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Alcohol Blackout

Voluntary Intoxication, Blackout, and Criminal Responsibility

Published

Snap Shot

  • The question: When an accused was drinking heavily and reports no memory of the charged conduct, what does the blackout research say about voluntariness, intent, competency to stand trial, and sentencing, and how do military and Arizona law treat that evidence?
  • What the research shows: A blackout is a failure to form lasting memories while the person remains awake and able to act; in the small number of laboratory and observational studies reviewed, memory was the function most clearly impaired and observers reported organized behavior. Alcohol also impairs inhibitory control and narrows attention, more so at higher doses, so organized behavior neither shows nor rules out a blackout and does not show what the person intended. No research has measured whether people in a blackout form intentions, and no single test can confirm or rule out a blackout afterward.
  • What it does not show: Amnesia for an act does not show that the act was involuntary or that the person lacked the required intent; nor does a blackout show that intent was present. Research cannot establish a particular accused’s mental state at the time of the offense.
  • The law: Arizona bars voluntary intoxication as a defense to any act or mental state (A.R.S. § 13-503), excludes acute voluntary intoxication from insanity (§ 13-502), and bars diminished-capacity evidence (Mott; Clark). The military permits voluntary intoxication evidence only on actual knowledge, specific intent, willfulness, or premeditation (R.C.M. 916(l)(2)). Amnesia does not by itself make an accused incompetent to stand trial (McClendon; Wilson).
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors can legitimately show that amnesia alone does not establish automatism and that people in blackouts have been observed acting purposefully; defense counsel can legitimately present intoxication evidence where the law allows it and raise fairness concerns when amnesia impairs the defense, while recognizing that a blackout claim cannot be verified and does not itself negate intent.

An accused who drank heavily before a charged offense may say, truthfully or not, that he or she remembers nothing of it. That claim raises questions the blackout research is sometimes asked to answer: whether a person who does not remember an act performed it voluntarily, whether the person could have formed the required intent or knowledge, whether a person with no memory of the events can fairly stand trial, and whether intoxication should affect the sentence. The research bears on each question, but the answers are set largely by law, and the law differs sharply between Arizona and the military.

This paper explains what a blackout does and does not impair, why amnesia is distinct from automatism, what research can and cannot say about intent, how amnesia bears on competency and participation in the defense, and the governing military and Arizona rules on intoxication, mental responsibility, competency, and sentencing. The same science applies to complainants and witnesses, and companion papers address those uses; this paper concerns the accused.

What a Blackout Does and Does Not Impair

Alcohol’s main effect on memory is on the formation of new long-term memories; memories formed before drinking and the ability to hold information briefly in mind are largely preserved, and the impairment grows with dose (White, 2003). A person in a blackout is awake and can converse, travel, and carry out complex behavior that is not later remembered. A review of 26 empirical studies, nine of which induced and observed a blackout, found no objective or scientific method to verify a blackout during or after the fact, described only short-term memory as impaired and planning, attention, and social skills as not impaired, and concluded that blackout offered as a criminal defense or mitigating factor would not appear to meet standards for scientific evidence and should not be admissible for that purpose (Pressman & Caudill, 2013). Their description of the impairment as one of short-term memory differs from the mechanism described above, in which what fails is the transfer of new information into lasting memory. That conclusion addresses blackout as a defense or mitigating factor; it does not address testimony explaining a complainant’s or witness’s memory gap.

Intoxication short of blackout has its own effects. A meta-analysis of human laboratory studies found that acute alcohol impaired response inhibition, the ability to stop an action already under way, by a moderate amount (Hedges’ g = 0.41), with larger effects at higher breath alcohol levels (McPhee & Hendershot, 2023). Alcohol myopia theory holds that intoxication narrows attention to the most salient immediate cues at the expense of less salient information (Steele & Josephs, 1990). Alcohol increases the probability of aggression, especially under provocation, although most intoxicated people do not aggress; the paper Alcohol and Aggression reviews that literature. These findings describe impaired self-control and judgment, which is different from an absence of intent, although in courts-martial evidence of impairment may bear on whether a specific intent or knowledge was formed.

