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Autobiographical Memory and Childhood Amnesia

Published

Snap Shot

  • The question: Can a person genuinely remember an event from infancy or the toddler years, and how does age at recall affect what memory can supply?
  • What the research shows: Adults’ earliest memories fall on average around 3 to 3.5 years. In one prospective study, only about half of what children recalled of events before age 2 was accurate, versus more than 75% for later events. The boundary moves with age: young children can accurately recall early events they will later forget. In studies of children’s memory for painful medical procedures (none involving abuse), children who were about 4 or older at the time were more accurate years later than younger children.
  • What it does not show: Group averages cannot establish whether a particular early memory is genuine or reconstructed. Sparseness, poor dating, and changes in a young child’s account over long intervals are common in genuine memories and do not by themselves show fabrication.
  • The law: Early-memory questions usually go to weight, not competency (Fed. R. Evid. 601, 602; A.R.S. § 13-4061). General “cold” testimony is permitted (Salazar-Mercado), but opinions that a particular memory is genuine or false are barred (Lindsey, Moran, Brooks).
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors should document the complainant’s age at each event and report and not present a vivid adult memory of infancy as accurate; defense counsel should tie testimony to specific facts, such as events dated before age 2, rather than claim young children cannot remember.

Allegations of child sexual abuse (CSA) often concern events said to have occurred when the child was very young, and they are sometimes reported years later, by an older child, an adolescent, or an adult. CSA is common and underreported, delayed disclosure is frequent in substantiated cases, and children, including young children, can retain accurate memories of distinctive personal experiences over long periods (London et al., 2005; Peterson, 2002; Stoltenborgh et al., 2011). At the same time, adults recall little or nothing from the first years of life, and memories from early childhood are fragile in ways that change as the rememberer grows older.

These two bodies of research reach court in several ways. A party may question whether a person could genuinely remember an event dated to infancy or the toddler years, or whether a detailed memory of that period is more likely a reconstruction. Another party may need to explain why a young child’s account is sparse, out of order, or unable to fix when something happened, without that sparseness signaling fabrication. And in cases involving long delays, the age of the person at the time of the event and at the time of recall both bear on what memory can supply.

This paper describes what autobiographical memory is and how it develops, the phenomenon of childhood amnesia and where its boundary falls, how that boundary shifts with the age of the rememberer, current explanations for it, and what the research shows about early stressful experiences. It then addresses the limits of the evidence and the governing law. Related questions about memory for repeated events and dating, and about stress and trauma, are treated in companion papers.

What Autobiographical Memory Is

Autobiographical memory is memory for specific events in one’s own life, located in time and place and experienced as having happened to oneself. It is distinct from general knowledge about the world and from generalized knowledge of what usually happens in a familiar routine, sometimes called script memory. Autobiographical memory is reconstructive rather than reproductive: each act of recall rebuilds an event from stored fragments, general knowledge, and the cues present at retrieval. This is normal at every age, and it means that an account can be accurate in its core while incomplete or mistaken in details, and that the way a memory is elicited can shape what is reported.

How Autobiographical Memory Develops

Autobiographical memory emerges gradually during the preschool years. Howe and Courage (1997) linked its emergence to the development of a cognitive sense of self in the second year of life, which they argued sets a lower limit of about age 2 for autobiographical memories, with later accumulation tied to improvements in the ability to retain information. Nelson and Fivush (2004) proposed a social-cultural account in which basic memory abilities combine with language and narrative skill, conversations with adults about past events, an understanding of time, and an understanding of self and others. On this view, children learn the form of a personal narrative partly by talking about the past with parents and others, and differences in how much and how richly families reminisce contribute to individual and cultural differences in early memories. Fivush (2011) reviewed the developmental research and described autobiographical memory as continuing to develop through childhood and adolescence.

Two practical consequences follow. First, very young children often report experiences in general terms, provide little information in free recall, and depend on adult questions to report what they remember. Their reports may be organized differently from an adult’s and may lack the time markers adults use. Second, because adult conversation helps build autobiographical memory, it can also shape the content of a young child’s memories. Open-ended, non-leading questioning helps a child report what the child remembers; leading or repeated suggestion can introduce information the child later reports as experienced. That second risk is addressed in the companion papers on suggestibility and contamination.

