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Alcohol Blackout

The Goldilocks Challenge: Intoxicated Enough to Lose Memory, but Capable of Consent?

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Snap Shot

  • The question: In alcohol-involved sexual assault cases, how can a complainant have been intoxicated enough to have little or no memory of a sexual act and yet, on one view of the evidence, capable of consenting to it, and how do the prosecution and the defense each confront that tension?
  • What the research shows: A blackout is a failure to form lasting memories, not unconsciousness, and a person in a blackout can talk and act in ways observers find ordinary. No validated sign identifies a blackout in progress. Signs of severe intoxication, such as vomiting, inability to stand, or unresponsiveness, can be observed, and alcohol shifts perception toward reading sexual interest and slows recognition of refusal in laboratory studies.
  • What it does not show: Research cannot show that a particular complainant was or was not in a blackout, was or was not capable of consenting, or communicated consent, or what a particular accused perceived. A memory gap does not by itself show that nothing happened, and it does not by itself show incapacity; it is consistent with a range of events, including some that are consensual, and it is relevant to the extent it reflects heavy drinking.
  • The law: Military law separates lack of consent from incapacity (Mendoza; Moore), defines incapacity by the ability to appraise the conduct or to decline or communicate unwillingness (Art. 120(g)(8); Pease), and treats mistake of fact as a special defense that must be honest and reasonable, judged from a sober person’s standpoint (R.C.M. 916(j)(1), (l)(2)). Arizona requires proof that the defendant knew the act was without consent and reaches incapacity known or reasonably knowable to the defendant (A.R.S. §§ 13-1401(A)(7)(b), 13-1406; Witwer; RAJI 14.06.01), and bars voluntary intoxication as a defense to any mental state (A.R.S. § 13-503).
  • Issues for each side: The prosecution must decide whether its evidence shows incapacity, nonconsent, or both, and cannot treat a blackout as proof of either; the defense can show that memory loss is not incapacity, but evidence of how intoxicated the complainant appeared bears on what the accused knew or reasonably should have known.

The name refers to a recurring difficulty in alcohol-involved sexual assault cases. Evidence that a complainant drank heavily helps explain why the complainant remembers little, but for the prosecution it may show memory loss without reaching the level the law treats as incapacity. For the defense the problem is the mirror image: evidence that the complainant was conscious, talking, and acting may support the possibility of consent, but evidence of heavy intoxication can show incapacity or what the accused should have recognized. Each side may need to argue that the complainant was intoxicated enough for one purpose but not for another.

Memory gaps after heavy drinking occur in many true cases, and drinking does not make a person responsible for being assaulted; at the same time, an inaccurate account can be sincerely given. This paper sets out the separate questions of memory, consciousness, and capacity, how the tension appears to each side, and the governing law. The paired papers Alcohol-Involved Cases: Practice Issues for the Defense and Alcohol-Involved Cases: Practice Issues for the Prosecution treat each side’s issues more broadly.

Three Separate Questions

Three questions are often merged in testimony and argument. The first is memory: a blackout is a period during which the drinker was awake and acting but did not form lasting memories (White, 2003; Wetherill & Fromme, 2016, p. 922). Fragmentary blackouts, with islands of memory, are far more common than complete ones. The second is consciousness: a person who has passed out has lost consciousness and is generally unresponsive, whereas a person in a blackout is conscious and interacting (Wetherill & Fromme, 2016, p. 922); complex behavior without awareness has been described in sleep-related states (see “Sleep, Parasomnia, and ‘Sexsomnia’ Versus Blackout”). Witnesses use “passed out” and “blacked out” loosely, so what anyone actually observed matters more than the label.

The third question is legal capacity. Under Article 120 and in Arizona, incapacity turns on whether the person could appraise the nature of the conduct, or could decline or communicate unwillingness, and on what the accused knew or reasonably should have known (see the law section). A person can be in a blackout and capable of consenting, or incapable of consenting without a blackout, and later non-recall alone does not establish either. The paper Blackout, Passing Out, and Incapacity: How They Overlap illustrates them in a figure, and the Counterintuitive Testimony paper on alcohol, blackouts, and memory treats them in depth.

