Snap Shot
- The question: What does the research on alcohol, memory, and blackouts allow defense counsel to raise in an alcohol-involved case, and where does the same research counsel restraint?
- What the research shows: A blackout is a failure to form lasting memories, not unconsciousness, and a person in a blackout can talk and act in ways observers find ordinary. Drink counts and BAC estimates are uncertain, and the net direction of error depends on the case. People reconstructing a blackout lean on others’ accounts, and some studies find greater suggestibility at high intoxication.
- What it does not show: Research cannot show that a particular complainant was or was not in a blackout, was or was not capable of consenting, or remembers accurately. A memory gap is not evidence that nothing happened, and no single test can confirm or rule out a claimed blackout after the fact; convergent evidence can make a claim more or less plausible but cannot verify it.
- The law: Military law treats mistake of fact as to consent as a special defense that must be honest and reasonable, judged from a sober person’s standpoint (R.C.M. 916(j)(1), (l)(2)); Arizona requires proof that the defendant knew the act was without consent (Witwer; RAJI 14.06.01) but bars voluntary intoxication as a defense to any mental state (A.R.S. § 13-503). Blackout and incapacity are separate questions under Art. 120(g)(8) and A.R.S. § 13-1401(A)(7)(b).
- Issues for each side: Defense counsel can legitimately separate memory loss from incapacity, test the drinking timeline, and document the sources of reconstructed details; the same research reminds the defense that memory gaps are common in true cases, that intoxicated witnesses are often accurate in what they report, and that every limit applies equally to the accused.
Alcohol is present in many sexual assault, assault, and homicide prosecutions, and it shapes the questions defense counsel must investigate: how much each person drank and how fast, what each person can and cannot remember, how an account came to contain its details, and what the accused could observe at the time. Often the complainant, the accused, or both report gaps in memory. Sexual assault is common and substantially underreported, and memory gaps after heavy drinking occur in many true cases; their presence says nothing by itself about whether an offense occurred.
This paper is one of a pair. It describes the recurring scientific issues defense counsel encounter in alcohol-involved cases and what the research counsels the defense to be careful about. The companion paper, Alcohol-Involved Cases: Practice Issues for the Prosecution, addresses the same science from the prosecution’s vantage point, and The Goldilocks Challenge: Intoxicated Enough to Lose Memory, but Capable of Consent? treats memory loss and capacity in depth. Neither paper is litigation strategy; both describe what the research supports and what it does not. This paper covers the drinking timeline, blackout versus incapacity, mistake of fact, alternative explanations for a disputed account, the accused’s own intoxication, and expert testimony, followed by the limits of the evidence and the law.
The Drinking Timeline and What It Can Support
Most alcohol questions begin with a reconstruction of the evening: what each person drank, over what period, with what food, sleep, and medications, and when any test was taken. Each element carries uncertainty. Young adults observed by peer researchers at nightlife venues reported their drinking accurately on average for sessions of eight or fewer drinks, but underestimation grew beyond that level (Northcote & Livingston, 2011). Equations that convert reported drinks, body weight, and time into an estimated BAC (eBAC) explained only about 55% of the variance in measured breath alcohol among drinkers recruited near bars, overestimated on average, and fit less well as intoxication rose (Hustad & Carey, 2005). The Widmark calculation rests on assumptions about distribution and elimination that may not hold for a particular person, so its estimate can be too high or too low depending on the drinking pattern: one commentary suggested it overestimates BAC after prolonged heavy drinking (Wigmore, 2014), while underestimation of drinks (Northcote & Livingston, 2011) pushes estimates the other way; Retrograde Extrapolation and the Limits of the Widmark Formula covers these assumptions.
The uncertainty runs in both directions and applies to both parties: underestimated drinks yield an estimate that is too low, while equation error can yield one that is too high. On average, women reach a higher BAC than men from the same dose, mainly because of differences in body water (Mumenthaler et al., 1999); body size, food, drinking speed, tolerance, and timing also matter, so equal drink counts do not show equal intoxication in either direction, and whether women are more impaired at the same BAC is less settled; the group difference cannot show how impaired a particular person was. In two small validation studies, equation-based estimates tended to exceed measured breath alcohol, while underreporting of drinks, which is common at high consumption, pushes estimates the other way; the net direction depends on the case.
