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Alcohol Blackout

Alcohol Blackouts in the Courtroom: Expert Testimony and Admissibility

Published

Snap Shot

  • The question: When may an expert testify about alcohol blackouts, what can such testimony reliably say, and where does it reach beyond the science?
  • What the research shows: The core findings are well established: a blackout is a failure to form lasting memories, not unconsciousness; blackouts are common and become more likely as blood alcohol rises quickly to high levels; and a person in a blackout can talk and act in ways observers find ordinary. The leading critique found no objective or scientific method to verify a blackout during or after the episode and concluded that blackout offered as a criminal defense or mitigating factor would not appear to meet standards for scientific evidence.
  • What it does not show: No single test or behavioral sign can establish that a particular person was or was not in a blackout, was or was not capable of consenting, or is reporting memory loss honestly. The critique addresses blackout as a criminal defense, not general testimony explaining a witness’s memory gap.
  • The law: Admissibility is governed by Rule 702 (as amended in 2023), Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho; Mil. R. Evid. 702 and Houser; and Ariz. R. Evid. 702 and Bernstein. Experts may not vouch for or against credibility (Brooks; Lindsey; Moran), and federal Rule 704(b) bars opinions on a defendant’s mental state. Arizona permits general “cold” expert testimony (Salazar-Mercado).
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors and defense counsel can each legitimately offer general blackout testimony that fits the facts; each should expect the other to test whether the testimony stays within the research and whether it has been applied evenhandedly to the complainant and the accused.

Blackout testimony now appears regularly in sexual assault, homicide, and assault prosecutions, in civilian courts and in courts-martial. It is offered by the prosecution to explain why a complainant remembers little of an assault, and by the defense to explain how a complainant could have participated in events she or he does not recall, or why an accused has no memory of the act charged. The same body of research is therefore invoked by both sides, often in the same trial, and the questions a court must decide are less about whether blackouts exist than about what an expert can responsibly say about them in a particular case.

This paper describes what blackout science reliably supports, the leading critique of blackout testimony and the responses to it, the earlier legal commentary, how the testimony is used by each side, the limits on opinions about a particular person, what is known about how jurors receive such evidence, and the procedures that govern expert testimony in federal, military, and Arizona courts. The companion paper Assessing a Claimed Blackout: Convergent Evidence, Malingering, and Limits addresses how an evaluator weighs a blackout claim.

What Blackout Science Reliably Supports

A blackout is a period during which a drinker was awake and acting but did not form lasting memories; passing out is a loss of consciousness (White, 2003; Wetherill & Fromme, 2016, p. 922). Fragmentary blackouts, with islands of memory, are far more common than complete, or en bloc, blackouts. Because alcohol mainly disrupts the transfer of information into long-term storage while sparing short-term memory and previously stored knowledge, a person in a blackout can converse, travel, and carry out complex behavior that observers may find unremarkable (White, 2003). Those propositions are well documented and are the usual core of educational testimony.

Dose findings are also well documented, if less precise than they are sometimes presented. Reported blackouts occur across a wide range of blood alcohol concentrations. The lowest level reported is about 0.06 g/dL (an estimate from self-reported drinking in 136 heavy-drinking young adults; Hartzler & Fromme, 2003b); in seven hospitalized men with alcoholism, blackouts began at about 0.14 (Ryback, 1970); a 2016 review reports that most blackouts occurred around 0.20, citing Ryback (1970) (Wetherill & Fromme, 2016, p. 923); and in one sample of arrestees (actively drinking people arrested for public intoxication, driving under the influence, or underage drinking, with BAC above 0.08 documented at arrest and an interview afterward about the episode), the estimated probability of a blackout (complete memory loss) reached 50% at about 0.31 g/dL, and of a grayout or a blackout at about 0.22 (Perry et al., 2006). These are group figures from different samples and methods, not cutoffs or plausibility screens for any person’s claim, and testimony that presents a single threshold as the point at which blackouts begin goes beyond them. Estimated BACs are uncertain, and a BAC figure does not show whether a blackout occurred.

