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Alcohol Blackout

Fragmentary and En Bloc Blackouts

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Snap Shot

  • The question: What are fragmentary and en bloc blackouts, how common is each, can memory return after either, and what does the distinction mean for an account given after heavy drinking?
  • What the research shows: An en bloc blackout is a dense loss of memory for a period that cues do not restore; a fragmentary blackout leaves islands of memory, and reminders can bring back some of the missing material. Fragmentary blackouts are several times more common. In one study the two types occurred across similar ranges of reported BAC, while most en bloc episodes involved other drugs; recent measurement studies support treating them as distinct but related experiences.
  • What it does not show: The type of blackout is classified from the person’s later recall, not measured during the episode, so the research cannot say which type a particular person had. It does not show that later recollections are accurate or inaccurate, that en bloc amnesia is absolute in every case, or that a changing account reflects either recovery or invention as a rule.
  • The law: Expert testimony is governed by Rule 702 (as amended in 2023), Daubert, Kumho, Mil. R. Evid. 702, and Ariz. R. Evid. 702, and experts may not opine on a particular witness’s credibility. Amnesia for the charged events does not by itself make an accused incompetent to stand trial (Wilson; State v. McClendon).
  • Issues for each side: A patchy account is consistent with a fragmentary blackout and also with ordinary memory limits, and patchiness alone shows neither a blackout nor fabrication; at the same time, details that surface later, after cues from others, may be genuine retrieval or reconstruction, and the research does not say which. These points apply equally to complainants, accused persons, and other witnesses.

A person who drank heavily may remember nothing of a period, or may remember scattered moments with gaps between them. Researchers have described these as two forms of alcohol-induced blackout: en bloc, in which a stretch of time is missing, and fragmentary, in which memory is spotty. The distinction was first drawn more than fifty years ago and remains in use, although the boundary between the two is less sharp than the labels suggest.

The distinction reaches court whenever an account given after drinking is partial, changes over time, or grows more detailed. A complainant may remember arriving at a party and waking the next morning, with a few moments in between; an accused may say he or she remembers nothing after a certain point; a witness may recall more at trial than in an early interview. This paper describes the two types, how common each is, how researchers now measure them, what is known about memory returning, a hypothetical illustration, and the governing law.

Two Patterns of Memory Loss

Goodwin and colleagues, interviewing 100 hospitalized patients with alcoholism, 64 of whom reported blackouts, described two forms (Goodwin et al., 1969a, 1969b). In an en bloc blackout, the person cannot recall any details of the period despite efforts by the person or others to cue recall; such blackouts usually have a distinct onset and a less clear end, often because the person falls asleep before the blackout is over. In a fragmentary blackout, memory formation is partly blocked, and the person often becomes aware of missing pieces only after being reminded that the events occurred (White, 2003, p. 188). A later review described en bloc blackouts as involving complete memory loss for a specific period and fragmentary blackouts, also called “brownouts” or “grayouts,” as partial amnesia in which some events can be recalled with relevant cues (Wetherill & Fromme, 2016, p. 923).

In both types the mechanism is the same: alcohol interferes with the transfer of information from short-term into long-term storage while leaving short-term memory and previously stored knowledge largely intact (White, 2003, p. 186). A person in either kind of blackout can be awake, talking, and acting. The difference lies in how complete the failure of storage is, and therefore in what the person can later retrieve.

How Common Each Type Is

Fragmentary blackouts are far more common. In a sample of 136 heavy-drinking young adults (54% men), the prevalence and incidence of fragmentary blackouts were more than three times those of en bloc blackouts (Hartzler & Fromme, 2003b). Among 400 college students with a history of alcohol-related memory loss across two studies, participants distinguished complete “blackouts” from partial “brownouts,” described them as points along a continuum, and in the survey study more reported brownouts (81%) than blackouts (54%) (Miller et al., 2018). In interviews with 50 college students who had experienced blackouts, fragmentary episodes were far more common than en bloc episodes (White et al., 2004).

