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Interviewing Young Children: Development and Language Comprehension

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Snap Shot

  • The question: How reliable are preschool children’s reports, and how do their developmental and language limits affect what their answers mean?
  • What the research shows: Preschool children are, on average, the age group most affected by externally supplied suggestion, whereas errors arising from a child’s own inferences can increase with age, and differences from adults tend to narrow by adolescence but can persist for peripheral details at ages 11 to 12 (Sutherland & Hayne, 2001); in classic studies, false reports arose under stereotype induction, repeated suggestive questions, parental misinformation, and social reinforcement. Under neutral, open-ended questioning, young children can give accurate, though often brief, accounts. Complex, negative, and multi-part questions reduce accuracy, and “do you know” questions are often misunderstood; clothing placement, time, and number are especially hard.
  • What it does not show: Most findings come from staged events and group averages and cannot say whether a particular child’s report is accurate. A confusing question reduces the weight of an answer without proving it wrong, and age alone is not evidence that an account is false.
  • The law: Children are presumed competent (Wheeler, Rule 601, 18 U.S.C. § 3509, A.R.S. § 13-4061); Rule 611(a) lets the court require age-appropriate questioning by any party. Remote testimony requires a case-specific necessity finding (Maryland v. Craig, McCollum). Experts may explain development and question form but may not vouch (Brooks, Lindsey); Michaels is one taint-hearing framework.
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors should preserve the earliest statement and pre-interview history and take care with details first elicited by closed questions; defense counsel should tie challenges to specific questions and suggestive conditions in the record rather than to age, recognizing that cross-examination-style questioning also changes correct answers.

Child sexual abuse (CSA) is common and underreported, and a meaningful share of the children who are interviewed about it are very young. Preschool children, roughly ages three through five, can be abused, can remember what happened to them, and can describe it. Field studies of recorded forensic interviews show that even three- and four-year-olds provide forensically relevant information when they are asked to recall. The same body of research shows that young children are, on average, the age group whose reports are most affected by how they are questioned, and that a great deal of ordinary adult and legal language is beyond what a young child reliably understands.

These findings reach court in predictable ways. A young child’s statement may be the only direct evidence of abuse, and its weight often depends on the conversations and interviews that preceded it. A child may answer “no” to a question about being touched and then describe contact, give an impossible number of incidents, or change answers in court. Each pattern has more than one possible explanation, and the research helps distinguish them. Judges must also decide competency, remote testimony, and the limits of expert testimony.

This paper reviews the suggestibility of preschool children and its limits, what young children can report, and the features of question wording young children misunderstand, from complex sentences and negatives to words such as “touch,” spatial language about clothing, and questions about time and number. It then turns to courtroom questioning, the limits of the evidence, the law, and the recurring issues for each side.

Development and the Young Witness

The developmental differences that matter most in an interview are not differences in honesty but in the skills needed to understand a question, search memory, and report what is found. Young children are still developing source monitoring, the ability to keep track of where information came from (something experienced, imagined, or heard from someone else). They have smaller vocabularies, limited command of complex grammar, and limited awareness of whether they have understood a question. Socially, they tend to assume an adult’s question has a correct answer, to read a repeated question as a sign that the first answer was wrong, and to be reluctant to say “I don’t know” (Lyon, 2014). The review that organized the field grouped these influences into cognitive, social, and biological factors and concluded that preschool children are the most vulnerable age group to misleading information and suggestive questioning, while emphasizing that even very young children can recall a great deal that is forensically relevant (Ceci & Bruck, 1993). Both halves of that conclusion have held up.