Amnesia and Automatism

Criminal liability generally requires a voluntary act, and automatism refers to bodily movement without conscious control, such as movement during a seizure or, in some cases, during sleep. A blackout, as the research defines it, is a different condition: a failure to record memories of conduct the person was performing while awake. Observers in the studies reviewed reported organized behavior, and no validated behavioral sign identifies a blackout in progress (Wetherill & Fromme, 2016, pp. 922–923). Amnesia afterward therefore does not by itself show that the conduct was involuntary; the absence of memory is consistent with conscious action at the time, though it does not prove it. Military instructions nonetheless allow members to weigh an inability to remember as one factor when voluntariness is in issue (see the law section).

Claims of automatism in alcohol cases more often involve sleep. Parasomnias such as sleepwalking and confusional arousals, sometimes said to be triggered by alcohol, differ from blackouts in that the person is not awake; the paper “Sleep, Parasomnia, and ‘Sexsomnia’ Versus Blackout” addresses those claims and how sleep specialists evaluate them. A person can also lose consciousness from intoxication, but passing out ends purposeful action rather than accompanying it (see Blacked Out Versus Passed Out).

Can Research Speak to Intent?

Researchers and commentators have long debated how blackouts bear on criminal responsibility. One early commentary argued that the legal relevance of alcoholic amnesia to competency and responsibility turns on whether the amnesia is reversible and whether the intoxication was voluntary, and that the voluntary nature of drinking should not mitigate the consequences of a drinker’s behavior (Cunnien, 1986). Sweeney (1990), a physician’s review, took a different view: that a documented blackout may indicate an altered cognitive state that bears on specific intent, relying largely on Goodwin’s 1971 work and describing blackouts at blood alcohol levels above about .25; later research reports blackouts at lower levels, and BAC figures are group findings, not cutoffs. Each is a review and argument rather than a study that measured intent, and Sweeney acknowledged that courts have generally allowed impaired consciousness from voluntary intoxication only to rebut specific intent. Commentary of this kind does not set the rule: the governing law, discussed below, does. Arizona bars voluntary intoxication as a defense to any criminal act or required mental state (A.R.S. § 13-503), while courts-martial admit it on specific mental elements and allow a blackout to be weighed as one factor on whether the acts were voluntary (R.C.M. 916(l)(2); Department of the Army, 2025).

No study has measured whether people in an alcohol blackout form intentions, deliberate, or know particular facts at the time, and the design problem is fundamental: the only access to the person’s mental state during the blackout is behavior observed by others, and the person’s own later report is absent by definition. What the research does show is that, in the small number of studies reviewed, observers reported organized behavior during blackouts (Pressman & Caudill, 2013), that intoxication also impairs inhibitory control and broad attention (McPhee & Hendershot, 2023; Steele & Josephs, 1990), and that these effects vary with dose and among individuals; organized behavior therefore neither shows nor rules out a blackout and does not show what the person intended. An expert can describe those general findings. An expert cannot say, from a claimed blackout alone, that a particular accused did or did not form a specific intent; the research does not support that opinion. In federal court, Fed. R. Evid. 704(b) limits such opinions about a defendant’s mental state; the corresponding military and Arizona rules (Mil. R. Evid. 704; Ariz. R. Evid. 704) should be checked by counsel, because their text is not identical to the federal rule. Evidence about the accused’s conduct before, during, and after the event, such as preparation, statements, concealment, or flight, remains the ordinary basis on which factfinders infer mental state.

Case Example. In Montana v. Egelhoff (1996), deputies found two people shot dead in the front seat of a car in a ditch in northwestern Montana, with the defendant alive in the back seat; about an hour later his blood alcohol level was 0.36 percent. He had spent the day drinking with the two victims, said he could not remember the night, and argued that his intoxication left him physically unable to commit the killings. The jury was instructed under a state statute not to consider his intoxication on whether he acted purposely or knowingly, and the Supreme Court, without a majority opinion, upheld that statute against a due process challenge. The case illustrates that the legal weight of claimed intoxication and amnesia is set by each jurisdiction’s law; it says nothing about what this defendant remembered.

