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Alcohol Blackout

Unknown Blackouts, Reconstruction, and Later Recall

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Snap Shot

  • The question: Can a person have a blackout without realizing it, how do people learn what happened during a blackout, and how should an account that is reconstructed or that grows over time be understood?
  • What the research shows: People with fragmentary blackouts may learn of missing events only when someone reminds them (a pattern described in a 1969 interview study of hospitalized patients; no study has counted how often it happens), so a person may not know the full extent of a gap. After a blackout, people commonly fill in what happened from friends, many of whom were also drinking, and from photos, videos, and messages; in one survey of university students, 25 of 148 who had blackouts reported being told something that did not happen, and 5 reported memories of it. In fragmentary blackouts some partly encoded information may return with cues, and a returned detail may be genuine or reconstructed.
  • What it does not show: The research does not show that a confident account is complete, that an account with no reported gap involved no blackout, or that a detail learned or remembered later is accurate or inaccurate. It cannot tell, from a recollection alone, whether a detail was retrieved or reconstructed.
  • The law: Expert testimony is governed by Rule 702 (as amended in 2023), Daubert, Kumho, Mil. R. Evid. 702, and Ariz. R. Evid. 702; experts may explain reconstruction in general but may not tell the factfinder that a particular witness’s memory is true or false (Lindsey; Moran; Brooks).
  • Issues for each side: Recording a witness’s first account and documenting what the witness later heard or saw protects every party; the same questions about sources apply to complainants, accused persons, and other witnesses.

Many people assume that a person who blacked out knows it: there is a gap, and the person notices it the next morning. The research describes something less tidy. With fragmentary blackouts, the more common type, a person may remember enough of an evening to have no sense that anything is missing until someone mentions an event the person cannot recall. And once a person knows there is a gap, the usual response is to fill it, by asking friends, looking at photos and messages, and piecing together what probably happened.

These processes reach court in two ways. A witness who gives a confident account of an alcohol-involved night may not know that parts of the night are missing, and a witness whose account grows more detailed over time may be retrieving genuine fragments, incorporating what others said, or both. This paper describes what is known about gaps that drinkers do not notice, how people reconstruct blackouts, how reconstruction can go wrong, how later recall should be understood, and the governing law. Some of the terms used in court, including “unknown blackout,” a descriptive term some use for a gap noticed only later, are descriptive labels rather than research categories.

Gaps a Drinker May Not Notice

Goodwin and colleagues, who first described fragmentary blackouts in interviews with hospitalized patients with alcoholism, reported that people with fragmentary blackouts may become aware that they are missing pieces of events only after being reminded that the events occurred (Goodwin et al., 1969a, as described by White, 2003, p. 188). The implication is that a gap can exist without the person knowing about it. White (2003) also noted that some of the patients who reported never having blacked out may have had blackouts without being aware of them. Neither observation measured how often unrecognized gaps occur, and no study has done so directly.

The research has not identified any internal signal that tells a drinker, at the time, that memories are not being stored. A review of the clinical literature observed that a person asked about a blackout is being asked to remember not remembering, which makes blackouts hard to study and raises questions about the accuracy of what is reported afterward (Wetherill & Fromme, 2016, p. 932). Prevalence surveys share the limit: respondents can report only the gaps they know about (see How Common Are Blackouts? Youth, College Students, and Service Members).

The practical consequence runs both ways. A complainant, accused, or witness who reports no memory gaps for a night of heavy drinking may still have had one; the absence of a reported blackout does not establish that none occurred. Equally, the possibility of an unnoticed gap is not evidence that a gap occurred, or that any particular event happened during one. When several people describe events that a witness does not mention, the omission may reflect a gap, ordinary forgetting, a different vantage point, or the other witnesses’ own errors.

How People Learn What Happened

After a blackout, most people try to find out what they did. In interviews with 50 college students (34 women and 16 men) who had experienced blackouts, most recalled bits and pieces of the missing period on their own, but they still relied on friends, most of whom had also been drinking, to tell them what had happened (White et al., 2004). In a survey of 280 university students (78% women), those who had experienced blackouts reported consulting both intoxicated and sober people about what they had done; 44% had at some point seen a photograph or video of what happened, and 21% had found other physical evidence (Nash & Takarangi, 2011). Students who had relied on intoxicated sources in the past expressed more confidence in those sources, even though they were also more likely to report having been misinformed by them. In an earlier e-mail survey of 772 Duke University undergraduates, many of those who had experienced blackouts reported that they later learned they had vandalized property, driven an automobile, had sexual intercourse, or engaged in other risky behaviors during the blackout (White et al., 2002). The survey relied on the students’ own reports, and the abstract does not give how often each behavior was reported or whether any report was checked, so it shows that people say they learn of such events afterward, not that the events occurred as reported. The same limit applies to anyone, complainant or accused, who describes what he or she later learned.