Childhood Amnesia: Where the Boundary Falls

Childhood amnesia, also called infantile amnesia, refers to adults’ relative inability to recall specific events from the first years of life and the smaller than expected number of memories from the years that follow (Bauer, 2015). Across many studies, the average age of an adult’s earliest memory falls in the first half of the fourth year of life, around 3 to 3.5 years. In a survey of 6,313 adults, the mean estimated age of the earliest memory was 3.15 years (Akhtar et al., 2018). Using a different method, Multhaup et al. (2005) estimated that adults’ memories of childhood events shift from mostly knowing that something happened to mostly recollecting it at roughly 4.7 years.

The boundary is a gradient rather than a line. Some adults report memories from before age 2, and the scientific debate over such reports is instructive. In the same survey, nearly 40% of respondents dated their first memory to age 2 or younger, and about 14% to age 1 or younger. Akhtar et al. (2018) characterized these very early memories as improbable and likely fictional, constructed from family stories, photographs, or knowledge about one’s early life. Bauer et al. (2019) disputed that characterization in a published comment, and Akhtar et al. (2019) replied that their claim was not that infants and toddlers lack memory but that they generally do not form the richly detailed autobiographical memories adults have, so that detailed adult accounts of events at around age 3 or younger are often elaborated from fragments, family stories, and later information. The exchange reflects agreement that young children remember and disagreement about how often adults’ detailed memories of that period reflect genuine recollection.

Accuracy also changes across the boundary. Cleveland and Reese (2008) followed 40 children who, at age 5.5, discussed personal experiences that had occurred as early as age 1.5. The children had not yet forgotten all events from before age 3.5, but there was a qualitative shift at about age 2: for events before age 2, only about half of what the children recalled was accurate, while for later events more than 75% was accurate.

The Boundary Moves With the Age of the Rememberer

Childhood amnesia is not fixed at birth; it descends over the course of childhood. Children and adolescents report more memories from before age 3 than adults do, and their earliest memories date from younger ages (Tustin & Hayne, 2010). Prospective studies show the process directly. Bauer and Larkina (2014) recorded conversations between children and their mothers about unique events when the children were 3, then tested different groups of children years later. Children aged 5, 6, and 7 remembered 60% or more of the early events, while children aged 8 and 9 remembered fewer than 40%. Peterson et al. (2011) asked children aged 4 to 13 for their earliest memories and asked again two years later; the younger children’s earliest memories shifted to later ages, and many could not recall the earlier memories even when cued, while older children were more consistent. Over eight years, the youngest children in a follow-up study forgot more than half of their initial memories, and of the information that the youngest children had provided, less than 10% was the same and 22% was contradictory at the later interview (Peterson et al., 2018).

This research has direct legal significance. A young child may genuinely remember an early event that the same person, as an older child or adult, will no longer be able to retrieve. The age of the person at the time of the event, the age at the time of recall, and the interval between them all bear on how plausible and how reliable a memory of early childhood is likely to be. A memory reported by a 5-year-old about an event at age 3 stands on different footing from a memory reported by an adult about the same age. Consistency over long intervals in the earliest years is also less common than lay intuition might suggest, so changes in a very young child’s account across years are not, by themselves, a sign of fabrication.

