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Script Memory, Repeated Events, and Dating Alleged Abuse

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Snap Shot

  • The question: What can a child who alleges repeated abuse be expected to remember about when it happened, how many times, and what happened on one particular occasion?
  • What the research shows: Repeated experience tends to strengthen memory for what usually happened, while details that varied, and which occasion they belong to, are weaker and prone to transfer between episodes. Dating is reconstructive, and counting is hard: in one study of children aged 4 to 8, about 85% who experienced an event once gave the correct number, compared with fewer than 25% who experienced it four times.
  • What it does not show: No study shows that a generic, script-like account is a marker of true abuse or that a highly specific account is a marker of a false one. There is little direct research on whether dating errors predict errors about core content, and the form of an account cannot show whether, or how often, a child was abused.
  • The law: Experts may explain why children often cannot date or count repeated events but may not use that to vouch (Brooks, Salazar-Mercado, Lindsey, Moran). Charging and findings limits appear in Valentine, Tsinhnahijinnie, Walters, and Klokic; A.R.S. § 13-1417 addresses undifferentiated repeated acts.
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors should keep testimony general and draft counts to match what the child’s account distinguishes; defense counsel should examine how each date, count, or occasion-specific detail entered the record, without treating vagueness as proof the abuse did not occur.

Many allegations of child sexual abuse (CSA) describe conduct that happened more than once, often over months or years, and often by someone the child knows. Abuse of this kind is common: a global meta-analysis estimated self-reported prevalence at about 18% for girls and about 8% for boys, with lower figures from informant studies (Stoltenborgh et al., 2011), and many children who were abused delay disclosure or disclose gradually (London et al., 2005). When such a child is interviewed, the questions that matter most to the legal system are often the hardest for memory to answer: when did it happen, how many times, and what happened on one particular occasion as opposed to the others.

The research on children’s memory for repeated events explains why those questions are hard. Repetition changes how an experience is stored and retrieved. A child who has experienced something many times tends to remember what usually happened well, and to have more difficulty isolating, dating, and counting individual occurrences. These patterns are ordinary features of memory. They help explain the form of a child’s account, but they do not show whether the alleged events occurred, and they also mark the places where an account is most open to error.

This paper describes script and episodic memory, the effects of repetition on memory and suggestibility, which occasions children remember best, and interviewing about repeated events. It then reviews children’s ability to date and count events, the limits of the research, and the law on charging and proving repeated offenses.

Episodic and Script Memory

An episodic memory is a memory of one particular occasion, with its own place, time, and details. When the same kind of event happens repeatedly, people of all ages also build a generalized representation of what typically happens on those occasions, usually called a script. A script records the regular parts of the experience and their usual order. Early research on children’s memory for familiar routines found that the more often children had experienced an event, the more they tended to describe it in general terms, using the language of what “usually” or “always” happens, rather than as a set of separate episodes (Hudson & Nelson, 1986).

Script knowledge and episodic memory are not alternatives; a child may know what usually happened and also remember specific occasions, particularly ones that were different in some way. A child’s account of repeated abuse therefore frequently mixes the two. Some statements describe the general pattern (“he would come in after my mom left”), and others describe a particular occasion (“the time at the lake house”). Both kinds of statement are normal. They raise different questions about accuracy, and the research treats them differently.

How Repetition Shapes Memory for Individual Occasions

Experimental studies of repeated events typically have children take part in the same staged activity several times, with some details held constant across sessions (fixed details) and others changed each time (variable details).

The leading study of this kind found that, compared with children who experienced an event once, children who experienced it repeatedly were more accurate about fixed details and less affected by false suggestions about them (Powell et al., 1999). For variable details, repeated experience reduced memory for which version occurred on the target occasion. Most errors were intrusions of details from a different occasion in the series rather than invented details. Repeated experience did not increase children’s acceptance of suggestions about details that had never occurred, and it reduced the extra suggestibility otherwise seen in younger children and in children interviewed after longer delays (Powell et al., 1999).