Messages, photos, video, location data, and other records are now often available, and they can anchor a reconstruction in a way that friends’ recollections cannot. The paper Reconstructing a Blackout Period from Digital and Documentary Evidence addresses what such records can and cannot show. Records can show that something happened (subject to questions about authenticity and timing); they do not, by themselves, restore the person’s memory of it, and a person who sees a photo may come to feel that he or she remembers the scene.

When Reconstruction Goes Wrong

The same survey asked how reconstruction can fail. Of 148 students who had experienced blackouts, 25 (16.9%) said they had been told they did something during a blackout that they later learned had not happened; most often the source was a friend, and the most common reason given was that the source had been drinking. Seventeen (11.5% of those with blackouts) said they had been confident at the time that the false event had occurred, and five (3.4%) said they had experienced memories of it (Nash & Takarangi, 2011). Looking at the other side of the exchange, 70% of all respondents had been asked to help someone else reconstruct a blackout; most of these informants acknowledged that they might have provided inaccurate details, and some admitted deliberately inventing details (13.7%) or an entire event (7.1%); the article reports these percentages without stating the denominator. The authors concluded that the desire to fill in the blanks can lead people to rely on unreliable sources and to loosen the standards they use to decide whether a recollection is their own, and that in at least some cases reconstruction appears to produce false beliefs or memories (Nash & Takarangi, 2011). Because the study asked only about errors the students had later discovered, it likely undercounts them, but it also cannot say how often reconstructions are accurate.

Laboratory research on memory conformity adds a qualification. When people recall an event together and one partner introduces errors, the other often incorporates them; in two experiments, drinking alcohol did not change how often participants adopted a partner’s errors, while participants were less likely to adopt errors from a partner they believed had been drinking, whom they rated as less credible (Thorley & Christiansen, 2018). A comprehensive review concluded that alcohol is most likely to increase suggestibility and false memory at high intoxication levels or after a delay (Kloft et al., 2021). The Memory in the Courtroom papers Source Monitoring and The Misinformation Effect explain the underlying processes.

Later Recall: Retrieval or Reconstruction?

In fragmentary blackouts some partly encoded information may return with cues (a 1969 interview study of hospitalized patients, described in a later review: Goodwin et al., 1969a, as described by White, 2003, p. 188); in en bloc blackouts cues generally fail, although the research does not show that no fragment can ever return; the accuracy of details that emerge later cannot be assumed, especially after exposure to others’ accounts, photos, or questioning (Nash & Takarangi, 2011; Kloft et al., 2021). In the student interviews, thinking about the remembered fragments triggered further recall in most cases (White et al., 2004), which is consistent with genuine retrieval; the study did not check the accuracy of what was recalled. The review of clinical research concluded that there is rarely a way to validate memories reconstructed after a blackout (Wetherill & Fromme, 2016, p. 932). A later, fuller account is therefore consistent with genuine retrieval and with reconstruction; the research does not indicate which has occurred in a particular case, and it does not support treating a changing account as either recovery or invention as a rule.

Hypothetical Example. Consider a hypothetical case in which a witness who drank heavily at a party tells police the next day that she remembers arriving and leaving and nothing notable in between. A week later, after a friend describes an argument in the kitchen and shows her a photo taken there, she describes the argument and says she now remembers it. Her first account may have contained a gap she did not notice; the later detail may be a retrieved fragment, something learned from the friend and the photo, or both, and the research does not say which. The friend’s own drinking, the photo’s time stamp, and the record of when the detail first appeared are what the factfinder can evaluate.