Two further propositions recur and need careful wording. First, no validated behavioral sign identifies a blackout in progress (Wetherill & Fromme, 2016, pp. 922–923), and no single test can confirm or rule out a blackout after the fact (Pressman & Caudill, 2013); evaluators look to convergent evidence, which can make a claim more or less plausible but cannot verify it. A 2026 study of phone-based memory tests given during drinking found that failing a test was associated with later-reported blackout but was not diagnostic (Miller et al., 2026), and a memory test given during the episode may help show whether a blackout is likely, but no equivalent exists for a past event. Second, in fragmentary blackouts some partly encoded information may return with cues (a 1969 interview study of hospitalized patients, described in a later review: Goodwin et al., 1969a, as described by White, 2003), whereas in en bloc blackouts cues generally fail; the accuracy of details that emerge later cannot be assumed, especially after exposure to others’ accounts, photos, or questioning (Nash & Takarangi, 2011; Kloft et al., 2021). Neither proposition tells the factfinder whether a particular later recollection is genuine.

The Leading Critique and the Responses

Pressman and Caudill (2013) reviewed 26 empirical studies, including nine in which a blackout was induced and observed. They found no objective or scientific method to verify a blackout while it is occurring or to confirm it afterward, described only short-term memory as impaired while planning, attention, and social skills were not (a description that differs from the mechanism described in this series, in which what fails is the transfer of new information into lasting memory), and concluded that blackout offered as a criminal defense or mitigating factor would not appear to meet standards for scientific evidence and should not be admissible for that purpose. Any expert who testifies about blackouts should be prepared to address that conclusion.

The critique has drawn agreement and qualification. A published commentary agreed with the review and added that the blood-alcohol estimate in the authors’ example case illustrated a further problem: in realistic experiments with prolonged heavy drinking, Widmark calculations have overestimated actual blood alcohol (Wigmore, 2014). Research since 2013 has also moved beyond the small laboratory studies the review relied on, using daily reports and in-the-moment phone measures to study blackouts as they occur in young adults’ ordinary drinking (Merrill et al., 2025; Miller et al., 2026). Those studies refine what is known about risk and timing; they still rely on participants’ later reports as the reference standard, and they do not supply a test that could be applied to a past event.

The scope of the critique matters. It concerns blackout offered as a criminal defense or mitigating factor, typically an accused’s claim that memory loss reflects impaired cognition or control. It does not address general testimony explaining why a complainant or witness has a memory gap, and it does not show that blackouts are rare or that a particular claim is false. Its central finding, that the authors identified no objective or scientific method to verify a blackout, applies to every party. The paper Voluntary Intoxication, Blackout, and Criminal Responsibility discusses why amnesia, even if genuine, does not establish that conduct was involuntary or that intent was absent.

Earlier Legal Commentary

Two earlier articles are cited. Cunnien (1986) reviewed the phenomenology of alcoholic blackouts and their legal relevance, arguing that their use as evidence of incompetence or in mitigation depends on whether the amnesia can be reversed and on the voluntariness of the drinking, and that the voluntary nature of drinking should not mitigate its behavioral consequences. It is a review and argument rather than a study that tested its claims, and it predates most modern blackout research.

Sweeney (1990), a physician’s review and opinion, argued that a documented blackout reflects a temporary block in forming long-term memory and may suggest an altered cognitive state, which in his view could bear on specific intent and diminished capacity. He relied largely on Goodwin’s 1971 work, in which blackouts occurred at blood alcohol levels averaging .279, and described blackouts as occurring at levels above about .25 in a person with considerable tolerance. Later research reports blackouts at much lower levels, and BAC figures are group findings, not cutoffs (see Blackouts and Blood Alcohol Concentration). The article is an argument that did not test its claim: no study has measured whether people in a blackout form intentions, and the same article acknowledges that intoxication is not generally accepted as a legal excuse and that courts have generally allowed impaired consciousness from voluntary use only to rebut specific intent, not to produce acquittal. Like Cunnien (1986), it sits alongside the later evidence-based review by Pressman and Caudill (2013), which found no objective method to verify a blackout.

The question of strategic claims has been studied directly. In two Dutch community samples, most respondents reported having experienced a blackout or having observed one in others (67% and 76%), but in a traffic-control study only 14% of stopped drivers claimed a blackout, mainly drivers involved in accidents; the authors concluded that both claiming and denying a blackout may serve a strategic purpose (van Oorsouw et al., 2004). That finding concerns situational incentives, which can exist for any party; it does not show whether a particular claim is true.

How Each Side Uses Blackout Testimony

Prosecutors typically offer blackout testimony to explain a complainant’s fragmentary memory: that gaps after heavy drinking are common, that they are consistent with a range of events (including events that did and did not occur) and do not by themselves show what happened, and that islands of memory and later partial recall are expected features of fragmentary blackouts. Defense counsel typically offer it to show that a complainant who remembers nothing may nonetheless have been conscious and interacting, that the absence of memory does not show incapacity, and that reconstructed details may come from others. Both uses rest on the same findings, and blackout and legal incapacity remain separate questions: a person can be in a blackout and capable of consenting, or incapable without a blackout, and later non-recall alone does not establish either (see The Goldilocks Challenge: Intoxicated Enough to Lose Memory, but Capable of Consent?).