Preschool Children and Suggestibility

The Classic Demonstrations

Several experiments defined the conditions under which preschool children make false reports. In the “Sam Stone” study, preschoolers given a negative stereotype about a classroom visitor and then repeatedly interviewed with suggestive questions came to report misdeeds he had not committed, sometimes with perceptual detail; the youngest were most affected, and children given neither the stereotype nor the suggestions made few false reports (Leichtman & Ceci, 1995). In the “mousetrap” study, preschoolers asked week after week to think about whether fictitious events had happened came to assent to and describe some of them (Ceci et al., 1994). In the “Mr. Science” studies, children whose parents read them a story containing events that had not happened later reported some of those events as experienced, and many did not retract them when asked about the source (Poole & Lindsay, 2001). When suggestive questions were combined with social influences drawn from a well-known preschool investigation, including telling children what classmates had supposedly said, praise for desired answers, and invitations to speculate, false allegations rose sharply (Garven et al., 1998).

The common thread is the conditions, not age alone: stereotype induction, repeated suggestive questions, information from trusted adults, and social reinforcement. The reviews that draw these studies together conclude that suggestive interviewing, rather than children’s memory as such, is the principal source of error, and that false reports produced this way can be detailed and convincing to adults (Bruck & Ceci, 1999; Ceci & Bruck, 1995).

What the Demonstrations Do and Do Not Show

Several findings keep this research in proportion. First, children are not equally suggestible about everything. In a study in which children took part in an event and were later asked misleading questions, children resisted false suggestions of abuse-related actions more than suggestions about other details (Rudy & Goodman, 1991). In a study of 4- and 10-year-olds who either were or were not touched in a specific way, suggestion changed children’s memory of a touch that had occurred, but it did not plant a touch that had not occurred or erase one that had (Pezdek & Roe, 1997). The authors cautioned that most classic studies examined changes to experienced events and should not be used to estimate the probability of planting an entire event. Second, the conclusion that younger children are more suggestible concerns information supplied from outside. For false memories a person generates internally from the meaning of an experience, susceptibility often increases with age, so that under some conditions older children and adults produce more false memories than young children (Brainerd et al., 2008; Otgaar et al., 2018). Third, children differ. A review of individual differences found that children with intellectual impairment and those with less developed language may be particularly vulnerable to suggestion, while several other characteristics showed no consistent relation to suggestibility (Klemfuss & Olaguez, 2020).

The conclusion is precise rather than sweeping. Young children’s reports are the most sensitive of any age group to the conditions of questioning, and externally supplied suggestion has been found to do the most harm, and to be hardest to detect, with the youngest children; errors arising from a child’s own inferences can increase with age. Under neutral, open-ended questioning, young children can give accurate, though often brief, accounts.

What Young Children Can Report

Field research on recorded forensic interviews shows what young children can do. In interviews of children aged four to eight, even the youngest responded to open-ended invitations with forensically relevant information, although their answers were shorter than those of older children (Lamb et al., 2003). In a study of 299 preschoolers’ responses in investigative interviews, informativeness increased steadily with age; three- and four-year-olds responded slightly more informatively to focused “wh-” recall prompts than to broad open-ended prompts, whereas children five and older were more responsive to open-ended prompts (Hershkowitz et al., 2012). Even three-year-olds can provide information when recall is engaged, but reliable narrative responses to broad invitations develop later. A brief answer to “Tell me everything that happened” is therefore typical for a three-year-old and does not by itself suggest a lack of memory. Follow-up recall questions that build on what the child has said (“What happened next?”) are an accepted way of helping a young child report, and they differ in kind from yes/no and forced-choice questions, which shift the task from recall to recognition (Lyon, 2014).

Language Comprehension: Where Questions Outrun the Child

The applied-linguistic study of questioning children rests on a consequential observation: the language adults use with children, especially in legal settings, routinely exceeds what a young child can reliably understand (Walker, 2013). Because a child’s answer usually sounds responsive, a misunderstanding is often invisible in the transcript.

Complex Sentences and Negatives

When participants from kindergarten through college were asked the same questions in complex courtroom phrasing and in simple phrasing, the complex forms (multi-part questions, negatives, double negatives, and difficult vocabulary) reduced accuracy at every age, not only among young children (Perry et al., 1995). In a study of 5- to 7-year-olds questioned about a play event, children asked linguistically complex questions were less accurate than children asked simple questions (Carter et al., 1996). Multi-part questions pose a particular problem because a single “yes” or “no” cannot answer two propositions at once. Negative questions (“Didn’t you go inside?”) and tag questions (“You didn’t tell anyone, did you?”) add another, because a one-word answer to a negatively framed question can carry opposite meanings to the child and to the questioner.