How the Tension Appears to the Prosecution

Evidence of heavy drinking is relevant to whether a memory gap, for any witness, is consistent with the circumstances. Reported blackouts occur across a wide range of blood alcohol concentrations: the lowest level reported is about 0.06 g/dL (an estimate from self-reported drinking in 136 heavy-drinking young adults; Hartzler & Fromme, 2003b); a 2016 review reports that most occurred around 0.20, citing Ryback (1970) (Wetherill & Fromme, 2016, p. 923); and in one arrest sample, with BAC documented at arrest, the estimated probability of a blackout (complete memory loss, as distinct from a partial “grayout”) reached 50% at about 0.31 g/dL (Perry et al., 2006). These are group figures from different samples and methods, and estimated BACs are uncertain; they are not cutoffs or plausibility screens for either party, and a BAC figure cannot show whether a blackout occurred. On average, women reach a higher BAC than men from the same dose, mainly because of lower body water and a smaller volume of distribution (Mumenthaler et al., 1999), but body size, food, drinking speed, tolerance, and timing also matter, so equal drink counts do not imply equal intoxication, in either direction; an individual comparison needs those facts.

The difficulty is that evidence of a blackout, standing alone, describes memory, not capacity. A person in a blackout may have been conscious and interacting; in the small number of laboratory and observational studies reviewed by Pressman and Caudill (2013), the authors described planning, attention, and social skills as not impaired, though they also found no objective or scientific method to verify a blackout. Evidence that bears on capacity is different: descriptions of slurred speech, inability to stand or walk, vomiting, confusion about surroundings, unresponsiveness, and the timing and amount of drinking. A charging theory built on incapacity therefore needs evidence of the person’s condition, not only evidence of later non-recall. In courts-martial, the theory matters for another reason: the government cannot prove lack of consent under Article 120(b)(2)(A) merely by showing that the complainant was too intoxicated to consent (United States v. Mendoza, 2024), so evidence aimed at incapacity and evidence aimed at nonconsent must each fit the theory charged.

How the Tension Appears to the Defense

The defense can legitimately point out that a complainant’s lack of memory does not, by itself, show that the complainant was unconscious, asleep, or incapable. Because a person in a blackout can behave in ways an observer reads as ordinary, and no validated behavioral sign or test identifies a blackout in progress (Wetherill & Fromme, 2016, pp. 922–923; Pressman & Caudill, 2013), an accused may have seen nothing that signaled memory failure.

The same research limits that argument. Evidence that the complainant was walking, talking, or texting does not show that the complainant could appraise a sexual act, because behavior that looks coordinated can coexist with substantial impairment of attention and judgment (Steele & Josephs, 1990), and it does not show that consent was communicated, which depends on what was said and done. Evidence offered to show that the complainant was not incapable also shows how intoxicated the complainant appeared, which bears on what the accused knew or reasonably should have known.

What the Accused Could Observe

The law in both forums asks what the accused knew or reasonably should have known about the complainant’s condition, so the relevant evidence concerns what was observable. Signs of severe intoxication are observable even though a blackout itself is not. Phone-based memory tests given during drinking have been associated with later-reported blackouts but were not diagnostic (Miller et al., 2026), and an impression that a person “seemed fine” or “was out of it” does not establish whether memories were forming.

The accused’s own intoxication affects perception. In a balanced-placebo study of mixed-sex pairs, intoxicated participants perceived more sexual behavior in themselves and their partners (Abbey et al., 2000), and men who drank or expected alcohol took longer to say that the man in an audiotaped date-rape scenario should stop (Gross et al., 2001). Those findings may help explain an honestly held belief, but in courts-martial reasonableness is judged from the standpoint of a sober person, and on whether the accused “reasonably should have known” of the complainant’s incapacity, the accused’s own intoxication may not be considered (Department of the Army, 2025, Instruction 3A-60-2, Notes 10–11). In Arizona, unawareness solely because of voluntary intoxication is no defense. The Counterintuitive Testimony paper “Consent Communication, Misperception, and Mistake of Fact” reviews the communication research in depth.

