Snap Shot
- The question: Does a child’s failure to resist during alleged abuse, or a flat, detached, or agitated demeanor afterward, say anything about whether the abuse happened?
- What the research shows: Freezing, tonic immobility, dissociation, and hyperarousal are well-documented responses to threat. In one Swedish clinic study, 70% of 298 women (not a child sample) seen within a month of a reported sexual assault reported significant tonic immobility, retrospectively; the study does not show how often children respond this way. Dissociation is associated with maltreatment at the group level, though whether trauma causes it is disputed.
- What it does not show: These responses are non-specific and also follow other adversity. No test can show whether a particular child froze or dissociated, or what caused a child’s current symptoms. Human data are mostly retrospective adult self-reports, the claim that young children are especially likely to freeze rests on inference, not direct comparison, and a “females freeze, males fight” binary overstates the evidence.
- The law: General testimony explaining counterintuitive reactions may be admitted (Flesher, Salazar-Mercado), but experts may not vouch or use these reactions to prove abuse (Lindsey, Moran, Brooks), and Haskie cautions against categorical claims about what is common. Consent is generally not an element in child cases under Article 120b and Arizona law.
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors should keep trauma-response testimony general and not suggest a child “must have” frozen or that non-resistance proves abuse; defense counsel should test the basis of the science, recognizing that non-resistance, calm demeanor, and a fragmentary account do not show consent or fabrication.
Child sexual abuse (CSA) is common and substantially underreported, and many children who experience it describe being frightened, confused, or unable to act while it was happening. When a case reaches court, questions about how the child reacted at the time and how the child appears afterward are often contested. A factfinder may expect that a child who was really abused would have resisted, cried out, or run, and would appear visibly distressed when describing it. A child who did none of those things, or who seems flat, distant, jumpy, or agitated in an interview or on the witness stand, may be judged by those expectations. Experts are frequently called to explain that such reactions are recognized responses to threat.
The research supports a good deal of that explanation, and it also sets firm limits on it. Freezing, tonic immobility, dissociation, and hyperarousal are well-documented human responses to threat, and the evidence that victims of sexual assault often do not physically resist is substantial. The same responses also occur after many other kinds of adversity and in some children with no history of abuse. A child’s reaction during an alleged event, or demeanor afterward, therefore does not show that abuse occurred, and the absence of an expected reaction does not show that it did not. Children interviewed well can give accurate, detailed accounts, and the reliability of a particular account turns primarily on how it was elicited and documented.
This paper defines dissociation and hyperarousal, distinguishes freezing from tonic immobility, reviews the research on immobility during sexual assault and CSA and on these responses and memory, and then addresses the limits of the evidence, the governing legal standards, and the recurring issues for each side.
Two Broad Responses to Threat
Much of the clinical literature organizes traumatized children’s reactions along two broad patterns. In hyperarousal, the body mobilizes: alertness rises, attention narrows toward danger, and the child becomes vigilant and reactive. In dissociation, the child disengages, becoming numb, detached, or unresponsive. Perry and colleagues described these as two continua, proposed that young children facing inescapable threat from a caregiver are more likely to show the dissociative pattern, and proposed that repeated activation of either state can consolidate into trait-like patterns (Perry et al., 1995). That account is useful for explaining why one traumatized child may appear agitated and another withdrawn, but it is a theoretical synthesis drawing heavily on animal neurobiology and clinical observation, and its developmental proposal has not been established by prospective, controlled human research. It is a framework for understanding behavior, not a method for determining its cause.
Dissociation: Definition, Measurement, and Association With Maltreatment
Dissociation refers to a disruption in the ordinary integration of awareness, memory, identity, emotion, and perception. The current diagnostic manual describes dissociative symptoms that include depersonalization (feeling detached from one’s own body or mental processes), derealization (experiencing the surroundings as unreal or dreamlike), and dissociative amnesia (American Psychiatric Association, 2022). Dissociative experiences range from ordinary absorption and daydreaming, which are common in children, to pronounced and impairing symptoms. Dissociation during or immediately after a traumatic event is called peritraumatic dissociation. Putnam’s (1997) developmental text describes its more pronounced forms in children exposed to chronic trauma and disrupted caregiving, and the difficulty of distinguishing it from ordinary childhood inattention or fantasy. Caregiver-report screening measures exist (Putnam et al., 1993), but no measure determines whether a particular child dissociated during a particular event.
