Snap Shot
- The question: Does stress or trauma make a child’s memory of an event better or worse, and what does that mean for evaluating the child’s account?
- What the research shows: Stress does not have a single effect. Within a stressful event, central information is comparatively favored and peripheral details, dates, order, and frequency are comparatively fragile; high stress tends to reduce overall accuracy in adult eyewitness studies, which mostly concerned strangers and identification. In one prospective study of children whose abuse was documented in criminal cases, 81% of 175 people reported it years later, and greater traumatic impact was generally associated with more accurate memory; the two bodies of research involve different populations and events.
- What it does not show: These are group-level findings. Trauma neither guarantees a memory nor disqualifies it; stressful memories remain open to misinformation and suggestion, and confidence and vividness are imperfect indicators of accuracy. No study or test can determine whether a particular child’s memory of a particular event is accurate.
- The law: Rule 702 and amended Arizona Rule 702 require reliable application to the facts (Daubert, Kumho Tire, Houser); experts may explain general patterns of memory (Salazar-Mercado) but may not vouch or testify beyond their expertise (Lindsey, Moran, Brooks, Flesher). Chapple and Henderson address memory science in eyewitness identification.
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors can explain that peripheral inconsistency is expected but should not claim traumatic memories are necessarily vivid and accurate; defense counsel can scrutinize fragile details and suggestively elicited ones, without arguing that peripheral inconsistency proves the core allegation false.
Child sexual abuse is common and substantially underreported, and many of the children who experience it describe the experience as frightening, painful, or confusing. When a case reaches court, the child’s account of a stressful event is often the central evidence, and the parties frequently disagree about what stress does to memory. One intuition holds that trauma overwhelms a child’s capacity to remember, so that a fragmented or inconsistent account is to be expected and an articulate one is suspect. The opposite intuition holds that trauma sears an event into memory, so that a vivid, confident account must be accurate and a gap in it must be a sign of invention. Neither intuition fully matches the research.
The scientific picture is more specific and more useful to both sides. Children interviewed well can give accurate, detailed accounts of stressful experiences, and the core of a genuinely experienced frightening event is often retained for years. At the same time, stress changes what is encoded, peripheral details and the timing and frequency of events are especially fragile, and memories of distressing events remain open to the same reconstructive errors and suggestive influences that affect ordinary memory. The way stress shapes memory bears on which parts of an account are likely to be robust and which are likely to be fragile; it does not, by itself, tell a court whether the events occurred.
This paper summarizes the research on arousal and encoding, central and peripheral detail, weapon focus and high stress, children’s memory for stressful medical experiences and documented abuse, and the distortion of emotional memories. It then addresses the limits of the evidence, the governing legal standards, and the recurring issues for each side.
Arousal and Memory: The Yerkes-Dodson Generalization and Its Limits
The idea most often invoked in this area is the Yerkes-Dodson “law,” usually summarized as an inverted-U relationship between arousal and performance: performance improves as arousal rises from low to moderate and declines as arousal becomes high. The original study was an animal-learning experiment with mice, in which the strength of an electric shock was varied while the animals learned a visual discrimination, and the optimal shock strength was lower for the harder discrimination (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908). The study did not examine human memory, and later writers extended its pattern far beyond the conditions tested.
The inverted-U remains a useful caution against assuming that stress is memory-neutral, but it is not a formula. Reviews of the eyewitness literature describe it as a rough generalization whose shape varies with the task, the kind of information tested, and the timing of the stress (Christianson, 1992; Deffenbacher et al., 2004). A modern meta-analysis of 113 human studies illustrates why. Stress experienced before or during encoding generally impaired memory, except when the stressor and the material to be learned were closely linked in time and content, in which case memory improved; stress shortly after encoding generally improved memory, unless the stressor occurred in a different physical setting from the material; and stress at the time of retrieval impaired memory, especially for emotional material (Shields et al., 2017). Those were studies of healthy adults, mostly using standardized laboratory stressors such as public speaking or immersing an arm in ice water; participants with a known psychological disorder were excluded, so the studies say nothing directly about memory in people with posttraumatic stress. They cannot be translated directly to a child’s experience of abuse, but they show that “stress” does not have a single effect on memory and that the stage at which stress operates matters. Much of the mechanistic research on stress hormones and emotional memory is animal research; it helps explain why emotional events are often well remembered, but it provides no test that can be applied to a particular witness.