When Both Parties Were Drinking

Many cases involve two intoxicated people, and every finding about memory and perception applies to each. No single test can verify a claimed blackout, whether the person claiming it is the accused or the complainant, and an accused’s detailed account of a heavily intoxicated period raises the same reconstruction questions as a complainant’s. In three experiments with sober participants assigned the role of complainant or accused in a sexual assault scenario, susceptibility to misinformation did not differ by role (Greene et al., 2025). Observers also weigh relative intoxication: across four vignette studies, encounters in which one partner was far more intoxicated than the other were rated less consensual and more likely to be assault than matched encounters, in same-gender and mixed-gender scenarios (Laughlin et al., 2023).

Hypothetical Example. Consider a hypothetical case in which both people drank heavily at a party and neither later recalls the sexual act. The prosecution’s theory is that the complainant was unconscious; the defense suggests that both were awake but in blackouts. Mutual absence of memory does not show which account is correct; the research cannot show that either person was or was not in a blackout, and the legal questions remain whether the complainant was capable of consenting and did consent, and what the accused knew or reasonably should have known. Those questions turn on what others observed, physical and digital evidence, and the timeline.

Alternative Explanations for an Inaccurate or Disputed Account

Disputed reports fall into three categories: substantiated, unsubstantiated or unresolved, and demonstrably false. Honest memory error is a different thing from deliberate fabrication. A complainant, an accused, or a witness can sincerely report a detail that is inaccurate, and an inaccurate detail does not make the rest of an account false. Base rates for false and unfounded reports, and what those terms mean, are treated in “False, Unfounded, and Unresolved Reports: What the Research Shows” in the Counterintuitive Testimony resource; this paper does not state a false-report rate.

Honest error after heavy drinking can arise when people reconstruct what happened. Students reconstructing a blackout relied heavily on what others told them and appeared to relax their standards for accepting a recollection as genuine (Nash & Takarangi, 2011). In fragmentary blackouts some partly encoded information may return with cues (Goodwin et al., 1969a, as described by White, 2003), whereas in en bloc blackouts cues generally fail, and the accuracy of details that emerge later cannot be assumed, especially after exposure to others’ accounts, photos, or questioning (Nash & Takarangi, 2011; Kloft et al., 2021). An account that grows over time is therefore consistent with genuine retrieval and also with the incorporation of information from others. The research on intoxicated witnesses does not uniformly favor either side: intoxication moderately reduced correct details recalled without significantly increasing incorrect details in experimental studies, mostly at low-to-moderate doses below those in many cases and not at blackout-level intoxication (Jores et al., 2019), and alcohol appears most likely to increase suggestibility at high intoxication levels or after a delay (Kloft et al., 2021). Questions about when each detail first appeared apply equally to complainants, accused persons, and other witnesses.

What Is Not Known About Passing Out and Sleep

How loss of consciousness relates to peak BAC has not been well studied, in part because researchers cannot ethically dose participants to that point; it may occur near peak BAC or later in the night as sedation and sleep take over. Complainants who say they “woke up” during a sexual act may be describing emergence from sleep or unconsciousness, or the return of memory formation during a blackout, and nothing in the report itself shows which. The papers Blacked Out Versus Passed Out and “‘Waking Up’ During a Blackout and Islands of Memory” treat this uncertainty in more detail.

Limits of the Evidence

Most experimental research on alcohol and memory or perception doses participants well below the levels described in many cases, uses scripted scenarios or videos, and involves college-age volunteers. Blackout research relies largely on retrospective self-report, and even the first real-time tests used participants’ later reports as the reference standard (Miller et al., 2026). Passing out has received little direct study. Several studies cited here tested only men (Gross et al., 2001), and vignette and misinformation studies used sober participants or written materials (Greene et al., 2025; Laughlin et al., 2023). Most fundamentally, group research cannot establish whether a particular person was in a blackout, was capable of consenting, communicated consent, or perceived a particular cue.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When a blackout is offered as evidence of incapacity, counsel can ask whether the research supports that inference at all, since a blackout concerns memory formation and the person may have been conscious and interacting (Wetherill & Fromme, 2016). When a complainant’s ordinary-seeming behavior is offered as evidence of capacity or consent, counsel can ask what the evidence shows about the person’s observed condition and what was communicated, since coordinated behavior can coexist with impaired judgment (Steele & Josephs, 1990). When a BAC estimate is used to place a person above or below a “blackout level,” counsel can ask whether it matches the observed ranges and probabilities (Perry et al., 2006). These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Consent, Capacity, and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