The association between maltreatment and dissociation is well replicated at the group level. A meta-analysis of 65 studies involving 7,352 abused or neglected individuals found higher Dissociative Experiences Scale scores than in comparison groups, highest for sexual and physical abuse, with earlier onset, longer duration, and parental abuse predicting higher scores (Vonderlin et al., 2018). Those studies measured dissociation in adolescents and adults, mostly relied on retrospective reports of maltreatment, and compared overlapping group averages.
Whether the association reflects trauma causing dissociation is an active scientific dispute. One review concluded that the evidence strongly supports a causal role for trauma, that the trauma-dissociation relationship persists when objective measures of trauma are used and fantasy proneness is controlled, and that dissociation is not reliably associated with suggestibility (Dalenberg et al., 2012). A published response argued that those conclusions move too quickly from correlational data to causation, give insufficient weight to the lack of corroboration of abuse in many studies, and underestimate the relationship between dissociation and false memories; its authors accepted that trauma may play a causal role but argued that the role is less central and specific than claimed (Lynn et al., 2014). For legal purposes, the points of agreement matter most: dissociation is associated with maltreatment at the group level, it has other contributors, and its presence in a particular child does not identify a cause.
Hyperarousal
Hyperarousal refers to a sustained state of physiological and behavioral readiness for threat. Its features include hypervigilance, an exaggerated startle response, irritability or angry outbursts, reckless or self-destructive behavior, difficulty concentrating, and sleep disturbance. In the current diagnostic framework, these appear as the cluster of marked alterations in arousal and reactivity that is one of the four symptom clusters of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), alongside intrusion symptoms, avoidance, and negative alterations in cognition and mood (American Psychiatric Association, 2022). A hyperaroused child may appear anxious, guarded, restless, or easily startled in an interview.
Each of these features is non-specific. They occur after many kinds of adversity and are also features of anxiety disorders, depression, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and reactions to family conflict or to the investigation itself. Their presence does not identify a traumatic experience, and their absence does not exclude one. The companion paper on trauma impact and PTSD in children addresses the broader PTSD research.
The Defense Cascade: Freezing Is Not Tonic Immobility
The phrase “fight or flight” describes only part of the defensive repertoire. Bracha (2004) proposed the sequence “freeze, flight, fight, fright, faint,” arguing that the classic formulation omitted the initial freezing response and the later immobility responses. Schauer and Elbert (2010) described a six-stage “defense cascade” that depends on the person’s appraisal of the threat and of the person’s own capacity to act, including age and physical strength. Kozlowska and colleagues (2015) reviewed the neurobiology of the cascade’s states, including arousal, freezing, flight or fight, tonic immobility, collapsed immobility, and quiescence, describing them as automatic responses shaped by appraisals of threat and escapability.
Two of these states are often grouped together as “freezing,” but the research distinguishes them. Freezing, in the technical sense, is an early, attentive immobility that typically occurs when a threat is detected but not yet upon the person. The body is still, attention is heightened, heart rate slows, and the organism is primed to act; it usually lasts seconds to minutes and can give way to flight or fight (Roelofs, 2017). Tonic immobility is a later, more profound state that tends to occur when the threat is inescapable and physical contact or restraint has occurred. It involves marked motor inhibition, which may appear as rigidity or limpness, reduced ability to vocalize, reduced responsiveness, and in some accounts altered pain perception; it can last from minutes to longer (Kozlowska et al., 2015; Marx et al., 2008). Freezing prepares for action; tonic immobility is the inhibition of action when other options have failed or appear unavailable.
Much of this framework comes from animal research, in which tonic immobility is induced by restraint and freezing is the principal laboratory measure of fear. A review noted that translation between animal and human studies has been hampered by differing definitions and methods, and that human studies have begun to measure freezing through heart-rate deceleration and reduced body movement (Hagenaars et al., 2014). Testimony should identify which findings come from animals, which from human laboratory studies of mild threat, and which from human victims of assault.
Tonic Immobility During Sexual Assault and Child Sexual Abuse
The human evidence on tonic immobility during sexual violence comes mainly from self-report questionnaires completed after the event. A theoretical review linked the animal research to survivors’ reports of being unable to move or call out, identifying fear and restraint as likely triggers (Marx et al., 2008). In a Swedish study of 298 women seen at an emergency clinic within a month of a sexual assault, 70% reported significant tonic immobility and 48% reported extreme tonic immobility during the assault. Tonic immobility was associated with a higher likelihood of PTSD and severe depression six months later, and a prior trauma history and prior psychiatric treatment were associated with reporting it (Möller et al., 2017). The sample was drawn from a single clinic for women who had reported rape, and tonic immobility was measured retrospectively.