The relationship to blood alcohol concentration (BAC) is less settled. In the heavy-drinking young adults, the two types were reported across a similar range and distribution of BACs, and most en bloc episodes involved concurrent use of other drugs, while few fragmentary episodes did (Hartzler & Fromme, 2003b). In the survey of 350 college students selected for a past-year blackout, the most recent en bloc episode followed more drinking than the most recent fragmentary episode (about 8.4 versus 6.7 drinks, with estimated BACs of about 0.16 and 0.14), a comparison limited to students who reported only one type (Miller et al., 2018). A review nonetheless described en bloc blackouts as typically occurring at higher BACs (Wetherill & Fromme, 2016, p. 923). Reported blackouts occur across a wide range of blood alcohol concentrations: the lowest level reported is about 0.06 g/dL (an estimate from self-reported drinking in 136 heavy-drinking young adults; Hartzler & Fromme, 2003b); in seven hospitalized men with alcoholism, blackouts began at about 0.14 (Ryback, 1970); a 2016 review reports that most blackouts occurred around 0.20, citing Ryback (1970) (Wetherill & Fromme, 2016, p. 923); and in one arrest sample, with BAC documented at arrest, the estimated probability of a partial memory loss (a “grayout,” meaning partial amnesia) or a blackout reached 50% at about 0.22 g/dL, and of a blackout (complete memory loss) at about 0.31 (Perry et al., 2006). These are group figures from different samples and methods, and they vary with tolerance, drinking pattern, and the time of the test; none is a cutoff or a threshold for any person, and the overlap means that a BAC estimate cannot identify which type a person experienced.

Measuring the Two Types

For decades most studies asked a single question about waking unable to remember, which could not separate the two types (Wetherill & Fromme, 2016). Recent work has built measures that do. A five-item measure of blackout experiences fit a two-part structure, but a single component accounted for most of the variation, suggesting that respondents experience blackouts largely along one dimension (Miller et al., 2019). A revised version developed through cognitive interviews and tested with 474 heavy-drinking college students was best described by two correlated factors, en bloc and fragmentary, and the two related differently to drinking motives (Boness et al., 2022). In a validation with 169 heavy-drinking young adults followed for a month, both factors were associated with hazardous drinking and consequences, but only en bloc blackouts predicted later outcomes when both were considered together (Boness et al., 2027).

Day-level studies point the same way. In a 28-day study of 203 young adults who reported high-intensity drinking (57% women), those with a stronger subjective response to alcohol were more likely to report both types after accounting for estimated BAC, while younger age and possible prior head injury were associated only with fragmentary blackouts (Merrill et al., 2025). In the same sample, days with pregaming were associated with higher estimated BAC and greater odds of both types (Merrill et al., 2026). Taken together, the research supports treating fragmentary and en bloc blackouts as related but distinguishable experiences, with en bloc episodes marking heavier risk, rather than as two sharply separate conditions.

Can Memory Return?

Memory return is the most contested courtroom issue. In fragmentary blackouts some partly encoded information may return with cues (a 1969 interview study of hospitalized patients, described in a later review: Goodwin et al., 1969a, as described by White, 2003, p. 188); in en bloc blackouts cues generally fail, although the research does not show that no fragment can ever return. A returned detail may be genuine or reconstructed, and the accuracy of what returns cannot be assumed, especially after exposure to others’ accounts, photos, or questioning (Nash & Takarangi, 2011; Kloft et al., 2021). In the interviews with college students, most recalled bits and pieces without cueing from others, yet still relied on friends, most of whom had also been drinking, to tell them what happened; thinking about the fragments triggered further recall in most cases, and four of five eventually recalled pieces of the missing period (White et al., 2004). Those reports describe the students’ own experience of recall; the study did not check whether what they recalled was accurate.

En bloc blackouts are defined by the failure of cues to restore memory, and researchers describe the loss as generally permanent (Hartzler & Fromme, 2003b). That definition is a description of how the episodes were classified, not a test showing that no fragment can ever return. Because short-term memory continues during a blackout, information may be held briefly and then lost; what a person later reports about an en bloc period is likely to come from other sources, inference, or reconstruction, but the research does not support calling recovery “impossible.” A later, fuller account is consistent with genuine retrieval of fragments and with reconstruction from what the person has since heard or seen; the research does not indicate which has occurred in a particular case. Unknown Blackouts, Reconstruction, and Later Recall treats these processes in depth.

Hypothetical Example. Consider a hypothetical assault investigation in which two friends left a bar together after heavy drinking. The next morning, one says she remembers ordering a last drink, a fragment of an argument on the sidewalk, and getting into a taxi, and nothing in between; over the following weeks, after seeing a video and hearing a bystander’s account, she adds that the argument was about a phone. The other says he remembers nothing after the bar and nothing has come back. The first pattern fits a fragmentary blackout and the second an en bloc blackout, but neither description shows which type occurred, whether the added detail was retrieved or learned from the video, or what happened on the sidewalk. Those questions turn on when each detail first appeared and on the video and other records, not on the label.