A review of this literature reached a similar conclusion (Roberts & Powell, 2001). Information that is consistent with what a child experienced, including repetition of the same event, tends to strengthen memory and support accurate recall. When related experiences differ from the target incident, children can become confused about which experience a remembered detail came from; they may retain the content while losing track of its source. In repeated-abuse cases, that means a detail may be genuinely remembered and still be attached to the wrong occasion.

The research therefore supports a specific statement rather than a general one: memory for what regularly happened tends to be strong, while memory for details that varied across occasions, and for which occasion they belong to, is weaker and prone to transfer between episodes. A general claim that script memory is “more stable” than episodic memory, without that qualification, goes beyond the evidence.

First, Last, and Best-Remembered Occasions

Not every occurrence in a series is remembered equally. In a series of experiments with children aged 4 to 5 and 6 to 8 years, older children remembered the first and last occasions of a repeated event better than the middle ones, although memory for the last occasion was more likely than memory for the first to fade or be misplaced in sequence over time; younger children’s results only sometimes followed the same pattern (Powell et al., 2003). A larger study of 372 children aged 4 to 8 found that older children showed better temporal memory for the first and last occurrences than for the middle ones, while younger children showed the advantage only for the first (Roberts et al., 2015).

These findings support the common practice of asking about the first time, the last time, or a time that was different, but they also show its limits. When children in grades 1 to 3 were asked to describe “the time you remember best,” younger children often had difficulty understanding the request, and children of all ages had difficulty explaining how they chose an occasion, although they were better able to describe an occasion when then asked about “another time” (Danby et al., 2017).

Repetition and Suggestibility

Repetition’s effect on suggestibility is specific to the type of detail. Repeated experience appears to protect memory for recurring features against false suggestion while leaving variable details and their source more open to confusion (Powell et al., 1999; Roberts & Powell, 2001). This cuts both ways: it supports the accuracy of a child’s account of what consistently happened, particularly when obtained with open-ended questions, and it explains why a detail tied to one occasion, such as the room or who else was home, may be the part of an account most likely to be wrong even when the child is sincere.

The broader suggestibility research applies here as elsewhere. The conditions that produce false reports in children, such as repeated suggestive questions, stereotypes communicated by adults, and interviewer bias, are well documented (Ceci & Bruck, 1993; Leichtman & Ceci, 1995), as are the limits of those findings, including evidence that, in one study of a specific touch, suggestion changed memory of the touch but did not significantly plant one (Pezdek & Roe, 1997), although studies using repeated suggestion found that some preschoolers assent to false events. The point is the conditions under which an account was obtained, not the child’s age or the repeated nature of the allegation alone.

Interviewing Children About Repeated Events

Because legal proceedings often require details of individual occurrences, research has examined how interviewers can help children particularize. In an analysis of 97 police interviews with children aged 5 to 13 who alleged multiple incidents of sexual abuse, interviewers used more temporal labels for occasions than children did, older children were more likely to generate labels themselves, and most children generated at least one label (Brubacher et al., 2013). In 66% of the cases, interviewers ignored or replaced a child’s own label for an occasion, and when that happened children reported proportionately fewer episodic details. In 80 English forensic interviews of 7- to 15-year-olds who disclosed sexual abuse, the first event elicited was more coherent than later ones, interviewer support was associated with clearer chronology, and script accounts of abuse were associated with lower consistency and chronology, though not lower thematic coherence (VanMeter et al., 2023). The study measured narrative coherence, not accuracy, so it does not show that script accounts are more or less likely to be true.

