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Alcohol Blackout

Alcohol-Involved Cases: Practice Issues for the Prosecution

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Snap Shot

  • The question: What does the research on alcohol, memory, and blackouts allow prosecutors to present in an alcohol-involved case, and where does the same research counsel restraint?
  • What the research shows: Memory gaps after heavy drinking are common and do not by themselves show whether an account is accurate or inaccurate. At the moderate doses studied in laboratories, intoxicated witnesses generally reported fewer details rather than more errors. A person can appear to function while impaired, and, on average, women reach higher BACs than men from the same dose. No single test can confirm or rule out anyone’s claimed blackout after the fact, and little is known about when intoxicated people pass out or fall asleep.
  • What it does not show: A blackout is not proof of incapacity or unconsciousness, low-dose findings may not hold at the levels described in many cases, and research cannot show that a particular complainant remembers accurately or that a particular accused knew of incapacity.
  • The law: Lack of consent and incapacity are separate theories (Mendoza), and incapacity requires that the accused knew or reasonably should have known of it (Art. 120(b)(3)(A); A.R.S. § 13-1401(A)(7)(b)). Voluntary intoxication is not a defense (R.C.M. 916(l)(2); A.R.S. § 13-503), although in courts-martial it may be considered on actual knowledge, specific intent, willfulness, or premeditation (R.C.M. 916(l)(2)), and experts may not vouch for a witness (Brooks; Lindsey).
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors can legitimately engage blackout claims on the science, apply its limits to the accused as well as the complainant, and corroborate the timeline; the same research counsels against equating a blackout with incapacity, overstating the low-dose accuracy findings, or treating apparent functioning, in either party, as settling capacity or knowledge.

Alcohol-involved cases present prosecutors with evidence that is often incomplete by its nature. A complainant may remember the beginning of the evening and then fragments, an accused may claim no memory or offer a detailed account of consent, and witnesses who were themselves drinking may supply the rest. Experts may testify that a blackout is not unconsciousness and that reconstructed accounts are vulnerable to suggestion, and those propositions are grounded in research. This paper describes that research from the prosecution’s vantage point, including the parts that support the prosecution and the parts that limit it.

This paper is one of a pair. It describes the recurring scientific issues prosecutors encounter in alcohol-involved cases, together with what the research counsels prosecutors to be careful about. A companion paper, Alcohol-Involved Cases: Practice Issues for the Defense, covers the same ground from the defense’s vantage point, and The Goldilocks Challenge: Intoxicated Enough to Lose Memory, but Capable of Consent? treats the tension between memory loss and capacity in depth. Neither paper is litigation strategy; both describe what the research will and will not support.

The sections below address engaging blackout claims on the science, evidence of intoxication and its effects, the accused’s own possible blackout, what is not known about passing out and sleep, intoxicated witnesses and the timing of interviews, and expert testimony within the research, followed by the limits of the evidence and the governing law.

Engaging Blackout Claims on the Science

Blackouts are common among drinkers who are not alcohol dependent; a review of 2010–2015 research reported that roughly half of college student drinkers in the studies reviewed had experienced one (figures vary by sample and time frame), and concluded that individual differences, not consumption alone, affect who does (Wetherill & Fromme, 2016). A claim that a person blacked out is therefore neither self-evidently true nor self-evidently false, whether the person is the complainant or the accused, and treating every blackout claim as implausible is not consistent with the research. The research supports examining a claim on its specifics: how much and how fast the person drank, what the person was observed doing, what the person said at the time and afterward, and whether the claimed gap fits what is known about blackouts. The paper Assessing a Claimed Blackout: Convergent Evidence, Malingering, and Limits describes how evaluators approach such claims.

