Snap Shot
- The question: What do alcohol-related memory gaps say about what happened, about capacity to consent, and about the reliability of either party’s account?
- What the research shows: A widely cited review estimated that about half of sexual assaults involve alcohol. A blackout is a failure to form memories, not unconsciousness; in one sample, fragmentary blackouts were more common than en bloc blackouts, and cues can restore some lost material. In a meta-analysis of experimental studies, intoxication moderately reduced correct details recalled without significantly increasing incorrect ones; suggestibility findings are mixed. Women generally reach higher BACs than men from the same dose.
- What it does not show: A blackout is not evidence of incapacity, unconsciousness, or consent, and apparent coordination does not settle capacity. No after-the-fact test has been shown to verify or refute a claimed blackout by anyone; real-time testing during drinking is a research tool (Miller et al., 2026) that is not available after the event. The research describes group tendencies and cannot say whether a particular person was capable of consenting or remembers accurately.
- The law: Article 120 and A.R.S. §§ 13-1401 and 13-1406 cover incapacity due to intoxication that the accused knew or reasonably should have known of. Mendoza holds that lack of consent and incapacity are separate theories; voluntary intoxication is not a defense (R.C.M. 916(l)(2); A.R.S. § 13-503), and mistake of fact must be honest and reasonable (DiPaola).
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors should separate memory loss from incapacity and document the sources of reconstructed details; defense counsel may stress that a blackout is not unconsciousness and that reconstruction carries risk, while recognizing that memory gaps are common in true cases and the same limits apply to the accused’s account.
Alcohol is present in a large share of sexual assault cases and shapes many of the disputed questions in them. A complainant may remember the beginning of an evening and then nothing until waking; an accused may describe a consensual encounter or may also report gaps; friends may supply fragments that neither party recalls. Sexual assault is common and substantially underreported. In the National Crime Victimization Survey, about one in four rape and sexual assault victimizations were reported to police in 2024 (23.6%); the estimate has varied considerably from year to year (46.0% in 2023), so no single figure should be treated as fixed (Tapp & Coen, 2025). Gaps in memory after heavy drinking occur in many true cases, and their presence says nothing by itself about whether an assault occurred.
Alcohol reaches the courtroom in three distinct ways. It bears on the reliability of memory, because intoxication affects what is encoded and how it is later reported. It bears on capacity, because both military and Arizona law make a sexual act with a person who is incapable of consenting due to intoxication a crime when the accused knew or reasonably should have known of that condition. And it bears on the accused’s own perception, memory, and mental state. Expert testimony on these issues is offered by both prosecution and defense, and testimony that confuses them, for example by equating a blackout with incapacity or with consent, can mislead a factfinder in either direction.
This paper summarizes research on alcohol involvement in sexual assault, alcohol-induced blackouts, the distinction between a blackout and unconsciousness, and the effects of intoxication on recall and suggestibility, applying each to complainants and accused persons alike. It then reviews military and Arizona law. Broader treatment of blackouts appears in the Alcohol Blackouts resource; this paper is confined to the intersection of alcohol, memory, and sexual assault allegations.
How Often Alcohol Is Involved
A widely cited review estimated that approximately half of sexual assaults involve alcohol consumption by the perpetrator, the victim, or both (Abbey et al., 2001). A later review reached a similar conclusion, found alcohol-involved assault especially common among college women, and emphasized that responsibility rests primarily with offenders (Lorenz & Ullman, 2016). In the Campus Sexual Assault Study, a random sample of 5,446 undergraduate women, almost 20% reported a completed sexual assault since entering college, and most of those assaults occurred after the women had voluntarily consumed alcohol; few followed covert drugging (Krebs et al., 2009). Reviews of college samples report that a majority of rapes of college women occur when the victim is too intoxicated to resist, a category researchers call incapacitated rape (Testa & Livingston, 2009). Alcohol-related assaults often involve drinking by both people: in a review of college studies, in 81% of the alcohol-related assaults reported by college men (Abbey et al., 1998) and 97% of those reported by college women (Harrington & Leitenberg, 1994), both the victim and the perpetrator had consumed alcohol (Abbey, 2002). These are self-report survey figures from college samples; they do not show what either person remembers, whether either was capable of consenting, or what occurred in any particular encounter. Clinical records show the same overlap with memory loss. In a retrospective review of 209 women seen at one Geneva emergency department after alleged sexual assault, 76.1% of cases involved intoxication and 45.9% involved total or partial amnesia, which was more frequent among younger, intoxicated women and those assaulted by unknown persons (Jantzi et al., 2026). Memory loss may also affect which cases reach the legal system: among 655 patients at a U.S. hospital forensic nursing program, complete memory loss predicted lower odds of reporting to police (odds ratio 0.45), while intermittent memory loss did not (Goodman-Williams et al., 2026). Most of this research concerns women. In the 2014 RAND survey of service members, alcohol was involved in 25% of men’s sexual assaults and 41% of women’s (Morral et al., 2016; see the paper on male complainants and sexual assault in military settings).