Attentional Narrowing: Central Versus Peripheral Detail
A better-supported mechanism explains much of what arousal does to memory. Easterbrook (1959) proposed that emotional arousal reduces the range of cues a person uses, concentrating attention on the features of a situation that are most relevant to the emotion and withdrawing it from others. Because a detail must be attended to in order to be encoded, attentional narrowing has a predictable consequence: features at the center of a frightening event tend to be encoded comparatively well, and features at its edges tend to be encoded poorly or not at all.
Christianson’s (1992) critical review organized the eyewitness research around this distinction and concluded that the simple claim that stress impairs memory is inadequate. Emotional arousal tended to preserve or enhance memory for central details, meaning the gist of what happened and the features that drew attention, while impairing memory for peripheral details such as background information and particulars unconnected to the source of the emotion. The pattern depended on the type of event and detail, the delay, and how memory was tested. The dependable generalization is a relative one: within a stressful event, central information is comparatively favored and peripheral information comparatively disadvantaged; it is not the case that every central detail is remembered accurately.
The pattern is also more conditional than it is often presented. Lane and Houston (2021) note that Easterbrook’s evidence came mainly from animals made anxious by food deprivation, and that studies have defined “central” differently, some as spatially central and others as central to the plot, with conflicting results (pp. 105–107). Where emotion arose from the meaning of a narrative rather than from a shocking image, one research group found no central-peripheral trade-off, with both kinds of detail remembered better, and a study of a negative-emotion crime video found fuller descriptions of the perpetrator but poorer memory for his actions and poorer identification (pp. 113–115). The authors still regard better memory for central details of negative events as well supported (p. 107); the qualification concerns how far the rule can be applied to a particular detail.
Several kinds of information that matter in abuse cases, such as dates, the number of occasions, the order of events, and clothing, are often peripheral to what the child was attending to. Whether a detail is central or peripheral depends on the event and the child, and a detail that seems peripheral to an adult may have been central to the child, or the reverse.
Weapon Focus and the Overall Effect of High Stress
Two findings from the adult eyewitness literature refine the picture. The first is the weapon-focus effect. Using eye-tracking, Loftus, Loftus, and Messo (1987) showed that witnesses looked more often and longer at a weapon than at a neutral object and remembered the perpetrator less well. Meta-analyses confirm that the presence of a weapon reduces memory for other features of a scene and, to a lesser degree, identification accuracy (Steblay, 1992), and a later meta-analysis found a moderate overall effect that varied with the level of threat, the duration of exposure, and the retention interval (Fawcett et al., 2013). Weapon focus is a concrete example of attention being drawn to the most threatening feature at the expense of other information.
The second finding guards against overstatement. A meta-analysis of studies in which stress was manipulated found that, on balance, high stress reduced both the accuracy of eyewitness identification and the accuracy of eyewitness recall of crime details, with larger effects in studies that used staged crimes (Deffenbacher et al., 2004). Taken together, the eyewitness studies show that stress does not reliably sharpen memory across the board. It narrows and reallocates attention, comparatively favoring central over peripheral information, while high stress tends to reduce overall accuracy. These studies were conducted mostly with adults and mostly concern strangers and identification, which are seldom the contested issues in child sexual abuse cases, so they bear on children’s accounts by analogy rather than directly.
The Developmental Baseline
How much a child can remember of any event depends first on development. Fivush’s (1998) review of children’s recollections of traumatic and nontraumatic events found striking similarities between the two and no evidence that traumatic events are encoded by a special mechanism. Experiences from before about 18 months of age are rarely available to later verbal recall; experiences from roughly 18 months to three years tend to be reported in fragmentary form and are more prone to error over time; and from about age three, children can give coherent accounts that can persist for long periods. Peterson’s (2002) review similarly concluded that children, including young children, can retain accurate memories of distinctive personal experiences such as injuries over months and years, while noting real limits on completeness and on dating.
These developmental limits apply independently of stress and are addressed in the companion papers on autobiographical memory and childhood amnesia and on script memory and dating.