The research also bounds what a blackout claim can mean. A blackout is a failure to form lasting memories, not a loss of consciousness or of the ability to act (White, 2003; Wetherill & Fromme, 2016, p. 922). For any party, a memory gap after heavy drinking is common, is consistent with a range of events (including events that did and did not occur), does not by itself show whether an account is accurate or inaccurate, and cannot by itself show what happened, whether conduct was voluntary, or whether a required mental state was present. A claimed gap is tested the same way, against the drinking, the observations, the records, and the consistency of the account, whoever makes the claim. For an accused, a claimed blackout also does not show that the accused’s conduct was involuntary or that he or she lacked the required mental state; it shows only that the accused does not now remember, just as a complainant’s gap shows only that the complainant does not now remember. Blackout figures are group findings, not cutoffs. Reported blackouts occur across a wide range of blood alcohol concentrations: the lowest level reported is about 0.06 g/dL (an estimate from self-reported drinking in 136 heavy-drinking young adults; Hartzler & Fromme, 2003b); in seven hospitalized men with alcoholism, blackouts began at about 0.14 (Ryback, 1970); a 2016 review reports that most blackouts occurred around 0.20, citing Ryback (1970) (Wetherill & Fromme, 2016, p. 923); and in one sample of arrestees (actively drinking people arrested for public intoxication, driving under the influence, or underage drinking, with BAC above 0.08 documented at arrest and an interview afterward about the episode), the estimated probability of a blackout (complete memory loss) reached 50% at about 0.31 g/dL, and of a grayout or a blackout at about 0.22 (Perry et al., 2006). The BAC estimate itself is uncertain, none of these figures shows whether a particular person had a blackout, and neither side can establish from a number that a blackout did or did not occur or use a number to judge the plausibility of any person’s claim.

Evidence of Intoxication and Its Effects

Incapacity theories require evidence of the complainant’s condition, not merely of the complainant’s memory. There is no bright-line BAC that distinguishes incapacity from intoxication, and a prosecutor’s guide to alcohol-facilitated sexual assault emphasizes building that proof from many sources, corroborating as much of the complainant’s account as possible, including small details, through witnesses, records, and the accused’s own statements (Scalzo, 2007). Observations of speech, balance, vomiting, responsiveness, and the need for assistance bear directly on capacity; a complainant’s later inability to remember does not.

Drink counts and BAC estimates are uncertain, and the net direction of error depends on the case. Young adults observed at nightlife venues underestimated their own consumption by increasing amounts once they drank more than about eight drinks (Northcote & Livingston, 2011), and equations converting reported drinks to an estimated BAC overestimated measured breath alcohol on average and fit less well as intoxication rose (Hustad & Carey, 2005); underreporting of drinks and equation error push estimates in opposite directions. On average, women reach a higher BAC than men from the same dose, mainly because of differences in body water (Mumenthaler et al., 1999); body size, food, drinking speed, tolerance, and timing also matter, so equal drink counts do not show equal intoxication in either direction, and whether women are more impaired at the same BAC is less settled. That group difference bears on an argument that a complainant who drank no more than the accused could not have been more impaired; it cannot show how impaired a particular person was, and it applies to complainants and accused persons of either sex according to their own physiology.

Apparent functioning is a further issue. Behavior that looks coordinated to an observer can coexist with substantial impairment of attention and judgment (Steele & Josephs, 1990), and acute alcohol impairs response inhibition, with larger effects at higher breath alcohol levels (McPhee & Hendershot, 2023). That research can explain why a person who walked and talked may nonetheless have been severely impaired. It does not establish that a particular person was incapable, and the same research bears on the accused’s perception and judgment.

The Accused’s Own Intoxication and Possible Blackout

Every principle in this literature applies to an accused who was drinking. An accused who reports no memory cannot be shown to have been in a blackout, any more than a complainant can (Pressman & Caudill, 2013), and an accused or a complainant who reports no memory of part of an encounter cannot give a memory-based account of that part; other evidence may address it. An accused who offers a detailed account of consent after heavy drinking is subject to the same reconstruction concerns that the defense raises about a complainant: people reconstructing a blackout lean on others’ accounts and other external sources and may relax their standards for accepting a recollection (Nash & Takarangi, 2011). In three experiments with sober participants randomly assigned the role of complainant or accused in a sexual assault scenario, susceptibility to misinformation did not differ by role (Greene et al., 2025). Whether these principles apply to the accused is a legitimate question within the research; what the accused did or did not encode is not, because the research cannot say what happened during anyone’s gap.

The accused’s intoxication also has defined legal effects. In Arizona, voluntary intoxication cannot negate a required mental state (A.R.S. § 13-503). In courts-martial, voluntary intoxication is not a defense, but evidence of it may be considered on actual knowledge, specific intent, willfulness, or premeditation (R.C.M. 916(l)(2)); it cannot make an unreasonable belief in consent reasonable. Counsel should confirm current authority. The paper Voluntary Intoxication, Blackout, and Criminal Responsibility addresses these rules.