Why Childhood Amnesia Occurs

Current explanations are developmental. The older psychoanalytic view that early memories are lost through repression has not received empirical support as an explanation for childhood amnesia. Whether memories of later events can become inaccessible and be recovered is a separate question, addressed in the companion paper on adults reporting historical abuse, where the dispute concerns mechanism and frequency. A 2026 systematic review of 42 studies published since 2000 found recovered-memory rates of 1% to 3% in legally documented CSA cases, 22% to 39% in self-reported survivor samples, 6% to 19% among therapy attendees, and 3% to 13% in general population samples, with the spread driven largely by differing definitions, samples, and recovery contexts (Carey et al., 2026). Studies of the process found no mechanism unique to recovered memories; the experiences were described as reflecting conscious suppression, failures of awareness, or environmental cues rather than special dissociative processes. The review addresses prevalence and mechanism; it does not show whether any particular recovered memory is accurate. Hayne (2004) reviewed evidence that infants and toddlers can remember, sometimes for long periods, and that encoding, retention, and retrieval all improve gradually across infancy, so early memories are formed and kept less robustly. Bauer (2015) proposed that childhood amnesia reflects two complementary processes: the gradual development of the ability to form, retain, and retrieve personal memories, and a faster rate of forgetting in childhood than in adulthood. As memory traces become richer and better integrated, they become less vulnerable to forgetting.

Language plays a specific role. Simcock and Hayne (2002) tested children’s verbal memory of a unique event 6 months or a year later. Although the children had by then acquired most of the vocabulary needed to describe the event, none verbally reported information that had not been part of their productive vocabulary at the time of the event. Experiences encoded before a child could put them into words do not readily become reportable later simply because the child has since learned the words.

Neuroscience research is consistent with these accounts but should not be overstated. In a functional imaging study of awake infants, greater hippocampal activity while viewing new photographs predicted later memory-based looking behavior beginning around 1 year of age, suggesting that the capacity to encode individual memories emerges in infancy and that childhood amnesia may depend more on later loss of access than on an inability to encode (Yates et al., 2025). Animal research in mice and other rodents found that high rates of new neuron production in the hippocampus were associated with forgetting, including in infant animals (Akers et al., 2014); this is animal research and cannot be applied directly to children. Richmond and Nelson (2007) reviewed the development of the brain systems that support declarative memory. None of this research permits conclusions about whether a particular person’s memory is accurate.

Remembering, Reporting, and Source Monitoring

Young children’s free recall is typically brief, and they often remember more than they report spontaneously. Peterson (2002) reviewed studies of children’s memory for injuries and emergency-room treatment and concluded that children, including preschoolers, can retain accurate memories of distinctive personal events for months and years, while completeness varies and dating events is difficult. Questions are therefore often needed to elicit what a young child remembers, and the form of those questions matters, as discussed in the companion papers on forensic interviewing and question types.

Source monitoring, the ability to identify where a memory came from, develops through the early school years. Roberts (2002) reviewed evidence that young children have more difficulty than older children and adults distinguishing what they experienced from what they imagined, were told, or saw on another occasion. A young child may sincerely report a detail that came from a conversation or an earlier question, without awareness that the source has been confused. For that reason, the history of how and when an account emerged is often more informative than the child’s confidence.

Early Stressful Experiences

Because emotion affects memory, it is often asked whether frightening or painful experiences in early childhood are exempt from childhood amnesia. Research on children’s memory for stressful medical procedures provides a partial answer. Quas et al. (1999) questioned children aged 3 to 13 about a painful and distressing medical procedure they had undergone between ages 2 and 6. Children who had been 4 or older at the time of the procedure were more accurate than children who had been younger than 4. Longer delays were associated with less correct information but not with more errors, and children were more likely to assent falsely to a never-experienced procedure when it was mentioned only briefly. Peterson (2012) reviewed research on childhood amnesia and on children’s memory for stressful events across years and discussed its forensic implications.

The research therefore supports two balanced conclusions. In the medical-procedure studies reviewed, stressful experiences from the preschool years were remembered accurately for long periods, particularly when the child was about 4 or older at the time. Emotional significance does not, however, remove the developmental limits that produce childhood amnesia, and detailed memories attributed to the first two years of life warrant the same scrutiny whether or not the content is traumatic. Goodman et al. (2010) reviewed the broader literature on maltreatment and memory, which is addressed in the companion paper on stress and trauma.