Pronouns, Reference, and “Do You Know” Questions

Words such as “he,” “there,” and “that time” depend on a referent both speakers share; when several people or occasions are involved, an unanchored pronoun can leave unclear which one the child is describing. A related problem arises with “Do you know” and “Do you remember” questions, which explicitly ask whether the child knows something while implicitly asking for the information. In a study of 104 children aged four to nine testifying in CSA cases, children often answered such questions with an unelaborated “yes,” attorneys’ follow-up questions suggested that the children usually misunderstood what was being asked, and when the implicit question was itself a yes/no question, children’s answers were often ambiguous and attorneys usually did not clarify them (Evans et al., 2017). The ambiguity did not diminish with age. Even “time” can mislead: in 827 forensic interviews of children aged 4 to 15, invitations to “tell me about the time” drew a date or time instead of an account more often than invitations asking what “happened” (11% vs. 6%), and interviewers did not clarify in a third of the cases where children misunderstood (Friend et al., 2022).

Legal Words and Everyday Words

Children misunderstand much of the vocabulary of the legal system. Among kindergarten, third-grade, and sixth-grade children, comprehension of legal terms increased with age, and younger children often misunderstood terms, sometimes confidently, by giving them a familiar everyday meaning (Saywitz et al., 1990). Common words can also mean something different to a child. In an early study of 40 preschoolers who classified drawings as showing touch or not, the children’s understanding of “touch” differed from that of adults in several respects (Hashima et al., 1988). The concern should not be overstated. In forensic interviews with 192 children aged 4 to 13 who alleged sexual abuse, even young children reported bodily contact as “touch,” did so more often in response to recall than recognition prompts, and usually used the word before the interviewer did (Teoh et al., 2014). A “no” to “Did he touch you?” followed by a description of contact may reflect the child’s understanding of the word or of the question form, or may reflect other explanations that the record must be examined to evaluate, and open questions that let the child describe contact in the child’s own words avoid the problem.

Clothing, Time, and Number

Questions about clothing placement are frequent in CSA interviews and difficult for young children. In a study of 97 children aged three to six, children described simple placements well, but when clothing was in an intermediate position (pants around the ankles, for example) they did poorly except when asked “where” questions, and they showed an underinclusive understanding of “over” (Stolzenberg et al., 2017). A follow-up study of 172 children of the same ages again found “where” questions superior, even for the youngest, and found tendencies to label partly removed clothing as simply “on” or “off” (Wylie et al., 2021). In forensic interviews of 458 children aged 5 to 17, even young children answered “how” questions about method or manner (“How did he touch you?”) appropriately more than 80% of the time, but those questions were particularly difficult when they concerned clothing, body position, or the nature of touch (Henderson et al., 2023).

Questions about when something happened and how many times it happened are similarly demanding. In 250 forensic interviews of 4- to 10-year-olds, references to timing and sequence increased with age and came more often from recall prompts than from recognition questions (Orbach & Lamb, 2007), and experimental work shows that the ability to place past events in time continues to develop well into middle childhood (Friedman & Lyon, 2005). In a study of 167 maltreated children aged 6 to 10 asked about documented events in their own lives (changes of placement and court visits), small percentages could give the exact age, month, or season of the first or last event, or the number of events; older children performed better than chance on several judgments, and their errors were not usually large (Wandrey et al., 2012). A precise number or date from a young child therefore carries less information than its precision suggests, and an imprecise or changing answer to such a question is not by itself a sign that the event did not occur.

