Snap Shot
- The question: Do differences among a complainant’s accounts of a sexual assault show that the account is inaccurate or untrue?
- What the research shows: Strong emotion tends to strengthen memory for the central features of an event and weaken memory for peripheral details. In two laboratory studies, newly recalled details were generally about as accurate as details recalled immediately or consistently (Oeberst, 2012; Krix et al., 2015), while direct contradictions were associated with lower overall accuracy. Memory for highly stressful events can still be altered by post-event misinformation.
- What it does not show: Inconsistency is not a reliable indicator that an account is false, and consistency is not a reliable indicator that it is true. Objective evidence that trauma fragments memory is mixed, and the group-level research cannot say what caused a particular inconsistency.
- The law: Inconsistencies come in through Rule 613 impeachment; a federal amendment effective December 1, 2026, drops the oath requirement for substantive use of prior inconsistent statements, while the military rule keeps it until amended. Attacks on consistency or memory can open the door to prior consistent statements (Finch, Ruiz, Brown). Experts may explain memory principles but may not vouch (Brooks, Mullins, Lindsey).
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors should frame testimony as ordinary memory science rather than a trauma-based explanation for this complainant’s inconsistencies; defense counsel should focus on genuine contradictions and details that first appear after outside information, rather than treating every difference as fabrication.
A complainant’s account of a sexual assault is rarely given only once. It may be told to a friend, a nurse, a victim advocate, an investigator, a prosecutor, and finally a jury, and the versions seldom match exactly. Some details appear only in later accounts, others drop out, the sequence of events shifts, and occasionally two statements directly contradict each other. Defense counsel often argue that these differences show the account is unreliable or untrue. Prosecutors often respond with counterintuitive behavior testimony, meaning expert testimony explaining that behaviors jurors may not expect from a person who has been assaulted, here an inconsistent or incomplete account, are common among people who have been.
Both sides start from sound premises. Sexual assault is common and underreported, and inconsistencies appear in many accounts of assaults that were established or later substantiated; ordinary memory is reconstructive, and no one recounts a complex event identically each time. At the same time, memory for stressful events is not immune to error or to suggestion, and some inconsistencies reflect genuine inaccuracy. The research supports two propositions that both parties can fairly use: inconsistency has not been shown to be a reliable indicator that an account is false, and consistency has not been shown to be a reliable stand-alone indicator that it is true, although some research finds a modest relationship between consistency and accuracy.
This paper reviews research on memory for stressful and traumatic events, including the distinction between central and peripheral details; studies of how consistency across interviews relates to accuracy; the evidence for and against the claim that traumatic memories are inherently disorganized; and research showing that memory for highly stressful events remains open to distortion. Alcohol raises distinct questions, addressed in the paper on alcohol, blackouts, and memory. The paper closes with the law on prior inconsistent and consistent statements and on expert memory testimony.
Memory for Stressful Events: Central and Peripheral Details
A long line of research indicates that emotional arousal tends to strengthen memory for the central features or gist of an event while weakening memory for peripheral details, although the effects depend on the level and type of emotion, what counts as central, and when memory is tested (Reisberg & Heuer, 2007). Lane and Houston (2021) regard the pattern as well supported but conditional: studies have defined “central” in different ways with conflicting results, and where emotion arose from the meaning of a narrative rather than a shocking image, researchers have found better memory for both central and peripheral details, or fuller description of a perpetrator alongside poorer memory for his actions (pp. 105–107, 113–115). That pattern is consistent with what is often described in sexual assault cases, in which a complainant may describe the core acts consistently while being uncertain or inconsistent about times, clothing, the layout of a room, or the order of peripheral events.