Children’s Memory for Stressful Experiences
Because serious stress cannot ethically be induced in children, much of the evidence comes from medical emergencies and procedures. Children who had been 2 to 13 years old when they were treated in a hospital emergency room for an injury were re-interviewed five years later. They showed excellent recall of the central components of the injury, more incomplete recall of the hospital treatment, and an effect of centrality within each event. Higher stress at the time had little effect on memory for the injury and appeared to aid recall of central components of the treatment (Peterson & Whalen, 2001). Even children injured at age two recalled a considerable amount about the injury.
A study of children who had undergone a painful and frightening medical procedure involving urinary catheterization between ages two and six found that those who were at least four at the time were more accurate than those who were younger, that longer delays reduced the amount of correct information without increasing errors, and that parental attachment style was related to errors (Quas et al., 1999). The same study tested suggestibility: when a never-experienced medical procedure was mentioned only briefly, children were more likely to assent falsely that it had happened than when it was described in detail. Stress at the time of an experience did not exempt these memories from suggestive influence.
The effect of arousal also depends on when it occurs and on the interview. In a laboratory study of 109 five- and six-year-olds who watched a frightening video, higher heart rate while watching was associated with fewer incorrect responses a week later, whereas higher heart rate during the memory interview was associated with poorer memory, but only when the interviewer was not supportive (Quas & Lench, 2007). The stressor was mild, but the finding is consistent with field research showing that interview conditions affect what a stressed child can report. Specific, closed questions about traumatic events can elicit errors that open-ended questions do not, even from children who remember the core of the event well (Peterson & Biggs, 1997).
Documented Abuse and Long-Term Memory
The strongest evidence against the view that trauma erases memory comes from prospective studies of people whose childhood sexual abuse was documented at the time. In a study of 175 individuals whose abuse had been documented in criminal cases years earlier, 81% reported the documented abuse when interviewed years later. Older age when the abuse ended, maternal support after disclosure, and more severe abuse were associated with a greater likelihood of reporting it (Goodman et al., 2003). In the same sample, memory for the abuse 12 to 21 years after it ended was more accurate among those with more severe posttraumatic stress symptoms, and those who identified the abuse as their most traumatic life event remembered it relatively accurately; less maternal support was among the predictors of errors (Alexander et al., 2005). A later review of this research program concluded that, overall, greater traumatic impact was associated with more accurate memory, although developmental factors, individual differences, and the conditions of questioning moderated that relationship (Goodman et al., 2019).
An earlier prospective study is often cited for a different proposition. Of 129 women whose childhood sexual abuse had been documented 17 years earlier, 38% did not report the documented abuse in a research interview; nonreport was more likely among those who were younger at the time and those abused by someone they knew (Williams, 1994). The author concluded that long periods without memory of abuse should not be taken as evidence that the abuse did not occur. Failure to report in an interview is not the same as absence of memory, since people may choose not to disclose or may have been too young to retain the event (Goodman et al., 2003). Read together, the studies show that most people with documented abuse remember and report it, and that some do not report it when asked, for reasons that include ordinary forgetting and reluctance. The separate question of memories said to be recovered after long periods of complete amnesia remains contested; one review argued that the evidence for a mechanism that blocks traumatic memories entirely is weak and that some memory-recovery techniques risk producing false memories (Otgaar et al., 2019). A shorter review by the same group summarized implantation studies in which about 30% of participants, on average, came to remember a suggested autobiographical event, and argued that ordinary processes, such as choosing not to think or talk about an experience and underestimating how much one previously remembered, can account for reports of long-forgotten trauma without a special repression mechanism (Otgaar et al., 2022). The authors acknowledged that the events implanted in research are far less serious than abuse, and the prospective research described above shows that most people with documented abuse remember it, with greater traumatic impact generally associated with more accurate memory (Goodman et al., 2019). Recovered-memory claims are not part of most child sexual abuse cases.
Trauma Memory Remains Subject to Ordinary Distortion
The research is equally clear in the other direction: memories of distressing events are reconstructive and not immune to error. In an adult study of a graphic, distressing film depicting a murder, misleading information presented afterward produced significant misinformation effects; control participants remembered central details better than peripheral ones, but that advantage disappeared for misinformed participants, and delay increased suggestibility and confidence in misinformed answers (Paz-Alonso & Goodman, 2008). That study involved adults and a filmed event, not children or personal experience, but it shows that strong emotion does not protect even central details from post-event information. The child studies described above reach a consistent conclusion about suggestibility (Quas et al., 1999).