These surveys define assault and incapacitation in research terms, usually by self-report. They establish that intoxicated persons are frequently victimized; they do not establish what happened in any particular encounter, and their definitions of incapacitation do not necessarily match statutory elements.
Blackouts: Fragmentary and En Bloc
An alcohol-induced blackout is a period of amnesia for events that occurred while the person was drinking. Early clinical descriptions came from studies of patients with alcoholism (Goodwin et al., 1969); later research established that blackouts are common among young adult drinkers who are not alcohol dependent. A review of research published from 2010 to 2015 reported that roughly half of drinkers report having experienced a blackout and concluded that individual differences, not consumption alone, affect who experiences them (Wetherill & Fromme, 2016). In a national sample of emerging adults one year after high school, 20% of those who drank reported a blackout in the prior six months; blackouts were more likely among those who drank heavily or used multiple drugs and, after adjustment for drinking, drug use, and body weight, among women (adjusted odds ratio 1.6), although the unadjusted difference (22% of women, 17% of men) was not significant (Hingson et al., 2016). In an earlier college survey, women who reported a recent blackout had drunk far less than men who did (White et al., 2002), but the 2010–2015 review found studies of sex differences inconsistent, some reporting greater risk for women, some no difference, and one higher rates among men (Wetherill & Fromme, 2016).
Researchers distinguish two forms. An en bloc blackout is a dense, usually permanent loss of memory for a period; a fragmentary blackout is partial, with islands of memory, and some lost material can be retrieved when the person is given cues (Hartzler & Fromme, 2003; White, 2003). In a sample of 136 heavy-drinking young adults, fragmentary blackouts were more than three times as common as en bloc blackouts, the two types were reported at similar ranges of blood alcohol concentration (BAC), and most en bloc episodes (61.9%) involved concurrent use of illicit drugs, most often marijuana (Hartzler & Fromme, 2003). Blackouts are associated with rapid increases in BAC and high peak levels, and the underlying mechanism is a disruption of the brain’s ability to transfer new information into long-term storage; much of the cellular evidence for that mechanism comes from animal research, and White (2003) reviews both the human and animal findings. A blackout does not erase memories formed before drinking.
The fragmentary form has direct forensic implications. Because cued retrieval can restore some lost material, a person who later recalls more than she or he initially reported is not necessarily fabricating; a fragmentary blackout predicts exactly that pattern. The same feature means that cues supplied by others, such as text messages, photographs, or friends’ accounts, can either restore genuine memories or introduce information the person never encoded. Nothing in the research allows an observer to tell, from the recollection alone, which has occurred.
A Blackout Is Not Unconsciousness
A blackout is a failure of memory formation, not a loss of consciousness. A person in a blackout is awake and can walk, talk, and engage in complex behavior that may appear purposeful to others; the person simply does not form lasting memories of it (White, 2003). Passing out, by contrast, is a loss of consciousness. The two can occur in the same evening, and a person may move from one to the other.
Two consequences follow, and they cut in different directions. First, a complainant’s absence of memory does not, by itself, establish that the complainant was unconscious, asleep, or incapable of consenting; it establishes that memories were not formed or cannot now be retrieved. Second, the fact that a person was walking, talking, or texting does not establish that the person was capable of appraising the nature of a sexual act. High levels of intoxication narrow attention to the most salient immediate cues and impair judgment about less salient information, an effect described as alcohol myopia (Steele & Josephs, 1990). Behavior that looks coordinated to an observer can coexist with substantial cognitive impairment.
