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Preparing for and Examining a Counterintuitive Behavior Expert

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Snap Shot

  • The question: How can each side prepare for, present, and examine an expert on counterintuitive behavior so that the testimony stays within what the research supports?
  • What the testimony can and cannot convey: Studies show that freezing, delayed disclosure, continued contact, and inconsistent accounts occur in many true cases, so a behavior does not by itself indicate that no assault occurred. Because the studies rarely compare true reports with mistaken or untrue ones, the testimony can remove an unwarranted inference but cannot corroborate an account.
  • Preparation and motions: Obtain the expert’s CV, prior testimony, and the full studies relied on, and read their methods and limitations sections. A motion in limine with findings on each Houser factor should define the expert’s field, the behaviors addressed, and a limiting instruction (Flesher, Webb).
  • Examination: Productive cross-examination seeks concessions the science supports: non-specificity, fit, variability, the absence of an evaluation, and study limitations, with learned treatises usable under Rule 803(18). Neither side may vouch or offer statistical credibility evidence (Brooks, Mullins, Lindsey), and argument must rest on the evidence, not members’ training (Bodoh).
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors should qualify the expert on the research, limit testimony to behaviors at issue, and have the expert state its limits on direct; defense counsel should draw limits from the studies themselves without suggesting the behaviors do not occur in true cases or arguing fabrication from non-prosecution figures.

Sexual assault is common, it is substantially underreported, and people who have been assaulted respond to it in widely different ways. Some resist and some freeze; some report within hours and some wait months or never report; some end contact with the person who assaulted them and some do not; some give accounts that change in detail from one telling to the next. Each of these responses occurs in many true cases. Because jurors and court members may expect a narrower range of behavior, prosecutors in adult sexual assault cases frequently call an expert to explain that such responses are not unusual. This paper uses “counterintuitive behavior testimony” to mean expert testimony offered to explain post-assault behavior that a factfinder might otherwise regard as inconsistent with an assault having occurred.

Courts in the military and in Arizona permit such testimony within limits. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has recognized that expert testimony about the counterintuitive behaviors of sexual assault victims can help members set aside widely held misconceptions, while holding that the expert must be qualified in the area addressed, must stay within that area, and may not bolster or vouch for the complainant (United States v. Flesher, 2014). The Arizona Supreme Court has approved general, educational testimony about victim behavior while directing trial courts to screen and limit it carefully (State v. Haskie, 2017). The practical questions are therefore less about whether such an expert will testify than about what the expert will say, on what basis, and how both parties can ensure that the testimony stays within what the research supports.

This paper addresses those practical questions for both sides: what to obtain in discovery, which pretrial motions shape the testimony, how a prosecutor can present direct examination that is consistent with the research and case law, which cross-examination topics the science legitimately supports, how learned treatises are used, and what both parties should avoid. It is written as orientation rather than as a script. Companion papers in this hub, Admissibility of Counterintuitive Behavior Testimony and Vouching, Profile Evidence, and the Human Lie Detector Rule, address the admissibility standards and the credibility rules in greater depth, and the Psychosexual Risk Evaluations resource from Arizona Forensic Services includes a paper, “Preparing the Expert for Testimony,” that discusses expert preparation generally.

What the Testimony Can Legitimately Convey

The strongest form of counterintuitive behavior testimony rests on research documenting how often particular responses occur among people who have been sexually assaulted. In a Swedish study of women seen at an emergency clinic for sexual assault within a month of the assault (298 analyzed, from 1,047 eligible women), about 70% reported significant tonic immobility (an involuntary, temporary inability to move) during the assault and about 48% reported extreme immobility; tonic immobility was associated with posttraumatic stress disorder and severe depression six months later among the women reassessed (Möller et al., 2017). In a sample of 254 college women assaulted by a friend or dating partner, roughly three-quarters reported that the relationship continued in some form afterward (Edwards et al., 2012). In a Dutch sample of 323 help-seeking female rape victims aged 12 to 25, about 41% disclosed more than a week after the assault, and delay was more likely when the assailant was known to the victim (Bicanic et al., 2015). National survey data show that most rape and sexual assault victimizations are not reported to police: the National Crime Victimization Survey estimated that about one in four (23.6%) were reported in 2024, although the estimate has varied considerably from year to year because of small samples (46.0% in 2023), so no single figure should be treated as fixed (Tapp & Coen, 2025). Findings like these support the educational proposition that a particular behavior does not, by itself, indicate that an assault did not occur.

