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Trauma Impact and PTSD in Children

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Snap Shot

  • The question: What does a child’s level of distress, a PTSD diagnosis, or a trauma symptom score say about whether that child was sexually abused?
  • What the research shows: Sexual abuse is a genuine cause of psychological harm, but the harm varies widely. In the leading synthesis of 45 studies, no single symptom characterized a majority of abused children and about one-third had no symptoms; most trauma-exposed children do not develop PTSD. Impact is associated with duration, force, self-blame, and support after disclosure.
  • What it does not show: PTSD is not specific to sexual abuse, and diagnosis usually accepts the reported history as the qualifying event, so neither a diagnosis nor an elevated symptom score can identify its cause. Low distress or ordinary functioning is weak evidence that abuse did not occur and cannot rule it out, because many abused children show no symptoms. No diagnosis or score can tell a court whether a particular child was abused.
  • The law: Experts may describe a child’s condition and symptoms associated with abuse (Norris, Anderson, Salazar-Mercado) but may not opine that abuse occurred or vouch (Mullins, Brooks, Lindsey, Moran); Haskie bars profile evidence as substantive proof of guilt. Harm is relevant at sentencing (Payne, R.C.M. 1001(c), A.R.S. § 13-4426).
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors can explain that impact varies and calm demeanor does not show the child was unharmed, but should not offer PTSD or scores as proof of the event; defense counsel can examine the qualifying event and alternative stressors, without arguing that a child who “does not look traumatized” was not abused.

Child sexual abuse (CSA) is common, and it can cause real and lasting harm. Sexually abused children as a group show more fears, posttraumatic stress, behavior problems, depression, and other difficulties than non-abused children, and longitudinal studies following children identified through protective services find that some of those differences persist through adolescence and into adulthood (Kendall-Tackett et al., 1993; Lewis et al., 2016; Trickett et al., 2011). The same research also shows that the harm varies widely. Some children are severely affected, many improve over the following year or two, and a substantial minority show no measurable symptoms when they are assessed.

Evidence about trauma and its effects reaches court in several ways. An expert may explain why one child is severely affected and another, after apparently similar abuse, seems unaffected. A clinician may testify that a child meets criteria for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), or that a trauma symptom measure showed elevated scores, sometimes with the implication that the findings corroborate the allegation. The defense may argue that a child’s calm presentation or ordinary functioning is inconsistent with abuse. And after a conviction, the harm a child has suffered bears directly on sentencing, restitution, and victim-impact statements.

This paper summarizes the research on how CSA affects children and why the impact differs, describes PTSD in children and how often it develops, and explains why neither a diagnosis nor a symptom score can identify the event that caused it. It then addresses three commonly used measures, the limits of the evidence, the governing law, and the recurring issues for each party. Dissociation and freezing are treated in a companion paper.

Variability in the Impact of Child Sexual Abuse

The foundational synthesis remains Kendall-Tackett, Williams, and Finkelhor (1993), who reviewed 45 studies. Sexually abused children had more symptoms than non-abused children, with abuse accounting for 15 to 45 percent of the variance in symptoms. Fears, PTSD, behavior problems, sexualized behaviors, and poor self-esteem were the most frequently reported, but no single symptom characterized a majority of abused children, some symptoms were specific to particular ages, and about one-third of the children had no symptoms. About two-thirds showed recovery within the first 12 to 18 months. The authors concluded that the findings suggested no specific syndrome in sexually abused children and no single traumatizing process.

Later work has refined rather than overturned those conclusions. In a prospective study of 977 children followed from age 4 to 16 using official protective services records, sexually abused children had significantly more internalizing and externalizing problems over time than children who had been maltreated in other ways (Lewis et al., 2016). A 23-year longitudinal study of girls with substantiated intrafamilial sexual abuse found, on average, adverse outcomes across many domains, including depression, dissociative symptoms, persistent PTSD, revictimization, and health problems, together with considerable variability within the abused group (Trickett et al., 2011). Meta-analyses and reviews report reliable associations with later psychopathology, with modest to moderate average effects and wide individual differences (Maniglio, 2009; Paolucci et al., 2001; Putnam, 2003). A New Zealand birth cohort of 937 people followed to age 45 showed the same pattern: after adjustment for other childhood adversity and adult sexual assault, those who reported CSA at age 26 had higher risk of problems across mental, physical, sexual, interpersonal, economic, and antisocial domains, with risk rising with severity. The added risk for most specific problems was small to moderate, but the cumulative burden was considerable (Guiney et al., 2024). CSA was reported retrospectively, in adulthood.