Article 120, UCMJ, reaches a sexual act without consent (Art. 120(b)(2)(A)); when the accused knows or reasonably should know that the other person is asleep, unconscious, or otherwise unaware (Art. 120(b)(2)(B)); and when the other person is incapable of consenting due to impairment by an intoxicant, and that condition is known or reasonably should be known by the accused (Art. 120(b)(3)(A)). “Incapable of consenting” means incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct at issue, or physically incapable of declining participation in, or communicating unwillingness to engage in, the sexual act (Art. 120(g)(8)); under the earlier statute, United States v. Pease (2016) approved a definition of incapacity as lacking the ability to appreciate the conduct or to make or communicate a decision about it. In United States v. Mendoza (2024), the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held that lack of consent and incapacity are separate theories and that the government cannot prove lack of consent merely by showing the complainant was too intoxicated to consent, although intoxication evidence remains admissible on consent. United States v. Moore (2026) applied the same separation to sleep while recognizing that evidence can still prove lack of consent where, for example, the complainant did not consent before falling asleep, and United States v. Hennessy (2026) held that a lower court reviewing a case involving a complainant’s alcohol-related memory gap had to consider whether her testimony that she awoke during the act and did not consent could prove lack of consent (United States v. Casillas, 2025).

Mistake of fact is a special defense (R.C.M. 916(a)). A mistake going to an element requiring only general intent or knowledge must be honest and reasonable under all the circumstances (R.C.M. 916(j)(1)), and United States v. McDonald (2019) described an honest and reasonable mistake as to consent as an affirmative defense to sexual assault on a nonconsent theory. Once raised, the prosecution must disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt (R.C.M. 916(b)(1)). Voluntary intoxication may be considered only on actual knowledge, specific intent, willfulness, or premeditated design to kill (R.C.M. 916(l)(2)). The Military Judges’ Benchbook defines a reasonable belief, for an intoxicated accused, as one an ordinary, prudent, sober adult would have under the circumstances, and instructs that on whether the accused “reasonably should have known” of a complainant’s incapacity, the accused’s intoxication may not be considered, although it may be considered on actual knowledge (Department of the Army, 2025, Instruction 3A-60-2, Notes 10–11). Expert testimony is governed by Military Rule of Evidence 702, which tracks Federal Rule of Evidence 702 as amended in 2023; the 2023 federal amendment took effect in the military rule in 2025 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025), and practitioners should confirm current text. No witness may offer an opinion that a person is or is not telling the truth (United States v. Brooks, 2007).

Arizona

Sexual assault requires intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact without consent (A.R.S. § 13-1406), and “without consent” includes incapacity by reason of drugs, alcohol, sleep, or similar impairment of cognition that is known or should reasonably have been known to the defendant (A.R.S. § 13-1401(A)(7)(b)). The State must prove that the defendant knew the act was without consent (State v. Witwer, 1993; State v. Kemper, 2011; RAJI (Criminal) 14.06.01). Arizona has no freestanding mistake-of-fact defense with its own reasonableness requirement; a mistaken belief relieves liability when it negates the required mental state (A.R.S. § 13-204(A)). Temporary intoxication from voluntary use of alcohol is not a defense to any criminal act or requisite state of mind (A.R.S. § 13-503), and the standard definition of “knowingly” may tell jurors that unawareness solely because of voluntary intoxication is no defense (RAJI (Criminal) 1.0510(b)). General educational expert testimony is permitted if it satisfies Rules 702 and 403 (State v. Salazar-Mercado, 2014), but experts may not opine on a particular witness’s credibility (State v. Lindsey, 1986, 149 Ariz. at 475).