Fuzzy-trace theory offers a framework for these findings. Memory stores both verbatim traces of specific details and gist traces of general meaning; gist traces tend to be more durable, while verbatim traces fade more quickly, and false memories that are consistent with the gist of an experience can be readily accepted (Brainerd & Reyna, 2002). That account helps explain why the core of a stressful event may be retained while its details become uncertain, and why suggestions that fit the gist of what a child believes happened can be incorporated.
A child’s account of a frightening event may therefore be accurate at its core and mistaken in its details, out of chronological order, and uncertain about dates and frequency. Trauma neither guarantees a memory nor disqualifies it. The reliability of particular details depends heavily on whether they were reported spontaneously in response to open questions or first emerged after leading, repeated, or suggestive questioning, a subject addressed in the companion papers on suggestibility and misinformation.
Individual Differences and Repeated Experiences
Children differ in how they encode and report distressing experiences. Age, caregiver support, attachment, the severity of posttraumatic symptoms, and dissociation all appear in the research as factors that influence how much is remembered and reported (Alexander et al., 2005; Quas et al., 1999); the limited research on dissociation during an event is addressed in the companion paper on dissociation, hyperarousal, and freezing. The nature of the experience also matters. Terr (1991), writing from clinical observation, associated single-incident trauma with detailed memories and repeated trauma with denial, numbing, and dissociation. Her framework is clinical and dated, but it is consistent with later research on script memory: when similar events recur, children tend to retain a generalized account of what usually happened and have difficulty isolating a particular occasion, which bears directly on charging and on the specificity a child can be expected to provide.
Limits of the Evidence
The research summarized here has substantial limits that apply to both sides. Laboratory studies of arousal use mild stressors and mostly adult participants. Eyewitness studies of weapon focus and high stress concern identification of strangers and recall of crime details, which are often not the contested issues in child sexual abuse cases. Studies of children’s memory for medical procedures and injuries involve events that were documented, discussed openly with caregivers, and not secret or shameful in the way abuse often is, so they may overstate or understate how well abuse is remembered. Prospective studies of documented abuse are few, draw on cases that reached the legal system, and cannot capture abuse that was never reported.
Most important, these are group-level findings. No study and no test can determine whether a particular child’s memory of a particular event is accurate, whether a particular gap reflects stress, forgetting, reluctance, or the absence of an event, or whether a vivid account reflects experience or later influence. Confidence and vividness are imperfect indicators of accuracy. The research can tell a factfinder which kinds of details tend to be robust or fragile and which conditions tend to improve or impair accuracy; it cannot resolve whether the events in a given case occurred.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When a witness cites the finding that 81% of 175 people with documented abuse reported it years later (Goodman et al., 2003), ask who was studied: the abuse had been documented in criminal cases, so the sample cannot capture abuse that was never reported. When testimony relies on the 38% of 129 women who did not report documented abuse (Williams, 1994), ask what exactly was counted, since failure to report in a research interview is not the same as absence of memory. When the finding that high stress reduced eyewitness accuracy (Deffenbacher et al., 2004) is offered to suggest that a child’s account is unreliable, ask whether it applies to this person, because those studies mostly involved adults, concerned strangers and identification, and showed larger effects with staged crimes. And when the association between greater traumatic impact and more accurate memory (Goodman et al., 2019) is offered to support a vivid account, ask whether the conclusion follows from the design and applies to this child, since a group-level association cannot determine whether a particular child’s memory of a particular event is accurate. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Stress, Trauma, and Memory and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
Expert testimony on stress and memory is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702 as construed in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999), which extended the trial court’s gatekeeping duty to all expert testimony, including clinical and behavioral expertise. Rule 702 was amended effective December 1, 2023, to state that the proponent must show by a preponderance of the evidence that each requirement is met and that each opinion reflects a reliable application of the expert’s methods to the facts. Testimony that generalizes from adult laboratory studies, or from animal neurobiology, to a particular child raises fit and reliable-application questions under the amended rule and under Rule 403.
In courts-martial, Military Rule of Evidence 702 governs, and the December 2023 federal amendment has been incorporated into the Military Rules of Evidence (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025). United States v. Houser (1993) sets out the factors a military judge considers in admitting expert testimony. In United States v. Flesher (2014), the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces recognized that expert testimony about the sometimes counterintuitive behavior of sexual assault victims may be admitted to help members understand it, but held that the qualifications of the witness offered in that case were not established on the record and that experts may not testify beyond their expertise or simply bolster the credibility of a government witness. In United States v. Brooks (2007), the court held that expert testimony about the percentage of false claims of sexual abuse made by children was the functional equivalent of vouching, and experts may not state or imply that a particular witness is or is not truthful.