A related limit applies to claims about the accused. A 2013 review of the empirical literature found no objective method to verify that a blackout occurred, either while it was occurring or afterward, and concluded that claims of alcohol blackout were not shown to meet scientific admissibility standards when offered to excuse a defendant’s conduct (Pressman & Caudill, 2013). The review’s conclusion that cognitive functions other than memory are largely spared should be read as a summary of the studies reviewed rather than a finding about any particular level of intoxication. Real-time measures have since been tested in research. In a prospective study of 63 young adults with recurrent blackouts who completed brief memory tests on their phones while drinking over 30 days, failing a recall test was associated with blackout but was not diagnostic (blackout was reported on 39% of days with a failed test), while correct recall on every test made blackout unlikely (no blackout was reported on 92% of those days) (Miller et al., 2026). The reference standard was the participants’ own later report, and such tests exist only if given during the drinking episode. The underlying point applies to every party: whether a complainant or an accused says “I blacked out,” no after-the-fact test has been shown to confirm or refute the statement, and the claim must be weighed against the rest of the evidence.
Capacity and Incapacity
Capacity to consent is a legal question. Research can describe how intoxication generally affects attention, judgment, coordination, and memory, and it can explain why a blackout and incapacity are different concepts. It cannot determine whether a particular person, at a particular moment, was incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct or of communicating unwillingness; that depends on the statutory definition and the full record, including descriptions of speech, balance, vomiting, responsiveness, and the timing of drinking. An expert may explain that a blackout is not itself a measure of capacity, that observable signs of severe intoxication bear on capacity, and that BAC estimates from reported drinks are uncertain because drink counts, sizes, and timing are often imprecise. Sex also matters: women generally reach higher BACs than men after equivalent doses, even when adjusted for body weight, partly because of lower total body water, and some studies have found greater alcohol-related impairment of delayed memory and divided attention in women, though not of psychomotor performance (Mumenthaler et al., 1999). Equal drink counts therefore do not imply equal intoxication for a complainant and an accused, and the difference describes groups, not how impaired a particular person was. An expert who tells the factfinder that a person was or was not capable of consent has moved from science to the ultimate legal question, which the law assigns to the trier of fact.
Effects on Encoding and Recall
The best current summary of experimental research is a meta-analysis of studies in which participants witnessed an event while sober or intoxicated and were later asked to recall it (Jores et al., 2019). Intoxication produced a moderate reduction in the number of correct details recalled (Hedges’ g = 0.40) but no significant increase in the number of incorrect details. The reduction depended on intoxication level, the delay before recall, and whether recall was free or cued. In practical terms, intoxicated witnesses in these studies tended to report less, not to report more errors.
Studies using sexual assault scenarios show a similar pattern. Women who engaged in an interactive hypothetical sexual assault scenario after drinking alcohol answered “don’t know” more often at later testing, but the accuracy of what they did report did not differ from that of sober participants, suggesting that intoxicated participants were monitoring the accuracy of their memories; peripheral details were less accurate than central details regardless of intoxication (Flowe et al., 2016). In a later balanced-placebo study of 90 women (mean breath alcohol 0.06%) using a similar scenario, alcohol did not affect accuracy a week later for the perpetrator’s behaviors, consensual activity was recalled highly accurately, and accuracy rose with confidence, although participants were overconfident overall (Stevens et al., 2023). A study of witnesses with low to moderate BAC (below 0.10%) found no main effect of alcohol on the quantity or quality of statements, and witnesses interviewed twice provided about 30% new details in the second interview, most of them accurate (Hagsand et al., 2017).
Higher intoxication appears to matter. In a field study of 67 bar patrons who took part in a mock crime, moderate and high intoxication were associated with poorer recall both immediately and when participants were retested sober several days later (van Oorsouw et al., 2015). Most laboratory studies, for ethical reasons, dose participants to BAC levels well below those described in many sexual assault cases, so the laboratory findings may understate effects at the highest levels and do not address blackout-level intoxication directly. Lane and Houston (2021, pp. 33–34) note that laboratory studies are generally capped near 0.08% BAC, below the average of about 0.11% in archival studies of real crimes, and describe a bar field study (BACs up to 0.29%) in which intoxication reduced the accuracy and completeness of recall but not identification of the perpetrator from a photo lineup (Altman et al., 2018, as cited in Lane & Houston, 2021). Field studies give up experimental control, including over other substances participants may have used, so the higher-dose findings carry their own limits.