Abuse that takes place through technology can also cause serious harm. A 2026 systematic review of 18 studies of technology-assisted CSA described distress, self-blame and guilt, social isolation, and persistent fear tied to the permanence of images (Forrester Fellowes et al., 2026); the review was a narrative synthesis of a small and varied literature. In an anonymous national survey of 3,416 U.S. students aged 13 to 17, about 15% reported having been targeted for sextortion, a figure higher than in other samples (a scoping review of youth studies reported 0.7% to 5.0%, and a 2024 sample of 4,972 students about 5%; see the companion paper on technology-facilitated abuse), so no single figure should be presented as the rate; sextortion was associated with suicidal thoughts and behavior whether or not the offender was known offline (Patchin & Hinduja, 2026). That survey was cross-sectional and self-reported, so it shows an association rather than the direction of cause.

Two propositions follow, and both matter. Sexual abuse is a genuine cause of psychological harm. And because the harm is so variable, a child’s level of distress, whether high or low, is a poor guide to whether abuse occurred.

Factors Associated With Greater or Lesser Impact

Researchers have asked which features of the abuse and its aftermath predict more severe outcomes. The same synthesis found that penetration, the duration and frequency of abuse, force, the relationship of the perpetrator to the child, and maternal support all affected the degree of symptoms (Kendall-Tackett et al., 1993). A review of long-term effects similarly associated greater harm with longer duration, penetration, force or threat of force, and abuse by a father or stepfather, while cautioning that the specific effects of sexual abuse, independent of force and family variables such as parental psychopathology, remained to be clarified (Beitchman et al., 1992). A later review grouped the predictors into personal, familial, and abuse-specific factors and emphasized that they interact (Yancey & Hansen, 2010).

Attributions and Shame

How a child understands the abuse matters as well as what happened. In a study of 137 children and adolescents assessed within eight weeks of discovery of abuse and again a year later, abuse-specific self-blame was consistently related to higher levels of psychopathology and was particularly important in predicting PTSD symptoms, even after controlling for age, gender, abuse characteristics, and general attributional style; shame partly mediated that relationship (Feiring et al., 2002). Research with adult women abused as children likewise found that self-blame and family blame were related to poorer adjustment (McMillen & Zuravin, 1997).

Caregiver Support After Disclosure

The response a child meets on disclosure is one of the most consistent predictors. In an early study of incest victims, the level of maternal support after disclosure was more closely related to characteristics of the perpetrator than to those of the child, and lack of support was associated with foster placement and higher psychopathology scores (Everson et al., 1989). A review found that most mothers believe and support their children at least in part, that a substantial number do not, and that parental support is consistently associated with children’s adjustment (Elliott & Carnes, 2001). A longitudinal study of 118 mother-child pairs from a children’s advocacy center found that maternal support was related to children’s adjustment shortly after the forensic evaluation and nine months later (Zajac et al., 2015).

Relationship to the Perpetrator

Abuse by a parent or other trusted figure is often associated with greater harm. In one clinical sample of 92 sexually abused children, 43.9% met criteria for PTSD, including 53.8% of those abused by fathers and 42.4% of those abused by other trusted adults, compared with 10% of those abused by strangers (McLeer et al., 1992). The relationship effect is difficult to isolate, however. Intrafamilial abuse tends to last longer and to be disclosed later, so part of an apparent relationship effect may reflect duration; and when the perpetrator is a family member, the caregiver support that buffers harm is more likely to be compromised (Everson et al., 1989). The fair summary is that closeness to the perpetrator is associated with greater harm largely through duration, betrayal, and diminished support, rather than as a clean, independent cause.