Why the Distinction Matters in Court

The fragmentary pattern would be expected to produce accounts that are partial, out of sequence, or uncertain about what came first, and that may grow when a cue is encountered. A partial or patchy account is therefore consistent with a fragmentary blackout, and it is also consistent with ordinary memory limits; patchiness alone does not show either fabrication or a blackout, for a complainant, an accused, or another witness. The same pattern means that cues supplied by others, such as text messages, photographs, or a friend’s description, can either restore genuine fragments or introduce information the person never encoded, and the person may not be able to tell the difference. Nothing in the research allows an observer to tell, from the recollection alone, which has occurred. What can be examined is the sequence: what the person reported first, what the person was told or shown afterward, and when each detail appeared.

These points apply in both directions. A complainant who reports islands of memory, and an accused who reports islands of memory, are describing the same phenomenon, and each account warrants the same questions about sources. A complainant or an accused who reports a complete loss for a period may be describing an en bloc blackout, a fragmentary blackout that included the critical moments, other forms of memory loss, or, in rare instances, feigning, and no single test confirms which (Pressman & Caudill, 2013). Whether the type of blackout matters to the legal questions in a case usually depends less on the label than on what other evidence shows about the person’s condition and conduct.

Limits of the Evidence

The two types are defined by the person’s later recall rather than by any measurement during the episode, and nearly all of the evidence is retrospective self-report. The original descriptions come from interviews with hospitalized men with alcoholism in the 1960s (Goodwin et al., 1969a, 1969b); later studies used college students and young adults, mostly in the United States. The comparison of BAC ranges relied on participants’ estimates (Hartzler & Fromme, 2003b), and the arrest study used BAC measured at arrest rather than during the episode (Perry et al., 2006). The new measures were validated against other self-reports, not against observed memory performance. Several studies included both sexes in roughly equal numbers or with a female majority (Hartzler & Fromme, 2003b; Miller et al., 2018; Merrill et al., 2025), but their abstracts do not report sex differences in the rates of the two types; in one study, women perceived blackouts and brownouts as more common than men did and reported weaker intentions to experience blackouts (Miller et al., 2018), and in the student interviews (34 women, 16 men), more women than men said their last blackout had frightened them (White et al., 2004). No study has tested whether recollections that return after a fragmentary blackout are accurate. Above all, group research cannot establish which type of blackout, if any, a particular person experienced.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When the finding that fragmentary blackouts are more than three times as common as en bloc blackouts (Hartzler & Fromme, 2003b) is cited, counsel can ask who was studied: 136 heavy-drinking young adults reporting their own experiences. When the 81% and 54% figures (Miller et al., 2018) are offered, counsel can ask what exactly was counted, since the labels depended on each student’s understanding of “blackout” and “brownout.” When the observation that reminders trigger recall (Goodwin et al., 1969a) is offered to explain why an account grew, counsel can ask how much evidence it rests on and whether it applies to this person: it comes from interviews with hospitalized patients decades ago and was not a test of accuracy. When an en bloc blackout is said to make any later recollection impossible, counsel can ask whether the conclusion follows from a classification based on self-report. And when Nash and Takarangi (2011) is offered to suggest that a new detail was reconstructed, counsel can ask whether the conclusion follows from the design, since it was a survey of how students reconstruct blackouts, not a test of any particular recollection. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Blackout Types and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

Expert testimony about blackout types is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as amended December 1, 2023, which requires the proponent to show that it is more likely than not that the testimony rests on sufficient facts or data, reflects reliable principles and methods, and reflects a reliable application of them to the case; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999) extend the court’s gatekeeping obligation to all expert testimony. Military Rule of Evidence 702 tracks the federal rule, and the 2023 amendment took effect in the military rule in 2025 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025); practitioners should confirm current text. Military judges also apply the factors in United States v. Houser (1993). An expert may explain the two types and what the research shows about cued recall; because the type is classified from later recall and no test confirms it, an opinion that a particular person had one type rather than the other rests on that person’s report and the surrounding evidence, and an opinion that the person’s later recollection is true or false is not one the research supports.