A further caution applies to the claim itself. Crime-related amnesia is commonly reported in samples of people charged with violent offenses, with prevalence figures that vary widely by sample and setting, and it is often attributed to alcohol; feigning has been documented; at the same time, blackouts are common and a claim is not implausible on its face (Jelicic, 2018; Wetherill & Fromme, 2016). Both points apply to any witness’s claimed memory loss, which is why the claim is not relied on alone. No single test can confirm or rule out a blackout after the fact; evaluators look to convergent evidence, which can make a claim more or less plausible but cannot verify it (Pressman & Caudill, 2013). The paper Assessing a Claimed Blackout: Convergent Evidence, Malingering, and Limits describes how evaluators approach such claims.

Amnesia, Competency, and Participation in the Defense

An accused with no memory of the charged events cannot tell counsel what happened, which can limit the investigation of defenses such as self-defense or mistake. Clinicians assessing amnesia in criminal cases consider organic causes such as intoxication or head injury, dissociative amnesia, psychosis, and feigning, and the features of the claimed memory loss (Bourget & Whitehurst, 2007). Alcohol blackouts affect the formation of memories during intoxication, so the missing period is generally not expected to return in full. In fragmentary blackouts some partly encoded information may return with cues (a 1969 interview study of hospitalized patients, described in a later review: Goodwin et al., 1969a, as described by White, 2003), whereas in en bloc blackouts cues generally fail; the accuracy of details that emerge later cannot be assumed, especially after exposure to others’ accounts, photos, or questioning (Nash & Takarangi, 2011; Kloft et al., 2021). An accused who learns the details from discovery may come to report them as memories, a risk that applies equally to complainants and witnesses.

Competency to stand trial is assessed under a functional standard: whether the accused has a sufficient present ability to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings (Dusky v. United States, 1960). Amnesia for the offense does not ordinarily prevent either ability, and courts have generally held that amnesia alone does not make a defendant incompetent, while recognizing that it can affect the fairness of a particular trial (see the law section). An evaluator can describe the nature and likely permanence of the claimed amnesia, whether it is consistent with an alcohol blackout, and how it affects the accused’s ability to assist counsel; whether a trial would be fair is a judicial question.

Limits of the Evidence

Blackout research relies largely on retrospective self-report, laboratory studies dose participants below the levels described in many cases, and the inhibitory-control research uses simple laboratory tasks with healthy volunteers rather than real decisions under provocation or stress. The studies Pressman and Caudill reviewed were small and often decades old. The intent and responsibility literature on blackouts consists mainly of commentary and case reports. The feigning literature relies on student simulators and offender samples from a few countries. Sex differences in blackout risk have been inconsistent across studies (Wetherill & Fromme, 2016), and the inhibitory-control meta-analysis did not report a sex moderator in its summary (McPhee & Hendershot, 2023). Research describes groups; it cannot establish what a particular accused intended, knew, or remembers.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When Pressman and Caudill (2013) is cited for the proposition that planning and social skills are spared in blackouts, counsel can ask how much evidence it rests on, since it drew on a small number of laboratory studies, and whether it says anything about intent, which none of the studies measured. When Cunnien (1986) or Sweeney (1990) is cited, counsel can ask whether the conclusion follows from data, since each is a review and argument. When the response-inhibition meta-analysis (McPhee & Hendershot, 2023) is offered to suggest an accused could not control his or her behavior, counsel can ask whether laboratory stop-signal tasks apply to this person and this conduct. When an accused’s amnesia is offered as evidence of a blackout, counsel can ask what besides the accused’s own report supports it. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Voluntary Intoxication, Blackout, and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