A representative general-population survey in Brazil of 3,231 people aged 15 to 75 who had experienced a variety of traumatic events extended the finding beyond clinical samples. Tonic immobility scores were more than twice as high among those who met criteria for PTSD, and scores were higher in women than in men after adjustment for potential confounders (Kalaf et al., 2015). The authors noted that the retrospective design could introduce recall bias. A 2024 review of 11 studies of women who experienced sexual violence concluded that tonic immobility helps explain a lack of resistance and is associated with later PTSD, while noting that studies are few and focus mainly on rape (de la Torre Laso, 2024). A meta-analysis of 27 studies found that tonic immobility was associated with PTSD severity (r = .39), was more severe in women (d = 0.37), and was more common after interpersonal violence than after other trauma (Coimbra et al., 2023). Not every study assigns it the same weight: among 86 women with PTSD after rape, peritraumatic dissociation predicted PTSD severity, whereas tonic immobility, measured in a subsample of 29, did not (deMello et al., 2023).
Direct research on children is limited. Among 80 women, 39 undergraduates and 41 psychiatric inpatients, who reported CSA, more than half reported tonic immobility in response to the abuse; attempted or completed penetration was associated with a greater likelihood of tonic immobility, and tonic immobility with greater current impairment (Heidt et al., 2005). The study was small, preliminary, based on adult recollection, and without a comparison group.
Two common generalizations deserve precise treatment. The first is that freezing is especially likely in young children. That follows from the defense-cascade framework, because young children facing a larger, trusted adult have little capacity to fight or flee (Perry et al., 1995; Schauer & Elbert, 2010), but direct age comparisons within CSA samples are lacking, so it is an inference from theory rather than a measured finding. The second is that females freeze and males fight or flee. The population survey found higher tonic immobility scores among women (Kalaf et al., 2015), but tonic immobility is also reported by men, and the alternative “tend-and-befriend” account of female stress responses concerns affiliation and caregiving in response to social stress, a different construct from immobility during assault (Taylor et al., 2000). A sex-typed binary overstates the evidence in both directions.
Dissociation, Arousal, and Memory
Whether dissociation or arousal during an event impairs a child’s later memory is frequently asserted and less frequently studied. An exploratory study of adults reported that traumatic memories were often first retrieved as fragmentary sensory and emotional impressions and later organized into a narrative (van der Kolk & Fisler, 1995). It relied on retrospective self-report by a small clinical sample without records of the events; it shows that some people describe traumatic memories as fragmentary, not that trauma memories are generally stored differently.
The most directly relevant evidence comes from children in actual maltreatment investigations questioned about a documented event. Among 189 children aged 3 to 17 questioned with specific and misleading questions about an anogenital examination they had undergone, older children made fewer errors and resisted suggestion better, and psychopathology, intellectual ability, and short-term memory predicted aspects of performance; neither dissociation nor stress arousal significantly predicted memory (Eisen et al., 2002). In a later study of 328 children aged 3 to 16, higher cortisol and trauma symptoms were associated with more memory errors among children who reported more dissociative tendencies, but not among children who reported fewer, and children with histories of sexual or physical abuse were more accurate than other children in the sample (Eisen et al., 2007). These studies suggest that dissociative tendencies may affect accuracy in combination with other factors, that children with abuse histories were not less accurate in these samples, and that age and cognitive ability remain strong predictors. Separately, peritraumatic dissociation predicts later PTSD in adults (Ozer et al., 2003), although a later meta-analysis found that study design and the timing of assessment explained much of the variability in that association and that causal conclusions could not be drawn (Lensvelt-Mulders et al., 2008).
Claims that a memory was entirely unavailable for years because of dissociative amnesia and later recovered are contested. One review argued that evidence for a mechanism that blocks traumatic memories entirely is weak and that some recovery techniques risk producing false memories (Otgaar et al., 2019; Otgaar et al., 2022); other researchers associate dissociation with trauma-memory recovery (Dalenberg et al., 2012). Most CSA cases do not involve such claims, and the companion paper on stress, trauma, and children’s memory addresses prospective studies showing that most people with documented childhood abuse remember and report it.
Demeanor in the Interview and the Courtroom
A child who appears flat, detached, or absent may be dissociating, or may be shy, fatigued, or overwhelmed by an unfamiliar setting; a child who is restless or guarded may be hyperaroused for many reasons. Nothing in the trauma literature provides a method for reading the cause of a presentation from the presentation itself. The non-specificity point applies evenly: a calm or flat demeanor while describing abuse is not a reliable sign of fabrication, and visible distress is not a reliable sign that the account is accurate. A fragmentary or out-of-order narrative is consistent with ordinary memory for stressful and repeated events and shows neither that the events occurred nor that they did not. The most informative evidence remains how the account first emerged, what the child said in response to open-ended prompts, and what independent evidence exists.
