Snap Shot
- The question: What is the difference between a person who “blacked out” and a person who “passed out,” why are the terms so often confused, and what does each state show, or fail to show, in a criminal case?
- What the research shows: A blackout is a failure to form lasting memories while the person is awake and interacting with the surroundings; passing out is a loss of consciousness and of the capacity for voluntary behavior. The two can occur on the same night, and surveys measure them as separate experiences: in one sample of underage college drinkers, about 38% reported a past-year blackout and about 21% reported passing out.
- What it does not show: A later memory gap does not show that the person was unconscious, and a person’s walking and talking does not show that the person was forming memories or was capable of consenting. The timing of passing out has not been well studied, and no BAC marks the point at which either state begins for a particular person.
- The law: Article 120, UCMJ, treats a person who is asleep or unconscious, a person who is incapable of consenting, and a person who is capable but does not consent under separate provisions, and Mendoza and Moore hold that the theories must be kept apart. Arizona’s definition of “without consent” covers incapacity from alcohol or sleep that the defendant knew or should reasonably have known of (A.R.S. § 13-1401(A)(7)(b)).
- Issues for each side: Both sides benefit from asking witnesses what they actually saw rather than accepting the labels “blacked out” or “passed out”; neither side can rely on a memory gap alone to establish unconsciousness, consciousness, consent, or incapacity.
Witnesses, complainants, accused persons, investigators, and lawyers often use “blacked out” and “passed out” as if they meant the same thing. They describe different states. A person in a blackout is awake and can talk, walk, and act but is not storing lasting memories of what is happening. A person who has passed out is unconscious. The confusion is understandable, because both states leave the person with no memory of the period afterward, but it can mislead a factfinder in either direction.
The distinction reaches court whenever a person cannot remember part of a night. A complainant’s statement that “I must have passed out” may be read as evidence of unconsciousness when the person may have been awake and interacting; an accused’s statement that the complainant “wasn’t passed out, they were talking” may be read as evidence of capacity when it shows only that the complainant was conscious at that moment. Witnesses who say someone “blacked out” may mean that the person collapsed. This paper explains the two states, what is known about when each occurs, how witnesses use the words, what each state does and does not show, and the governing military and Arizona law.
Two Different States
Alcohol primarily interferes with the formation of new long-term memories while leaving previously stored memories, and the ability to hold new information in mind for a short time, largely intact (White, 2003, p. 186). A person in a blackout is therefore conscious and interacting with the environment, whereas a person who has passed out from alcohol has lost consciousness and the capacity to engage in voluntary behavior (Wetherill & Fromme, 2016, p. 922). Because short-term memory continues to work, a person in a blackout can hold a detailed conversation and carry out complex behavior such as driving, but the experience is not transferred into lasting storage (Wetherill & Fromme, 2016, p. 922). Ryback, who observed hospitalized patients drinking in a research ward, wrote that subjects in the amnesic state could carry on conversations but could not remember what they had said or done minutes earlier (Ryback, 1971, p. 1003).
Passing out is a much less studied state. Forensic toxicology references describe a progression of effects as blood alcohol concentration (BAC) rises, from confusion and poor coordination through stupor, with impaired consciousness, to coma, with complete unconsciousness, and then to respiratory depression and death; the BAC ranges given for these stages overlap, and the same references report heavy drinkers who remained conscious and able to function at levels listed in the coma range, which the authors attribute to tolerance (Garriott & Manno, 2008). In ordinary usage, “passed out” may refer to anything from falling asleep after drinking to a state from which the person cannot be roused, which is a medical emergency.
Surveys treat the two experiences separately, and drinkers report them at different rates. In a study of 925 underage college drinkers (66% female), 37.8% reported at least one blackout in the past year and 20.9% reported having passed out from drinking (Davis et al., 2021). Lower sensitivity to alcohol (needing more drinks to feel its effects) was linked to heavier drinking and to more of both experiences, but the relationship between drinking quantity and blackouts differed by sensitivity, while the relationship with passing out did not, suggesting that the two outcomes are related but not interchangeable. Sex did not change these relationships. The study relied on self-report, so “passing out” meant whatever each respondent understood by the term.