The timeline also bears on blackout risk. Reported blackouts occur across a wide range of blood alcohol concentrations. The lowest level reported is about 0.06 g/dL (an estimate from self-reported drinking in 136 heavy-drinking young adults; Hartzler & Fromme, 2003b); in seven hospitalized men with alcoholism, blackouts began at about 0.14 (Ryback, 1970); a 2016 review reports that most blackouts occurred around 0.20, citing Ryback (1970) (Wetherill & Fromme, 2016, p. 923); and in one sample of arrestees (actively drinking people arrested for public intoxication, driving under the influence, or underage drinking, with BAC above 0.08 documented at arrest and an interview afterward about the episode), the estimated probability of a blackout (complete memory loss) reached 50% at about 0.31 g/dL, and of a grayout or a blackout at about 0.22 (Perry et al., 2006). In an event-level study of 369 young Swiss drinkers, the drink counts that best discriminated nights with blackouts were up to three drinks above the conventional 4+/5+ binge threshold (Labhart et al., 2018). These are group figures from different samples and methods; none is a cutoff, none shows whether a particular person had a blackout, and an argument by either side that a particular person was above or below a “blackout threshold” asks more of the research than it can supply. Estimated BACs are uncertain, and a BAC figure does not show whether a blackout occurred.
Blackout, Passing Out, and Incapacity Are Separate Questions
A blackout is a period in which the drinker was awake and acting but did not store lasting memories; passing out is a loss of consciousness (White, 2003; Wetherill & Fromme, 2016, p. 922). Witnesses and parties use the terms loosely; a complainant who says “I passed out” or “I woke up” may be describing a gap in memory, or may be describing sleep or unconsciousness accurately, and the research does not allow an expert to say which. Non-leading questions about what the person and any observers saw and did help clarify the account.
Legal capacity to consent is a third question, turning on whether the person could appraise the conduct or decide and communicate a decision, and on what the accused knew or reasonably should have known (see the law section). A person can be in a blackout and capable, or incapable without a blackout, and later non-recall alone does not establish either. A complainant’s absence of memory does not, by itself, show that the complainant was unconscious, asleep, or incapable; it shows that memories were not formed or cannot now be retrieved. The same distinction limits the defense: evidence that the complainant was walking, talking, or texting does not show that the complainant could appraise a sexual act, because behavior that looks coordinated can coexist with substantial impairment of attention and judgment (Steele & Josephs, 1990). Evidence of the person’s condition, such as speech, balance, vomiting, and responsiveness, bears on capacity in a way that memory loss does not.
No validated behavioral sign identifies a blackout in progress (Wetherill & Fromme, 2016, pp. 922–923), and no single test can confirm or rule out a blackout after the fact (Pressman & Caudill, 2013); evaluators look to convergent evidence, which can make a claim more or less plausible but cannot verify it. In a 2026 study of 63 young adults, failing a brief phone memory test while drinking was associated with later-reported blackout but was not diagnostic, and a blackout was less often reported on days when every test was passed, which describes a probability within that research sample and does not rule out a blackout for any person (Miller et al., 2026). A memory test given during the episode may help show whether a blackout is likely, but no equivalent exists for a past event, so in ordinary cases neither an impression that a person “seemed fine” nor one that the person “was out of it” establishes whether the person was forming memories (see Can Observers Tell When Someone Is in a Blackout?).
Mistake of Fact and What the Accused Could Observe
Where the defense is that the accused believed the complainant consented, research on how people read sexual cues becomes relevant. In courts-martial, mistake of fact as to consent is a special defense requiring a belief that was both honest and reasonable, judged from a sober person’s standpoint; in Arizona, the State must prove that the defendant knew the act was without consent, but voluntary intoxication is not a defense to that or any mental state (see the law section). “Consent Communication, Misperception, and Mistake of Fact” in the Counterintuitive Testimony resource reviews the communication research.
Two lines of research are often raised. First, a person in a blackout may behave in ways an observer reads as willing, with no outward sign that memories are not forming; that does not establish consent, which depends on what was communicated and on capacity. Second, laboratory and scenario studies generally find that alcohol shifts attention toward salient cues and, in some, perception toward reading sexual interest and slows recognition of refusal: intoxicated participants in mixed-sex pairs in a laboratory study perceived more sexual behavior in themselves and their partners (Abbey et al., 2000), and in an audiotaped scenario study with male participants only, men who drank or expected alcohol took longer to say that the man in the date-rape scenario should stop (Gross et al., 2001). Those findings bear, if at all, on what an intoxicated person believed, not on whether the belief was reasonable under the military’s sober-adult standard, and in Arizona intoxication cannot excuse unawareness; the research cannot show what any particular person perceived, and the same research applies to a complainant’s perception. The research is most informative when it is tied to what the record shows the accused could actually observe: the complainant’s words, conduct, and condition.