Intoxication, Suggestibility, and Reconstruction
The question of whether intoxicated persons are more susceptible to suggestion has produced mixed findings. In the field study described above, highly intoxicated participants were more likely to accept suggestive cues, and the effect persisted after they sobered (van Oorsouw et al., 2015). In contrast, participants who drank alcohol after witnessing a simulated crime were less likely than sober controls to report misleading information they encountered later, a pattern attributed to alcohol-induced retrograde facilitation (Gawrylowicz et al., 2017). In a hypothetical rape scenario with a mean BAC of 0.06%, participants who had consumed alcohol were no more likely than sober participants to report misleading post-event information (Flowe et al., 2019). Among pub patrons who watched a mock crime and then a co-witness statement containing both correct and false details, greater intoxication was associated with lower confidence, completeness, and accuracy, but not with a greater tendency to adopt the false information; exposure to correct co-witness information improved accuracy regardless of intoxication (Bartlett, Albery, et al., 2022). A comprehensive review concluded that alcohol is most likely to increase susceptibility to suggestion and false memory at high intoxication levels or after a delay (Kloft et al., 2021).
Blackouts add a further consideration. After a blackout, people commonly try to reconstruct what happened, and a survey of university students found that they rely heavily on external sources, sometimes unreliable ones, and may relax the standards they use to judge whether a recollection is genuine; in some cases reconstruction appeared to produce false beliefs or memories (Nash & Takarangi, 2011). That finding does not mean a reconstructed account is inaccurate. It means that when a person’s account of a blackout period rests partly on what others said, the sources of each detail matter. The companion paper on memory contamination addresses those processes in more detail.
Complainants and Accused Persons Alike
Every finding summarized above applies equally to an accused who was drinking. In three experiments with sober participants (total N = 1,341) randomly assigned the role of complainant or accused in a sexual assault scenario, susceptibility to misinformation did not differ by role (Greene et al., 2025). The accused’s account of consent, of the complainant’s words or behavior, or of the accused’s own conduct is subject to the same encoding deficits, the same gap-filling, and the same influence from later conversations with friends, investigators, or counsel. Law enforcement officers report that intoxicated witnesses and suspects are common (Evans et al., 2009). An accused’s claim of no memory cannot be verified any more than a complainant’s can (Pressman & Caudill, 2013), and an accused’s detailed account of a period of heavy intoxication warrants the same scrutiny of sources as a complainant’s. Expert testimony that applies these principles only to one party’s account is not supported by the research.
Perceptions of intoxicated witnesses can also diverge from the recall research. In an online study of 281 participants, a witness shown drinking wine was rated less credible than one drinking a soft drink, yet participants were as likely to adopt that witness’s misinformation (Bartlett, Gawrylowicz, et al., 2022).