When Each State Occurs
Blackouts are associated with heavy and rapid drinking, but no BAC serves as a cutoff. The lowest level reported is about 0.06 g/dL (an estimate from self-reported drinking in 136 heavy-drinking young adults; Hartzler & Fromme, 2003b); in seven hospitalized men with alcoholism, blackouts began at about 0.14 (Ryback, 1970); and a 2016 review reports that most blackouts occurred around 0.20, citing Ryback (1970) (Wetherill & Fromme, 2016, p. 923). In one arrest sample, with BAC documented at arrest, the estimated probability of a blackout (complete memory loss, as distinct from a partial “grayout”) reached 50% at about 0.31 g/dL (Perry et al., 2006). These are group figures from different samples and methods, not cutoffs or plausibility screens for any person’s account. Blackouts are more likely when BAC rises quickly, as with gulping drinks or drinking on an empty stomach (White, 2003, p. 189).
Little research has measured when loss of consciousness occurs relative to peak BAC; clinical references suggest it tends to come as BAC rises or later in the night as sedation and sleep take over, but this is a general expectation, not measured timing. Alcohol shortens the time it takes to fall asleep and consolidates sleep early in the night, but disrupts sleep in the second half (Ebrahim et al., 2013). Blackouts and passing out can occur in the same episode, and an en bloc blackout often has no clear end because the person typically falls asleep before it is over (White, 2003, p. 188). In the study of underage drinkers, the most alcohol-sensitive participants reported that their most recent blackout or passing-out episode followed about 10 to 12 drinks, and the least sensitive about 18 (Davis et al., 2021). A person who was seen walking and talking at one point and unresponsive at a later point is therefore not necessarily presenting a contradiction; both observations can be accurate. Which state existed at a legally relevant moment is a question about the evidence for that moment, not something a general pattern can answer.
How Witnesses Use the Words
The words are used loosely in everyday speech. Schneider (2020) wrote that laypersons, courts, witnesses, attorneys, and some experts in sexual assault investigations confuse “blackout” and “pass out,” and that the difference matters to evaluating what an accused perceived or could reasonably have perceived. College students in focus groups distinguished complete “blackouts” from partial “brownouts,” and said that the phrase “blackout drinking” does not always imply memory loss (Miller et al., 2018). The same word may thus describe memory loss, collapse, very heavy drinking, or a combination.
For that reason, what a witness observed is more informative than the label the witness chose. Whether the person’s eyes were open or closed, whether the person spoke and what was said, whether the person moved and how, whether the person responded to voice or touch, how long the observation lasted, and when it occurred are all more useful than “she was passed out” or “he was blacked out.” The same applies to the person’s own account. A complainant or accused who says “I passed out” may be describing an experience of waking with no memory of the preceding period, which is equally consistent with having been asleep or unconscious and with having been awake in a blackout.
Hypothetical Example. Consider a hypothetical burglary trial in which a roommate testifies that the defendant “was totally passed out on the couch” when she came home at midnight. Asked what she saw, she says that his eyes were closed, that he mumbled when she said his name, and that she checked on him once more an hour later, when he was in the same position. Another witness testifies that the defendant sent her text messages at 12:40 a.m. The roommate’s label suggests unconsciousness throughout, but her description covers two brief observations, and a person who appears asleep at midnight may be awake and active forty minutes later. The details, the timestamps, and any other records, not the word “passed out,” are what the factfinder can evaluate; the example illustrates the questions, not how any case should be resolved.
What Each State Does and Does Not Show
The distinction has consequences that cut in more than one direction. A person’s later absence of memory does not, by itself, establish that the person was unconscious, asleep, or incapable of consenting; it establishes that lasting memories were not formed or cannot now be retrieved. At the same time, the fact that a person was awake, walking, or talking does not establish that the person was forming memories, and it does not establish that the person was capable of appraising the nature of a sexual act or of making and communicating a decision about it. Blackout, unconsciousness, and legal incapacity are three different questions; a person can be in a blackout and capable of consenting, or incapable of consenting without a blackout, and later non-recall alone does not establish either (see Blackout, Passing Out, and Incapacity: How They Overlap).