Field studies of real traumatic events support the view that core memories for highly threatening experiences can be detailed and durable. Passengers aboard a transatlantic flight that nearly ditched at sea, whose shared experience allowed their recollections to be checked, showed robust enhancement of episodic detail for the event, and the richness and accuracy of their recollection did not differ between passengers with and without posttraumatic stress disorder (McKinnon et al., 2015). In a study of 44 women recruited from a sexual trauma agency, memories of sexual assault or abuse were not impaired or fragmented relative to memories of other traumas and positive events; they were rated as highly vivid, detailed, and sensory, and greater traumatic impact was not associated with memory impairment (Peace et al., 2008). These studies are useful to the prosecution because they contradict the assumption that a genuine traumatic memory must be vague, and to the defense because they contradict the opposite assumption that traumatic memories are characteristically fragmented.
High stress can, however, impair memory for some kinds of information. In a study of 509 military personnel in survival-school training, identification of an interrogator or guard was poorer after a high-stress interrogation involving physical confrontation than after a low-stress one, across live lineups, photo spreads, and sequential presentations (Morgan et al., 2004). The trainees had also been deprived of food and sleep, which may limit how far the findings extend to witnesses without that added physical strain, although trained personnel might also cope better with such stress than civilians would (Lane & Houston, 2021, pp. 102–103). The authors of that research have cautioned that under high stress the brain favors gist memories that help avoid future danger but may lack the detail and precision the legal system demands (Morgan & Southwick, 2014). Enhancement of the core and impairment of detail are therefore compatible findings, and neither tells a factfinder whether a particular detail is accurate.
Consistency, Reminiscence, and Accuracy
Not all inconsistencies are alike. Researchers distinguish omissions, in which a detail reported once is not reported again; reminiscence, in which a detail appears for the first time in a later account; and contradictions, in which two accounts assert incompatible things. The legal system has traditionally treated all three as signs of inaccuracy, while cognitive research suggests that the relation between consistency and accuracy is weaker and more specific than that assumption implies (Fisher et al., 2009). In eyewitness research, consistency across statements has been found to be at most a weak predictor of accuracy (Brewer et al., 1999). Varying the retrieval cues across interviews tends to elicit additional details not reported before (Gilbert & Fisher, 2006).
In the laboratory studies described here, reminiscent details were generally about as accurate as details recalled immediately or consistently, although participants and detectives expected them to be less accurate. In two studies with retention intervals of up to a week, newly recalled details were highly accurate, comparable to details recalled immediately, although participants judged them unreliable (Oeberst, 2012). In a study comparing 81 experienced police detectives’ estimates with the actual performance of 84 witnesses interviewed twice, detectives expected accuracy to decline sharply between interviews and judged reminiscent details as inaccurate as direct contradictions; in fact, accuracy remained stable and reminiscent details were almost as accurate as consistently reported ones (Krix et al., 2015). The same study points the other way on contradictions: the number of direct contradictions was negatively correlated with overall accuracy. A contradiction means that at least one version is wrong, and a witness who contradicts herself frequently may be less accurate overall. What the research does not support is treating omissions and later additions as evidence of fabrication, or treating a consistent account as evidence of accuracy.
These findings matter in practice. Researchers examining rape complaints in England have argued that ordinary features of memory, such as gaps, inconsistencies, and lack of peripheral detail, are often read by police and prosecutors as signs that a complainant is not credible, contributing to attrition (Hohl & Conway, 2017). The same research base also counsels that a complainant’s confident, consistent, and detailed account is not, for that reason, accurate; consistency can result from rehearsal and repetition, including repetition of details learned after the event.
Are Traumatic Memories Disorganized?
Counterintuitive behavior testimony sometimes asserts that trauma causes memories to be encoded in a fragmented, disorganized, or nonlinear way, so that inconsistent accounts are to be expected from genuine victims. The research on this claim is genuinely contested, and testimony should describe both sides. Brewin’s (2014) review argues that people with posttraumatic stress disorder show enhanced involuntary, image-based memory for the trauma alongside impaired voluntary, narrative memory, and that this distinction helps explain intrusive memories and difficulty constructing a coherent account. That position is influential, and it was published alongside commentaries, some of them critical.