Military appellate courts have met this testimony directly. In United States v. Hennessy (2026), the record included defense expert testimony that a person in a blackout is not necessarily too intoxicated to engage in consensual sexual activity; the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces remanded because the lower court had not considered whether the complainant’s testimony about waking during the act could itself prove lack of consent under United States v. Casillas (2025), and it expressed no view on the outcome. General blackout testimony can explain why a period is missing from memory, but it does not resolve what happened during it, and what a complainant does remember must still be weighed. The case is described more fully in “Waking Up” During a Blackout and Islands of Memory.

A California trial shows how such testimony is presented, although the appellate decision does not evaluate it. In People v. Turner (Cal. Ct. App. 2018), an unpublished opinion, the court recounted that a defense clinical psychologist testified that a person in an alcoholic blackout is conscious and making voluntary decisions but is not forming memories, that most blackouts occur at a BAC of 0.20 percent or above, that people are not very good at judging others’ intoxication and cannot tell when someone else is in a blackout, and that the complainant had experienced a blackout that night. The jury convicted the defendant of assault with intent to commit rape, sexual penetration of an intoxicated person, and sexual penetration of an unconscious person, and the court affirmed on a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence; the defendant had withdrawn his claims of evidentiary error, so the opinion does not decide whether the expert testimony was properly admitted or how it should be weighed. Testimony of that kind raises the questions discussed above about dose findings and about opinions on a particular person, which apply to any expert. Because the opinion is unpublished, California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), generally bars citing it in California courts; it is described here only to show how blackout testimony reaches a jury.

Limits on Opinions About a Particular Person

The research permits general education and, in some cases, an explanation of which features of the evidence are typical or atypical of a blackout. It does not permit an opinion that a particular person was in a blackout, that a particular person’s memory loss is genuine or feigned, or that a person was or was not capable of consenting. Those opinions would also run into the rules against vouching and, for an accused’s mental state in federal court, Rule 704(b) (see the law section). An expert who has not interviewed the person and offers general education only is not in a position to give an opinion on whether that person was in a blackout; this is so for an accused, a complainant, or any other witness. Testimony that applies the research to one side’s witnesses while treating the other side’s accounts as unaffected is a further problem: a claimed blackout cannot be verified by any single test, whoever makes the claim (Pressman & Caudill, 2013), and an accused’s detailed account of a heavily intoxicated period raises the same reconstruction questions as a complainant’s.

Hypothetical Example. Consider a hypothetical trial in which an expert is asked, on direct examination, whether the complainant “was in a blackout” between midnight and two in the morning, based on reported drink counts and a witness’s description of her as “glassy-eyed but talking.” The research allows the expert to describe what blackouts are, the observed BAC ranges and their uncertainty, and why no validated behavioral sign identifies a blackout in progress. It does not allow the expert to say that this complainant was in a blackout, because no single test can confirm one after the fact and drink counts carry substantial error. The same limits would apply if the question concerned the accused.

How Jurors May Receive Blackout and Intoxication Evidence

Research on how factfinders weigh intoxication suggests that blackout testimony enters a setting already shaped by assumptions. In a mock-jury study with 152 participants, a defendant who had been drinking was seen as less credible and more likely to be guilty, whereas a complainant who had been drinking was seen as less credible and the defendant as less likely to be guilty (Schuller & Wall, 1998). In written verdict explanations from 250 Australian jury-eligible adults who read an alcohol-related acquaintance rape transcript, intoxication often mitigated the defendant’s responsibility while undermining the complainant’s credibility (Wieberneit et al., 2026). In a mock-juror study of 261 participants (115 students and 146 community members) who read a short written summary of an assault in a park, the witness’s intoxication (alcohol, cannabis, or amphetamines, compared with sober) and role (victim or bystander) did not change guilt judgments; victims were rated lower than bystanders on credibility, cognitive competence, and honesty, and amphetamine-intoxicated witnesses were rated less credible than sober witnesses, while witnesses who had drunk alcohol or used cannabis did not differ from sober witnesses on any rating (Dilevski et al., 2024). The case was a brief summary without deliberation, and the intoxication was described only as moderate. These studies did not test expert testimony about blackouts, and their samples and materials differ from actual trials, but they suggest why both sides may seek to explain what intoxication does and does not imply. The Jurors and Jury Decision-Making resource on this site reviews how jurors evaluate expert testimony.