Evidence that a person passed out raises different questions. A person who is unconscious cannot consent under military or Arizona law, so evidence of when the person lost consciousness, and of what happened before, can be central. Because blackouts often precede passing out, a person who was later found unconscious may have been awake, and in a blackout, earlier in the evening, and the evidence about each period has to be considered on its own. On average, women reach higher BACs than men from the same dose, mainly because of lower body water and a smaller volume of distribution (Mumenthaler et al., 1999), and in a laboratory study of 93 young adults dosed to the same peak breath alcohol (about 0.11), alcohol disrupted later sleep more in women than in men (Arnedt et al., 2011). These are group findings; they do not show how impaired, or how deeply asleep, a particular woman or man was, and they apply equally to complainants and accused persons of either sex.
Every point in this section applies to accused persons as well as complainants. An accused who says he or she “passed out” and remembers nothing may have been unconscious or may have been awake and acting during a blackout, and no single test can verify a claim either way, whoever makes it (Pressman & Caudill, 2013). The Counterintuitive Testimony paper Alcohol, Blackouts, and Memory in Sexual Assault Cases treats these issues in sexual assault cases in more depth.
Limits of the Evidence
Most of what is known about blackouts comes from retrospective self-report, and passing out has received even less direct study; surveys such as Davis et al. (2021) rely on single questions whose meaning respondents interpret for themselves. The laboratory observations of people in blackouts are small, decades old, and based mostly on middle-aged men with alcoholism (Ryback, 1970, 1971; Goodwin et al., 1970). The toxicology stages of intoxication are clinical descriptions with overlapping ranges, not cutoffs, and tolerance shifts them (Garriott & Manno, 2008). Research on when people lose consciousness after drinking is sparse, so the clinical expectation that passing out tends to come as BAC rises or later as sleep takes over is a general expectation, not measured timing. The studies that compared women and men found no sex difference in how sensitivity related to blackouts or passing out (Davis et al., 2021) but greater sleep disruption in women (Arnedt et al., 2011); other key studies did not compare the sexes. Above all, the research describes groups and probabilities; it cannot establish whether a particular person was in a blackout, asleep, or unconscious at a particular moment.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When an expert says that a person in a blackout can converse and act purposefully, counsel can ask who was studied: the laboratory observations come from a handful of hospitalized men with alcoholism (Ryback, 1970; Goodwin et al., 1970), and the young-adult evidence comes from self-report. When a witness’s statement that a person “passed out” is offered as evidence of unconsciousness, counsel can ask what exactly was observed, for how long, and when. When the coma or stupor range of BAC is cited to show that a person must have been unconscious, counsel can ask whether the conclusion follows from the design, since the ranges overlap and tolerant drinkers have been documented functioning within them (Garriott & Manno, 2008). When a survey finding is offered, such as the rates of blackout and passing out in Davis et al. (2021), counsel can ask what was counted, since each respondent defined the terms. And when either side argues that a memory gap shows the person was unconscious, or that conversation shows capacity, counsel can ask what evidence other than the gap or the conversation supports the conclusion. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Blackout, Passing Out, and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
Article 120, UCMJ, addresses these states in separate provisions. Sexual assault includes a sexual act committed without the consent of the other person (Art. 120(b)(2)(A)); when the accused knows or reasonably should know that the other person is asleep, unconscious, or otherwise unaware that the act is occurring (Art. 120(b)(2)(B)); and when the other person is incapable of consenting due to impairment by any drug, intoxicant, or other similar substance, and that condition is known or reasonably should be known by the accused (Art. 120(b)(3)(A)). A sleeping, unconscious, or incompetent person cannot consent (Art. 120(g)(7)(B)), and “incapable of consenting” means incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct at issue, or physically incapable of declining participation in, or communicating unwillingness to engage in, the sexual act (Art. 120(g)(8)). Under the earlier statute, United States v. Pease (2016) approved a definition centered on the ability to appreciate the conduct and to make or communicate a decision about it. None of these provisions turns on whether the person later remembers the event.