Alternative Explanations for an Inaccurate or Disputed Account
In the usual classification described in “False, Unfounded, and Unresolved Reports: What the Research Shows” in the Counterintuitive Testimony resource, reports fall into three categories: substantiated; unsubstantiated or unresolved; and demonstrably false. The research reviewed here concerns honest memory error, which is different from deliberate fabrication. A complainant, an accused, or a witness can sincerely report an inaccurate detail, and an inaccurate detail does not make the rest of an account false. Base rates and the meaning of those categories are treated there; none of the research below bears on whether a particular account was fabricated.
People who have experienced a blackout often try to reconstruct what happened. In a survey of university students, those reconstructing a blackout relied heavily on others’ accounts and other external sources, sometimes unreliable ones, and appeared to relax their standards for accepting a recollection as genuine; in some cases reconstruction seemed to produce false beliefs or memories (Nash & Takarangi, 2011). In fragmentary blackouts some partly encoded information may return with cues (a 1969 interview study of hospitalized patients, described in a later review: Goodwin et al., 1969a, as described by White, 2003); in en bloc blackouts cues generally fail, although the research does not show that no fragment can ever return. A returned detail may be genuine or reconstructed, and the accuracy of what returns cannot be assumed, especially after exposure to others’ accounts, photographs, or questioning (Nash & Takarangi, 2011; Kloft et al., 2021). An account that grows over time is therefore consistent with genuine retrieval and also with the incorporation of information from others, and nothing in the recollection itself shows which has occurred.
The suggestibility research is mixed. In a field study of 67 bar patrons, highly intoxicated participants accepted more suggestive cues about a mock crime, and the effect persisted when they were retested sober (van Oorsouw et al., 2015). Other studies found intoxicated witnesses no more suggestible, or less so: participants who drank after witnessing a simulated crime reported less of the misleading information they later encountered (Gawrylowicz et al., 2017), and in a hypothetical rape scenario at a mean BAC of about 0.06%, participants who had drunk were no more likely to report misleading post-event information (Flowe et al., 2019). A review concluded that alcohol is most likely to increase suggestibility at high intoxication levels or after a delay (Kloft et al., 2021). The research supports asking when each detail first appeared, what the person had been told or shown before that point, and whether early recorded statements exist; those questions apply equally to the accused’s account and to defense witnesses.
The Accused’s Own Intoxication and Memory
Every finding summarized here applies to an accused who was drinking. A claimed blackout cannot be verified by any single test, whether it is made by an accused or by a complainant (Pressman & Caudill, 2013), and an accused’s detailed account of a heavily intoxicated period raises the same reconstruction and contamination concerns. In three experiments with sober participants randomly assigned the role of complainant or accused in a sexual assault scenario, susceptibility to misinformation did not differ by role (Greene et al., 2025). The reconstruction research does not support applying its concerns to one party’s account and not the other’s.
Legally, amnesia for an act does not show that the act was involuntary or that the required mental state was absent; the paper Voluntary Intoxication, Blackout, and Criminal Responsibility addresses voluntary intoxication, automatism, and amnesia and competency to stand trial.
Expert Testimony Within the Research
The leading critique of blackout testimony bears directly on the defense. Pressman and Caudill (2013) reviewed 26 empirical studies, nine of which induced and observed a blackout, found no objective or scientific method to verify a blackout during or after the fact, and concluded that blackout offered as a criminal defense or mitigating factor would not appear to meet standards for scientific evidence and should not be admissible for that purpose. Their conclusion addresses blackout as a criminal defense or mitigating factor; it does not address general testimony explaining why a complainant or witness has a memory gap, and it does not show that blackouts are rare or that a particular claim is false. One published commentary (a commentary, not a study) suggested that Widmark estimates of high BAC may overstate actual levels in prolonged drinking (Wigmore, 2014), a point that has to be weighed against underreporting of drinks, which pushes estimates the other way; research since 2013 has examined blackouts prospectively (Miller et al., 2026).
An expert may explain what a blackout is, how it differs from passing out, why BAC estimates are uncertain, and how reconstruction and suggestion can shape an account, acknowledging the critique and the samples and dose limits of the studies. An expert may not tell the factfinder that a particular complainant was in a blackout, was capable of consenting, or is mistaken, or that the accused did or did not hold a particular belief.