Limits of the Evidence
Alcohol and memory studies use mock crimes or scripted scenarios, usually with college-age participants, at intoxication levels capped by ethical limits; participants are not threatened or harmed, so the effects of an actual assault on encoding are absent. The sexual assault scenario studies (Flowe et al., 2016, 2019; Stevens et al., 2023) tested only women; whether intoxicated men recall a sexual encounter the same way has not been tested in that paradigm, and two mixed-sex eyewitness studies cited here did not compare men and women (Gawrylowicz et al., 2017; Bartlett, Albery, et al., 2022). Blackout research relies largely on retrospective self-report and lacks a standardized assessment (Wetherill & Fromme, 2016); even the first real-time memory tests used participants’ later reports as the reference standard (Miller et al., 2026). No study, test, or calculation has been shown to establish whether a particular person was in a blackout, was capable of consenting, or remembers accurately; the research describes group tendencies with substantial individual variation. It can inform the factfinder’s evaluation of an account but cannot substitute for it.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When an expert cites the estimate that about half of sexual assaults involve alcohol (Abbey et al., 2001), counsel can ask what was counted and how it was defined. When the finding that intoxication reduced correct details without significantly increasing incorrect ones (Jores et al., 2019) is offered to support a complainant’s account, counsel can ask who was studied, because most studies dosed participants well below many case levels. When the finding that highly intoxicated bar patrons accepted more suggestive cues (van Oorsouw et al., 2015) is offered to question a reconstructed account, counsel can ask how much evidence it rests on and whether it has held up, given 67 participants and differing results elsewhere (Gawrylowicz et al., 2017; Flowe et al., 2019). When Pressman and Caudill (2013) are cited to discount an accused’s claimed blackout, counsel can ask whether the conclusion follows from the design: the review found no objective method to verify a blackout, and none yet exists for use after the fact; that limit applies equally to a complainant’s claim. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Alcohol, Memory, and Capacity and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
Article 120, UCMJ, defines sexual assault to include a sexual act committed without the consent of the other person (Art. 120(b)(2)(A)); when the accused knows or reasonably should know that the other person is asleep, unconscious, or otherwise unaware that the act is occurring (Art. 120(b)(2)(B)); and when the other person is incapable of consenting due to impairment by any drug, intoxicant, or other similar substance, and that condition is known or reasonably should be known by the accused (Art. 120(b)(3)(A)). Consent means a freely given agreement by a competent person; a sleeping, unconscious, or incompetent person cannot consent; and all the surrounding circumstances are considered (Art. 120(g)(7)). Since January 1, 2019, the statute has defined “incapable of consenting” to mean incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct at issue, or physically incapable of declining participation in, or communicating unwillingness to engage in, the sexual act (Art. 120(g)(8)). The federal civilian offense of sexual abuse uses parallel language (18 U.S.C. § 2242(2)).
Under the earlier version of the statute, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces approved definitions describing a competent person as one with the physical and mental ability to consent and describing incapacity as lacking the cognitive ability to appreciate the sexual conduct or the physical or mental ability to make or communicate a decision about it (United States v. Pease, 2016). In United States v. Mendoza (2024), the court held that lack of consent under Article 120(b)(2)(A) and incapacity under Article 120(b)(3)(A) are separate theories of liability, that the government may not charge one and argue the other at trial, and that the government cannot prove absence of consent under (b)(2)(A) merely by establishing that the victim was too intoxicated to consent, although evidence of intoxication remains admissible on the question of consent. In United States v. Moore (2026), the court applied the same rule to a complainant who was asleep, so that evidence of sleep alone cannot prove absence of consent, but held that evidence is legally sufficient if a rational factfinder could find that the complainant did not consent before falling asleep and that the act then occurred while the complainant was asleep. Moore also restated the holding of United States v. Casillas (2025) that evidence may be legally sufficient where the complainant was asleep when the act began, awoke before it was complete, and did not consent while awake, and it stressed that legal sufficiency does not settle factual sufficiency. In United States v. Serjak (2026), the court applied Moore’s before-sleep principle where the complainant testified that she had not consented before she fell asleep or became too intoxicated to consent, and remanded for a new factual sufficiency review without expressing a view on the outcome. In another case decided the same day, the court noted trial testimony from a defense psychologist that a person in an alcohol blackout is not necessarily too intoxicated to engage in consensual sexual activity and remanded for a further factual sufficiency review without expressing a view on the outcome (United States v. Hennessy, 2026).
An accused’s own intoxication is treated differently. Voluntary intoxication is not a defense, although it may be considered on elements requiring actual knowledge, specific intent, willfulness, or premeditation (R.C.M. 916(l)(2)). A mistake of fact as to consent is an affirmative defense only if the belief was both honestly held and reasonable under all the circumstances (R.C.M. 916(j)(1); United States v. DiPaola, 2008). Expert testimony on alcohol and memory is governed by Military Rule of Evidence 702 and the factors identified in United States v. Houser (1993). Military Rule of Evidence 702 tracks Federal Rule of Evidence 702, whose December 1, 2023 amendment became part of the military rule in 2025 under the eighteen-month provision of Military Rule of Evidence 1102: the proponent must show the military judge that it is more likely than not that each admissibility requirement is met, so gaps in an expert’s basis or in the application of the method are questions of admissibility rather than of weight for the members (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025).