Limits of the Evidence
The research summarized here has substantial limits that apply to both sides. The neurobiological framework for freezing and tonic immobility rests heavily on animal studies and on human laboratory studies of mild threat. Human data on tonic immobility during sexual violence are almost entirely retrospective self-reports, often from women who reported rape and sought care, and may not generalize to children, to boys and men, or to unreported abuse. The one direct study of tonic immobility in CSA is small and uses adult recollection. Research on dissociation and maltreatment relies largely on retrospective reports and self-report scales, and its causal interpretation is disputed.
Most important, these are group-level findings. No test or study can determine whether a particular child froze, entered tonic immobility, or dissociated during a particular event, or whether a particular child’s current numbness or hypervigilance was caused by sexual abuse rather than by another experience or condition. The research can explain to a factfinder that non-resistance and atypical demeanor are recognized reactions to threat and therefore do not, by themselves, undermine an account. It cannot be used to infer from a child’s reaction or demeanor that abuse occurred or did not occur.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When the prosecution cites Möller et al. (2017), in which 70% of women reported significant tonic immobility during a sexual assault, counsel should ask who was studied, since the 298 women came from one clinic and reported it retrospectively. When a witness says young children are especially likely to freeze, counsel should ask how much evidence it rests on, because it is an inference from the defense-cascade framework (Perry et al., 1995; Schauer & Elbert, 2010) and direct age comparisons are lacking. When the defense argues that dissociation or stress made an account unreliable, counsel should ask whether the conclusion follows, since neither dissociation nor stress arousal predicted memory in Eisen et al. (2002), and in Eisen et al. (2007) higher cortisol was linked to more errors only among children reporting more dissociative tendencies, and children with abuse histories were more accurate. When either side uses the higher tonic immobility scores among women (Kalaf et al., 2015) to predict a child’s reaction, counsel should ask whether a group difference applies to this person, because men also report tonic immobility. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Dissociation, Hyperarousal, and Freezing and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
Expert testimony on these responses is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702 as construed in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999). Rule 702 was amended effective December 1, 2023, to state that the proponent must show by a preponderance of the evidence that each requirement is met and that each opinion reflects a reliable application of the expert’s methods to the facts. Testimony that generalizes from animal research or adult retrospective surveys to how a particular child reacted raises fit and reliable-application questions under the amended rule and Rule 403.
In courts-martial, Military Rule of Evidence 702 governs, and the December 2023 federal amendment has been incorporated into the Military Rules of Evidence (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025). United States v. Houser (1993) sets out the factors a military judge considers in admitting expert testimony. In United States v. Flesher (2014), the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces recognized that expert testimony about the counterintuitive behavior of sexual assault victims may be admitted, but held that the witness’s qualifications were not established and that experts may not testify beyond their expertise or simply bolster a government witness. Under United States v. Brooks (2007), an expert may not state or imply, directly or through statistics, that a particular complainant is truthful.
The substantive offenses frame the relevance of non-resistance differently depending on the complainant’s age. Under Article 120b, UCMJ, lack of consent is not an element of child sexual offenses and a child, defined as a person under 16, cannot consent (10 U.S.C. § 920b(f), (g)). For older adolescents and adults charged under Article 120, the statutory definition of consent provides that lack of verbal or physical resistance does not constitute consent and that submission resulting from force, threat of force, or placing a person in fear does not constitute consent (10 U.S.C. § 920(g)(7)(A)). In child cases, therefore, testimony about freezing is offered to explain behavior that bears on credibility, such as the absence of an outcry, rather than to address an element.
Arizona
Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 adopted the Daubert standard in 2012 and was amended effective January 1, 2024, to conform to the 2023 federal amendment (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004). In State v. Lindsey (1986) and State v. Moran (1986), the Arizona Supreme Court held that an expert may describe general behavioral characteristics of sexual abuse victims but may not opine, directly or indirectly, on whether a particular complainant is truthful, or quantify how often such complainants tell the truth (Lindsey, 149 Ariz. at 473–75). In State v. Salazar-Mercado (2014), the court held that a “cold” expert may educate the jury about general behavioral patterns of child sexual abuse victims without applying them to the facts, provided the testimony satisfies Rule 702 and survives Rule 403. In State v. Haskie (2017), the court reaffirmed that profile evidence may not be used as substantive proof of guilt and cautioned against experts speaking in broad, categorical terms about what is common or usual without empirical support, a caution that applies directly to generalizations about how often victims freeze.