An accused’s amnesia raises a separate question. An accused may not be tried while unable, because of mental disease or defect, to understand the proceedings or to cooperate intelligently in the defense (R.C.M. 909(a)). In federal court, the D.C. Circuit held that amnesia does not per se render a defendant incompetent and that the trial court should assess, after trial, whether the amnesia deprived the defendant of a fair trial, considering factors such as the extent to which the events could be reconstructed from other evidence and the strength of the government’s case (Wilson v. United States, 1968). Voluntary Intoxication, Blackout, and Criminal Responsibility addresses competency in more detail.

Arizona

Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 was amended effective January 1, 2024, to track the 2023 federal amendment (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004). General educational testimony that satisfies Rules 702 and 403 is permitted (State v. Salazar-Mercado, 2014), but experts may not opine on whether a particular witness is truthful (State v. Lindsey, 1986, 149 Ariz. at 475; State v. Moran, 1986). Arizona’s general credibility instruction directs jurors to consider, among other factors, the quality of the witness’s memory and whether the witness was contradicted by anything the witness said or wrote before trial (RAJI (Criminal) Standard 15), so the sequence in which details appeared is a matter for the jury. The Arizona Supreme Court held that limited amnesia for the events of the crime did not make an otherwise competent defendant incompetent, noting that each case turns on its own facts (State v. McClendon, 1968).

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports several propositions prosecutors can legitimately present. In an interview study of 136 heavy-drinking young adults, fragmentary blackouts were reported more than three times as often as en bloc blackouts, a sample finding rather than a probability for any person; fragmentary blackouts are consistent with the pattern of islands of memory, uncertain sequence, and later-emerging fragments that a complainant’s account may show; that pattern, which is also consistent with ordinary memory limits, does not by itself show either fabrication or a blackout. Some missing material may return with cues, and a returned detail may be genuine or reconstructed. Prosecutors are well placed to ensure that early accounts are recorded in full, in the person’s own words, and that what the complainant was later told or shown, and when, is documented, so that the factfinder can evaluate any later recollection.

The research also counsels caution. Details that appear after the complainant has heard others’ accounts or seen photographs may be genuine or reconstructed, and the research cannot say which; testimony that later details reflect “recovered memory” goes beyond the evidence. The same reasoning applies to an accused who reports fragments of memory: a partial account does not by itself show either a blackout or deception. No validated test can confirm or refute an accused’s en bloc claim, and its weight depends on the rest of the evidence.

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports several propositions defense counsel can legitimately present. Cues supplied by others can introduce information a person never encoded, and people reconstructing a blackout rely heavily on others’ accounts, often from people who were also drinking. It is legitimate to ask when each detail of an account first appeared, what the witness had heard or seen beforehand, and whether the witness can distinguish remembered fragments from what was learned later. An accused’s report of complete memory loss is consistent with an en bloc blackout, which research describes as a recognized form of alcohol-induced amnesia.

The research also counsels caution about the limits that apply to the defense. A partial or changing account is consistent with a fragmentary blackout and also with ordinary memory limits, and it does not by itself show either a blackout or that the account is false, and the research has not shown that cued recollections are generally inaccurate. The same scrutiny of sources applies to an accused’s account: an accused who learns the details from discovery or from others may come to report them as memories. No single test can verify a claimed en bloc blackout, whoever claims it, and a claimed blackout does not show that the accused’s conduct was involuntary.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

Boness, C. L., DiBello, A. M., Herberholz, E. S., Link, K. M., Neil Greene, R., Merrill, J. E., Carey, K. B., & Miller, M. B. (2027). Validation of the alcohol induced blackout measure-2 (ABOM-2) among young adults who experience blackout. Addictive Behaviors, 184, Article 108844. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.addbeh.2026.108844

Boness, C. L., Gatten, N., Treece, M. K., & Miller, M. B. (2022). A mixed-methods approach to improve the measurement of alcohol-induced blackouts: ABOM-2. Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research, 46(8), 1497–1514. https://doi.org/10.1111/acer.14882

Goodwin, D. W., Crane, J. B., & Guze, S. B. (1969a). Alcoholic “blackouts”: A review and clinical study of 100 alcoholics. American Journal of Psychiatry, 126(2), 191–198. https://doi.org/10.1176/ajp.126.2.191

Goodwin, D. W., Crane, J. B., & Guze, S. B. (1969b). Phenomenological aspects of the alcoholic “blackout.” British Journal of Psychiatry, 115(526), 1033–1038. https://doi.org/10.1192/bjp.115.526.1033