Arizona
Arizona defines sexual assault as intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact with any person without that person’s consent (A.R.S. § 13-1406). “Without consent” includes circumstances in which the victim is incapable of consent by reason of mental disorder, mental defect, drugs, alcohol, sleep, or any other similar impairment of cognition, and the condition is known or should reasonably have been known to the defendant (A.R.S. § 13-1401(A)(7)(b)). For an accused, Arizona provides that temporary intoxication from voluntary consumption of alcohol is not a defense to a criminal act or to a required mental state (A.R.S. § 13-503). Expert testimony is governed by Arizona Rule of Evidence 702, amended in 2012 to follow the federal rule and Daubert; under State v. Salazar-Mercado (2014), an expert may offer general educational testimony without applying it to the facts, provided the testimony satisfies Rule 702 and survives Rule 403. Testimony about alcohol’s general effects on memory and judgment fits that model; testimony that a particular person was or was not capable of consent moves into the factfinder’s province.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party may need to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports several propositions prosecutors can legitimately present. Alcohol is involved in a large share of sexual assaults, and intoxicated persons are frequently victimized. Memory gaps after heavy drinking are common and do not suggest fabrication; fragmentary blackouts predict partial recall and later retrieval of additional material when cues are encountered. Meta-analytic evidence indicates that intoxicated witnesses generally report less rather than report more errors, and that what they do report is often as accurate as sober witnesses’ reports at moderate levels. A person can appear to function while severely impaired, so apparent coordination does not settle capacity. Because women generally reach higher BACs per dose, an argument that a complainant who drank no more than the accused could not have been more impaired is not supported by the research, although the group difference cannot show how impaired a particular person was. Testimony keeps its supported scope when it is framed as general education, distinguishes memory loss from incapacity, and leaves the capacity determination to the factfinder.
The research also counsels caution. A complainant’s blackout is not evidence of incapacity, and after Mendoza the charging theory matters: intoxication evidence alone does not prove lack of consent under Article 120(b)(2)(A). The suggestibility findings are mixed, and at high intoxication some studies show increased susceptibility that persists after sobering, so the sources of a complainant’s reconstructed details deserve careful documentation. Early, recorded, non-leading interviews, and records of what the complainant learned from others and when, strengthen rather than weaken the evidentiary value of a later account.
Special Issues for Defense
The research supports several propositions defense counsel can legitimately present. A blackout is a memory failure, not unconsciousness, and a person in a blackout may engage in complex, apparently purposeful behavior; a complainant’s lack of memory therefore does not by itself establish that she or he was unconscious or incapable. Reconstruction of a blackout period from external sources can produce beliefs that are not based on memory, and at high levels of intoxication some studies find increased suggestibility. Expert testimony that explains these principles, and that asks whether the factfinder has evidence of the complainant’s condition other than the absence of memory, is grounded in the literature.
The research also counsels caution about the limits that apply to the defense. Group research on stress, alcohol, and discussion shows how memory can be affected; it cannot show that a particular complainant’s memory was. Memory gaps are common in true cases and are not evidence of a false report. Intoxicated witnesses in experimental studies are often accurate in what they report, and laboratory doses are generally lower than case doses in ways that do not uniformly favor either side. The same principles apply to the accused: an accused’s claim of blackout cannot be verified, voluntary intoxication does not make an unreasonable belief in consent reasonable, and an accused’s detailed account of a heavily intoxicated period is subject to the same reconstruction concerns. Testimony that applies the science evenly to both parties is more accurate.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Abbey, A. (2002). Alcohol-related sexual assault: A common problem among college students. Journal of Studies on Alcohol, Supplement 14, 118–128. https://doi.org/10.15288/jsas.2002.s14.118
Abbey, A., Zawacki, T., Buck, P. O., Clinton, A. M., & McAuslan, P. (2001). Alcohol and sexual assault. Alcohol Research & Health, 25(1), 43–51.