Limits of the Evidence

The laboratory studies on which the leading critique relied were few and small, and blackout research still relies largely on retrospective self-report, with even the newest real-time measures validated against later reports (Miller et al., 2026). Dose findings come from college students, arrested drinkers, and alcoholic inpatients, not from the circumstances of a particular case. The earlier legal commentary is argument rather than data, and the strategic-claims study compared community surveys with roadside reports in one country. The juror studies used written materials and student or community samples and did not test blackout testimony itself. Sex differences in blackout risk have been inconsistent across studies (Wetherill & Fromme, 2016), on average, women reach higher BACs than men from the same dose (Mumenthaler et al., 1999), though body size, food, tolerance, and timing also matter, and the critique and commentary did not address sex. Most fundamentally, group research cannot establish whether a particular person experienced a blackout, could consent, or is reporting memory loss honestly.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When Pressman and Caudill (2013) is cited, counsel can ask whether the conclusion reaches the question in the case, since it addresses blackout offered as a criminal defense or mitigating factor, and whether its central finding has been applied to every party. When an expert testifies to a BAC “threshold” for blackouts, counsel can ask whether it matches the observed ranges and probabilities (Wetherill & Fromme, 2016; Perry et al., 2006) and how much the underlying BAC estimate rests on uncertain drink counts. When Cunnien (1986) or Sweeney (1990) is cited, counsel can ask whether the conclusion follows from data, since each is a review and argument, and, for Sweeney, whether the .25 figure matches later research on blackouts at lower BACs. When van Oorsouw et al. (2004) is cited to suggest a claim is strategic, counsel can ask whether a comparison of surveys and roadside reports says anything about this person. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Blackout Testimony and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as amended December 1, 2023, requires the proponent to show that it is more likely than not that expert testimony rests on sufficient facts or data, reflects reliable principles and methods, and reflects a reliable application of those methods to the case. Under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993), the trial court acts as gatekeeper; General Electric Co. v. Joiner (1997) held that admissibility rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion and that a court may exclude an opinion connected to the data only by the expert’s say-so; and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999) extended gatekeeping to all expert testimony. The 2023 amendment’s emphasis on reliable application bears directly on blackout testimony, where the general science is sound but its application to one person is often the contested step. Rule 704(b) bars an expert from opining whether the defendant had a mental state that is an element of the crime or a defense; it reaches only opinions about the defendant himself, so testimony about what is generally true of a group is not barred by that rule, though Rules 702 and 403 still apply (Diaz v. United States, 2024).

In courts-martial, Military Rule of Evidence 702 tracks the federal rule; the 2023 federal amendment took effect in the military rule in 2025 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025), and practitioners should confirm current text. Military judges apply the six factors of United States v. Houser (1993), and no witness may offer a “human lie detector” opinion that a person is or is not telling the truth (United States v. Brooks, 2007). After referral, a defense request for an expert witness is decided by the military judge on whether the testimony is relevant and necessary, and a request for an expert consultant, which may be made ex parte, on whether the assistance is necessary for an adequate defense (R.C.M. 703(d)(2)(A)). Since December 27, 2023, sexual assault and other covered offenses fall under the authority of the services’ Offices of Special Trial Counsel, which decide whether to prefer and refer charges (10 U.S.C. § 824a; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022); the change moved prosecutorial decisions to specialized prosecutors but did not change the evidentiary rules governing expert testimony. The Military Judges’ Benchbook instructs members that inability to remember because of intoxication is not itself a defense but is one factor in deciding the extent and effect of intoxication (Department of the Army, 2025, Instruction 5-21, Note 3); where automatism is raised, the Benchbook likewise tells members that inability to remember is not itself a defense but is one factor in deciding whether the acts were voluntary (Instruction 5-4).