Why Children Answer Questions They Do Not Understand

What makes these problems consequential is that children seldom signal them. In one study, children were much more likely to try to answer nonsensical questions when they were phrased as yes/no questions than when they were phrased as open questions (Waterman et al., 2000). Interview instructions that tell children it is acceptable to say “I don’t know” or “I don’t understand,” particularly when the child practices those responses, can reduce but do not eliminate the problem (Lyon, 2014). A record in which the child explained answers in the child’s own words, or in which a confusing question was rephrased, is more informative than one-word answers to complex questions.

Questioning in Court

Cross-examination concentrates many of the forms that reduce children’s accuracy, including leading, negative, and complex questions and direct challenges to earlier answers. In an experiment with 5- and 6-year-olds who had earlier described a staged event, cross-examination-style questioning led children to change their answers, the changes occurred whether or not the original answers were correct, and overall accuracy declined (Zajac & Hayne, 2003). A follow-up study found the same pattern among 9- and 10-year-olds (Zajac & Hayne, 2006). In transcripts of actual CSA trials, defense attorneys asked more linguistically complex questions than prosecutors (Evans et al., 2009), and attorneys on both sides relied heavily on closed questions (Andrews et al., 2015). The research bears on the technique, whichever party uses it: question forms that degrade accuracy produce changed answers of uncertain meaning in any setting. Word choice matters as well: in an analysis of 100 sexual abuse trials with child witnesses aged 12 and under, attorneys’ and children’s use of “ask” and “tell” was ambiguous in 83% of cases, and children and attorneys rarely clarified which word they meant, so a confusion between the two usually could not be detected from the record (Lyon & Stolzenberg, 2014). Sequence questions raise similar problems. In an exploratory study of 156 CSA trials with witnesses aged 5 to 9, 84% of attorneys’ before/after questions left the time span unspecified, 78% were option-posing, and 84% of the children’s answers to the option-posing questions were unelaborated, which made it hard to tell what the child meant (Szojka et al., 2026a). The study did not assess whether the answers were accurate.

Limits of the Evidence

Most experimental research on young children’s suggestibility uses staged or imagined events that differ from abuse in personal significance, stress, and consequences, and most studies average across many children. They identify conditions that raise or lower the risk of error; they cannot say whether a particular child’s report is accurate. Field studies of real interviews can measure what interviewers asked and how children responded, but can only occasionally check accuracy against independent evidence. Many foundational studies date from the 1990s; their central findings have been replicated, but interviewing practice has changed since then.

Language studies show which question forms children misunderstand on average, not whether a particular child misunderstood a particular question. A confusing question reduces the weight its answer can carry, but the child may still have answered accurately, and a simple question does not guarantee an accurate answer. Age is only a rough proxy for development. No study or test can determine from the form of the questioning whether abuse occurred: a young child’s suggestibility and language limits bear on the reliability of what a given interview or examination produced, not on whether the underlying events happened.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When the “Sam Stone” study is cited to question a preschooler’s account (Leichtman & Ceci, 1995), an attorney can ask whether it applies to this child: false reports arose under a negative stereotype combined with repeated suggestive questions, so the question is whether those conditions appear in this record. When the finding that suggestion did not plant a touch that had not occurred is offered to support an account (Pezdek & Roe, 1997), the question is whether the conclusion follows from the design, since staged events differ from abuse in significance, stress, and consequences. When the finding that cross-examination-style questioning changed 5- and 6-year-olds’ answers is cited (Zajac & Hayne, 2003), the question is whether it has held up, which the replication with 9- and 10-year-olds addresses (Zajac & Hayne, 2006), and it cuts both ways because correct and incorrect answers both changed. When a child’s count or date of events is offered, the question is what exactly was counted, given how rarely children in one study could give the exact month, season, or number of documented events (Wandrey et al., 2012). These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Young Child Witnesses and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

Competency is the threshold question for a young witness, and modern law sets a low threshold. In Wheeler v. United States (1895), the Supreme Court held that a five-year-old could testify, explaining that competency depends on the child’s capacity and intelligence and understanding of the duty to tell the truth, not on age. Federal Rule of Evidence 601 provides that every person is competent unless the rules provide otherwise. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3509(c), a child is presumed competent, a competency examination requires a written motion, an offer of proof, and a finding of compelling reasons, and a child’s age alone is not a compelling reason; questions at such an examination are to suit the child’s age and developmental level. Military Rule of Evidence 601 follows the federal rule, and United States v. Washington (2006) held that Military Rule of Evidence 603 requires no particular oath formula for a child so long as the oath is meaningful to the witness.