In courts-martial, voluntary intoxication, whether from alcohol or drugs, is not a defense, but evidence of any degree of voluntary intoxication may be introduced to raise a reasonable doubt about actual knowledge, specific intent, willfulness, or a premeditated design to kill when one of those is an element (R.C.M. 916(l)(2)). The rule’s discussion notes that intoxication may reduce premeditated murder to unpremeditated murder but not to manslaughter, and that intoxication may be admitted in extenuation (Manual for Courts-Martial [MCM], 2024). The Military Judges’ Benchbook voluntary-intoxication instruction tells members that intoxication may, alone or with other evidence, raise a reasonable doubt about premeditation, specific intent, or knowledge, but that a person may be drunk yet still aware of his or her actions and their probable results; that inability to remember because of intoxication is not itself a defense but is one factor in assessing the extent and effect of intoxication; and that drinking from the compulsion of alcoholism is treated as voluntary (Department of the Army, 2025, Instruction 5-21, Notes 2–3, pp. 1745–1746). The automatism instruction similarly tells members that inability to remember because of amnesia or a blackout is not itself a defense but is one factor in deciding whether the accused’s acts were voluntary (Department of the Army, 2025, Instruction 5-4, p. 1675). For general-intent elements, an intoxicated accused’s mistake of fact must be one an ordinary, prudent, sober adult would have made (Department of the Army, 2025, Instruction 3A-60-2, Note 10, p. 1365; R.C.M. 916(j)(1)).

Lack of mental responsibility requires a severe mental disease or defect that made the accused unable to appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of the acts (R.C.M. 916(k)(1)). Military courts have long held that amnesia from drugs or alcohol is not a complete defense and is not in itself a mental disease or defect, describing amnesia as a relatively neutral circumstance in its bearing on responsibility (United States v. Olvera, 1954). Involuntary intoxication is treated separately: when the evidence reasonably raises involuntary ingestion of an intoxicant that left the accused unable to appreciate the nature or wrongfulness of the conduct, the military judge must instruct on it (United States v. MacDonald, 2014). The court distinguished the defense from lack of mental responsibility because it requires no mental disease or defect, but described it as an affirmative defense that the accused must show by clear and convincing evidence, the same burden that applies to lack of mental responsibility (MacDonald, 2014, slip op. at 6, quoting the lower court, and at 23 n. 3); the Military Judges’ Benchbook (DA Pam 27-9, 2025) has no separate involuntary-intoxication instruction, and trial judges have adapted the lack-of-mental-responsibility instructions (Instructions 6-4 and 6-7), under which the members first decide whether the elements are proved beyond a reasonable doubt and only then whether the accused has proved the defense by clear and convincing evidence (see United States v. Rice, 2021). When automatism is reasonably raised, members should be instructed that it may negate the actus reus, and the prosecution must prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt (United States v. Torres, 2015); that case involved an epileptic seizure, not intoxication.

An accused may not be tried while unable, because of mental disease or defect, to understand the proceedings or to cooperate intelligently in the defense (R.C.M. 909(a)), and questions of capacity or responsibility may be referred for a mental examination under R.C.M. 706. An accused who cannot recall the offense may still plead guilty if satisfied from the evidence of guilt (Luebs, 1971). In federal court, the D.C. Circuit held that amnesia does not per se render a defendant incompetent, and that the trial court should assess, after trial, whether the amnesia deprived the defendant of a fair trial, considering factors such as the extent to which the defendant could reconstruct the events from other evidence and the strength of the government’s case (Wilson v. United States, 1968). In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court upheld a state law barring consideration of voluntary intoxication in determining mental state (Montana v. Egelhoff, 1996). At federal sentencing, courts consider the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); the 2025 Guidelines amendment removed most departure provisions from the Guidelines Manual and compiled them in an appendix, describing the change as outcome neutral and not limiting the information courts may consider under § 3553(a) (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2025a, 2025b). In courts-martial, intoxication evidence may be offered in extenuation and mitigation under R.C.M. 1001.