Other evidence is less supportive of a general fragmentation claim. A review of 16 studies found that the association between dissociation and memory fragmentation was strongest when fragmentation was measured by the person’s own rating of the memory, and did not hold when fragmentation was measured by trained raters or computer coding of the narratives themselves (Bedard-Gilligan & Zoellner, 2012). A study comparing 30 trauma-exposed adults with and 30 without posttraumatic stress disorder, using 28 participant, rater, and computer measures of coherence, found differences among types of memories but not between the diagnostic groups; most differences were small, and trauma memories were sometimes more coherent than comparison memories (Rubin et al., 2016). In a small study of sexual assault complainants, those who rated their memories as more fragmented also believed they had given less coherent police interviews, but both measures were self-reports (Hardy et al., 2009).
The fairest summary is that people with posttraumatic stress disorder often experience their trauma memories as fragmented, that objective evidence of greater fragmentation is mixed, and that the theory concerns a clinical condition that many assault victims do not develop. Sex differences do not alter that point. Women are more likely than men to develop posttraumatic stress disorder after trauma generally, but a meta-analysis of 25 years of research did not find that difference among victims of sexual assault (Tolin & Foa, 2006), and in a later meta-analysis the share of women in a sample was unrelated to the strength of the link between sexual assault and psychopathology (Dworkin et al., 2017). The higher overall rate among women is therefore not a basis for expecting more trauma-related memory disruption in a female complainant than in a male one. The evidence is mixed on whether trauma as such makes memories disorganized, and the research does not support treating inconsistency as a marker of trauma or attributing a particular complainant’s inconsistencies to trauma rather than to other causes. Nor does it support the opposite claim that a coherent, linear account is a sign of fabrication.
Memory Remains Malleable Under Stress
Trauma does not make memory immune to error. In a study of more than 800 military personnel in a mock prisoner-of-war training exercise, misinformation introduced after a stressful interrogation altered memory for details of the event and for the identity of the interrogator; in some conditions more than half of those shown a misleading photograph later identified the wrong person (Morgan et al., 2013). In a laboratory study using a distressing film, misleading post-event information produced significant memory errors, and longer delays increased suggestibility and confidence in inaccurate answers (Paz-Alonso & Goodman, 2008). Soldiers’ reports of the stressors they experienced on deployment changed substantially over repeated assessments, and those with more posttraumatic stress symptoms tended to report more over time (Engelhard et al., 2008). Reviewers have cautioned that the vividness or emotional significance of a memory does not guarantee its accuracy (Laney & Loftus, 2005), and that claims that traumatic experiences are commonly repressed and later accurately recovered lack scientific support and can encourage suggestive practices (Otgaar et al., 2019). A later systematic review of 42 studies, most concerning childhood sexual abuse, found that reported rates of recovered memories depended heavily on definitions and samples, from 1%–3% in legally documented child sexual abuse cases to 22%–39% in samples of self-reported child sexual abuse survivors, and found no cognitive mechanism unique to recovered memories (Carey et al., 2026). The review does not establish whether any particular recovered memory is accurate or inaccurate.
This research does not suggest that complainants’ accounts are generally unreliable. It establishes that memory for stressful events follows the same reconstructive principles as other memory: it can be accurate in its core, uncertain at the periphery, and altered by information encountered after the event. The paper on memory contamination examines how discussion, interviewing, and other post-event information can shape an account; that issue is often more useful to a factfinder than the bare fact that two statements differ.