What Is Not Known About Passing Out and Sleep

Some charging theories depend on the complainant having been unconscious or asleep, and the research here is thin. Loss of consciousness typically occurs at or near peak BAC, or later in the night as sedation and sleep take over, but the timing has not been well studied; laboratory studies for ethical reasons do not dose participants to the levels at which people pass out. Alcohol shortens the time it takes to fall asleep and consolidates the first half of the night, but disrupts sleep in the second half (Ebrahim et al., 2013). A complainant who describes falling asleep and waking may be describing actual sleep or unconsciousness, or may be describing the edges of a fragmentary blackout, in which islands of memory can feel like episodes of waking; the research does not allow an expert to say which. The papers Blacked Out Versus Passed Out and “‘Waking Up’ During a Blackout and Islands of Memory” treat these questions.

That uncertainty cuts in both directions. It means a defense expert cannot properly testify that a complainant who reports waking during an act must have been in a blackout rather than asleep. It also means a prosecution expert cannot testify that the complainant must have been asleep or unconscious. Evidence of the complainant’s condition from other sources, together with the complainant’s own account of what she or he remembers and how, is what the factfinder has to work with.

Intoxicated Witnesses and the Timing of Interviews

The research on intoxicated witnesses supports more than the common intuition that their accounts are worthless. In a meta-analysis of experimental studies, intoxication moderately reduced the number of correct details recalled without significantly increasing incorrect details (Jores et al., 2019). In one study of witnesses whose BAC was below 0.10%, alcohol had no main effect on the quantity or quality of statements, and a second interview yielded substantial new detail, most of it accurate (Hagsand et al., 2017); that is one study at low to moderate doses and does not show that a second interview is reliable at higher BACs. These findings are consistent with an intoxicated complainant’s or witness’s account being accurate in much of what it contains, even if incomplete; they do not show that any particular account is accurate.

The findings also have limits. Most experiments stop at moderate doses. In a field study of bar patrons with elevated BACs, intoxication reduced the accuracy as well as the completeness of recall (Altman et al., 2018), and in another field study highly intoxicated participants accepted more suggestive cues, with the effect persisting after they sobered (van Oorsouw et al., 2015). A review concluded that alcohol is most likely to increase suggestibility at high intoxication levels or after a delay (Kloft et al., 2021). In fragmentary blackouts some partly encoded information may return with cues (a 1969 interview study of hospitalized patients, described in a later review: Goodwin et al., 1969a, as described by White, 2003), whereas in en bloc blackouts cues generally fail, although the research does not show that no fragment can ever return; the accuracy of details that emerge later cannot be assumed, especially after exposure to others’ accounts, photos, or questioning (Nash & Takarangi, 2011; Kloft et al., 2021). An early, brief, recorded, open-ended account, a fuller interview once the person is sober, and a record of what the complainant learned from friends, investigators, and others before each statement allow the factfinder to assess a later account, whichever way the evidence points.

Perceptions of intoxicated witnesses can diverge from the research. Swedish police officers and recruits rated a witness with breath alcohol as low as 0.04% less credible than a sober witness (Pettersson et al., 2022), and online participants rated a witness shown drinking wine as less credible than one drinking a soft drink, while adopting that witness’s misinformation just as often (Bartlett, Gawrylowicz, et al., 2022). General expert testimony about the research, limited to principles, can address that gap without vouching for any witness.

Expert Testimony Within the Research

Expert testimony on these subjects, from either side, is bounded by the literature it relies on. The research addresses the dose limits of the studies, the absence of any validated test that confirms a blackout (Wetherill & Fromme, 2016, pp. 922–923), the uncertainty of BAC estimates, whose net direction of error depends on the case, the mixed suggestibility findings (compare van Oorsouw et al., 2015, with Gawrylowicz et al., 2017, and Flowe et al., 2019), the application of every principle to the accused, and the point that a blackout is not evidence of consent. The leading critique of blackout testimony, Pressman and Caudill (2013), reviewed 26 empirical studies (nine of which induced and directly observed a blackout), found no objective or scientific method to verify a blackout during or after the fact, and concluded that blackout offered as a criminal defense or mitigating factor would not appear to meet standards for scientific evidence and should not be admissible for that purpose. That conclusion addresses blackout as a defense or mitigating factor, not general testimony explaining a complainant’s or witness’s memory gap, and the review’s finding that no method verifies a blackout applies to every party.