Arizona

Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 adopted the Daubert standard effective January 1, 2012, and was amended effective January 1, 2024, to track the 2023 federal amendment (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004). In State v. Bernstein (2015), an aggravated DUI case involving blood-alcohol results, the Arizona Supreme Court held that Rule 702(d) requires the court to consider whether a method was reliably applied, but that errors in application call for exclusion only when they make the expert’s conclusions unreliable. Arizona permits general educational testimony from an expert who knows nothing of the case, if it satisfies Rules 702 and 403 and fits the facts (State v. Salazar-Mercado, 2014). State v. Chapple (1983) held that excluding a qualified memory expert was an abuse of discretion on its facts while leaving admission generally within the trial court’s discretion, and experts may not opine on a particular witness’s credibility (State v. Lindsey, 1986, 149 Ariz. at 475; State v. Moran, 1986). Temporary voluntary intoxication is not a defense to any criminal act or requisite state of mind (A.R.S. § 13-503), and Arizona does not permit expert evidence of a mental condition short of insanity to negate mens rea (State v. Mott, 1997), so testimony about an accused’s blackout is more likely to bear on the reliability of accounts than on mental state.

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports several points prosecutors can legitimately present through a qualified expert. Memory gaps after heavy drinking are common, fragmentary blackouts predict islands of memory and some later recall, and a gap is not evidence that nothing happened or that a report is false. The leading critique concerns blackout as an excuse for a defendant’s conduct, and its finding that no method verifies a blackout applies to every party’s claimed amnesia, an accused’s or a complainant’s. Cold-expert testimony in Arizona and educational testimony in courts-martial allow these points to be made without commenting on any witness.

The research also counsels caution. The same research shows that a person in a blackout may have been conscious and interacting, that later-emerging details may reflect reconstruction, and that a blackout alone does not establish incapacity; testimony that implies otherwise goes beyond the research. Prosecution experts may not offer opinions that a complainant was in a blackout, incapable of consenting, or accurate, and prosecutors are well positioned to ensure that BAC figures are presented as ranges with their uncertainty.

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports several propositions defense counsel can legitimately present through a qualified expert. A blackout is not unconsciousness, a complainant’s lack of memory does not by itself show incapacity, no validated behavioral sign identifies a blackout in progress, and recollections that emerge after exposure to others’ accounts may be reconstructed. In courts-martial, the rules provide a route to expert consultants and witnesses when the defense shows necessity. Asking whether any expert’s testimony stays within the observed ranges and the limits of application is a legitimate use of Rule 702.

The research also counsels caution about the limits that apply to the defense. The leading critique concluded that blackout offered as a criminal defense or mitigating factor would not appear to meet scientific-evidence standards, and a claimed blackout cannot be verified by any single test, whether by an accused or a complainant. Defense experts may not opine that a complainant was in a blackout, capable of consenting, or mistaken, and testimony that a person in a blackout can engage in consensual sexual activity describes a possibility, not a finding about any encounter. Reconstruction concerns apply to an accused’s account as much as to a complainant’s, and testimony that applies them to only one party is not supported by the research.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

Cunnien, A. J. (1986). Alcoholic blackouts: Phenomenology and legal relevance. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 4(1), 73–85. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.2370040106

Department of the Army. (2025). Military judges’ benchbook (DA Pamphlet 27-9, 29 July 2025).

Dilevski, N., Cullen, H. J., van Golde, C., Flowe, H. D., Paterson, H. M., Takarangi, M. K. T., & Monds, L. A. (2024). Juror perceptions of bystander and victim intoxication by different substances. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 51(4), 569–587. https://doi.org/10.1177/00938548241227543

Goodwin, D. W., Crane, J. B., & Guze, S. B. (1969a). Alcoholic “blackouts”: A review and clinical study of 100 alcoholics. American Journal of Psychiatry, 126(2), 191–198. https://doi.org/10.1176/ajp.126.2.191

Hartzler, B., & Fromme, K. (2003b). Fragmentary and en bloc blackouts: Similarity and distinction among episodes of alcohol-induced memory loss. Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 64(4), 547–550. https://doi.org/10.15288/jsa.2003.64.547

Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf

Kloft, L., Monds, L. A., Blokland, A., Ramaekers, J. G., & Otgaar, H. (2021). Hazy memories in the courtroom: A review of alcohol and other drug effects on false memory and suggestibility. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 124, 291–307. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2021.02.012

Merrill, J. E., Boyle, H. K., Peterson, R., Belitsos, O. A., Miller, M. B., Carey, K. B., Jackson, K. M., & Barnett, N. P. (2025). Factors that increase risk for alcohol-induced blackouts in high-intensity drinking young adults. Alcohol, Clinical and Experimental Research, 49(7), 1530–1541. https://doi.org/10.1111/acer.70074

Miller, M. B., Shoemaker, S. D., Freeman, L. K., Curtis, A. F., Merrill, J. E., & Merkle, E. C. (2026). Predictive value of real-time memory tests in identifying alcohol-induced blackouts in situ. Addiction, 121(8), 2166–2175. https://doi.org/10.1111/add.70446

Mumenthaler, M. S., Taylor, J. L., O’Hara, R., & Yesavage, J. A. (1999). Gender differences in moderate drinking effects. Alcohol Research & Health, 23(1), 55–64.