Federal and Military Rule of Evidence 611(a) direct the judge to control the mode of questioning so that it is effective for determining the truth and protects witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment; it is the principal vehicle for asking a court to require age-appropriate questioning by any party. Rule 611(c) permits leading questions on direct examination when necessary to develop a witness’s testimony, an exception traditionally applied to young children. Under Coy v. Iowa (1988) and Maryland v. Craig (1990), a child may testify outside the defendant’s physical presence only on a case-specific finding that this is necessary to protect the child from trauma caused by the defendant’s presence; 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b) and (i) provide for closed-circuit testimony, videotaped depositions, and an adult attendant. Military Rule of Evidence 611(d) permits remote live testimony when the child cannot testify in the accused’s presence because of fear, a substantial likelihood of emotional trauma shown by expert testimony, a mental or other infirmity, or conduct by the accused or defense counsel, and United States v. McCollum (2003) requires a case-specific showing of distress, arising from the accused’s presence, that is more than nervousness or reluctance.

In Idaho v. Wright (1990), the Supreme Court identified factors bearing on the reliability of a young child’s statements, including spontaneity, consistent repetition, and the use of terminology unexpected of a child of similar age, and found the statements at issue unreliable in part because the questioning was leading and unrecorded. Since Crawford v. Washington (2004), confrontation analysis turns on whether a statement is testimonial; Ohio v. Clark (2015) held that a three-year-old’s statements to his preschool teachers were not, observing that statements by very young children will rarely, if ever, implicate the Confrontation Clause. Reliability under the evidence rules remains a separate question.

Expert testimony on these subjects is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as amended December 1, 2023, under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999). Military Rule of Evidence 702 incorporated the 2023 amendment in 2025 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025), and United States v. Houser (1993) supplies the military framework. An expert may explain how development and question form affect children’s answers and may identify questions in the record a young child is likely to misunderstand; an expert may not opine that the child is or is not telling the truth or quantify how often children in such cases are truthful (United States v. Brooks, 2007).

Arizona

Arizona treats every person as competent to testify in a criminal trial (A.R.S. § 13-4061; see Ariz. R. Evid. 601), so concerns about a young child’s capacity are ordinarily addressed through Rules 611 (which parallels the federal rule), 403, and 702 and cross-examination rather than exclusion. A.R.S. § 13-4253 authorizes, on the prosecution’s motion, closed-circuit or recorded testimony of a minor outside the courtroom, with only the attorneys questioning the minor; its application is subject to the case-specific necessity finding required by Maryland v. Craig.

Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 adopted the Daubert standard in 2012 and was conformed to the 2023 federal amendment effective January 1, 2024. Under State v. Lindsey (1986) and State v. Moran (1986), an expert may describe general characteristics of child witnesses but may not opine, directly or indirectly, on whether a particular child is truthful (Lindsey, 149 Ariz. at 473–75). State v. Salazar-Mercado (2014) permits “cold” educational testimony that explains general principles, such as how young children understand questions, without applying them to the case. An expert who analyzes the questions actually put to a particular child applies principles to facts and must satisfy Rule 702(d).

Taint Hearings

In State v. Michaels (1994), arising from interviews of preschool children, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that when a defendant produces some evidence that a child’s statements resulted from suggestive or coercive interviewing, the State must establish at a pretrial hearing, by clear and convincing evidence, that the statements and anticipated testimony retain sufficient reliability (136 N.J. at 320–21). Jurisdictions differ on whether they recognize a separate taint hearing. Where one exists, the research described above is usually central to it.