Arizona
Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 adopted the Daubert standard in 2012 and was amended effective January 1, 2024, to conform to the 2023 federal amendment (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004). Arizona recognized the value of memory science well before that. In State v. Chapple (1983), the Arizona Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding expert testimony on factors affecting the reliability of eyewitness identification where identification was the central disputed issue, while leaving such testimony generally to the trial court’s discretion.
Testimony about how stress affects a child’s memory is subject to the anti-vouching rule of State v. Lindsey (1986) and State v. Moran (1986): an expert may describe general characteristics and patterns but may not opine, directly or indirectly, on whether a particular witness’s account is accurate or truthful, or quantify how often witnesses of that type are accurate (Lindsey, 149 Ariz. at 473–75). Under State v. Salazar-Mercado (2014), a “cold” expert may educate the jury about general principles without applying them to the facts, provided the testimony satisfies Rule 702 and survives Rule 403. That framework permits either party to offer general testimony that central details of stressful events tend to be well retained, that peripheral details, dates, and frequency are fragile, and that stressful memories remain open to suggestion.
Other Jurisdictions
In State v. Henderson (2011), after an extensive review of the scientific record, the New Jersey Supreme Court identified high stress and weapon focus among the variables that can affect the reliability of eyewitness memory and revised its framework and jury instructions accordingly. Henderson concerns identification, not children’s accounts of abuse, but it is the most detailed judicial treatment of the stress research. In State v. Michaels (1994), the same court held that when a defendant produces some evidence that a child’s statements resulted from suggestive or coercive interviewing, the State must establish their reliability at a pretrial hearing by clear and convincing evidence (136 N.J. at 320–21). Jurisdictions differ on whether such hearings are available.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports explaining to a factfinder that a child may remember the core of a frightening experience well while being vague, uncertain, or inconsistent about peripheral particulars such as dates, the order of events, the number of occasions, or what someone was wearing. Studies of children’s memory for injuries and of adults with documented childhood abuse show that the central features of genuinely experienced stressful events are often retained for years (Alexander et al., 2005; Peterson & Whalen, 2001), and, in the prospective abuse studies, that greater traumatic impact was generally associated with more accurate memory (Alexander et al., 2005; Goodman et al., 2019). A qualified expert can explain that peripheral inconsistency is expected under these conditions and is not, by itself, a sign of fabrication, provided the testimony stays general, as Salazar-Mercado contemplates, and does not imply that the particular child’s account is accurate.
The research also counsels caution about what stress does for memory. High stress tends to reduce overall accuracy in the eyewitness research, stressful memories remain open to misinformation and suggestive questioning, and confidence and vividness do not guarantee accuracy (Deffenbacher et al., 2004; Paz-Alonso & Goodman, 2008; Quas et al., 1999). Prosecutors and investigators can protect a child’s account by ensuring an early, recorded, open-ended interview and by documenting who spoke with the child beforehand. At trial, testimony that a traumatic memory is necessarily vivid and accurate, or neurobiological testimony that outruns the human research, is vulnerable under amended Rule 702 and Flesher; reliance on the spontaneous core of the account and on independent evidence gives the factfinder more to evaluate.
Special Issues for Defense
The research supports careful examination of the details on which a case depends. Where an allegation turns on peripheral particulars, dates, frequency, or the identification of a person or place, the research on attentional narrowing and high stress identifies real limits, and where key details first appeared after leading, repeated, or suggestive questioning, the misinformation research supports testimony explaining how emotional memories can incorporate post-event information. Counsel can seek the recordings and records of every interview and of earlier informal conversations, and an expert can distinguish the portions of an account that emerged spontaneously from those that emerged in response to particular questions.