Arizona

Arizona provides that temporary intoxication resulting from the voluntary ingestion, consumption, inhalation, or injection of alcohol, an illegal substance, or other psychoactive substances, or the abuse of prescribed medications, is not insanity and is not a defense for any criminal act or requisite state of mind (A.R.S. § 13-503; RAJI (Criminal) 5.03-1a). Intoxication from the non-abusive use of a prescribed medication, or from substances administered without the defendant’s knowledge or against the defendant’s will, may be considered on the required mental state (State v. McKeon, 2002; State v. Edmisten, 2009; RAJI (Criminal) Standard 39). Arizona does not permit expert evidence of a mental condition short of insanity to negate mens rea (State v. Mott, 1997), a rule the Supreme Court upheld (Clark v. Arizona, 2006). A defendant may be found guilty except insane only on clear and convincing proof of a mental disease or defect so severe that the defendant did not know the act was wrong, and mental disease or defect does not include disorders resulting from acute voluntary intoxication or withdrawal (A.R.S. § 13-502; RAJI (Criminal) 5.02-1).

Criminal liability requires a voluntary act, defined as a bodily movement performed consciously and as a result of effort and determination (A.R.S. §§ 13-105(42), 13-201; RAJI (Criminal) Standard 35). The statute does not list examples, and the Arizona Supreme Court has described a voluntary act as a determined, conscious movement, in contrast to a reflex (State v. Lara, 1995). Arizona’s competency rule asks whether a mental illness, defect, or disability leaves the defendant unable to understand the proceedings or assist in the defense (Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.1), and the Arizona Supreme Court held that limited amnesia for the events of the crime did not make an otherwise competent defendant incompetent, noting that each case turns on its own facts and that a continuance may be appropriate where recovery is possible (State v. McClendon, 1968). At sentencing, mitigating circumstances include significantly impaired capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct or to conform it to the law, and any other factor relevant to the defendant’s character or background (A.R.S. § 13-701(E)(2), (E)(6)). In capital cases applying the parallel provision, the Arizona Supreme Court has weighed claimed intoxication by asking whether the evidence showed that it significantly impaired the defendant’s capacity at the time of the offense (State v. Kayer, 1999; State v. Medina, 1999). Decisions of that period that refused to weigh nonstatutory mitigation, such as a history of substance abuse, unless it was causally connected to the crime were held to violate the Constitution (McKinney v. Ryan, 2015), and Arizona courts now consider such evidence without requiring a causal link, although the strength of any connection may affect the weight it receives.

Other Jurisdictions Compared

The summaries below state only what each provision’s current text says, as of November 2026. How courts apply them, including which offenses count as specific-intent crimes, varies and must be checked for the jurisdiction in question.

Arizona. Voluntary intoxication is not a defense for any criminal act or requisite state of mind (A.R.S. § 13-503).

Courts-martial. Voluntary intoxication is not a defense, but evidence of it may be introduced to raise a reasonable doubt about actual knowledge, specific intent, willfulness, or a premeditated design to kill when one of those is an element (R.C.M. 916(l)(2)).

California. Evidence of voluntary intoxication may not be admitted to negate the capacity to form a mental state; it is admissible solely on whether the defendant actually formed a required specific intent or, in a murder charge, whether the defendant premeditated, deliberated, or harbored express malice aforethought (Cal. Penal Code § 29.4).

Montana. An intoxicated condition is not a defense to any offense and may not be considered in determining a mental state that is an element, unless the defendant proves that he or she did not know the substance was intoxicating when ingesting it (Mont. Code Ann. § 45-2-203). This is the section at issue in Montana v. Egelhoff (1996) (plurality opinion).

New York. Intoxication is not, as such, a defense, but the defendant may offer evidence of it whenever it is relevant to negate an element of the crime charged (N.Y. Penal Law § 15.25).

Texas. Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to the commission of a crime; evidence of temporary insanity caused by intoxication may be introduced in mitigation of the penalty (Tex. Penal Code § 8.04(a)–(b)).