Two related points help keep the inquiry balanced. First, a less complete account is not the same as a less accurate one. In experiments in which people witnessed an event sober or intoxicated, intoxication reduced the number of correct details recalled but did not significantly increase the number of incorrect details (Jores et al., 2019); those studies used doses well below blackout levels. Second, confidence and completeness are different things. A witness can be confident about the islands of memory that remain and still be unaware of what lies between them, and a witness can be uncertain and accurate. The most useful evidence is often the sequence: what the person reported first, in the person’s own words; what the person was later told or shown; and when each detail first appeared. The Counterintuitive Testimony paper Memory Contamination: Discussion, Interviews, and Post-Event Information discusses how investigators can preserve that record.

Limits of the Evidence

The research on unrecognized gaps rests largely on clinical observations from the 1960s, as summarized in a later review (Goodwin et al., 1969a; White, 2003), and has not been tested by any study measuring how often drinkers fail to notice a gap. The reconstruction findings come from one survey of university students reporting their own past experiences (Nash & Takarangi, 2011) and one interview study of 50 students (White et al., 2004); both relied on self-report, both samples were mostly women, and neither compared women and men on reconstruction. Nash and Takarangi (2011) found that male drinkers in their sample were more likely than female drinkers to report a blackout (75.4% vs. 56.7%) but did not report sex differences in reconstruction strategies. The memory conformity and suggestibility studies used laboratory materials and doses below blackout levels (Thorley & Christiansen, 2018; Jores et al., 2019). No study has followed real witnesses to test whether details recalled after a blackout were accurate. Group research cannot establish whether a particular person had an unnoticed gap or whether a particular detail was remembered or learned.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When the observation that people learn of gaps only when reminded (Goodwin et al., 1969a) is offered to suggest that a confident witness’s account is incomplete, counsel can ask who was studied and whether the claim is testable: if both a reported gap and the absence of one are treated as consistent with a blackout, what evidence would show that no gap occurred? When Nash and Takarangi (2011) is cited to suggest that a detail came from friends rather than memory, counsel can ask whether the conclusion follows from the design: it was a survey of students’ past experiences, and it showed that reconstruction errors happen, not how often or in whom. When the 3.4% of students who reported memories of a false event is cited, counsel can ask what exactly was counted, since the figure includes only errors the students later discovered. And when White et al. (2004) is offered to show that later recall is genuine, counsel can ask whether the accuracy of the recalled fragments was ever checked. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Reconstruction, Later Recall, and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

Expert testimony about reconstruction and later recall is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as amended December 1, 2023, which requires the proponent to show that it is more likely than not that the testimony rests on sufficient facts or data, reflects reliable principles and methods, and reflects a reliable application of them to the case; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999) extend the court’s gatekeeping obligation to all expert testimony. Military Rule of Evidence 702 tracks the federal rule, and the 2023 amendment took effect in the military rule in 2025 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025); practitioners should confirm current text. Military judges also apply the factors in United States v. Houser (1993). An expert may explain how blackouts are reconstructed and what is known about cued recall, but may not vouch for or against a witness’s credibility (United States v. Brooks, 2007); an opinion that a particular detail was or was not genuinely remembered is not one the research supports.

Arizona

Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 was amended effective January 1, 2024, to track the 2023 federal amendment (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004). State v. Chapple (1983), Arizona’s leading case on expert testimony about the reliability of eyewitness memory, held that excluding a qualified expert was an abuse of discretion on its facts, while leaving admission generally within the trial court’s discretion; State v. Nordstrom (2001) upheld limiting such an expert to general factors. General educational testimony that satisfies Rules 702 and 403 is permitted (State v. Salazar-Mercado, 2014), but experts may not opine on a particular witness’s credibility (State v. Lindsey, 1986, 149 Ariz. at 475; State v. Moran, 1986). Arizona’s general credibility instruction directs jurors to consider, among other factors, the quality of the witness’s memory and whether the witness was contradicted by anything the witness said or wrote before trial (RAJI (Criminal) Standard 15), which makes a record of the witness’s earliest account especially useful.

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports several propositions prosecutors can legitimately present. People with fragmentary blackouts may learn of missing events only when reminded, so a complainant who did not initially describe a gap, or who learned of events from others, may be describing a pattern the clinical literature has described, and the omission is not, by itself, a sign of fabrication or of accuracy. In fragmentary blackouts some recall may return with cues, and reduced completeness after drinking is not the same as reduced accuracy. Prosecutors and investigators are well placed to record a complainant’s first account in full and in the complainant’s own words, and to document what the complainant was later told or shown, so that the factfinder can evaluate any later recollection.