The research also limits what the prosecution can expect an expert to say. It does not support a statement that intoxicated witnesses are as accurate as sober ones at high doses, or that a complainant who walked and talked could not have been in a blackout.

Limits of the Evidence

Most experimental research uses college-age volunteers, scripted scenarios or videos, and doses below those described in many cases; participants are not frightened or harmed. Field studies reach higher levels but lose control over dose and other substances. Blackout research relies largely on retrospective self-report, and no validated method identifies a blackout after the fact. Several key studies tested only women (Flowe et al., 2019) or reported no sex comparison (Jores et al., 2019; Hagsand et al., 2017), and the military and same-sex cases that reach courts-martial are scarcely represented. The research describes group tendencies; it cannot establish whether a particular complainant was capable, was asleep, or remembers accurately, or what a particular accused perceived or knew.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When the meta-analytic finding that intoxicated witnesses report fewer correct details without more errors (Jores et al., 2019) is offered, counsel can ask who was studied and at what dose, and whether a higher-dose field study points the other way (Altman et al., 2018). When the field finding of increased suggestibility (van Oorsouw et al., 2015) is offered, counsel can ask how much evidence it rests on and whether it has held up, since lower-dose studies found otherwise. When a BAC estimate is offered by either side, counsel can ask what it rests on and how large its error is (Hustad & Carey, 2005). When Pressman and Caudill (2013) is cited, counsel can ask whether its conclusion reaches the testimony being offered. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Alcohol-Involved Cases and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

Article 120, UCMJ, reaches a sexual act without consent (Art. 120(b)(2)(A)); when the accused knows or reasonably should know that the other person is asleep, unconscious, or otherwise unaware (Art. 120(b)(2)(B)); and when the other person is incapable of consenting due to impairment by an intoxicant, a condition known or reasonably knowable by the accused (Art. 120(b)(3)(A)). “Incapable of consenting” means incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct, or physically incapable of declining participation in, or communicating unwillingness to engage in, the act (Art. 120(g)(8)); United States v. Pease (2016) approved similar definitions under the earlier statute. In United States v. Mendoza (2024), the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held that lack of consent and incapacity are separate theories of liability and that the government cannot prove lack of consent under Article 120(b)(2)(A) merely by showing the complainant was too intoxicated to consent, though intoxication evidence remains admissible on consent. United States v. Moore (2026) applied the same rule to sleep, while holding that evidence the complainant did not consent before falling asleep can support a nonconsent conviction. The Counterintuitive alcohol paper reviews these decisions.

An honest and reasonable mistake of fact as to consent is a special defense that the prosecution must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt once raised (R.C.M. 916(a), (b)(1), (j)(1); United States v. McDonald, 2019). Voluntary intoxication may be considered only on actual knowledge, specific intent, willfulness, or premeditated design to kill (R.C.M. 916(l)(2)), and the Military Judges’ Benchbook measures reasonableness by what an ordinary, prudent, sober adult would believe (Department of the Army, 2025, Instruction 3A-60-2, Note 10, p. 1365). Where the charge requires that the accused knew or reasonably should have known that the complainant was asleep, unaware, or incapable of consenting, the Benchbook allows members to consider voluntary intoxication on actual knowledge but not on what the accused reasonably should have known, which is measured by an ordinary, prudent, sober adult (Department of the Army, 2025, Instruction 3A-60-2, Note 11, pp. 1365–1366). Expert testimony is governed by Military Rule of Evidence 702, which incorporated the 2023 federal amendment in 2025 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025; practitioners should confirm current text), and by United States v. Houser (1993). No witness may opine that a complainant is telling the truth (United States v. Brooks, 2007).

Arizona

Sexual assault requires intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact without consent (A.R.S. § 13-1406), and “without consent” includes incapacity by reason of drugs, alcohol, sleep, or similar impairment of cognition that is known or should reasonably have been known to the defendant (A.R.S. § 13-1401(A)(7)(b)). The State must prove that the defendant knew the act was without consent (State v. Witwer, 1993; State v. Kemper, 2011; RAJI (Criminal) 14.06.01), and a mistaken belief relieves liability when it negates that mental state (A.R.S. § 13-204(A)). Temporary intoxication from voluntary use of alcohol is not a defense to any criminal act or requisite state of mind (A.R.S. § 13-503). General educational expert testimony is permitted if it satisfies Rules 702 and 403 (State v. Salazar-Mercado, 2014), and experts may not opine on a particular witness’s credibility (State v. Lindsey, 1986, 149 Ariz. at 475).