Bartlett, G., Albery, I. P., Frings, D., & Gawrylowicz, J. (2022). The effects of alcohol and co-witness information on memory reports: A field study. Psychopharmacology, 239(9), 2945–2953. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00213-022-06179-5
Bartlett, G., Gawrylowicz, J., Frings, D., & Albery, I. P. (2022). Would you believe an intoxicated witness? The impact of witness alcohol intoxication status on credibility judgments and suggestibility. Frontiers in Psychology, 13, Article 983681. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.983681
Evans, J. R., Schreiber Compo, N., & Russano, M. B. (2009). Intoxicated witnesses and suspects: Procedures and prevalence according to law enforcement. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 15(3), 194–221. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0016837
Flowe, H. D., Humphries, J. E., Takarangi, M. K. T., Zelek, K., Karoğlu, N., Gabbert, F., & Hope, L. (2019). An experimental examination of the effects of alcohol consumption and exposure to misleading postevent information on remembering a hypothetical rape scenario. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 33(3), 393–413. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3531
Flowe, H. D., Takarangi, M. K. T., Humphries, J. E., & Wright, D. S. (2016). Alcohol and remembering a hypothetical sexual assault: Can people who were under the influence of alcohol during the event provide accurate testimony? Memory, 24(8), 1042–1061. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2015.1064536
Gawrylowicz, J., Ridley, A. M., Albery, I. P., Barnoth, E., & Young, J. (2017). Alcohol-induced retrograde facilitation renders witnesses of crime less suggestible to misinformation. Psychopharmacology, 234(8), 1267–1275. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00213-017-4564-2
Goodman-Williams, R., Smith, S., Volz, J., & Hanna, A. (2026). Police reporting after sexual assault: Victim and assault characteristics that predict reporting among victims who seek medical forensic care. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 41(17–18), 6658–6679. https://doi.org/10.1177/08862605261455557
Goodwin, D. W., Crane, J. B., & Guze, S. B. (1969). Phenomenological aspects of the alcoholic “blackout.” British Journal of Psychiatry, 115(526), 1033–1038. https://doi.org/10.1192/bjp.115.526.1033
Greene, C. M., Brassil, M., & Murphy, G. (2025). He said, she said: The “accused” and “complainant” in a sexual assault scenario are equally susceptible to misinformation. Scientific Reports, 15(1), Article 27693. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-025-13587-y
Hagsand, A. V., Roos af Hjelmsäter, E., Granhag, P. A., Fahlke, C., & Söderpalm Gordh, A. (2017). Witnesses stumbling down memory lane: The effects of alcohol intoxication, retention interval, and repeated interviewing. Memory, 25(4), 531–543. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2016.1191652
Hartzler, B., & Fromme, K. (2003). Fragmentary and en bloc blackouts: Similarity and distinction among episodes of alcohol-induced memory loss. Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 64(4), 547–550. https://doi.org/10.15288/jsa.2003.64.547
Hingson, R., Zha, W., Simons-Morton, B., & White, A. (2016). Alcohol-induced blackouts as predictors of other drinking related harms among emerging young adults. Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research, 40(4), 776–784. https://doi.org/10.1111/acer.13010
Jantzi, C., Demessence, T., Niveau, G., Abdulcadir, J., & Fracasso, T. (2026). Is amnesia in women victims of sexual assault a risk factor for developing PTSD symptoms? Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 33(5), 1406–1413. https://doi.org/10.1080/13218719.2025.2546314
Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf
Jores, T., Colloff, M. F., Kloft, L., Smailes, H., & Flowe, H. D. (2019). A meta-analysis of the effects of acute alcohol intoxication on witness recall. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 33(3), 334–343. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3533
Kloft, L., Monds, L. A., Blokland, A., Ramaekers, J. G., & Otgaar, H. (2021). Hazy memories in the courtroom: A review of alcohol and other drug effects on false memory and suggestibility. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 124, 291–307. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2021.02.012
Krebs, C. P., Lindquist, C. H., Warner, T. D., Fisher, B. S., & Martin, S. L. (2009). College women’s experiences with physically forced, alcohol- or other drug-enabled, and drug-facilitated sexual assault before and since entering college. Journal of American College Health, 57(6), 639–647. https://doi.org/10.3200/JACH.57.6.639-649
Lane, S. M., & Houston, K. A. (2021). Understanding eyewitness memory: Theory and applications. New York University Press.