The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has held that lack of consent and incapacity are separate theories of liability and that the government cannot prove absence of consent under Article 120(b)(2)(A) merely by establishing that the person was too intoxicated to consent (United States v. Mendoza, 2024). In United States v. Moore (2026), the court identified the legal principles that govern sufficiency disputes when the evidence shows that a person was asleep or too intoxicated to consent, including that evidence is legally sufficient if a rational factfinder could find that the person did not consent before falling asleep and that the act occurred while the person was asleep. Whether a person was in a blackout, asleep, or unconscious can therefore matter to which provision applies. Expert testimony on these distinctions is governed by Military Rule of Evidence 702, which tracks Federal Rule of Evidence 702 as amended December 1, 2023, and was amended to track it in 2025 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025); practitioners should confirm current text. Military judges also apply the factors in United States v. Houser (1993), and under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999) the gatekeeping obligation extends to all expert testimony.
Arizona
Arizona defines sexual assault as intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact with any person without that person’s consent (A.R.S. § 13-1406). “Without consent” includes a victim incapable of consent by reason of mental disorder, mental defect, drugs, alcohol, sleep, or any other similar impairment of cognition, where the condition is known or should reasonably have been known to the defendant (A.R.S. § 13-1401(A)(7)(b)). Sleep and alcohol impairment appear in the same clause, and the knowledge element makes the observable evidence of the person’s condition important. Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 was amended effective January 1, 2024, to track the 2023 federal amendment (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004); general educational testimony that satisfies Rules 702 and 403 is permitted (State v. Salazar-Mercado, 2014), but experts may not opine on whether a particular witness is truthful (State v. Lindsey, 1986, 149 Ariz. at 475; State v. Moran, 1986). Testimony explaining that a blackout is not unconsciousness fits the educational model; testimony that a particular person was or was not conscious, or capable of consent, at a particular moment moves into the factfinder’s province.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports several propositions prosecutors can legitimately present. A complainant who cannot remember part of a night may have been awake in a blackout, asleep, or unconscious, and a memory gap is consistent with alcohol’s effect on memory formation; it is not, by itself, evidence of fabrication. Testimony that a person was talking or walking at one point does not show what the person’s state was at a later point, because blackouts often precede sleep or loss of consciousness. On average, women reach higher BACs per dose, though many factors matter, and observable descriptions of the complainant’s condition bear on the “known or reasonably should be known” elements under both Article 120 and A.R.S. § 13-1401(A)(7)(b).
The research also counsels caution. A complainant’s lack of memory does not by itself show that the complainant was unconscious, and describing a blackout as “passing out” may assert more than the evidence shows. After Mendoza and Moore, the theory charged determines which state matters, and evidence that the complainant was asleep or unconscious at the time of the act requires its own proof beyond the memory gap. Witnesses who use “passed out” loosely can be asked what they saw, since the details they observed, not the label, are what the factfinder can evaluate.
Special Issues for Defense
The research supports several propositions defense counsel can legitimately present. A blackout is a failure of memory formation, not unconsciousness, and a person in a blackout can converse and act in complex ways; a complainant’s absence of memory therefore does not by itself establish unconsciousness, sleep, or incapacity. Witnesses’ use of “passed out” is often loose, and asking what they actually observed, and when, is legitimate. Testimony explaining these distinctions can help the factfinder identify what evidence, other than the gap in memory, bears on the complainant’s condition.
The research also counsels caution about the limits that apply to the defense. That a person was conscious does not show that the person was capable of consenting or did consent, and the research does not show that a person in a blackout was capable of consenting, only that the blackout does not settle the question. Evidence that a person was walking and talking earlier does not rule out that the person was asleep or unconscious later. The same principles apply to the accused: no single test can verify a claimed blackout or claimed loss of consciousness, whether the claim is made by the accused or the complainant, and an accused’s account of a heavily intoxicated period raises the same questions about what was observed as a complainant’s.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Arnedt, J. T., Rohsenow, D. J., Almeida, A. B., Hunt, S. K., Gokhale, M., Gottlieb, D. J., & Howland, J. (2011). Sleep following alcohol intoxication in healthy, young adults: Effects of sex and family history of alcoholism. Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research, 35(5), 870–878. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-0277.2010.01417.x
Davis, C. N., Piasecki, T. M., Bartholow, B. D., & Slutske, W. S. (2021). Effects of alcohol sensitivity on alcohol-induced blackouts and passing out: An examination of the alcohol sensitivity questionnaire among underage drinkers. Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research, 45(5), 1149–1160. https://doi.org/10.1111/acer.14607
Ebrahim, I. O., Shapiro, C. M., Williams, A. J., & Fenwick, P. B. (2013). Alcohol and sleep I: Effects on normal sleep. Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research, 37(4), 539–549. https://doi.org/10.1111/acer.12006
Garriott, J. C., & Manno, J. E. (2008). Pharmacology and toxicology of ethyl alcohol. In J. C. Garriott (Ed.), Garriott’s medicolegal aspects of alcohol (5th ed., pp. 25–45). Lawyers & Judges Publishing.