The research also counsels caution about overreading. Trauma does not erase a child’s memory or make a child broadly unreliable, the core of a genuinely experienced event is often well retained, and a fragmentary, non-chronological, or incomplete account is a known feature of memory for stressful and repeated events that does not show the underlying event did not occur. Arguments that treat peripheral inconsistency as proof that the core allegation is false are not supported by the research and can be answered by it, and a defense expert who implies that a particular account is false faces the same anti-vouching limits under Lindsey and Brooks that apply to prosecution experts. The most persuasive analysis is precise: it identifies specific fragile details or specific suggestive elicitation and explains why they matter.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Alexander, K. W., Quas, J. A., Goodman, G. S., Ghetti, S., Edelstein, R. S., Redlich, A. D., Cordon, I. M., & Jones, D. P. H. (2005). Traumatic impact predicts long-term memory for documented child sexual abuse. Psychological Science, 16(1), 33–40. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0956-7976.2005.00777.x
Brainerd, C. J., & Reyna, V. F. (2002). Fuzzy-trace theory and false memory. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 11(5), 164–169. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8721.00192
Christianson, S.-Å. (1992). Emotional stress and eyewitness memory: A critical review. Psychological Bulletin, 112(2), 284–309. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.112.2.284
Deffenbacher, K. A., Bornstein, B. H., Penrod, S. D., & McGorty, E. K. (2004). A meta-analytic review of the effects of high stress on eyewitness memory. Law and Human Behavior, 28(6), 687–706. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-004-0565-x
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Fawcett, J. M., Russell, E. J., Peace, K. A., & Christie, J. (2013). Of guns and geese: A meta-analytic review of the “weapon focus” literature. Psychology, Crime & Law, 19(1), 35–66. https://doi.org/10.1080/1068316X.2011.599325
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Goodman, G. S., Ghetti, S., Quas, J. A., Edelstein, R. S., Alexander, K. W., Redlich, A. D., Cordon, I. M., & Jones, D. P. H. (2003). A prospective study of memory for child sexual abuse: New findings relevant to the repressed-memory controversy. Psychological Science, 14(2), 113–118. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9280.01428
Goodman, G. S., Quas, J. A., Goldfarb, D., Gonzalves, L., & Gonzalez, A. (2019). Trauma and long-term memory for childhood events: Impact matters. Child Development Perspectives, 13(1), 3–9. https://doi.org/10.1111/cdep.12307
Lane, S. M., & Houston, K. A. (2021). Understanding eyewitness memory: Theory and applications. New York University Press.
Loftus, E. F., Loftus, G. R., & Messo, J. (1987). Some facts about “weapon focus.” Law and Human Behavior, 11(1), 55–62. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01044839
Otgaar, H., Howe, M. L., & Patihis, L. (2022). What science tells us about false and repressed memories. Memory, 30(1), 16–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2020.1870699
Otgaar, H., Howe, M. L., Patihis, L., Merckelbach, H., Lynn, S. J., Lilienfeld, S. O., & Loftus, E. F. (2019). The return of the repressed: The persistent and problematic claims of long-forgotten trauma. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 14(6), 1072–1095. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691619862306
Paz-Alonso, P. M., & Goodman, G. S. (2008). Trauma and memory: Effects of post-event misinformation, retrieval order, and retention interval. Memory, 16(1), 58–75. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658210701363146
Peterson, C. (2002). Children’s long-term memory for autobiographical events. Developmental Review, 22(3), 370–402. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0273-2297(02)00007-2
Peterson, C., & Biggs, M. (1997). Interviewing children about trauma: Problems with “specific” questions. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 10(2), 279–290. https://doi.org/10.1002/jts.2490100208
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Legal Authorities
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983).
State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 27 A.3d 872 (2011).
State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).
State v. Michaels, 136 N.J. 299, 642 A.2d 1372 (1994).
State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986).
State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).
United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
United States v. Flesher, 73 M.J. 303 (C.A.A.F. 2014).
United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).
Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Ariz. R. Evid. 403.
Ariz. R. Evid. 702.
Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004 (amending Ariz. R. Evid. 702, effective Jan. 1, 2024).
Mil. R. Evid. 403.
Mil. R. Evid. 702.
Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf
Related topic papers: Autobiographical Memory and Childhood Amnesia · Script Memory, Repeated Events, and Dating Alleged Abuse · Fuzzy-Trace Theory and How Children’s Memories Change Over Time · Misinformation and Pre-Interview Contamination · Children’s Suggestibility: What the Research Shows · Trauma Impact and PTSD in Children · Dissociation, Hyperarousal, and Freezing
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Memory in the Courtroom · Courts-Martial