Snap Shot
- The question: How do a blackout, passing out, and legal incapacity to consent relate to one another?
- What the research shows: A blackout is a failure to form lasting memories while awake; passing out is a loss of consciousness; incapacity is a legal conclusion about whether a person could appraise the conduct or decide and communicate. A person who has passed out cannot consent; a person in a blackout may or may not be capable.
- What it does not show: Group research has not been shown to determine whether a particular person was in a blackout, was unconscious, or could consent; later non-recall alone does not establish any of the three.
- The law: Article 120(g)(7)–(8), UCMJ, United States v. Pease, and A.R.S. § 13-1401(A)(7)(b) define consent and incapacity; capacity is decided by the factfinder.
- Issues for each side: Both parties should keep the three questions separate and ask what evidence, other than a memory gap, bears on each.
Witnesses, lawyers, and sometimes experts use “blacked out,” “passed out,” and “too drunk to consent” as if they meant the same thing. They answer three different questions: whether the person was forming lasting memories, was conscious, and was legally capable of consenting. The figure shows how they relate.
Figure for the web manager: A simple three-circle diagram in flat outlines with labels (no photographs). Circle C, the largest, “Legally incapable of consenting: cannot appraise the conduct, or cannot decide or communicate (a legal question for the fact-finder).” Circle B, “Passed out: not conscious,” sits entirely inside circle C, because a person who has passed out cannot consent. Circle A, “Blackout: not forming lasting memories,” overlaps circle C only in part and does not touch circle B, because a person in a blackout is awake. Labels: the part of A outside C, “in a blackout but capable: awake and acting, forming no lasting memories”; the part of A inside C, “in a blackout and incapable: may occur together; a blackout alone does not establish incapacity”; circle B, “a person who is unconscious cannot consent”; the rest of C, “incapable without a blackout or loss of consciousness”; outside all three, “intoxicated, remembering, conscious, and capable.” Caption: “A person who has passed out cannot consent; a person in a blackout may or may not be capable of consenting. At one moment a person may be in only one of these states, but the same person may black out and later pass out during one night. This figure illustrates concepts; it is not a test for any person.”
Was the Person Forming Lasting Memories?
A blackout is a period of amnesia for events during drinking. Alcohol mainly impairs the formation of new long-term memories, so a person in a blackout can converse and act in complex ways without storing a lasting record (White, 2003, p. 186). In an interview study of 136 heavy-drinking young adults, fragmentary blackouts were reported more often than en bloc (complete) blackouts (Hartzler & Fromme, 2003b). No validated behavioral sign identifies a blackout in progress (Wetherill & Fromme, 2016, pp. 922–923), and no single test can confirm or rule out a blackout afterward (Pressman & Caudill, 2013). Fragmentary and En Bloc Blackouts and Can Observers Tell When Someone Is in a Blackout? address this question.
Was the Person Conscious?
A person in a blackout is conscious and interacting with the surroundings, whereas a person who has passed out has lost consciousness and the capacity for voluntary behavior (Wetherill & Fromme, 2016, p. 922). The same person may black out and later pass out, and a later memory gap can span both periods, but the two states differ at any one moment, so the figure keeps their circles apart. Witnesses use “passed out” loosely, so what they observed matters more than the label (Schneider, 2020). Blacked Out Versus Passed Out treats this question.
Could the Person Consent?
Capacity to consent is a legal question decided by the factfinder on the whole record. An unconscious person cannot consent, so the figure places passing out inside the incapacity circle; whether the person was in fact unconscious is a question of evidence. Research describes intoxication’s effects in groups; it has not been shown to determine whether a particular person, at a particular moment, could appraise the conduct or make or communicate a decision. A person can be in a blackout and capable of consenting, or incapable of consenting without a blackout, and later non-recall alone does not establish either. Evidence bearing on capacity includes speech, balance, responsiveness, vomiting, and the timing and amount of drinking, and also coordinated, purposeful behavior, such as messages sent or decisions made. Purposeful behavior does not by itself show that the person could appraise the conduct or decide, and it does not by itself show that the person could not. The Goldilocks Challenge and the Counterintuitive Testimony paper on alcohol, blackouts, and memory treat this question in depth.
Limits of the Evidence
The figure simplifies. Blackout research relies mainly on later self-report, passing out has received little direct study, and the legal definitions of incapacity do not map onto any research measure. The circles are concepts, not categories into which a test can sort a person, and the sizes of the overlaps are not known. Applying group research to one person is discussed in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys.”
Blackout, Passing Out, Incapacity, and the Law
Under Article 120, UCMJ, a sleeping, unconscious, or incompetent person cannot consent (Art. 120(g)(7)(B)); a sexual act with a person the accused knows or reasonably should know is asleep or unconscious is a separately charged theory (Art. 120(b)(2)(B)). The phrase “incapable of consenting” means incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct at issue, or physically incapable of declining participation in, or communicating unwillingness to engage in, the sexual act (Art. 120(g)(8)). Under the earlier statute, United States v. Pease (2016) approved a definition of incapacity as lacking the cognitive ability to appreciate the conduct, or lacking the physical or mental ability to make or to communicate a decision about it. In Arizona, “without consent” includes a victim incapable of consent by reason of drugs, alcohol, sleep, or similar impairment of cognition, where the condition is known or should reasonably have been known to the defendant (A.R.S. § 13-1401(A)(7)(b)). Neither definition mentions memory; a blackout bears on capacity only through whatever else the evidence shows about the person’s condition. In both forums, what the accused knew or reasonably should have known is a separate element that the figure does not address.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Hartzler, B., & Fromme, K. (2003b). Fragmentary and en bloc blackouts: Similarity and distinction among episodes of alcohol-induced memory loss. Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 64(4), 547–550. https://doi.org/10.15288/jsa.2003.64.547
Pressman, M. R., & Caudill, D. S. (2013). Alcohol-induced blackout as a criminal defense or mitigating factor: An evidence-based review and admissibility as scientific evidence. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 58(4), 932–940. https://doi.org/10.1111/1556-4029.12134
Schneider, N. (2020). Blackout versus pass out in allegations of alcohol-involved sexual assault: Why knowing the difference matters. Journal of Psychiatric Practice, 26(2), 141–145. https://doi.org/10.1097/PRA.0000000000000452
Wetherill, R. R., & Fromme, K. (2016). Alcohol-induced blackouts: A review of recent clinical research with practical implications and recommendations for future studies. Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research, 40(5), 922–935. https://doi.org/10.1111/acer.13051
White, A. M. (2003). What happened? Alcohol, memory blackouts, and the brain. Alcohol Research & Health, 27(2), 186–196.
Legal Authorities
United States v. Pease, 75 M.J. 180 (C.A.A.F. 2016).
10 U.S.C. § 920 (Article 120, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1401.
Related topic papers: Blacked Out Versus Passed Out · Can Observers Tell When Someone Is in a Blackout? · The Goldilocks Challenge: Intoxicated Enough to Lose Memory, but Capable of Consent? · Introduction to Alcohol Blackouts: A Primer
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Counterintuitive Testimony: Alcohol, Blackouts, and Memory in Sexual Assault Cases · Counterintuitive Testimony: Consent Communication, Misperception, and Mistake of Fact · Courts-Martial