Lorenz, K., & Ullman, S. E. (2016). Alcohol and sexual assault victimization: Research findings and future directions. Aggression and Violent Behavior, 31, 82–94. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.avb.2016.08.001
Miller, M. B., Shoemaker, S. D., Freeman, L. K., Curtis, A. F., Merrill, J. E., & Merkle, E. C. (2026). Predictive value of real-time memory tests in identifying alcohol-induced blackouts in situ. Addiction, 121(8), 2166–2175. https://doi.org/10.1111/add.70446
Morral, A. R., Gore, K. L., & Schell, T. L. (Eds.). (2016). Sexual assault and sexual harassment in the U.S. military: Volume 2. Estimates for Department of Defense service members from the 2014 RAND Military Workplace Study (RR-870/2-1-OSD). RAND Corporation. https://doi.org/10.7249/RR870.2-1
Mumenthaler, M. S., Taylor, J. L., O’Hara, R., & Yesavage, J. A. (1999). Gender differences in moderate drinking effects. Alcohol Research & Health, 23(1), 55–64.
Nash, R. A., & Takarangi, M. K. T. (2011). Reconstructing alcohol-induced memory blackouts. Memory, 19(6), 566–573. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2011.590508
Pressman, M. R., & Caudill, D. S. (2013). Alcohol-induced blackout as a criminal defense or mitigating factor: An evidence-based review and admissibility as scientific evidence. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 58(4), 932–940. https://doi.org/10.1111/1556-4029.12134
Steele, C. M., & Josephs, R. A. (1990). Alcohol myopia: Its prized and dangerous effects. American Psychologist, 45(8), 921–933. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.45.8.921
Stevens, L. M., Monds, L. A., Riordan, B., Hayre, R. K., & Flowe, H. D. (2023). Acute alcohol intoxication and alcohol expectancy effects on women’s memory for consensual and non-consensual sexual activity. Frontiers in Psychology, 13, Article 1008563. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.1008563
Tapp, S. N., & Coen, E. J. (2025). Criminal victimization, 2024 (NCJ 310547). U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics.
Testa, M., & Livingston, J. A. (2009). Alcohol consumption and women’s vulnerability to sexual victimization: Can reducing women’s drinking prevent rape? Substance Use & Misuse, 44(9–10), 1349–1376. https://doi.org/10.1080/10826080902961468
van Oorsouw, K., Merckelbach, H., & Smeets, T. (2015). Alcohol intoxication impairs memory and increases suggestibility for a mock crime: A field study. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 29(4), 493–501. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3129
Wetherill, R. R., & Fromme, K. (2016). Alcohol-induced blackouts: A review of recent clinical research with practical implications and recommendations for future studies. Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research, 40(5), 922–935. https://doi.org/10.1111/acer.13051
White, A. M. (2003). What happened? Alcohol, memory blackouts, and the brain. Alcohol Research & Health, 27(2), 186–196.
White, A. M., Jamieson-Drake, D. W., & Swartzwelder, H. S. (2002). Prevalence and correlates of alcohol-induced blackouts among college students: Results of an e-mail survey. Journal of American College Health, 51(3), 117–131. https://doi.org/10.1080/07448480209596339
Legal Authorities
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).
United States v. Casillas, 86 M.J. 94 (C.A.A.F. 2025).
United States v. DiPaola, 67 M.J. 98 (C.A.A.F. 2008).
United States v. Hennessy, 86 M.J. 315 (C.A.A.F. 2026) (No. 25-0112/AF, Jan. 23, 2026).
United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).
United States v. Mendoza, 85 M.J. 213 (C.A.A.F. 2024).
United States v. Moore, 86 M.J. 308 (C.A.A.F. 2026).
United States v. Pease, 75 M.J. 180 (C.A.A.F. 2016).
United States v. Serjak, 86 M.J. 319 (C.A.A.F. 2026).
10 U.S.C. § 920 (Article 120, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
18 U.S.C. § 2242.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-503.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1401.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1406.
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Ariz. R. Evid. 702.
Mil. R. Evid. 702.
Mil. R. Evid. 1102.
Rule for Courts-Martial 916(j), (l).
Related topic papers: Memory Contamination: Discussion, Interviews, and Post-Event Information · Inconsistent and Incomplete Accounts · Variability, Confounds, and Individual Differences in Responses to Sexual Assault · Admissibility of Counterintuitive Behavior Testimony · Male Complainants and Sexual Assault in Military Settings
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Alcohol Blackouts · Alcohol Blackouts: Alcohol Blackout / Amnesia · Memory in the Courtroom · Courts-Martial