The research also counsels caution. Details that surface after a complainant has talked with friends, seen photos, or been questioned may be genuine or reconstructed, and the research does not say which; testimony presenting them as recovered memory goes beyond the evidence. The possibility of an unnoticed gap applies to the accused as well, and it does not show that any particular event occurred. An argument that a confident account must be incomplete, or that an incomplete account must be accurate, is not supported by the research.

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports several propositions defense counsel can legitimately present. People reconstructing a blackout rely heavily on others’ accounts, often from people who were drinking, and in one survey some came to believe, and a few to remember, events that had not happened. It is legitimate to ask what the witness said first, what the witness learned afterward and from whom, and when each detail appeared, and to offer expert testimony on these general principles. A confident account of a night of heavy drinking is not necessarily a complete one.

The research also counsels caution about the limits that apply to the defense. The survey that documented reconstruction errors did not show that most reconstructions are wrong, and recall that returns with cues may be genuine or reconstructed; a detail that appeared later is not, by itself, false. The same questions apply to an accused’s account: an accused who reports a detailed memory of consent after heavy drinking, or who learned the details from friends or from discovery, raises the same concerns about sources and reconstruction as a complainant. An expert cannot tell the factfinder that a particular witness’s recollection was reconstructed.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

Goodwin, D. W., Crane, J. B., & Guze, S. B. (1969a). Alcoholic “blackouts”: A review and clinical study of 100 alcoholics. American Journal of Psychiatry, 126(2), 191–198. https://doi.org/10.1176/ajp.126.2.191

Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf

Jores, T., Colloff, M. F., Kloft, L., Smailes, H., & Flowe, H. D. (2019). A meta-analysis of the effects of acute alcohol intoxication on witness recall. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 33(3), 334–343. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3533

Kloft, L., Monds, L. A., Blokland, A., Ramaekers, J. G., & Otgaar, H. (2021). Hazy memories in the courtroom: A review of alcohol and other drug effects on false memory and suggestibility. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 124, 291–307. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2021.02.012

Nash, R. A., & Takarangi, M. K. T. (2011). Reconstructing alcohol-induced memory blackouts. Memory, 19(6), 566–573. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2011.590508

Thorley, C., & Christiansen, P. (2018). The impact of own and others’ alcohol consumption on social contagion following a collaborative memory task. Memory, 26(6), 727–740. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2017.1404110

Wetherill, R. R., & Fromme, K. (2016). Alcohol-induced blackouts: A review of recent clinical research with practical implications and recommendations for future studies. Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research, 40(5), 922–935. https://doi.org/10.1111/acer.13051

White, A. M. (2003). What happened? Alcohol, memory blackouts, and the brain. Alcohol Research & Health, 27(2), 186–196.

White, A. M., Jamieson-Drake, D. W., & Swartzwelder, H. S. (2002). Prevalence and correlates of alcohol-induced blackouts among college students: Results of an e-mail survey. Journal of American College Health, 51(3), 117–131. https://doi.org/10.1080/07448480209596339

White, A. M., Signer, M. L., Kraus, C. L., & Swartzwelder, H. S. (2004). Experiential aspects of alcohol-induced blackouts among college students. American Journal of Drug and Alcohol Abuse, 30(1), 205–224. https://doi.org/10.1081/ADA-120029874

Legal Authorities

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).

State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983).

State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).

State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986).

State v. Nordstrom, 200 Ariz. 229, 25 P.3d 717 (2001) (abrogated on other grounds by State v. Ferrero, as noted in State v. Payne, 314 P.3d 1239 (Ariz. 2013)).

State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).

United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).

United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

Mil. R. Evid. 702, 1102.

Ariz. R. Evid. 702.

Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004 (amending Ariz. R. Evid. 702, effective Jan. 1, 2024).

Revised Arizona Jury Instructions (Criminal), Standard Criminal 15 (Credibility of Witnesses).

Related topic papers: Fragmentary and En Bloc Blackouts · Reconstructing a Blackout Period from Digital and Documentary Evidence · “Waking Up” During a Blackout and Islands of Memory · Assessing a Claimed Blackout: Convergent Evidence, Malingering, and Limits · Alcohol and Memory for Crimes

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Memory in the Courtroom: Reconstruction and Recall · Memory in the Courtroom: Source Monitoring · Counterintuitive Testimony: Memory Contamination: Discussion, Interviews, and Post-Event Information