Hartzler, B., & Fromme, K. (2003b). Fragmentary and en bloc blackouts: Similarity and distinction among episodes of alcohol-induced memory loss. Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 64(4), 547–550. https://doi.org/10.15288/jsa.2003.64.547

Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf

Kloft, L., Monds, L. A., Blokland, A., Ramaekers, J. G., & Otgaar, H. (2021). Hazy memories in the courtroom: A review of alcohol and other drug effects on false memory and suggestibility. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 124, 291–307. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2021.02.012

Merrill, J. E., Boyle, H. K., Peterson, R., Belitsos, O. A., Miller, M. B., Carey, K. B., Jackson, K. M., & Barnett, N. P. (2025). Factors that increase risk for alcohol-induced blackouts in high-intensity drinking young adults. Alcohol, Clinical and Experimental Research, 49(7), 1530–1541. https://doi.org/10.1111/acer.70074

Merrill, J. E., Perks, S. N., Gebru, N. M., Zamboanga, B. L., Miller, M. B., Barnett, N. P., & Carey, K. B. (2026). Pregaming promotes risky drinking patterns and alcohol-induced blackouts: A day-level study among young adults who report high-intensity drinking. Psychology of Addictive Behaviors, 40(7), 787–797. https://doi.org/10.1037/adb0001171

Miller, M. B., DiBello, A. M., Merrill, J. E., & Carey, K. B. (2019). Development and initial validation of the alcohol-induced blackout measure. Addictive Behaviors, 99, Article 106079. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.addbeh.2019.106079

Miller, M. B., Merrill, J. E., DiBello, A. M., & Carey, K. B. (2018). Distinctions in alcohol-induced memory impairment: A mixed methods study of en bloc versus fragmentary blackouts. Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research, 42(10), 2000–2010. https://doi.org/10.1111/acer.13850

Nash, R. A., & Takarangi, M. K. T. (2011). Reconstructing alcohol-induced memory blackouts. Memory, 19(6), 566–573. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2011.590508

Perry, P. J., Argo, T. R., Barnett, M. J., Liesveld, J. L., Liskow, B., Hernan, J. M., Trnka, M. G., & Brabson, M. A. (2006). The association of alcohol-induced blackouts and grayouts to blood alcohol concentrations. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 51(4), 896–899. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1556-4029.2006.00161.x

Pressman, M. R., & Caudill, D. S. (2013). Alcohol-induced blackout as a criminal defense or mitigating factor: An evidence-based review and admissibility as scientific evidence. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 58(4), 932–940. https://doi.org/10.1111/1556-4029.12134

Wetherill, R. R., & Fromme, K. (2016). Alcohol-induced blackouts: A review of recent clinical research with practical implications and recommendations for future studies. Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research, 40(5), 922–935. https://doi.org/10.1111/acer.13051

White, A. M. (2003). What happened? Alcohol, memory blackouts, and the brain. Alcohol Research & Health, 27(2), 186–196.

White, A. M., Signer, M. L., Kraus, C. L., & Swartzwelder, H. S. (2004). Experiential aspects of alcohol-induced blackouts among college students. American Journal of Drug and Alcohol Abuse, 30(1), 205–224. https://doi.org/10.1081/ADA-120029874

Legal Authorities

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).

State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).

State v. McClendon, 103 Ariz. 105, 437 P.2d 421 (1968) (amnesia and competency holding not affected; the former-jeopardy ruling in the opinion was later displaced, see State v. Maloney, 105 Ariz. 348, 464 P.2d 793 (1970)).

State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986).

State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).

United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).

Wilson v. United States, 391 F.2d 460 (D.C. Cir. 1968).

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

Mil. R. Evid. 702, 1102.

Rule for Courts-Martial 909.

Ariz. R. Evid. 702.

Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004 (amending Ariz. R. Evid. 702, effective Jan. 1, 2024).

Revised Arizona Jury Instructions (Criminal), Standard Criminal 15 (Credibility of Witnesses).

Related topic papers: Unknown Blackouts, Reconstruction, and Later Recall · “Waking Up” During a Blackout and Islands of Memory · Blacked Out Versus Passed Out · The Hippocampus and Memory Formation During a Blackout · Assessing a Claimed Blackout: Convergent Evidence, Malingering, and Limits

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Memory in the Courtroom: Intoxication and Memory · Counterintuitive Testimony: Inconsistent and Incomplete Accounts