Case Example. In State v. Causbie (App. 2016), the complainant drank about six shots of whiskey and a mixed drink at a party, vomited, and fell asleep on a couch. A friend later found the defendant sexually touching her and could not tell whether she was awake; afterward the complainant was confused about where she was, and she could not later remember everything. The defense argued consent and asked for an instruction that drinking alone does not mean a person cannot consent; the State argued incapacity from alcohol and sleep. The Court of Appeals held that “incapable of consent by reason of … alcohol” is not unconstitutionally vague, reasoning that the statute turns on legal capacity, not a threshold amount of alcohol, and that the instruction given already covered the defense’s point; it affirmed the conviction. Neither a drink count nor a memory gap answered the question; the jury weighed the evidence of her condition and of what the defendant knew or should have known.

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports several points prosecutors can legitimately present. Memory gaps after heavy drinking are common, are consistent with a range of events and do not by themselves show what happened, and do not by themselves show either fabrication or a blackout. Observable signs of severe intoxication bear on capacity and on what the accused reasonably should have known, and in courts-martial the accused’s own intoxication cannot make a belief reasonable or excuse failing to recognize incapacity; in Arizona, unawareness from voluntary intoxication is no defense. On average, women reach higher BACs per dose, but body size, food, drinking speed, tolerance, and timing also matter, so an argument that a person who drank no more than another party could not have been more impaired is not supported by the group research without those facts, for either party.

The research also counsels caution. A blackout does not by itself show incapacity, and after Mendoza the charging theory must match the evidence: incapacity requires evidence of the complainant’s condition, and nonconsent requires evidence that consent was not given. Later-emerging details should be traced to their sources; early recorded statements help show what was remembered before exposure to other accounts, and they can reveal inconsistencies as well as consistency. The same memory and perception limits apply to the complainant and to prosecution witnesses as to the accused.

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports several propositions defense counsel can legitimately present. A blackout is a failure of memory formation, not unconsciousness, and a complainant’s lack of memory does not by itself show incapacity. No validated sign identifies a blackout in progress, so an accused may have observed nothing indicating memory failure. People reconstructing a blackout rely on external sources, and questions about when each detail first appeared are grounded in the literature.

The research also counsels caution about the limits that apply to the defense. Ordinary-seeming behavior does not show capacity or consent, and evidence of the complainant’s intoxication offered for one purpose may show what the accused should have recognized. Misperception research may support an honest belief while undercutting a reasonable one under the military sober-adult standard, and in Arizona intoxication cannot excuse unawareness. Memory gaps are common after heavy drinking, honest error does not by itself indicate fabrication, and every limit on the complainant’s account applies equally to an intoxicated accused.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

Abbey, A., Zawacki, T., & McAuslan, P. (2000). Alcohol’s effects on sexual perception. Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 61(5), 688–697. https://doi.org/10.15288/jsa.2000.61.688

Department of the Army. (2025). Military judges’ benchbook (DA Pamphlet 27-9, 29 July 2025).

Goodwin, D. W., Crane, J. B., & Guze, S. B. (1969a). Alcoholic “blackouts”: A review and clinical study of 100 alcoholics. American Journal of Psychiatry, 126(2), 191–198. https://doi.org/10.1176/ajp.126.2.191

Greene, C. M., Brassil, M., & Murphy, G. (2025). He said, she said: The “accused” and “complainant” in a sexual assault scenario are equally susceptible to misinformation. Scientific Reports, 15(1), Article 27693. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-025-13587-y

Gross, A. M., Bennett, T., Sloan, L., Marx, B. P., & Juergens, J. (2001). The impact of alcohol and alcohol expectancies on male perception of female sexual arousal in a date rape analog. Experimental and Clinical Psychopharmacology, 9(4), 380–388. https://doi.org/10.1037/1064-1297.9.4.380

Hartzler, B., & Fromme, K. (2003b). Fragmentary and en bloc blackouts: Similarity and distinction among episodes of alcohol-induced memory loss. Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 64(4), 547–550. https://doi.org/10.15288/jsa.2003.64.547

Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf

Jores, T., Colloff, M. F., Kloft, L., Smailes, H., & Flowe, H. D. (2019). A meta-analysis of the effects of acute alcohol intoxication on witness recall. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 33(3), 334–343. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3533