The Traumagenic Dynamics Framework

Many of these findings are organized by a conceptual model proposing four “traumagenic dynamics” through which sexual abuse causes harm: traumatic sexualization, betrayal, powerlessness, and stigmatization (Finkelhor & Browne, 1985). Betrayal captures the added injury of abuse by a trusted person and of a protective adult’s failure to respond; powerlessness captures coercion, force, and inability to stop the abuse; stigmatization captures shame and self-blame; and traumatic sexualization captures the shaping of a child’s sexuality in developmentally inappropriate ways. The model is useful for explaining why particular features of an abusive situation, and of the response to it, tend to intensify or moderate impact. It is a framework for understanding harm in children known to have been abused, not a test for whether abuse occurred.

PTSD: Definition and Developmental Expression

PTSD is defined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fifth edition, text revision (DSM-5-TR), by exposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury, or sexual violence, experienced directly, witnessed, learned of as occurring to a close family member or friend, or encountered through repeated or extreme exposure to aversive details, together with four clusters of symptoms: intrusion, such as unwanted memories, nightmares, or flashbacks; avoidance of reminders; negative alterations in thoughts and mood; and alterations in arousal and reactivity, such as hypervigilance, irritability, sleep disturbance, and difficulty concentrating (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2022). The symptoms must last more than a month and cause clinically significant distress or impairment.

Children express posttraumatic symptoms differently from adults. Young children may show traumatic play, frightening dreams without recognizable content, and new fears or separation distress, and may lack the language to describe internal states. Research reviewed for the manual’s revision supported developmentally adjusted criteria with a lower avoidance threshold for preschoolers (Scheeringa et al., 2011), and the DSM-5-TR includes separate criteria for children 6 and younger (APA, 2022). Those adjustments help identify genuinely distressed young children, but they also make the diagnosis rely more on caregiver observation and on behaviors, such as sleep problems and irritability, that are common for many reasons.

How Often Trauma-Exposed Children Develop PTSD

Most children exposed to potentially traumatic events do not develop PTSD. In a representative community sample of 1,420 children aged 9, 11, or 13 at intake and followed annually through age 16, more than two-thirds reported at least one traumatic event, 13.4% of those children developed some posttraumatic stress symptoms, and fewer than 0.5% met full DSM-IV criteria; violent and sexual trauma were associated with the highest rates of symptoms (Copeland et al., 2007). A meta-analysis of 43 samples assessed with established diagnostic interviews found an overall PTSD rate of 15.9% among trauma-exposed children and adolescents, ranging from 8.4% among boys exposed to non-interpersonal trauma to 32.9% among girls exposed to interpersonal trauma (Alisic et al., 2014). An updated meta-analysis estimated a prevalence of about 20% under DSM-IV criteria and about 12% under DSM-5 criteria, while noting that few DSM-5 studies were available (Visser et al., 2026). Rates in clinical samples of sexually abused children can be considerably higher, as the 43.9% figure in one referred sample illustrates (McLeer et al., 1992).

These figures cut in both directions. Interpersonal and sexual trauma carry a higher risk of PTSD than many other events, which is consistent with the clinical observation that sexual abuse can be severely traumatizing. But even after interpersonal trauma, most children do not meet criteria for PTSD, so the absence of the disorder is weak evidence that a traumatic event did not occur.

Why PTSD Does Not Identify Its Cause

The decisive point for legal purposes is that PTSD is not specific to sexual abuse. Motor-vehicle accidents, painful medical procedures, physical abuse, witnessing domestic or community violence, disasters, and the sudden death of a loved one can all produce the same disorder. Critical reviews of the PTSD construct have concluded that its core assumption of a specific etiology, in which a distinct class of traumatic events produces a distinct syndrome, lacks compelling empirical support (Rosen & Lilienfeld, 2008), and that the breadth of the qualifying stressor criterion has been a long-standing controversy (McNally, 2003). Posttraumatic symptoms can even follow events that do not meet the formal stressor criterion: in the community study described above, lower-magnitude stressors accounted for half of the cases of subclinical PTSD and two-thirds of cases of painful recall, simply because they were so much more common than extreme stressors (Copeland et al., 2010). Individual symptoms such as nightmares, irritability, poor concentration, and sleep disturbance also occur in depression, other anxiety disorders, attention problems, and ordinary reactions to stress.

It follows that reasoning from “sexual abuse can cause PTSD” and “this child has PTSD” to “this child was sexually abused” is not valid; it affirms the consequent. The presence of PTSD may modestly raise the probability that some significant stressor occurred, but it does not distinguish sexual abuse from the many other stressors capable of producing the same picture.