Limits of the Evidence
Most experimental research on alcohol and memory doses participants below the levels described in many cases, uses scripted scenarios, and involves college-age volunteers who are not frightened or harmed. Blackout research relies largely on retrospective self-report, and even the first real-time tests used later reports as the reference standard (Miller et al., 2026). Several studies cited here tested only women (Flowe et al., 2019) or only men (Gross et al., 2001), and the eBAC and self-report studies did not report sex differences in accuracy. In a meta-analysis of experimental studies, intoxication moderately reduced correct details recalled without significantly increasing incorrect details (Jores et al., 2019), so the witness research does not uniformly favor either side. Group research cannot establish whether a particular person was in a blackout, was capable of consenting, perceived a particular cue, or remembers accurately.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When an estimated BAC is offered by either side, counsel can ask what it rests on and how large its error is, since equations explained only about half the variance in measured breath alcohol in a field validation (Hustad & Carey, 2005). When Perry et al. (2006) is cited for a blackout probability, counsel can ask who was studied (arrested drinkers interviewed about a recent episode). When van Oorsouw et al. (2015) is cited for increased suggestibility, counsel can ask whether it has held up, given 67 participants and contrary findings at lower doses (Gawrylowicz et al., 2017; Flowe et al., 2019). When Pressman and Caudill (2013) is cited, counsel can ask whether its conclusion, which addresses blackout offered to excuse conduct, reaches the question in the case. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Alcohol-Involved Cases and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
Article 120, UCMJ, reaches a sexual act without consent (Art. 120(b)(2)(A)); when the accused knows or reasonably should know that the other person is asleep, unconscious, or otherwise unaware (Art. 120(b)(2)(B)); and when the other person is incapable of consenting due to impairment by an intoxicant, and that condition is known or reasonably should be known by the accused (Art. 120(b)(3)(A)). “Incapable of consenting” means incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct at issue, or physically incapable of declining participation in, or communicating unwillingness to engage in, the sexual act (Art. 120(g)(8)); under the earlier statute, United States v. Pease (2016) approved definitions centered on the ability to appreciate the conduct and to make or communicate a decision about it. In United States v. Mendoza (2024), the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held that lack of consent and incapacity are separate theories of liability and that the government cannot prove lack of consent under Article 120(b)(2)(A) merely by showing the complainant was too intoxicated to consent, although intoxication evidence remains admissible on consent. United States v. Moore (2026) applied the same rule to sleep, while holding that evidence the complainant did not consent before falling asleep can support a nonconsent conviction.
Mistake of fact is a special defense (R.C.M. 916(a)). As to a general-intent element, the mistake must be honest and reasonable under all the circumstances (R.C.M. 916(j)(1)); United States v. McDonald (2019) described an honest and reasonable mistake as to consent as an affirmative defense to sexual assault on a nonconsent theory, which the prosecution must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt once raised (R.C.M. 916(b)(1)). Voluntary intoxication may be considered only on actual knowledge, specific intent, willfulness, or premeditated design to kill (R.C.M. 916(l)(2)), and the Military Judges’ Benchbook defines a reasonable belief, for an intoxicated accused, as one that an ordinary, prudent, sober adult would have under the circumstances (Department of the Army, 2025, Instruction 3A-60-2, Note 10, p. 1365). Where the charge requires that the accused knew or reasonably should have known that the complainant was asleep, unaware, or incapable of consenting, the Benchbook allows members to consider voluntary intoxication on actual knowledge but not on what the accused reasonably should have known, which is measured by an ordinary, prudent, sober adult (Department of the Army, 2025, Instruction 3A-60-2, Note 11, pp. 1365–1366). Expert testimony is governed by Military Rule of Evidence 702, which took on the 2023 federal amendment in 2025 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025; practitioners should confirm current text), and by United States v. Houser (1993); no witness may opine that a person is or is not telling the truth (United States v. Brooks, 2007). In federal civilian courts, Rule 704(b) bars an expert opinion on whether the defendant had a mental state that is an element (Diaz v. United States, 2024).