Federal courts. Federal courts of appeals apply the common-law distinction between specific-intent and general-intent crimes: voluntary intoxication can negate culpability for the former but not the latter, and whether an offense is one or the other is decided offense by offense (United States v. Lamott, 2016, holding assault by strangulation under 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(8) a general-intent crime).

None of these rules turns on amnesia itself. Whether intoxication evidence may be considered depends on the jurisdiction’s rule and on whether it bears on an element, and a claimed memory gap does not by itself change that analysis.

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports several propositions prosecutors can legitimately present. A blackout is defined by a failure to form memories, observers in the studies reviewed reported organized behavior during blackouts, and amnesia afterward does not by itself establish automatism. No single test confirms a claimed blackout, by an accused or a complainant, and evidence of preparation, statements, and conduct during and after the event remains a proper basis for inferring mental state. In Arizona, voluntary intoxication is not a defense to any mental state and diminished-capacity evidence is barred, and in courts-martial intoxication bears only on the specified mental elements and cannot make a mistaken belief reasonable.

The research also counsels caution. It does not show that an intoxicated accused formed the required intent, and an expert’s description of organized behavior in laboratory blackouts is not evidence of a particular accused’s state of mind. In courts-martial, evidence of heavy intoxication may legitimately raise reasonable doubt about specific intent or knowledge, and an accused’s amnesia may bear on the fairness of trial if it is shown. A claimed blackout is assessed against the evidence, like any party’s claim, and is neither accepted nor rejected because it may be convenient.

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports several propositions defense counsel can legitimately present. Alcohol impairs inhibitory control and narrows attention, more so at higher doses, and in courts-martial that evidence may raise a reasonable doubt about actual knowledge, specific intent, willfulness, or premeditation; military instructions also treat an inability to remember as one factor on the extent of intoxication and on voluntariness. An accused who cannot remember the events may be limited in assisting the defense, and courts assess whether trial is fair in light of amnesia. Intoxication evidence may be offered in extenuation and mitigation, and in Arizona impaired capacity is a statutory mitigating circumstance where the evidence supports it.

The research also counsels caution about the limits that apply to the defense. A blackout does not show that conduct was involuntary or that intent was absent, and no research has measured intent during a blackout. In Arizona, voluntary intoxication cannot negate any mental state and expert diminished-capacity evidence is barred. An accused’s claimed amnesia cannot be verified by any single test, and details the accused later learns from discovery may be reported as memory. Courts generally do not treat amnesia alone as incompetence.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

Bourget, D., & Whitehurst, L. (2007). Amnesia and crime. Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 35(4), 469–480.

Cunnien, A. J. (1986). Alcoholic blackouts: Phenomenology and legal relevance. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 4(1), 73–85. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.2370040106

Department of the Army. (2025). Military judges’ benchbook (DA Pamphlet 27-9, 29 July 2025).

Goodwin, D. W., Crane, J. B., & Guze, S. B. (1969a). Alcoholic “blackouts”: A review and clinical study of 100 alcoholics. American Journal of Psychiatry, 126(2), 191–198. https://doi.org/10.1176/ajp.126.2.191

Jelicic, M. (2018). Testing claims of crime-related amnesia. Frontiers in Psychiatry, 9, Article 617. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyt.2018.00617

Kloft, L., Monds, L. A., Blokland, A., Ramaekers, J. G., & Otgaar, H. (2021). Hazy memories in the courtroom: A review of alcohol and other drug effects on false memory and suggestibility. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 124, 291–307. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2021.02.012

Manual for courts-martial, United States (2024 ed.). (2024). U.S. Department of Defense.