A related problem is circularity. To diagnose PTSD, a clinician must identify a qualifying traumatic event, and in ordinary clinical practice the clinician appropriately relies on the history the child or caregiver provides. When that history is the disputed allegation, the diagnosis presupposes the event that a court must decide. The content of a child’s intrusive memories or nightmares may refer to the alleged abuse, but that content reflects what the child has reported, not an independent determination of what happened. The DSM-5-TR’s cautionary statement for forensic use makes a compatible point: a clinical diagnosis was not designed to answer legal questions and does not, by itself, establish the cause of a person’s condition or that a legal standard has been met (APA, 2022).

These limits do not make a diagnosis irrelevant. A carefully made diagnosis can accurately describe a child’s distress and impairment, explain behavior a juror might misread, and inform treatment, damages, and sentencing. The limit is on using it as proof of the event.

Trauma Symptom Measures in Forensic Settings

Three measures appear frequently. The Trauma Symptom Checklist for Children (TSCC) is a 54-item self-report measure for ages 8 to 16 with six clinical scales (Anxiety, Depression, Anger, Posttraumatic Stress, Dissociation, and Sexual Concerns) and two validity scales (Underresponse and Hyperresponse); an alternate 44-item version omits the sexual items, and a caregiver-report companion is used with younger children (Briere, 1996; Lanktree et al., 2008). The Child PTSD Symptom Scale for DSM-5 (CPSS-5) has interview and self-report versions for ages 8 to 18; in its validation study of 64 trauma-exposed youths, a self-report score of 31 was identified as the cutoff for probable PTSD (Foa et al., 2018). The Clinician-Administered PTSD Scale for DSM-5, Child/Adolescent Version (CAPS-CA-5), is a structured clinical interview for children 7 and older that assesses the 20 DSM-5 symptoms, their onset and duration, distress, and impairment (Pynoos et al., 2015).

Each instrument is useful for measuring the presence and severity of posttraumatic symptoms. None was designed to determine whether a particular event occurred, and the research calls for caution when scores are offered in that role. First, the PTSD instruments anchor symptoms to an index event identified in advance, usually the event under investigation. Second, scores depend on what children are willing and able to report. In a forensic evaluation center sample of 399 children aged 8 to 15, children whose abuse was supported by external evidence and who disclosed it reported particularly high distress on the TSCC, but abused children who did not disclose reported the lowest distress of any group, lower than children found not to have been abused (Elliott & Briere, 1994). Low scores therefore cannot rule abuse out, and high scores may partly reflect the circumstances of disclosure and evaluation. Third, child and caregiver reports converge only moderately, so the informant affects the result (Lanktree et al., 2008). Fourth, elevations on scales such as Sexual Concerns can arise from many sources, including exposure to sexual material, other victimization, the investigation itself, and the questioning a child has undergone. Fifth, cutoffs from small validation samples identify probable diagnoses for screening; they supply no error rates for distinguishing abused from non-abused children, and validity scales cannot establish that reported symptoms arose from the alleged event.

Limits of the Evidence

The impact literature relies on samples whose abuse status was established by substantiation, conviction, or clinical judgment; clinical samples overrepresent severe and intrafamilial cases; and many studies of moderating factors are cross-sectional, so they cannot separate cause from correlation. Abuse characteristics, family functioning, and caregiver support are intertwined, and the effect of any one factor is difficult to isolate. PTSD prevalence estimates vary with the diagnostic criteria, the instrument, the informant, and the time since exposure, and few studies use DSM-5 criteria with young children. Symptom measures rely on self-report and caregiver report, which can be shaped by distress, suggestion, the investigation, and the stakes of the proceeding.