Limits of the Evidence
Much of the consistency and misinformation research uses films or staged events that cannot replicate the experience of sexual assault, and its generalizability to real complainants must be argued rather than assumed. Field studies of real trauma, such as the flight passengers, soldiers, and survival-school trainees, involve events with verifiable features but differ from sexual assault in context, relationship, and motivation. Studies of sexual assault survivors’ memories rarely have an independent record against which accuracy can be checked, so they measure the characteristics of memories rather than their accuracy. Studies of trauma memory organization often compare people with and without posttraumatic stress disorder, which is not the same as comparing people who were and were not assaulted. Sex differences in these memory findings are largely untested: Peace et al. (2008) studied only women, the survival-school and deployment studies drew on military personnel, most of them men, Krix et al.’s (2015) witnesses were 62 men and 22 women, and this review found no reported test of whether the consistency-accuracy relationship differs by sex. And all of the research is group-level: it can tell a court how inconsistency and accuracy relate on average under particular conditions, but not whether a particular inconsistency in a particular account reflects error, reluctance, an interviewer’s questions, contamination, or deception.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When testimony relies on the finding that reminiscent details were almost as accurate as consistently reported ones (Krix et al., 2015; Oeberst, 2012), counsel should ask who was studied and whether it applies to this person: much of this research uses films or staged events, so its extension to a complainant interviewed across months must be argued. The same study found that direct contradictions were associated with lower overall accuracy, which raises the question of what exactly was counted, since omissions, additions, and contradictions are different measures and should not be merged in either direction. When testimony relies on Brewin’s (2014) account of fragmented trauma memory, counsel should ask whether the conclusion follows from the design: the association held for self-rated fragmentation but not for trained raters or computer coding (Bedard-Gilligan & Zoellner, 2012), and the theory concerns posttraumatic stress disorder, which many complainants do not develop. When Peace et al. (2008) is cited to show that assault memories are vivid and detailed, counsel should ask how much evidence it rests on: 44 women, with no independent record against which to check accuracy. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Inconsistent Accounts and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
Inconsistencies reach the factfinder primarily through impeachment with prior inconsistent statements under Federal and Military Rule of Evidence 613. Whether a prior inconsistent statement may also be used as substantive evidence is changing. Under Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(A) as it has stood since 1975, a testifying witness’s prior inconsistent statement is excluded from hearsay only if it was given under penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, other proceeding, or deposition. An amendment approved by the Supreme Court and effective December 1, 2026, removes the oath requirement, so that any prior inconsistent statement of a witness who testifies and is subject to cross-examination may be considered substantively. Military Rule 801(d)(1)(A) retains the oath requirement until it is amended; under Military Rule of Evidence 1102, a federal amendment generally applies in courts-martial eighteen months after its effective date unless the President directs otherwise.
Rehabilitation runs through Rule 801(d)(1)(B). Since the 2014 federal amendment and the 2016 military amendment, a prior consistent statement may be admitted to rehabilitate a witness whose credibility has been attacked on grounds such as inconsistency or faulty memory, not only charges of recent fabrication. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces requires that such a statement be relevant to the specific ground of attack and admits only the portions that are consistent with the trial testimony (United States v. Finch, 2020); it has held that a statement offered to rebut an attack on memory need not predate the onset of the claimed memory problem (United States v. Ruiz, 2025); and it has upheld admission of a complainant’s recorded statements under (B)(ii) after the defense attacked her consistency (United States v. Brown, 2026). Counsel who attack consistency should anticipate that the attack may open the door to prior consistent statements.
Expert testimony about memory and trauma must satisfy Rule 702, amended December 1, 2023, to make explicit that the proponent must establish each reliability requirement by a preponderance of the evidence, and, in courts-martial, the United States v. Houser (1993) factors. An expert may explain general principles of memory, but no witness may serve as a “human lie detector” (United States v. Brooks, 2007; United States v. Kasper, 2003), and an expert may not opine on a complainant’s credibility or the accused’s guilt (United States v. Mullins, 2010). Testimony that a complainant’s inconsistencies are the product of trauma rather than fabrication approaches that line, because it attributes particular inconsistencies to a cause the expert cannot know and implicitly vouches for the account.