Kloft, L., Monds, L. A., Blokland, A., Ramaekers, J. G., & Otgaar, H. (2021). Hazy memories in the courtroom: A review of alcohol and other drug effects on false memory and suggestibility. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 124, 291–307. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2021.02.012

Laughlin, E., Pettitt, M., Lamarche, V. M., & James-Hawkins, L. (2023). Just one shot? The contextual effects of matched and unmatched intoxication on perceptions of consent in ambiguous alcohol-fueled sexual encounters. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 38(21–22), 11445–11474. https://doi.org/10.1177/08862605231182378

Miller, M. B., Shoemaker, S. D., Freeman, L. K., Curtis, A. F., Merrill, J. E., & Merkle, E. C. (2026). Predictive value of real-time memory tests in identifying alcohol-induced blackouts in situ. Addiction, 121(8), 2166–2175. https://doi.org/10.1111/add.70446

Mumenthaler, M. S., Taylor, J. L., O’Hara, R., & Yesavage, J. A. (1999). Gender differences in moderate drinking effects. Alcohol Research & Health, 23(1), 55–64.

Nash, R. A., & Takarangi, M. K. T. (2011). Reconstructing alcohol-induced memory blackouts. Memory, 19(6), 566–573. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2011.590508

Perry, P. J., Argo, T. R., Barnett, M. J., Liesveld, J. L., Liskow, B., Hernan, J. M., Trnka, M. G., & Brabson, M. A. (2006). The association of alcohol-induced blackouts and grayouts to blood alcohol concentrations. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 51(4), 896–899. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1556-4029.2006.00161.x

Pressman, M. R., & Caudill, D. S. (2013). Alcohol-induced blackout as a criminal defense or mitigating factor: An evidence-based review and admissibility as scientific evidence. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 58(4), 932–940. https://doi.org/10.1111/1556-4029.12134

Steele, C. M., & Josephs, R. A. (1990). Alcohol myopia: Its prized and dangerous effects. American Psychologist, 45(8), 921–933. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.45.8.921

Wetherill, R. R., & Fromme, K. (2016). Alcohol-induced blackouts: A review of recent clinical research with practical implications and recommendations for future studies. Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research, 40(5), 922–935. https://doi.org/10.1111/acer.13051

White, A. M. (2003). What happened? Alcohol, memory blackouts, and the brain. Alcohol Research & Health, 27(2), 186–196.

Legal Authorities

State v. Causbie, 241 Ariz. 173, 384 P.3d 1253 (App. 2016).

State v. Kemper, 229 Ariz. 105, 271 P.3d 484 (App. 2011).

State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).

State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).

State v. Witwer, 175 Ariz. 305, 856 P.2d 1183 (App. 1993).

United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).

United States v. Casillas, 86 M.J. 94 (C.A.A.F. 2025).

United States v. Hennessy, 86 M.J. 315 (C.A.A.F. 2026).

United States v. McDonald, 78 M.J. 376 (C.A.A.F. 2019).

United States v. Mendoza, 85 M.J. 213 (C.A.A.F. 2024).

United States v. Moore, 86 M.J. 308 (C.A.A.F. 2026).

United States v. Pease, 75 M.J. 180 (C.A.A.F. 2016).

10 U.S.C. § 920 (Article 120, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-204, 13-503, 13-1401, 13-1406.

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

Ariz. R. Evid. 403, 702.

Mil. R. Evid. 702, 1102.

Rule for Courts-Martial 916(a), (b), (j), (l).

Revised Arizona Jury Instructions (Criminal) (6th ed. 2022), 1.0510(b), 14.06.01.

Related topic papers: Blackout, Passing Out, and Incapacity: How They Overlap · Blacked Out Versus Passed Out · Alcohol-Involved Cases: Practice Issues for the Defense · Alcohol-Involved Cases: Practice Issues for the Prosecution · Can Observers Tell When Someone Is in a Blackout? · Alcohol Blackouts in the Courtroom: Expert Testimony and Admissibility

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Counterintuitive Testimony: Consent Communication, Misperception, and Mistake of Fact · Counterintuitive Testimony: False, Unfounded, and Unresolved Reports: What the Research Shows · Courts-Martial