No diagnosis, symptom score, or list of moderating factors can tell a court whether a particular child was abused, how long abuse lasted, or who committed it. The research explains why abused children differ from one another and why some are more affected than others; whether abuse occurred in a given case turns on the evidence in that case.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When a PTSD diagnosis is offered as evidence of abuse, ask what a positive result means, probability of what, given what: PTSD follows many kinds of trauma, lower-magnitude stressors accounted for half of subclinical cases (Copeland et al., 2010), and the diagnosis usually accepts the reported history as the qualifying event. When the 43.9% PTSD rate (McLeer et al., 1992) is cited, ask who was studied, since the 92 children were a referred clinical sample, and how the effect of abuse by fathers was separated from duration and support. When a CPSS-5 score that meets the cutoff of 31 (Foa et al., 2018) is presented as corroboration, ask how much evidence the cutoff rests on: it came from 64 youths, identifies probable PTSD for screening, and supplies no error rate for distinguishing abused from non-abused children. When low distress is offered to suggest no abuse occurred, ask about the base rate: about one-third of abused children had no symptoms (Kendall-Tackett et al., 1993), and abused children who did not disclose reported the lowest distress of any group (Elliott & Briere, 1994). These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Trauma Impact, PTSD, and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

Under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999), trial judges must ensure that clinical and behavioral testimony is relevant and reliable. Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as amended effective December 1, 2023, requires the proponent to show by a preponderance of the evidence that each opinion reflects a reliable application of the expert’s principles and methods to the facts of the case. Testimony that a child has PTSD may satisfy that standard as a description of the child’s condition; an opinion that the PTSD shows that sexual abuse occurred raises a harder application question, because the diagnostic method does not discriminate among causes, and Rule 403 permits exclusion when such testimony’s probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or of misleading the jury.

Military Rule of Evidence 702 tracks the federal rule, and the 2023 federal amendment was incorporated through the 2025 amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025). United States v. Houser (1993) sets out the admissibility factors. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has permitted a qualified counselor to testify to a working PTSD diagnosis made in treatment (United States v. Norris, 2001) and has held that an expert may describe symptoms found among abused children and whether the child exhibits them, and whether findings are consistent with the allegation, but may not opine that abuse occurred or that the child is credible (United States v. Anderson, 1999; United States v. Mullins, 2010). Testimony quantifying how rarely such allegations are false is the functional equivalent of vouching (United States v. Brooks, 2007). In United States v. Flesher (2014), the court held that the proponent must establish the reliability of expert testimony about victim responses to sexual assault, that an expert qualified by experience must explain how that experience supports the opinion, and that expert testimony may not simply bolster a fact witness by mirroring the witness’s account.

Arizona

Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 adopted the Daubert standard in 2012 and was amended effective January 1, 2024, to conform to the 2023 federal amendment. In State v. Lindsey (1986), the Arizona Supreme Court held that an expert may describe general behavioral characteristics of sexually abused children but may not opine on the truthfulness of a particular witness or of witnesses of that type (149 Ariz. at 473–75), and State v. Moran (1986) applied the same rule to indirect opinions on credibility. State v. Salazar-Mercado (2014) permits “cold” educational testimony about the behavior of abused children that satisfies Rule 702 and Rule 403, and State v. Haskie (2017) bars profile evidence as substantive proof of guilt and cautions against categorical statements about what is “common” without empirical support. Under these decisions, testimony explaining that trauma reactions vary widely, and that a child’s calm presentation is not a reliable sign that abuse did not occur, falls within accepted educational testimony; testimony that a child’s symptoms prove abuse does not.

Other Jurisdictions

In People v. Bledsoe (1984), the California Supreme Court held that rape trauma syndrome testimony was inadmissible to prove that a rape occurred, because the concept was developed as a therapeutic tool rather than to determine whether an assault took place, while recognizing that such testimony may be used to rebut misconceptions about victims’ post-incident behavior, such as delay in reporting, when the defense raises such conduct. It is widely cited for the distinction between explaining trauma reactions and using them as proof.

Sentencing and Victim Impact

The harm a child has suffered has a recognized place at sentencing. Payne v. Tennessee (1991) held that the Eighth Amendment does not bar victim-impact evidence at capital sentencing. Federal crime victims have a statutory right to be reasonably heard at sentencing (18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4)). In courts-martial, Article 6b, UCMJ, and Rule for Courts-Martial 1001(c) give a crime victim the right to be heard at presentencing and define victim impact to include financial, social, psychological, or medical impact directly relating to or arising from the offense of which the accused was found guilty. Arizona’s Victims’ Bill of Rights guarantees a victim the right to be heard at sentencing (Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1(A)(4)), and A.R.S. § 13-4426 permits the victim to present information and views on the sentence and restitution. In these settings the research on moderating factors helps explain the particular harm a child has suffered.