Arizona
Arizona’s Rule 801(d)(1)(A) has long treated a testifying witness’s prior inconsistent statement as non-hearsay without an oath requirement, and in State v. Allred (1982) the Arizona Supreme Court held that such statements are subject to Rule 403 and identified nonexclusive factors for assessing unfair prejudice, including whether the witness denies making the statement and whether the statement is the only evidence of guilt, and held that substantive use of a denied, uncorroborated statement that was the only evidence of guilt was an abuse of discretion as to one defendant (the court affirmed the other defendant’s conviction). Arizona’s Rule 702 conformed to the federal rule in 2012. State v. Lindsey (1986) permits an expert to describe general behavioral characteristics of sexual abuse victims, including inconsistent accounts, but bars opinions on the truthfulness of a particular witness or class of witnesses, and State v. Moran (1986) applies the same limit to indirect opinions. State v. Salazar-Mercado (2014) allows cold expert testimony on general principles if it satisfies Rules 702 and 403. Arizona also has a long-standing recognition that expert testimony on memory may assist jurors: in State v. Chapple (1983), the Arizona Supreme Court held that excluding expert testimony on factors affecting eyewitness identification was an abuse of discretion in that case. Expert testimony about memory is therefore available to either side, within the same limits on vouching.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party may need to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports educational testimony that people commonly recall events differently across interviews, that omissions and newly recalled details are not reliable signs of fabrication, that in the laboratory studies reviewed newly recalled details were often about as accurate as details recalled immediately, and that strong emotion tends to preserve central features of an event while weakening memory for peripheral ones (Krix et al., 2015; Oeberst, 2012; Reisberg & Heuer, 2007). Studies of real traumatic events, including sexual trauma, show that core memories can be vivid and detailed (McKinnon et al., 2015; Peace et al., 2008). Prosecutors can keep testimony on that solid ground and away from contested claims that trauma inherently fragments memory or that inconsistency is a marker of genuine victimization. Testimony framed as ordinary memory science, rather than as a trauma-specific explanation for this complainant’s inconsistencies, is more accurate and more consistent with the case law.
The research also counsels caution. Direct contradictions do indicate that at least one account is wrong and have been associated with lower overall accuracy; memory for stressful events is vulnerable to post-event information; and an expert who testifies that trauma explains a complainant’s inconsistencies is attributing a cause the research cannot identify in an individual case. When the defense attacks consistency, prior consistent statements may become admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(ii), but only the consistent portions and only as relevant to the ground of attack.
Special Issues for Defense
The research supports several legitimate points. Memory for stressful events is reconstructive and can be altered by misinformation (Morgan et al., 2013; Paz-Alonso & Goodman, 2008); claims that trauma inherently disorganizes memory rest on contested evidence, with objective measures often failing to find greater fragmentation (Bedard-Gilligan & Zoellner, 2012; Rubin et al., 2016); contradictions bear on accuracy (Krix et al., 2015); and consistency is not proof of accuracy. Defense counsel can test whether an expert’s claims about trauma and memory are supported by objective rather than self-report measures, whether they apply to a person without posttraumatic stress disorder, and whether changes in the account can be traced to identifiable post-event sources.
The research also counsels caution about the defense’s own inferences. Because omissions and later additions are common in accurate accounts and reminiscent details are usually accurate, cross-examination that treats every difference between statements as evidence of fabrication rests on an assumption the research does not support, and an expert or juror familiar with the research may reject it. A focused challenge to genuine contradictions, to details that first appear after exposure to outside information, and to overstatement of the trauma-and-memory literature presents the most defensible use of the science. Attacks on consistency may also open the door to the complainant’s prior consistent statements.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
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Brewer, N., Potter, R., Fisher, R. P., Bond, N., & Luszcz, M. A. (1999). Beliefs and data on the relationship between consistency and accuracy of eyewitness testimony. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 13(4), 297–313. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0720(199908)13:4<297::AID-ACP578>3.0.CO;2-S