Nash, R. A., & Takarangi, M. K. T. (2011). Reconstructing alcohol-induced memory blackouts. Memory, 19(6), 566–573. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2011.590508

Perry, P. J., Argo, T. R., Barnett, M. J., Liesveld, J. L., Liskow, B., Hernan, J. M., Trnka, M. G., & Brabson, M. A. (2006). The association of alcohol-induced blackouts and grayouts to blood alcohol concentrations. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 51(4), 896–899. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1556-4029.2006.00161.x

Pressman, M. R., & Caudill, D. S. (2013). Alcohol-induced blackout as a criminal defense or mitigating factor: An evidence-based review and admissibility as scientific evidence. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 58(4), 932–940. https://doi.org/10.1111/1556-4029.12134

Ryback, R. S. (1970). Alcohol amnesia: Observations in seven drinking inpatient alcoholics. Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 31(3), 616–632. https://doi.org/10.15288/qjsa.1970.31.616

Schuller, R. A., & Wall, A.-M. (1998). The effects of defendant and complainant intoxication on mock jurors’ judgments of sexual assault. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 22(4), 555–573. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-6402.1998.tb00177.x

Sweeney, D. F. (1990). Alcoholic blackouts: Legal implications. Journal of Substance Abuse Treatment, 7(3), 155–159. https://doi.org/10.1016/0740-5472(90)90016-J

van Oorsouw, K., Merckelbach, H., Ravelli, D., Nijman, H., & Mekking-Pompen, I. (2004). Alcoholic blackout for criminally relevant behavior. Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 32(4), 364–370.

Wetherill, R. R., & Fromme, K. (2016). Alcohol-induced blackouts: A review of recent clinical research with practical implications and recommendations for future studies. Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research, 40(5), 922–935. https://doi.org/10.1111/acer.13051

White, A. M. (2003). What happened? Alcohol, memory blackouts, and the brain. Alcohol Research & Health, 27(2), 186–196.

Wieberneit, M., Tubex, H., Notebaert, L., & Clare, J. (2026). Making sense of consent: A qualitative analysis of Australian mock juror decision-making in a rape trial. Journal of Interpersonal Violence. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1177/08862605261467507

Wigmore, J. G. (2014). Commentary on: Pressman MR, Caudill DS. Alcohol-induced blackout as a criminal defense or mitigating factor: An evidence-based review and admissibility as scientific evidence. J Forensic Sci 2013;58(4):932–40. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 59(1), 293. https://doi.org/10.1111/1556-4029.12364

Legal Authorities

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

Diaz v. United States, 602 U.S. 526 (2024).

General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).

State v. Bernstein, 237 Ariz. 226, 349 P.3d 200 (2015).

State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983).

State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).

State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986).

State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 931 P.2d 1046 (1997).

State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).

People v. Turner, No. H043709 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2018) (unpublished; not citable in California courts under Cal. R. Ct. 8.1115(a)).

United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).

United States v. Casillas, 86 M.J. 94 (C.A.A.F. 2025).

United States v. Hennessy, 86 M.J. 315 (C.A.A.F. 2026).

United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).

10 U.S.C. § 824a (Article 24a, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-81, 135 Stat. 1541 (2021).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-503.

Fed. R. Evid. 403, 702, 704(b).

Ariz. R. Evid. 403, 702.

Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004 (amending Ariz. R. Evid. 702, effective Jan. 1, 2024).

Mil. R. Evid. 702, 1102.

Rule for Courts-Martial 703(d).

Related topic papers: Assessing a Claimed Blackout: Convergent Evidence, Malingering, and Limits · Voluntary Intoxication, Blackout, and Criminal Responsibility · The Goldilocks Challenge: Intoxicated Enough to Lose Memory, but Capable of Consent? · Can Observers Tell When Someone Is in a Blackout? · Blackouts and Blood Alcohol Concentration · Alcohol-Involved Cases: Practice Issues for the Prosecution

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Memory in the Courtroom: Memory Expert Testimony · Counterintuitive Testimony: Vouching, Profile Evidence, and the Human Lie Detector Rule · Reading Research Claims