The order of questions also matters. In an experiment with 157 children aged 4 to 8, children with repeated experience who were asked first about what usually happens, and then about a specific occasion, reported more event-related information overall than those asked in the reverse order, and accuracy did not differ between the two orders (Brubacher et al., 2012). A review of this research recommends that interviewers establish whether an event happened once or more than once, use the child’s own labels for occasions, use episodic language (“that time”) when asking about a particular occurrence, and avoid pressing the child to supply details the child has not indicated are available (Brubacher et al., 2014). These recommendations are consistent with structured protocols such as the NICHD Protocol, whose field research shows that open-ended prompts elicit more information, and more accurate information, than focused or option-posing questions (Lamb et al., 2007).

Placing Events in Time

Memory does not store a date with each event. Research on the development of temporal memory shows that people, including children, usually reconstruct when something happened by reasoning from other information, such as where they lived, what grade they were in, the season, or nearby holidays (Friedman, 1991). In a study of 86 children aged 4 to 13 who were asked three months later about two classroom demonstrations, many of the abilities needed to reconstruct the time of an event were present by age 6, but the episodic information needed to use them continued to develop well into middle childhood. Children were poor at remembering the events’ proximity to, or order relative to, a major holiday, although the order of the two target events was well recalled by age 6 (Friedman & Lyon, 2005). A study of 128 children, adolescents, and adults tested eight months after a campus visit found that participants of every age relied mainly on reconstruction when estimating dates, and that age-related improvement in accuracy appeared only for some time scales, such as the day of the week and the month (Jack et al., 2016).

Field data show the same trend. In 250 interviews of children aged 4 to 10 alleging sexual abuse, references to temporal attributes increased with age, and more temporal information emerged in response to open-ended recall prompts than to recognition questions such as yes-or-no or forced-choice questions (Orbach & Lamb, 2007). A study of 167 maltreated children aged 6 to 10, asked about documented and personally significant events (changes in placement and visits to court), found that only small percentages could give exact temporal information, such as their age, the month, or the season, for the first or last such experience. Older children performed better than chance on several judgments, and their reports were not far from the truth (Wandrey et al., 2012).

Duration poses similar problems. Preschool children use words such as “minute” and “hour” and understand their relative order, but they have little knowledge of the actual durations, and that knowledge develops years later (Tillman & Barner, 2015). A young child’s estimate of how long something lasted is therefore a weak basis for inference in either direction.

Counting How Many Times

Counting repeated events is especially difficult. In the study of 372 children aged 4 to 8, about 85% of children who experienced an event once gave the correct number, compared with fewer than 25% of children who experienced it four times, even though every child with repeated experience knew it had happened more than once (Roberts et al., 2015). Maltreated children likewise rarely gave accurate counts of placements or court visits (Wandrey et al., 2012). A child’s statement that something happened “a lot,” “every time,” or “too many times to count” is consistent with how repeated experiences are stored. Conversely, a precise number from a young child, particularly one that first appears after an adult proposed it, may reflect the conversation rather than the child’s memory.

The same difficulties surface at trial. In 120 U.S. prosecutions with witnesses aged 6 to 12, attorneys impeached children with allegedly inconsistent prior statements in 96 cases; in 11% the statements were not in fact inconsistent, and among the most common sources of the remaining inconsistencies were questions about time and number and questions requiring the child to distinguish among individual incidents (Sullivan et al., 2026). The study identified likely sources of inconsistency; it did not determine which of the child’s answers was accurate.

Because dating is reconstructive, neutral questions about anchoring facts, such as where the child lived or what grade the child was in, can help a child produce a useful approximate time frame. The same process makes dates and counts open to influence: an adult who proposes a date or number, offers a choice among dates, or repeats a question until the child settles on an answer can produce a specific response that reflects the adult’s input. How a date or count was obtained bears directly on its reliability.

Limits of the Evidence

Most experimental research on repeated events uses staged, benign activities with children who were not abused, often with a few repetitions over days or weeks. These events lack the emotional significance, secrecy, and relationship context of abuse, so how closely the findings apply to a particular child’s experience is a matter of judgment. Field studies of forensic interviews have the opposite limitation: they involve real allegations, but the ground truth of what happened is usually unknown, so they can describe how children talk about repeated events but cannot measure accuracy directly. Studies of maltreated children’s temporal memory use documented events, but not the alleged abuse itself.