Limits of the Evidence

Most studies of childhood amnesia rely on adults’ reports of their earliest memories, which usually cannot be verified and whose dating is uncertain. Prospective studies that follow children over time are more informative but are small, often with fewer than 100 children, and they track ordinary, positive, or medical events rather than abuse. Samples are drawn mainly from Western, middle-class families, and research shows cultural and family differences in the timing and richness of early memories. Laboratory measures of infant memory, such as looking time or imitation, do not map directly onto the verbal accounts at issue in court.

These studies describe group averages and probabilities. They show that genuine narrative memories from before about age 2 are uncommon in adults and, in the one study that checked accuracy, about half accurate, that memories from about ages 2 to 4 are possible but fragile, and that young children can accurately recall recent early experiences that they will later forget. They cannot establish whether a particular person’s memory of a particular early event is genuine or reconstructed. Applying the research requires attention to the person’s age at the time of the alleged event and at the time of each report, how the memory first emerged, and the rest of the evidence.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When a party relies on Akhtar et al. (2018), in which nearly 40% of 6,313 adults dated a first memory to age 2 or younger, to argue that an early memory is likely fictional, the attorney should ask what exactly was counted: adults’ estimates of their earliest memories, which usually cannot be verified, under a characterization that Bauer et al. (2019) disputed. When the finding that only about half of what children recalled of events before age 2 was accurate (Cleveland & Reese, 2008) is cited, ask how much evidence it rests on: 40 children recalling events other than abuse. When Quas et al. (1999) or Bauer and Larkina (2014) is offered to show that a complainant’s early memory is likely accurate, ask who was studied: children recalling medical procedures or unique ordinary events, mainly from Western, middle-class families, rather than abuse. And for any of these group averages, ask whether it applies to this person, given the age at the event, the age at each report, and how the memory first emerged. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Autobiographical Memory and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

Federal Rule of Evidence 601 provides that every person is competent to be a witness unless the rules provide otherwise, and Rule 602 requires that a witness testify only to matters within personal knowledge. Questions about whether a witness could remember an event from early childhood are therefore usually matters of weight, explored through cross-examination and expert testimony, rather than of competency. Expert testimony on memory development and childhood amnesia is governed by Rule 702 as construed in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999); Rule 702 was amended effective December 1, 2023, to state that the proponent must establish each requirement by a preponderance of the evidence and that each opinion must reflect a reliable application of the expert’s methods to the facts.

In Idaho v. Wright (1990), the Supreme Court listed factors relevant to the reliability of a young child’s hearsay statements, including spontaneity and consistent repetition, the child’s mental state, the use of terminology unexpected of a child of similar age, and lack of motive to fabricate. Developmental memory research bears on how such factors are assessed for a very young child. Long delays are possible in federal prosecutions because 18 U.S.C. § 3299 removes any limitation period for most federal child sexual abuse and exploitation felonies, and 18 U.S.C. § 3283 permits prosecution of other offenses involving the sexual or physical abuse of a child during the life of the child or for ten years after the offense, whichever is longer.

In courts-martial, Military Rules of Evidence 601, 602, and 702 apply in parallel, and the 2023 federal amendment to Rule 702 has been incorporated into the Military Rules of Evidence (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025). United States v. Houser (1993) sets out the factors for admitting expert testimony, and under United States v. Brooks (2007) an expert may not offer testimony that functions as an opinion on a witness’s truthfulness. Article 43, UCMJ, permits certain offenses to be tried at any time and, for child abuse offenses not covered by that provision, extends the limitation period to the life of the child or ten years after the offense, whichever is longer.

Arizona

Every person is competent to be a witness in an Arizona criminal trial (A.R.S. § 13-4061), and Arizona Rule of Evidence 602 requires personal knowledge. Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 adopted the Daubert standard in 2012 and was amended effective January 1, 2024, to conform to the 2023 federal amendment (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004). Under State v. Salazar-Mercado (2014), a “cold” expert may educate the jury about general principles without applying them to the facts, which permits either party to offer general testimony about the development of autobiographical memory and childhood amnesia. Under State v. Lindsey (1986) and State v. Moran (1986), an expert may not opine, directly or indirectly, on whether a particular witness is truthful or accurate (Lindsey, 149 Ariz. at 475), a limit that applies equally to testimony that a particular early memory is genuine and to testimony that it is not.