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports several propositions prosecutors can legitimately present. For any party, a memory gap after heavy drinking is common and does not by itself show whether an account is accurate or inaccurate, and partial recall after a fragmentary blackout is consistent with the research. At moderate doses, intoxicated witnesses generally reported fewer details rather than more errors. Apparent coordination does not settle capacity, on average women reach higher BACs per dose, and the accused’s intoxication cannot make a belief reasonable or excuse unawareness. No single test confirms a claimed blackout, by an accused or a complainant, and the reconstruction concerns raised about a complainant apply to the accused’s account as well. Early recorded statements, documentation of what each witness learned from others, and independent corroboration of the timeline give the factfinder a fuller basis for assessing every account.

The research also counsels caution. A complainant’s blackout is not evidence of incapacity or unconsciousness, and after Mendoza the charging theory must match the proof. Low-dose accuracy findings may not hold at the levels in many cases, where field studies have found reduced accuracy and increased suggestibility. Little is known about when intoxicated people pass out or fall asleep, so testimony that a complainant must have been unconscious goes beyond the research. Testimony that keeps to general principles and leaves capacity and credibility to the factfinder avoids vouching problems. Statistics on false or unfounded reports cannot be used to suggest that a particular complainant is truthful; their meaning and limits are addressed in “False, Unfounded, and Unresolved Reports: What the Research Shows” in the Counterintuitive Testimony resource.

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports several propositions defense counsel can legitimately present. A blackout is a failure of memory formation, not unconsciousness, so a complainant’s lack of memory does not by itself establish unconsciousness or incapacity. Drink counts and BAC estimates are uncertain and the net direction of error depends on the case, reconstruction from external sources can produce beliefs not based on memory, and some studies find increased suggestibility at high intoxication. Questions about when each detail first appeared and what the person had been told by then are grounded in the literature.

The research also counsels caution about the limits that apply to the defense. For any party, memory gaps are common and do not by themselves show whether an account is accurate or inaccurate, and honest memory error is not fabrication. Intoxicated witnesses are often accurate in what they report, and the suggestibility findings are mixed. Alcohol research on misperception bears, if at all, on what an intoxicated person believed, not on whether the belief was reasonable under the military sober-adult standard, and in Arizona it cannot excuse unawareness; the same research applies to a complainant’s perception. A claimed blackout cannot be verified by any single test, and an accused’s account of an intoxicated period raises the same reconstruction concerns as a complainant’s.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

Altman, C. M., Schreiber Compo, N., McQuiston, D., Hagsand, A. V., & Cervera, J. (2018). Witnesses’ memory for events and faces under elevated levels of intoxication. Memory, 26(7), 946–959. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2018.1445758

Bartlett, G., Gawrylowicz, J., Frings, D., & Albery, I. P. (2022). Would you believe an intoxicated witness? The impact of witness alcohol intoxication status on credibility judgments and suggestibility. Frontiers in Psychology, 13, Article 983681. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.983681

Department of the Army. (2025). Military judges’ benchbook (DA Pamphlet 27-9, 29 July 2025).

Ebrahim, I. O., Shapiro, C. M., Williams, A. J., & Fenwick, P. B. (2013). Alcohol and sleep I: Effects on normal sleep. Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research, 37(4), 539–549. https://doi.org/10.1111/acer.12006

Flowe, H. D., Humphries, J. E., Takarangi, M. K. T., Zelek, K., Karoğlu, N., Gabbert, F., & Hope, L. (2019). An experimental examination of the effects of alcohol consumption and exposure to misleading postevent information on remembering a hypothetical rape scenario. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 33(3), 393–413. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3531

Gawrylowicz, J., Ridley, A. M., Albery, I. P., Barnoth, E., & Young, J. (2017). Alcohol-induced retrograde facilitation renders witnesses of crime less suggestible to misinformation. Psychopharmacology, 234(8), 1267–1275. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00213-017-4564-2

Goodwin, D. W., Crane, J. B., & Guze, S. B. (1969a). Alcoholic “blackouts”: A review and clinical study of 100 alcoholics. American Journal of Psychiatry, 126(2), 191–198. https://doi.org/10.1176/ajp.126.2.191