Arizona
Sexual assault requires intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact without consent (A.R.S. § 13-1406), and “without consent” includes incapacity by reason of drugs, alcohol, sleep, or similar impairment of cognition that is known or should reasonably have been known to the defendant (A.R.S. § 13-1401(A)(7)(b)). The State must prove that the defendant knew the act was without consent: State v. Witwer, 1993, so held for sexual abuse; State v. Kemper, 2011, held it fundamental error to instruct on sexual assault without the mental state for the consent element; and the current sexual assault instruction includes that element (RAJI (Criminal) 14.06.01). Where the theory is incapacity, the condition must have been known or reasonably should have been known to the defendant, and incapacity turns on the victim’s legal capacity to consent, not on a threshold amount of alcohol (A.R.S. § 13-1401(A)(7)(b); State v. Causbie, 2016). Arizona has no freestanding mistake-of-fact defense with its own reasonableness requirement; a mistaken belief relieves liability when it negates the required mental state (A.R.S. § 13-204(A)). Temporary intoxication from voluntary use of alcohol is not a defense to any criminal act or requisite state of mind (A.R.S. § 13-503), and the standard definition of “knowingly” may tell jurors that unawareness solely because of voluntary intoxication is no defense (RAJI (Criminal) 1.0510(b)). General educational expert testimony is permitted if it satisfies Rules 702 and 403 (State v. Salazar-Mercado, 2014), but experts may not opine on a particular witness’s credibility (State v. Lindsey, 1986, 149 Ariz. at 475).
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports several propositions prosecutors can legitimately present. For any party, a memory gap after heavy drinking is common and does not by itself show whether an account is accurate or inaccurate, and partial recall after a fragmentary blackout, including some recall prompted by cues, is consistent with the research (en bloc blackouts, by contrast, generally do not return with cues). At moderate doses, intoxicated witnesses in experimental studies reported fewer details rather than more errors (Jores et al., 2019). Apparent coordination does not settle capacity, and the accused’s intoxication cannot make a belief reasonable. On average, women reach higher BACs per dose, and body size, food, tolerance, and timing also matter, so an argument that a complainant who drank no more than the accused must have been equally impaired, or could not have been more impaired, is not supported by the research in either direction.
The research also counsels caution. A complainant’s blackout is not evidence of incapacity or unconsciousness, and after Mendoza the theory charged must match the proof. Low-dose accuracy findings may not hold at higher levels, and the suggestibility findings at high intoxication mean that the sources of a reconstructed account deserve careful documentation; early recorded interviews and records of what a complainant learned from others allow a later account to be assessed. Expert testimony from either side is limited to general principles, not opinions about a particular person.
Special Issues for Defense
The research supports several propositions defense counsel can legitimately present. A blackout is a failure of memory formation, not unconsciousness, and a complainant’s lack of memory does not by itself show that the complainant was unconscious or incapable. Drink counts and BAC estimates are uncertain; in two small validation studies equation-based estimates tended to exceed measured breath alcohol, while underreporting of drinks pushes estimates the other way, so the net direction depends on the case. People reconstructing a blackout rely on external sources and may relax their standards for accepting a recollection, and some studies find greater suggestibility at high intoxication. Questions about when each detail first appeared and what the person had been told by then are grounded in the literature.
The research also counsels caution about the limits that apply to the defense. For any party, memory gaps are common and do not by themselves show whether an account is accurate or inaccurate, and honest memory error is not fabrication. Intoxicated witnesses are often accurate in what they report, and the suggestibility findings are mixed. Alcohol research on misperception bears, if at all, on what an intoxicated person believed, not on whether the belief was reasonable under the military sober-adult standard, and in Arizona it cannot excuse unawareness; the same research applies to a complainant’s perception. The same limits apply to the accused: a claimed blackout cannot be verified by any single test, and an accused’s detailed account of a heavily intoxicated period raises the same reconstruction concerns as a complainant’s.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Abbey, A., Zawacki, T., & McAuslan, P. (2000). Alcohol’s effects on sexual perception. Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 61(5), 688–697. https://doi.org/10.15288/jsa.2000.61.688
Department of the Army. (2025). Military judges’ benchbook (DA Pamphlet 27-9, 29 July 2025).