Arizona law permits prosecution at any time for any offense listed in chapter 14 or 35.1 of title 13 that is a class 2 felony (A.R.S. § 13-107(A)), a category that includes many child sexual offenses. Cases involving adults’ memories of early childhood can therefore arise long after the alleged events, which makes the age of the complainant at the time of the events and at the time of the first report a recurring issue.

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports several points the prosecution can legitimately make. Children, including preschoolers, can retain accurate memories of distinctive personal events for long periods, and in studies of painful medical procedures, children who were about 4 or older at the time recalled them more accurately years later than younger children (Peterson, 2002; Quas et al., 1999); those studies did not involve abuse. A young child’s account may be sparse, lack chronology, depend on questions to emerge, and fail to fix when an event occurred, and those features are consistent with normal memory development and do not, by themselves, show either fabrication or accuracy. A young child may remember an early event that the same person will later forget, so a memory reported by a child close in time to an event at age 3 or 4 is not undermined by the general finding that adults rarely remember that age (Bauer & Larkina, 2014; Tustin & Hayne, 2010). An expert can explain these findings in general terms.

The research also counsels caution. Narrative memories of events before about age 2 are uncommon and, in the one study that checked accuracy, about half accurate, and adults’ reports of very early memories may be reconstructed from later information (Akhtar et al., 2018; Cleveland & Reese, 2008). Prosecutors can document the complainant’s age at the time of each alleged event and at each report, to obtain the earliest recorded account, to identify any conversations, therapy, or other sources that preceded a later report, and to seek corroboration independent of memory. Presenting a detailed adult memory of infancy as though its vividness established its accuracy invites a challenge the research supports; framing early-memory evidence within the age ranges the research treats as plausible gives the factfinder more to evaluate.

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports careful examination of when an alleged event occurred and when it was first reported. Where an account describes events in the first two years of life, or where an adult reports a detailed memory of early childhood that first emerged long afterward, the research supports expert testimony explaining childhood amnesia, the low accuracy of memories from before about age 2, the role of language at the time of the event, and the difficulty young children have identifying the source of a remembered detail (Cleveland & Reese, 2008; Roberts, 2002; Simcock & Hayne, 2002). Counsel can seek the history of how the memory emerged, including family discussions, photographs, therapy, and prior statements.

The research also counsels caution about overreading. The boundary of childhood amnesia is gradual and varies between people; memories from about age 3 onward can be genuine; and children can accurately recall recent early events that they will later forget. Sparseness, poor dating, and changes in a young child’s account over long intervals are common in genuine memories and do not by themselves show fabrication (Peterson et al., 2018). An expert who testifies that a particular early memory is false faces the same anti-vouching limits that apply to prosecution experts. A developmental-memory argument is most persuasive when tied to specific facts, such as an alleged event dated within the first two years of life or a memory that first appeared after identifiable outside influence, rather than offered as a general claim that young children cannot remember.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

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Legal Authorities

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990).

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).

State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).

State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986).

State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).

United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).

United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).

10 U.S.C. § 843 (Article 43, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

18 U.S.C. § 3283.

18 U.S.C. § 3299.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-107(A).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4061.

Fed. R. Evid. 601.

Fed. R. Evid. 602.

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

Ariz. R. Evid. 602.

Ariz. R. Evid. 702.

Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004 (amending Ariz. R. Evid. 702, effective Jan. 1, 2024).

Mil. R. Evid. 601.

Mil. R. Evid. 602.

Mil. R. Evid. 702.

Related topic papers: Script Memory, Repeated Events, and Dating Alleged Abuse · Fuzzy-Trace Theory and How Children’s Memories Change Over Time · Stress, Trauma, and Children’s Memory · Interviewing Young Children: Development and Language Comprehension · Children’s Suggestibility: What the Research Shows · Delayed Disclosure: Timing, Age, and Gender

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Memory in the Courtroom · Courts-Martial