Several popular claims go beyond this evidence. There is little direct research on whether a child’s errors about dates predict errors about the core content of an account, so a dating error should not be offered as proof that the core account is wrong, and accurate dating should not be offered as proof that it is right. No study shows that a generic, script-like account is a marker of true abuse, and none shows that a highly specific account is a marker of a false one. No research method can determine, from the form of an account, whether a particular child was abused or how many times.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When a witness cites the finding that about 85% of children who experienced an event once gave the correct number, compared with fewer than 25% of those who experienced it four times (Roberts et al., 2015), ask who was studied: 372 children aged 4 to 8 counted a staged, benign activity, so it explains why counting is hard, not how often this child was abused. When testimony relies on evidence that repetition protected fixed details against false suggestion (Powell et al., 1999), ask whether it applies to the detail at issue, since variable details in the same study were prone to transfer between occasions. When a dating error is offered as a sign that the core account is wrong, ask how much evidence that inference rests on, since little direct research tests whether dating errors predict errors about core content. And when a generic, script-like account is offered as a marker of genuine repeated abuse, ask whether the claim is testable, since no study shows that a generic account marks a true report or that a highly specific account marks a false one. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Repeated Events, Dates, and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

Expert testimony on children’s memory for repeated events is admitted, if at all, under Fed. R. Evid. 702 and the framework of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999). The December 1, 2023 amendment makes explicit that the proponent must show each requirement by a preponderance of the evidence. Mil. R. Evid. 702 tracks the federal rule; the 2023 amendment was incorporated in the 2025 amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025). In courts-martial, United States v. Houser (1993) sets out the factors for admitting expert testimony, and United States v. Brooks (2007) holds that an expert may not, directly or through statistics, convey that a complainant is truthful. An expert may explain why children often cannot date or count repeated events; the expert may not tell members that a particular child’s vagueness shows that the child is or is not telling the truth.

The difficulty of dating and counting events also arises in charging. Federal courts generally accept broad date ranges in child abuse cases, but there are limits. In Valentine v. Konteh (2005), the Sixth Circuit held that dozens of identically worded counts of child rape and felonious sexual penetration, not tied to distinguishable incidents in the indictment or the proof, violated the defendant’s rights to notice and protection against double jeopardy; it sustained one count of each type and set aside the rest, while noting that a wide time frame was not by itself the defect. In United States v. Tsinhnahijinnie (1997), the Ninth Circuit reversed a conviction where the indictment charged abuse on the Gila River Indian Reservation in June or July 1992, the child could not place the abuse in that period, and documents showed the family did not live on the reservation then; the court found no substantial evidence that the offense occurred in or reasonably near the charged period and a variance that prejudiced the defense.

In the military, specifications in Article 120b, UCMJ, prosecutions often allege acts “on divers occasions.” In United States v. Walters (2003), the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held that when members except “divers occasions” and find the accused guilty of conduct on a single occasion, the findings must clearly reflect which occasion; an ambiguous finding prevents appellate factual-sufficiency review, and the court set aside the finding and dismissed the specification. Repeated-event memory therefore bears on how specifications are drafted and findings announced, not only on testimony.

Arizona

Arizona adopted the Daubert standard in its Rule 702 in 2012 and conformed the rule to the 2023 federal amendment effective January 1, 2024 (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004). In State v. Salazar-Mercado (2014), the Arizona Supreme Court permitted “cold” expert testimony that educates jurors about general behavioral patterns of child sexual abuse victims without applying them to the particular child, and State v. Lindsey (1986) and State v. Moran (1986) bar experts from opining, directly or indirectly, that a particular child or class of children is telling the truth (Lindsey, 149 Ariz. at 475). Testimony explaining that children commonly cannot date or count repeated events fits the educational model of Salazar-Mercado; testimony that a particular child’s generic account shows that the abuse occurred, or did not, falls within the Lindsey and Moran prohibition.

