Loftus, E. F. (1975). Leading questions and the eyewitness report. Cognitive Psychology, 7(4), 560–572. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285(75)90023-7

Loftus, E. F. (2005). Planting misinformation in the human mind: A 30-year investigation of the malleability of memory. Learning & Memory, 12(4), 361–366. https://doi.org/10.1101/lm.94705

Loftus, E. F., Miller, D. G., & Burns, H. J. (1978). Semantic integration of verbal information into a visual memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 4(1), 19–31. https://doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.4.1.19

Loftus, E. F., & Palmer, J. C. (1974). Reconstruction of automobile destruction: An example of the interaction between language and memory. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 13(5), 585–589. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-5371(74)80011-3

London, K., Bruck, M., Ceci, S. J., & Shuman, D. W. (2005). Disclosure of child sexual abuse: What does the research tell us about the ways that children tell? Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 11(1), 194–226. https://doi.org/10.1037/1076-8971.11.1.194

London, K., Bruck, M., & Melnyk, L. (2009). Post-event information affects children’s autobiographical memory after one year. Law and Human Behavior, 33(4), 344–355. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-008-9147-7

McCloskey, M., & Zaragoza, M. (1985). Misleading postevent information and memory for events: Arguments and evidence against memory impairment hypotheses. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 114(1), 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.114.1.1

Pezdek, K., & Roe, C. (1997). The suggestibility of children’s memory for being touched: Planting, erasing, and changing memories. Law and Human Behavior, 21(1), 95–106. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024870127516

Poole, D. A., & Lindsay, D. S. (2001). Children’s eyewitness reports after exposure to misinformation from parents. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 7(1), 27–50. https://doi.org/10.1037/1076-898X.7.1.27

Principe, G. F., DiPuppo, J., & Gammel, J. (2013). Effects of mothers’ conversation style and receipt of misinformation on children’s event reports. Cognitive Development, 28(3), 260–271. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2013.01.012

Principe, G. F., Kanaya, T., Ceci, S. J., & Singh, M. (2006). Believing is seeing: How rumors can engender false memories in preschoolers. Psychological Science, 17(3), 243–248. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01692.x

Principe, G. F., Kirkpatrick, H., & Langley, S. (2022). A focus on accuracy in misinformed mothers puts young children at risk for false memories. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 214, Article 105274. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2021.105274

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Stoltenborgh, M., van IJzendoorn, M. H., Euser, E. M., & Bakermans-Kranenburg, M. J. (2011). A global perspective on child sexual abuse: Meta-analysis of prevalence around the world. Child Maltreatment, 16(2), 79–101. https://doi.org/10.1177/1077559511403920

Sutherland, R., & Hayne, H. (2001). Age-related changes in the misinformation effect. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 79(4), 388–404. https://doi.org/10.1006/jecp.2000.2610

Zaragoza, M. S., & Lane, S. M. (1994). Source misattributions and the suggestibility of eyewitness memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 20(4), 934–945. https://doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.20.4.934

Legal Authorities

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990).

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).

State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).

State v. Michaels, 136 N.J. 299, 642 A.2d 1372 (1994).

State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986).

State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).

State v. Taylor, 196 Ariz. 584, 2 P.3d 674 (App. 1999).

United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).

United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).

U.S. Const. amend. VI.

18 U.S.C. § 3509.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-817.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4061.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4252 (held unconstitutional in State v. Taylor).

Fed. R. Evid. 403.

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

Fed. R. Evid. 807.

Ariz. R. Evid. 403.

Ariz. R. Evid. 702.

Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004 (amending Ariz. R. Evid. 702, effective Jan. 1, 2024).

Mil. R. Evid. 702.

Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf

Related topic papers: Children’s Suggestibility: What the Research Shows · Co-Witness and Peer Contamination · Repeated Interviews of Children · Interviewer Bias and Confirmation Bias in Child Abuse Investigations · Why and to Whom Children Disclose · Allegations in Divorce and Custody Disputes, and Parental Alienation · Taint Hearings and Child Witness Competency

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Memory in the Courtroom · False Confessions: Suggestibility · Courts-Martial