Flowe, H. D., Humphries, J. E., Takarangi, M. K. T., Zelek, K., Karoğlu, N., Gabbert, F., & Hope, L. (2019). An experimental examination of the effects of alcohol consumption and exposure to misleading postevent information on remembering a hypothetical rape scenario. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 33(3), 393–413. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3531
Gawrylowicz, J., Ridley, A. M., Albery, I. P., Barnoth, E., & Young, J. (2017). Alcohol-induced retrograde facilitation renders witnesses of crime less suggestible to misinformation. Psychopharmacology, 234(8), 1267–1275. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00213-017-4564-2
Goodwin, D. W., Crane, J. B., & Guze, S. B. (1969a). Alcoholic “blackouts”: A review and clinical study of 100 alcoholics. American Journal of Psychiatry, 126(2), 191–198. https://doi.org/10.1176/ajp.126.2.191
Greene, C. M., Brassil, M., & Murphy, G. (2025). He said, she said: The “accused” and “complainant” in a sexual assault scenario are equally susceptible to misinformation. Scientific Reports, 15(1), Article 27693. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-025-13587-y
Gross, A. M., Bennett, T., Sloan, L., Marx, B. P., & Juergens, J. (2001). The impact of alcohol and alcohol expectancies on male perception of female sexual arousal in a date rape analog. Experimental and Clinical Psychopharmacology, 9(4), 380–388. https://doi.org/10.1037/1064-1297.9.4.380
Hartzler, B., & Fromme, K. (2003b). Fragmentary and en bloc blackouts: Similarity and distinction among episodes of alcohol-induced memory loss. Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 64(4), 547–550. https://doi.org/10.15288/jsa.2003.64.547
Hustad, J. T. P., & Carey, K. B. (2005). Using calculations to estimate blood alcohol concentrations for naturally occurring drinking episodes: A validity study. Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 66(1), 130–138. https://doi.org/10.15288/jsa.2005.66.130
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Jores, T., Colloff, M. F., Kloft, L., Smailes, H., & Flowe, H. D. (2019). A meta-analysis of the effects of acute alcohol intoxication on witness recall. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 33(3), 334–343. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3533
Kloft, L., Monds, L. A., Blokland, A., Ramaekers, J. G., & Otgaar, H. (2021). Hazy memories in the courtroom: A review of alcohol and other drug effects on false memory and suggestibility. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 124, 291–307. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2021.02.012
Labhart, F., Livingston, M., Engels, R., & Kuntsche, E. (2018). After how many drinks does someone experience acute consequences—determining thresholds for binge drinking based on two event-level studies. Addiction, 113(12), 2235–2244. https://doi.org/10.1111/add.14370
Miller, M. B., Shoemaker, S. D., Freeman, L. K., Curtis, A. F., Merrill, J. E., & Merkle, E. C. (2026). Predictive value of real-time memory tests in identifying alcohol-induced blackouts in situ. Addiction, 121(8), 2166–2175. https://doi.org/10.1111/add.70446
Mumenthaler, M. S., Taylor, J. L., O’Hara, R., & Yesavage, J. A. (1999). Gender differences in moderate drinking effects. Alcohol Research & Health, 23(1), 55–64.
Nash, R. A., & Takarangi, M. K. T. (2011). Reconstructing alcohol-induced memory blackouts. Memory, 19(6), 566–573. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2011.590508
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Perry, P. J., Argo, T. R., Barnett, M. J., Liesveld, J. L., Liskow, B., Hernan, J. M., Trnka, M. G., & Brabson, M. A. (2006). The association of alcohol-induced blackouts and grayouts to blood alcohol concentrations. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 51(4), 896–899. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1556-4029.2006.00161.x
Pressman, M. R., & Caudill, D. S. (2013). Alcohol-induced blackout as a criminal defense or mitigating factor: An evidence-based review and admissibility as scientific evidence. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 58(4), 932–940. https://doi.org/10.1111/1556-4029.12134
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Legal Authorities
Diaz v. United States, 602 U.S. 526 (2024).
State v. Causbie, 384 P.3d 1253 (Ariz. App. 2016).
State v. Kemper, 229 Ariz. 105, 271 P.3d 484 (App. 2011).
State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).
State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).
State v. Witwer, 175 Ariz. 305, 856 P.2d 1183 (App. 1993).
United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).
United States v. McDonald, 78 M.J. 376 (C.A.A.F. 2019).
United States v. Mendoza, 85 M.J. 213 (C.A.A.F. 2024).
United States v. Moore, 86 M.J. 308 (C.A.A.F. 2026).
United States v. Pease, 75 M.J. 180 (C.A.A.F. 2016).
10 U.S.C. § 920 (Article 120, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-204, 13-503, 13-1401, 13-1406.
Fed. R. Evid. 702, 704.
Ariz. R. Evid. 403, 702.
Mil. R. Evid. 702, 1102.
Rule for Courts-Martial 916(a), (b), (j), (l).
Revised Arizona Jury Instructions (Criminal) (6th ed. 2022), 1.0510(b), 14.06.01.
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