Arizona’s continuous sexual abuse statute, A.R.S. § 13-1417, addresses the problem of undifferentiated repeated acts directly. It applies when a person, over a period of three months or more, engages in three or more specified sexual offenses with a child under fourteen, and it requires that the trier of fact unanimously agree that the requisite number of acts occurred without needing to agree on which acts constitute that number. Where the State instead charges individual acts, Arizona’s duplicity cases govern. In State v. Klokic (2008), the court of appeals held that when the State introduces evidence of multiple acts to prove a single charge, the trial court ordinarily must require the State to elect the act on which it relies or instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree on the act, unless the acts form part of a single criminal transaction.

Other Jurisdictions

The California Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Jones (1990) is a leading treatment of generic testimony by a child who lived with the accused. The court held that a child’s generic testimony can support conviction if it describes the kind of act with enough specificity to distinguish among types of offenses, the number of acts with enough certainty to support each count, and the general time period. It addressed unanimity by approving either a standard unanimity instruction or a modified instruction allowing jurors to convict if they unanimously agree that the defendant committed all the acts described. Outside California, Jones is persuasive authority only.

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports educational testimony that children who experience an event repeatedly commonly remember what usually happened, have difficulty separating, dating, and counting individual occasions, and may attach a detail to the wrong occasion, and that these features are expected of memory for repeated events rather than signs of fabrication. Experimental work also shows that repetition can make memory for recurring features more resistant to false suggestion (Powell et al., 1999). Prosecutors can keep such testimony general, tied to the feature of the account at issue, and free of any suggestion that a generic account confirms abuse. Counts or specifications that track what the child’s account actually distinguishes, such as the first time, the last time, or an occasion the child labeled, or use of A.R.S. § 13-1417 where its elements fit, may avoid the problems illustrated by Valentine, Klokic, and Walters.

The research also counsels caution. Precise dates, counts, or occasion-specific details that first appear after adults proposed them, or after repeated or forced-choice questioning, are the parts of an account the research identifies as most open to error, and pressing a child for specifics beyond what the child’s memory supports can produce answers that later change. Interviews that establish whether an event occurred once or more than once, use the child’s own labels, and ask about occasions in open-ended episodic language are both more consistent with the research and easier to evaluate (Brubacher et al., 2013, 2014).

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports careful scrutiny of the occasion-specific parts of a repeated-event account. Details that vary across occasions, the assignment of a detail to a particular occasion, dates, durations, and counts are where repeated-event memory is least reliable, and the research supports expert explanation of why a child may misplace a detail or adopt a date or number suggested in conversation (Powell et al., 1999; Roberts & Powell, 2001; Roberts et al., 2015). Defense counsel can examine how each date or count entered the record, whether interviewers replaced the child’s labels with their own, and whether the charged time frame, place, or number of acts matches what the proof can support, which bears on variance, notice, unanimity, and findings issues under Tsinhnahijinnie, Valentine, Klokic, and Walters.

The research also counsels caution about overreading. A generic account, an inability to give dates or numbers, or uncertainty about which occasion a detail belongs to is normal in memory for repeated events and does not show that the abuse did not occur. The same research shows that repetition can strengthen memory for recurring features and that children who experience events repeatedly are not, for that reason, more likely to accept suggestions about details that never happened. A memory-based argument is most persuasive when it identifies particular details, and particular questioning, that the research shows to be vulnerable, rather than asserting that a child who cannot say when or how often must be mistaken. Before impeaching a child with a prior statement about dates, counts, or which occasion was which, confirming that the statements actually conflict, and that each question was clear, avoids relying on an inconsistency the questioning itself may have produced (Sullivan et al., 2026).