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports the reliability of what young children report to recall prompts under neutral conditions, and in some experiments children resisted suggestions of abuse-related acts more than peripheral suggestions, and, in one study of a specific touch, suggestion changed memory of the touch but did not significantly plant one, although studies using repeated suggestion found that some preschoolers assent to false events. Prosecutors can show that an account came from the child by preserving the earliest statement and the history of conversations before the interview, relying on details the child volunteered, and questioning in short, concrete language at trial. Expert testimony can explain, without vouching, that brief answers, imprecise dates and numbers, and idiosyncratic word use are typical of young children, and that age-appropriate questioning is a condition of accurate testimony rather than coaching. Where questioning at trial uses complex, negative, “do you remember,” or ambiguous before/after questions, Rule 611(a) and a request to rephrase are the appropriate responses, and a changed answer should not be treated as a recantation without examining the questions that produced it.

The research also counsels caution. With very young children, externally supplied suggestion does the most damage and is hardest to detect, so an account whose central details emerged only after repeated suggestive questioning, delay, or pressure (neutral repeated interviews soon after an event have not been shown to reduce accuracy), stereotyped statements about the accused, or prior adult conversations is the most vulnerable to a reliability or taint challenge. Details that first appear in answers to yes/no or forced-choice questions about clothing, timing, or number deserve particular care, and charges that depend on a young child’s count of incidents or dating of an event rest on the information young children report least reliably.

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports a careful examination of how a young child was questioned. The classic demonstrations identify the conditions under which young children make false reports (stereotype induction, repeated suggestive questions, parental misinformation, and social reinforcement), and where the record shows them, the reliability of a preschooler’s account is in genuine question. The language research supports identifying specific answers that followed complex, negative, multi-part, ambiguous, or jargon-laden questions, and details about clothing, timing, or frequency that emerged from closed questions; expert testimony can explain why such answers carry less weight. Missing recordings and undocumented pre-interview conversations are legitimate subjects of inquiry.

The research also counsels caution. A young child’s age is not evidence that an account is false. In some experiments, young children resisted suggestions of abuse-related acts more than other suggestions; they also report experienced events accurately in response to recall prompts, and are not more prone than adults to every memory error. An answer that varies with wording, such as a “no” to “touch” followed by a description of contact, may reflect the question rather than the memory. The research on complex questions also applies to cross-examination: challenging questioning causes children to abandon correct answers as well as incorrect ones, so a change produced that way does not show the original account was wrong, and a court may limit it under Rule 611(a). An argument tied to specific questions and suggestive conditions in the record is more accurate, and more persuasive, than one based on age.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

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Legal Authorities

Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990).

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).

Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990).

Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237 (2015).

State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).

State v. Michaels, 136 N.J. 299, 642 A.2d 1372 (1994).

State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986).

State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).

United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).

United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).

United States v. McCollum, 58 M.J. 323 (C.A.A.F. 2003).

United States v. Washington, 63 M.J. 418 (C.A.A.F. 2006).

Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523 (1895).

U.S. Const. amend. VI.

18 U.S.C. § 3509.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4061.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4253.

Fed. R. Evid. 601.

Fed. R. Evid. 611.

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

Ariz. R. Evid. 601.

Ariz. R. Evid. 611.

Ariz. R. Evid. 702.

Mil. R. Evid. 601.

Mil. R. Evid. 603.

Mil. R. Evid. 611.

Mil. R. Evid. 702.

Related topic papers: Children’s Suggestibility: What the Research Shows · Question Types and Evaluating a Forensic Interview from the Record · Forensic Interviews of Children: Purpose, Protocols, and Practice · Misinformation and Pre-Interview Contamination · Script Memory, Repeated Events, and Dating Alleged Abuse · Children with Intellectual Disabilities as Witnesses · Taint Hearings and Child Witness Competency · Confrontation, Child Hearsay, and Remote Testimony

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Memory in the Courtroom · False Confessions: Suggestibility · Courts-Martial