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports educational testimony on several points that jurors may not understand: that the impact of CSA varies widely; that about a third of abused children in the leading synthesis showed no symptoms and most trauma-exposed children do not develop PTSD; that impact is shaped by duration, force, self-blame, and the support the child received after disclosure; and that a calm or high-functioning child is therefore not shown by demeanor alone to have been unharmed or unabused. A treating clinician’s description of a child’s PTSD symptoms can also help jurors understand avoidance, sleep disturbance, or reluctance to discuss events. Such testimony is most durable when framed as education or as a description of the child’s condition, consistent with Salazar-Mercado, Anderson, and Norris. After conviction, the moderating-factor literature can help explain a child’s particular harm for sentencing and restitution.

The research counsels caution about asking a diagnosis or symptom score to prove the event. Because PTSD follows many kinds of trauma, can follow lower-magnitude stressors, and is usually diagnosed by accepting the reported history as the qualifying event, testimony that a child’s PTSD shows that sexual abuse occurred invites a challenge under Rule 702 and approaches the vouching lines drawn in Lindsey, Brooks, and Mullins. The same is true of testimony that an elevated TSCC or CPSS-5 score corroborates an allegation. Prosecutors can also keep treatment and forensic roles distinct, so that a therapist who treated the child is not asked to give opinions that depend on assuming the disputed facts. Either party can ask whether a case rests on the child’s account, a forensic interview conducted under a recognized protocol, and independent corroboration, with trauma evidence offered to explain rather than to prove.

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports a rigorous challenge to testimony that treats PTSD or trauma symptoms as evidence that abuse occurred. Defense counsel can examine what qualifying event the clinician relied on and how it was identified; whether other stressors in the child’s history were considered, including family violence, medical events, losses, prior victimization, and the investigation itself; whether the clinician was a treating therapist rather than a forensic evaluator; which informant supplied the symptom reports; and whether a measure was used for a purpose for which it was not validated. These questions bear on Rules 702 and 403 and can support limiting instructions confining diagnostic testimony to the child’s condition rather than its cause.

The research counsels equal caution about the mirror-image argument. A child’s lack of PTSD, low symptom scores, or apparently normal functioning is weak evidence that abuse did not occur and cannot rule it out: about a third of abused children in the leading synthesis had no symptoms, most trauma-exposed children do not develop PTSD, supportive caregiving can buffer harm, and in at least one forensic sample abused children who did not disclose reported the lowest distress of any group. An argument that a child “does not look traumatized” is profile reasoning in reverse and can be rebutted by the same research. A trauma-evidence challenge is most persuasive when it is specific, addressing the causal inference, the basis for the qualifying event, and the documented alternative stressors, rather than suggesting that the child’s distress is not genuine or that it has no bearing on the case.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

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Legal Authorities

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).

Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).

People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984).

State v. Haskie, 242 Ariz. 582, 399 P.3d 657 (2017).

State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).

State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986).

State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).

United States v. Anderson, 51 M.J. 145 (C.A.A.F. 1999).

United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).

United States v. Flesher, 73 M.J. 303 (C.A.A.F. 2014).

United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).

United States v. Mullins, 69 M.J. 113 (C.A.A.F. 2010).

United States v. Norris, 55 M.J. 209 (C.A.A.F. 2001).

U.S. Const. amend. VIII.

Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1.

10 U.S.C. § 806b (Article 6b, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

18 U.S.C. § 3771.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4426.

Fed. R. Evid. 403.

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

Mil. R. Evid. 403.

Mil. R. Evid. 702.

Ariz. R. Evid. 403.

Ariz. R. Evid. 702.

Rule for Courts-Martial 1001(c).

Related topic papers: Behavioral Indicators, Base Rates, and the Limits of Inference · Sexual Behavior and Regressive Behavior in Children · Dissociation, Hyperarousal, and Freezing · Stress, Trauma, and Children’s Memory · Why and to Whom Children Disclose · Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: Daubert, Frye, and Arizona’s Cold-Expert Cases

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Counterintuitive Testimony · Courts-Martial