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

Brubacher, S. P., Malloy, L. C., Lamb, M. E., & Roberts, K. P. (2013). How do interviewers and children discuss individual occurrences of alleged repeated abuse in forensic interviews? Applied Cognitive Psychology, 27(4), 443–450. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.2920

Brubacher, S. P., Powell, M. B., & Roberts, K. P. (2014). Recommendations for interviewing children about repeated experiences. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 20(3), 325–335. https://doi.org/10.1037/law0000011

Brubacher, S. P., Roberts, K. P., & Powell, M. (2012). Retrieval of episodic versus generic information: Does the order of recall affect the amount and accuracy of details reported by children about repeated events? Developmental Psychology, 48(1), 111–122. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0025864

Ceci, S. J., & Bruck, M. (1993). Suggestibility of the child witness: A historical review and synthesis. Psychological Bulletin, 113(3), 403–439. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.113.3.403

Danby, M. C., Brubacher, S. P., Sharman, S. J., Powell, M. B., & Roberts, K. P. (2017). Children’s reasoning about which episode of a repeated event is best remembered. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 31(1), 99–108. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3306

Friedman, W. J. (1991). The development of children’s memory for the time of past events. Child Development, 62(1), 139–155. https://doi.org/10.2307/1130710

Friedman, W. J., & Lyon, T. D. (2005). Development of temporal-reconstructive abilities. Child Development, 76(6), 1202–1216. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2005.00844.x-i1

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Jack, F., Friedman, W. J., Reese, E., & Zajac, R. (2016). Age-related differences in memory for time, temporal reconstruction, and the availability and use of temporal landmarks. Cognitive Development, 37, 53–66. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2015.12.003

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Lamb, M. E., Orbach, Y., Hershkowitz, I., Esplin, P. W., & Horowitz, D. (2007). A structured forensic interview protocol improves the quality and informativeness of investigative interviews with children: A review of research using the NICHD Investigative Interview Protocol. Child Abuse & Neglect, 31(11–12), 1201–1231. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chiabu.2007.03.021

Leichtman, M. D., & Ceci, S. J. (1995). The effects of stereotypes and suggestions on preschoolers’ reports. Developmental Psychology, 31(4), 568–578. https://doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.31.4.568

London, K., Bruck, M., Ceci, S. J., & Shuman, D. W. (2005). Disclosure of child sexual abuse: What does the research tell us about the ways that children tell? Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 11(1), 194–226. https://doi.org/10.1037/1076-8971.11.1.194

Orbach, Y., & Lamb, M. E. (2007). Young children’s references to temporal attributes of allegedly experienced events in the course of forensic interviews. Child Development, 78(4), 1100–1120. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2007.01055.x

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Legal Authorities

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).

People v. Jones, 51 Cal. 3d 294, 792 P.2d 643 (1990).

State v. Klokic, 219 Ariz. 241, 196 P.3d 844 (App. 2008).

State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).

State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986).

State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).

United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).

United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).

United States v. Tsinhnahijinnie, 112 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 1997).

United States v. Walters, 58 M.J. 391 (C.A.A.F. 2003).

Valentine v. Konteh, 395 F.3d 626 (6th Cir. 2005).

U.S. Const. amend. V.

U.S. Const. amend. VI.

10 U.S.C. § 920b (Article 120b, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1417.

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

Ariz. R. Evid. 702.

Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004 (amending Ariz. R. Evid. 702, effective Jan. 1, 2024).

Mil. R. Evid. 702.

Related topic papers: Autobiographical Memory and Childhood Amnesia · Fuzzy-Trace Theory and How Children’s Memories Change Over Time · Children’s Suggestibility: What the Research Shows · Misinformation and Pre-Interview Contamination · Question Types and Evaluating a Forensic Interview from the Record · Types of Disclosure: Piecemeal, Tentative, and Under-Disclosure · Interviewing Young Children: Development and Language Comprehension

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Memory in the Courtroom · Courts-Martial