McPhee, M. D., & Hendershot, C. S. (2023). Meta-analysis of acute alcohol effects on response inhibition. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 152, Article 105274. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105274

Nash, R. A., & Takarangi, M. K. T. (2011). Reconstructing alcohol-induced memory blackouts. Memory, 19(6), 566–573. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2011.590508

Pressman, M. R., & Caudill, D. S. (2013). Alcohol-induced blackout as a criminal defense or mitigating factor: An evidence-based review and admissibility as scientific evidence. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 58(4), 932–940. https://doi.org/10.1111/1556-4029.12134

Steele, C. M., & Josephs, R. A. (1990). Alcohol myopia: Its prized and dangerous effects. American Psychologist, 45(8), 921–933. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.45.8.921

Sweeney, D. F. (1990). Alcoholic blackouts: Legal implications. Journal of Substance Abuse Treatment, 7(3), 155–159. https://doi.org/10.1016/0740-5472(90)90016-J

U.S. Sentencing Commission. (2025a). Amendments in brief: Simplification [Amendment effective November 1, 2025]. https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/amendments-in-brief/AIB_2025-simplification.pdf

U.S. Sentencing Commission. (2025b). Guidelines manual (Chapter One). https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2025/CHAPTER_1.pdf

Wetherill, R. R., & Fromme, K. (2016). Alcohol-induced blackouts: A review of recent clinical research with practical implications and recommendations for future studies. Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research, 40(5), 922–935. https://doi.org/10.1111/acer.13051

White, A. M. (2003). What happened? Alcohol, memory blackouts, and the brain. Alcohol Research & Health, 27(2), 186–196.

Legal Authorities

Dep’t of the Army, Pam. 27-9, Military Judges’ Benchbook (July 29, 2025), Instructions 5-21 (voluntary intoxication), 6-4 and 6-7 (lack of mental responsibility).

United States v. Rice, No. ACM 39071 (reh) (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Jan. 29, 2021) (unpublished).

Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006).

Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).

McKinney v. Ryan, 813 F.3d 798 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).

Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996) (plurality opinion).

State v. Edmisten, 220 Ariz. 517, 207 P.3d 770 (App. 2009).

State v. Kayer, 194 Ariz. 423, 984 P.2d 31 (1999).

State v. Lara, 183 Ariz. 233, 902 P.2d 1337 (1995).

State v. McClendon, 103 Ariz. 105, 437 P.2d 421 (1968) (amnesia and competency holding not affected; the former-jeopardy ruling in the opinion was later displaced, see State v. Maloney, 105 Ariz. 348, 464 P.2d 793 (1970)).

State v. McKeon, 201 Ariz. 571, 38 P.3d 1236 (App. 2002).

State v. Medina, 193 Ariz. 504, 975 P.2d 94 (1999).

State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 931 P.2d 1046 (1997).

United States v. Lamott, 831 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2016).

United States v. Luebs, 20 C.M.A. 475, 43 C.M.R. 315 (1971).

United States v. MacDonald, 73 M.J. 426 (C.A.A.F. 2014).

United States v. Olvera, 4 C.M.A. 134, 15 C.M.R. 134 (1954).

United States v. Torres, 74 M.J. 154 (C.A.A.F. 2015).

Wilson v. United States, 391 F.2d 460 (D.C. Cir. 1968).

18 U.S.C. §§ 113(a)(8), 3553(a).

Cal. Penal Code § 29.4.

Mont. Code Ann. § 45-2-203.

N.Y. Penal Law § 15.25.

Tex. Penal Code § 8.04.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-105, 13-201, 13-502, 13-503, 13-701(E).

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.1.

Fed. R. Evid. 704(b).

Rule for Courts-Martial 706, 909, 916(j), (k), (l), 1001.

Revised Arizona Jury Instructions (Criminal) (6th ed. 2022), Standard 35, Standard 39, 5.02-1, 5.03-1a.

Related topic papers: Assessing a Claimed Blackout: Convergent Evidence, Malingering, and Limits · Sleep, Parasomnia, and “Sexsomnia” Versus Blackout · Alcohol and Aggression · Blacked Out Versus Passed Out · Alcohol Blackouts in the Courtroom: Expert Testimony and Admissibility · Alcohol-Involved Cases: Practice Issues for the Defense

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Counterintuitive Testimony: Alcohol, Blackouts, and Memory in Sexual Assault Cases · Memory in the Courtroom: Intoxication and Memory · Courts-Martial