Brewin, C. R. (2014). Episodic memory, perceptual memory, and their interaction: Foundations for a theory of posttraumatic stress disorder. Psychological Bulletin, 140(1), 69–97. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0033722
Carey, O. G., Dempsey, M., Minihane, K., & Murphy, G. (2026). When, where, and how often do individuals recover memories of traumatic experiences? A systematic review. Memory, 34(2), 238–259. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2025.2601699
Dworkin, E. R., Menon, S. V., Bystrynski, J., & Allen, N. E. (2017). Sexual assault victimization and psychopathology: A review and meta-analysis. Clinical Psychology Review, 56, 65–81. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2017.06.002
Engelhard, I. M., van den Hout, M. A., & McNally, R. J. (2008). Memory consistency for traumatic events in Dutch soldiers deployed to Iraq. Memory, 16(1), 3–9. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658210701334022
Fisher, R. P., Brewer, N., & Mitchell, G. (2009). The relation between consistency and accuracy of eyewitness testimony: Legal versus cognitive explanations. In R. Bull, T. Valentine, & T. Williamson (Eds.), Handbook of psychology of investigative interviewing: Current developments and future directions (pp. 121–136). Wiley-Blackwell. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470747599.ch8
Gilbert, J. A. E., & Fisher, R. P. (2006). The effects of varied retrieval cues on reminiscence in eyewitness memory. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 20(6), 723–739. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.1232
Hardy, A., Young, K., & Holmes, E. A. (2009). Does trauma memory play a role in the experience of reporting sexual assault during police interviews? An exploratory study. Memory, 17(8), 783–788. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658210903081835
Hohl, K., & Conway, M. A. (2017). Memory as evidence: How normal features of victim memory lead to the attrition of rape complaints. Criminology & Criminal Justice, 17(3), 248–265. https://doi.org/10.1177/1748895816668937
Krix, A. C., Sauerland, M., Lorei, C., & Rispens, I. (2015). Consistency across repeated eyewitness interviews: Contrasting police detectives’ beliefs with actual eyewitness performance. PLOS ONE, 10(2), Article e0118641. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0118641
Lane, S. M., & Houston, K. A. (2021). Understanding eyewitness memory: Theory and applications. New York University Press.
Laney, C., & Loftus, E. F. (2005). Traumatic memories are not necessarily accurate memories. The Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, 50(13), 823–828. https://doi.org/10.1177/070674370505001303
McKinnon, M. C., Palombo, D. J., Nazarov, A., Kumar, N., Khuu, W., & Levine, B. (2015). Threat of death and autobiographical memory: A study of passengers from Flight AT236. Clinical Psychological Science, 3(4), 487–502. https://doi.org/10.1177/2167702614542280
Morgan, C. A., III, Hazlett, G., Doran, A., Garrett, S., Hoyt, G., Thomas, P., Baranoski, M., & Southwick, S. M. (2004). Accuracy of eyewitness memory for persons encountered during exposure to highly intense stress. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 27(3), 265–279. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijlp.2004.03.004
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Legal Authorities
State v. Allred, 134 Ariz. 274, 655 P.2d 1326 (1982).
State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983).
State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).
State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986).
State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).
United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
United States v. Brown, No. 25-0181/AR, ___ M.J. ___ (C.A.A.F. May 12, 2026).
United States v. Finch, 79 M.J. 389 (C.A.A.F. 2020).
United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).
United States v. Kasper, 58 M.J. 314 (C.A.A.F. 2003).
United States v. Mullins, 69 M.J. 113 (C.A.A.F. 2010).
United States v. Ruiz, 86 M.J. 75 (C.A.A.F. 2025).
Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Fed. R. Evid. 613.
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A) (as amended effective Dec. 1, 2026).
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B).
Ariz. R. Evid. 702.
Ariz. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A).
Mil. R. Evid. 613.
Mil. R. Evid. 702.
Mil. R. Evid. 801(d)(1).
Mil. R. Evid. 1102.
Related topic papers: Memory Contamination: Discussion, Interviews, and Post-Event Information · Alcohol, Blackouts, and Memory in Sexual Assault Cases · Delayed and Incremental Disclosure · Variability, Confounds, and Individual Differences in Responses to Sexual Assault · Preparing for and Examining a Counterintuitive Behavior Expert
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Memory in the Courtroom · Memory in the Courtroom: Principles of Memory · False Confessions: Suggestibility · Alcohol Blackouts: Alcohol Blackout / Amnesia