Goodwin, D. W., Othmer, E., Halikas, J. A., & Freemon, F. (1970). Loss of short term memory as a predictor of the alcoholic “blackout.” Nature, 227(5254), 201–202. https://doi.org/10.1038/227201a0
Hartzler, B., & Fromme, K. (2003b). Fragmentary and en bloc blackouts: Similarity and distinction among episodes of alcohol-induced memory loss. Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 64(4), 547–550. https://doi.org/10.15288/jsa.2003.64.547
Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf
Miller, M. B., Merrill, J. E., DiBello, A. M., & Carey, K. B. (2018). Distinctions in alcohol-induced memory impairment: A mixed methods study of en bloc versus fragmentary blackouts. Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research, 42(10), 2000–2010. https://doi.org/10.1111/acer.13850
Mumenthaler, M. S., Taylor, J. L., O’Hara, R., & Yesavage, J. A. (1999). Gender differences in moderate drinking effects. Alcohol Research & Health, 23(1), 55–64.
Perry, P. J., Argo, T. R., Barnett, M. J., Liesveld, J. L., Liskow, B., Hernan, J. M., Trnka, M. G., & Brabson, M. A. (2006). The association of alcohol-induced blackouts and grayouts to blood alcohol concentrations. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 51(4), 896–899. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1556-4029.2006.00161.x
Pressman, M. R., & Caudill, D. S. (2013). Alcohol-induced blackout as a criminal defense or mitigating factor: An evidence-based review and admissibility as scientific evidence. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 58(4), 932–940. https://doi.org/10.1111/1556-4029.12134
Ryback, R. S. (1970). Alcohol amnesia: Observations in seven drinking inpatient alcoholics. Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 31(3), 616–632. https://doi.org/10.15288/qjsa.1970.31.616
Ryback, R. S. (1971). The continuum and specificity of the effects of alcohol on memory: A review. Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 32(4), 995–1016. https://doi.org/10.15288/qjsa.1971.32.995
Schneider, N. (2020). Blackout versus pass out in allegations of alcohol-involved sexual assault: Why knowing the difference matters. Journal of Psychiatric Practice, 26(2), 141–145. https://doi.org/10.1097/PRA.0000000000000452
Wetherill, R. R., & Fromme, K. (2016). Alcohol-induced blackouts: A review of recent clinical research with practical implications and recommendations for future studies. Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research, 40(5), 922–935. https://doi.org/10.1111/acer.13051
White, A. M. (2003). What happened? Alcohol, memory blackouts, and the brain. Alcohol Research & Health, 27(2), 186–196.
Legal Authorities
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).
State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986).
State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).
United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).
United States v. Mendoza, 85 M.J. 213 (C.A.A.F. 2024).
United States v. Moore, 86 M.J. 308 (C.A.A.F. 2026).
United States v. Pease, 75 M.J. 180 (C.A.A.F. 2016).
10 U.S.C. § 920 (Article 120, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1401.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1406.
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Mil. R. Evid. 702, 1102.
Ariz. R. Evid. 702.
Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004 (amending Ariz. R. Evid. 702, effective Jan. 1, 2024).
Related topic papers: Blackout, Passing Out, and Incapacity: How They Overlap · Can Observers Tell When Someone Is in a Blackout? · Fragmentary and En Bloc Blackouts · “Waking Up” During a Blackout and Islands of Memory · Alcohol, Sleep, and Memory · The Goldilocks Challenge: Intoxicated Enough to Lose Memory, but Capable of Consent?
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Counterintuitive Testimony: Alcohol, Blackouts, and Memory in Sexual Assault Cases · Counterintuitive Testimony: Consent Communication, Misperception, and Mistake of Fact · Courts-Martial