Arizona’s statutes, like the military’s, make consent irrelevant to most child offenses. Sexual conduct with a minor is defined by sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact with a person under 18 (A.R.S. § 13-1405(A)), subject to limited statutory defenses for some 15- to 17-year-olds (A.R.S. § 13-1407(B), (E)), and molestation of a child is defined by sexual contact with a child under 15 (A.R.S. § 13-1410). For sexual assault, the statutory definition of “without consent” is framed in terms of coercion by force or threatened force, incapacity, and deception, and does not include a resistance requirement (A.R.S. § 13-1401(A)(7)).
Other Jurisdictions
In People v. Barnes (1986), the California Supreme Court held that the Legislature’s 1980 removal of the resistance requirement from California’s rape statute was substantive, so that juries may not be instructed that resistance is required and the absence of resistance does not render evidence insufficient. The court discussed research describing a “frozen fright” response in which a victim may appear calm while terrified. In People v. Taylor (1990), the New York Court of Appeals held that expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome may be admitted to explain behavior a jury might not understand, such as a complainant’s calm demeanor, but not to prove that a rape occurred. In Commonwealth v. Shanley (2010), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld the admission of expert testimony on dissociative amnesia, concluding that general acceptance does not require unanimity; the decision illustrates that courts have resolved the recovered-memory dispute differently from many researchers, and it has been criticized in the forensic literature.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports explaining to a factfinder that a child may not resist, cry out, or flee during abuse, and may appear flat, detached, or agitated afterward, without those reactions casting doubt on the account. Clinical and population studies show that tonic immobility is frequently reported by sexual assault victims (Kalaf et al., 2015; Möller et al., 2017), the defense-cascade framework explains why immobility is more likely when escape appears impossible, and dissociation is associated with maltreatment at the group level (Vonderlin et al., 2018). A qualified expert can address the assumption that a genuine victim would have fought back, provided the testimony stays general, as Salazar-Mercado contemplates, distinguishes freezing from tonic immobility, and identifies which findings rest on animal or retrospective research.
The research also counsels caution about what these responses prove. Because they are non-specific, testimony that a child’s non-resistance, numbness, or hypervigilance shows that abuse occurred exceeds the science and raises the concerns addressed in Lindsey, Haskie, Flesher, and Brooks. Statements that a child “must have” frozen because of age or sex, or that trauma explains every gap in an account, are vulnerable on cross-examination. Prosecutors can keep trauma-response testimony educational and to anchor the case in a well-documented first disclosure, open-ended interviewing, and independent evidence.
Special Issues for Defense
The research supports careful examination of trauma-response testimony. Counsel can ask whether an expert has distinguished animal from human findings and freezing from tonic immobility, whether the human evidence cited is retrospective self-report from adult women, and whether claims about age or sex differences rest on direct comparison or inference. Where testimony attributes a child’s dissociation or hyperarousal to sexual abuse, counsel can identify documented alternative sources of the same symptoms, and where an allegation rests on a memory said to have been dissociated for years and later recovered, the contested status of dissociative amnesia is a legitimate subject for an admissibility challenge (Lynn et al., 2014; Otgaar et al., 2019).
The research also counsels caution about overreading in the other direction. Non-resistance, a calm or flat demeanor, and a fragmentary account are recognized responses to threat and features of ordinary memory for stressful events, so arguments that treat them as signs of consent or fabrication are not supported by the research and can be answered by it. In child cases consent is generally not an element, and the absence of visible distress does not show that nothing happened. A defense expert who implies that an account is false because of the child’s demeanor faces the same anti-vouching limits that apply to prosecution experts. The most persuasive analysis identifies specific overstatements of the science or specific alternative explanations documented in the case.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
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Legal Authorities
Commonwealth v. Shanley, 455 Mass. 752, 919 N.E.2d 1254 (2010).
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
People v. Barnes, 42 Cal. 3d 284, 721 P.2d 110 (1986).
People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 552 N.E.2d 131 (1990).
State v. Haskie, 242 Ariz. 582, 399 P.3d 657 (2017).
State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).
State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986).
State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).
United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
United States v. Flesher, 73 M.J. 303 (C.A.A.F. 2014).
United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).
10 U.S.C. § 920(g)(7) (Article 120, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
10 U.S.C. § 920b(f), (g) (Article 120b, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1401(A)(7).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1405.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1407.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1410.
Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Ariz. R. Evid. 403.
Ariz. R. Evid. 702.
Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004 (amending Ariz. R. Evid. 702, effective Jan. 1, 2024).
Mil. R. Evid. 403.
Mil. R. Evid. 702.
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