Greene, C. M., Brassil, M., & Murphy, G. (2025). He said, she said: The “accused” and “complainant” in a sexual assault scenario are equally susceptible to misinformation. Scientific Reports, 15(1), Article 27693. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-025-13587-y

Hagsand, A. V., Roos af Hjelmsäter, E., Granhag, P. A., Fahlke, C., & Söderpalm Gordh, A. (2017). Witnesses stumbling down memory lane: The effects of alcohol intoxication, retention interval, and repeated interviewing. Memory, 25(4), 531–543. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2016.1191652

Hartzler, B., & Fromme, K. (2003b). Fragmentary and en bloc blackouts: Similarity and distinction among episodes of alcohol-induced memory loss. Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 64(4), 547–550. https://doi.org/10.15288/jsa.2003.64.547

Hustad, J. T. P., & Carey, K. B. (2005). Using calculations to estimate blood alcohol concentrations for naturally occurring drinking episodes: A validity study. Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 66(1), 130–138. https://doi.org/10.15288/jsa.2005.66.130

Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf

Jores, T., Colloff, M. F., Kloft, L., Smailes, H., & Flowe, H. D. (2019). A meta-analysis of the effects of acute alcohol intoxication on witness recall. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 33(3), 334–343. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3533

Kloft, L., Monds, L. A., Blokland, A., Ramaekers, J. G., & Otgaar, H. (2021). Hazy memories in the courtroom: A review of alcohol and other drug effects on false memory and suggestibility. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 124, 291–307. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2021.02.012

McPhee, M. D., & Hendershot, C. S. (2023). Meta-analysis of acute alcohol effects on response inhibition. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 152, Article 105274. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105274

Mumenthaler, M. S., Taylor, J. L., O’Hara, R., & Yesavage, J. A. (1999). Gender differences in moderate drinking effects. Alcohol Research & Health, 23(1), 55–64.

Nash, R. A., & Takarangi, M. K. T. (2011). Reconstructing alcohol-induced memory blackouts. Memory, 19(6), 566–573. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2011.590508

Northcote, J., & Livingston, M. (2011). Accuracy of self-reported drinking: Observational verification of ‘last occasion’ drink estimates of young adults. Alcohol and Alcoholism, 46(6), 709–713. https://doi.org/10.1093/alcalc/agr138

Perry, P. J., Argo, T. R., Barnett, M. J., Liesveld, J. L., Liskow, B., Hernan, J. M., Trnka, M. G., & Brabson, M. A. (2006). The association of alcohol-induced blackouts and grayouts to blood alcohol concentrations. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 51(4), 896–899. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1556-4029.2006.00161.x

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White, A. M. (2003). What happened? Alcohol, memory blackouts, and the brain. Alcohol Research & Health, 27(2), 186–196.

Legal Authorities

State v. Kemper, 229 Ariz. 105, 271 P.3d 484 (App. 2011).

State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).

State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).

State v. Witwer, 175 Ariz. 305, 856 P.2d 1183 (App. 1993).

United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).

United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).

United States v. McDonald, 78 M.J. 376 (C.A.A.F. 2019).

United States v. Mendoza, 85 M.J. 213 (C.A.A.F. 2024).

United States v. Moore, 86 M.J. 308 (C.A.A.F. 2026).

United States v. Pease, 75 M.J. 180 (C.A.A.F. 2016).

10 U.S.C. § 920 (Article 120, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-204, 13-503, 13-1401, 13-1406.

Ariz. R. Evid. 403, 702.

Mil. R. Evid. 702, 1102.

Rule for Courts-Martial 916(a), (b), (j), (l).

Revised Arizona Jury Instructions (Criminal) (6th ed. 2022), 14.06.01.

Related topic papers: Alcohol-Involved Cases: Practice Issues for the Defense · The Goldilocks Challenge: Intoxicated Enough to Lose Memory, but Capable of Consent? · Blacked Out Versus Passed Out · Assessing a Claimed Blackout: Convergent Evidence, Malingering, and Limits · Alcohol and Memory for Crimes · Alcohol Blackouts in the Courtroom: Expert Testimony and Admissibility

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Counterintuitive Testimony: Alcohol, Blackouts, and Memory in Sexual Assault Cases · Counterintuitive Testimony: Vouching, Profile Evidence, and the Human Lie Detector Rule · Courts-Martial