The research supports a narrower conclusion than is sometimes drawn from it. Studies of this kind measure how often a behavior occurs among people who report having been assaulted; they generally do not measure how often the same behavior occurs among people whose reports are mistaken or untrue, or among people who were not assaulted at all. Without those comparisons, the research cannot show that a behavior is more likely in true reports than in other reports, and it therefore cannot be used to infer that an assault occurred (Hunley et al., 2023). The same point applies in the other direction: a prompt report, physical resistance, or ending contact with the accused does not show that an assault did occur. The testimony’s legitimate function is to remove an unwarranted inference, not to supply a new one.

A second premise of the testimony is that factfinders hold mistaken beliefs that the expert can correct. That premise is contested. A review of mock-jury and deliberation research concluded that inaccurate beliefs about rape affect how jurors evaluate evidence (Leverick, 2020). A post-verdict survey of 771 serving jurors in England and Wales found that few endorsed the most commonly studied misconceptions, although many were unsure about several issues (Thomas, 2020), and a group of researchers published a detailed critique of that survey’s design and interpretation (Daly et al., 2023). For trial practice, the disagreement matters in two ways: it bears on whether testimony on a particular point will assist the factfinder, and it suggests that testimony should be tied to the specific behaviors at issue in the case rather than to a general catalogue of misconceptions.

Discovery and Preparation

Both parties benefit from obtaining the expert’s materials early. In federal court, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(G), as amended in 2022, requires the government on request to disclose a complete statement of the opinions it will elicit in its case-in-chief, the bases and reasons for them, the witness’s qualifications including publications from the previous ten years, and a list of cases in which the witness testified as an expert during the previous four years, signed by the witness. Courts-martial proceed under the Rules for Courts-Martial, including Rule 701 (discovery), Rule 703 (production of witnesses and evidence, including expert witnesses), and Rule 914 (production of a witness’s prior statements after direct examination), together with Article 46, UCMJ, and the prosecution’s constitutional disclosure obligations. In Arizona, Rule 15.1(b)(4) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the State to disclose each expert it intends to call, with the expert’s qualifications, any report, and, if no report was prepared, a summary of the subject matter and anticipated opinions.

The items most useful to request are the expert’s curriculum vitae; a list of prior testimony and, where available, transcripts on the same subject; the specific studies, reviews, and texts the expert will rely on, in full rather than as summaries; any materials from the case the expert has reviewed; notes and written communications describing the scope of the engagement; and any presentations or training the expert has given on the same subject, which show how the expert has described the research to other audiences. Whether the expert has reviewed case materials is itself important: an expert presented as a general educator who has read the file may be drawn, consciously or not, toward the particular facts, and the parties should know which kind of witness to expect.

Preparation for either side begins with reading the studies themselves. The relevant details are usually in the methods and limitations sections: how participants were recruited, whether they were help-seeking, how long after the assault they were assessed, how the behavior was defined and measured, what proportion of eligible people participated, and how many were lost to follow-up. The Swedish tonic immobility study, for example, enrolled 317 of 1,047 eligible women (298 completed the tonic immobility assessment), lost a substantial share to follow-up, and relied on self-report questionnaires completed an average of about 19 days after the assault (Möller et al., 2017). None of this undermines the study’s finding that tonic immobility is common in that population; it defines the population to which the finding applies.

Defense counsel in courts-martial who need their own consultant must ordinarily show necessity: why the expert is needed, what the expert would accomplish, and why counsel cannot gather and present the same evidence without one (United States v. Anderson, 2010). Counsel on both sides may consider, if resources permit, whether a consultant is needed to read and explain the research before trial even if no defense expert will testify.

Pretrial Motions

A motion in limine, heard at an Article 39(a) session in a court-martial or at a pretrial hearing in civilian court, is the main tool for defining what the expert will say. The proponent bears the burden of establishing admissibility. Under United States v. Houser (1993), the military judge considers the expert’s qualifications, the subject matter, the basis for the testimony, its legal relevance, its reliability, and whether its probative value outweighs the dangers listed in Mil. R. Evid. 403. Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as amended December 1, 2023, requires the proponent to show by a preponderance of the evidence that each requirement is met and that each opinion reflects a reliable application of the expert’s methods to the facts; Mil. R. Evid. 1102 generally incorporates federal amendments eighteen months after their effective date unless the President acts otherwise. The December 1, 2023 amendment to Federal Rule 702 accordingly became part of Military Rule of Evidence 702 in 2025: the proponent of expert testimony in a court-martial must now show the military judge that it is more likely than not that each admissibility requirement is met, so gaps in an expert’s basis or in the application of the method are questions of admissibility rather than of weight for the members (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025).

Flesher illustrates the issues that a pretrial hearing should resolve. The witness, a former sexual assault response coordinator, was qualified on the basis of her experience with many victims; the court questioned whether a job title can define an area of expertise, found that the area of expertise had not been clearly defined, held that her testimony about why victims do not resist went beyond the scope of her expertise, and found that the testimony bolstered the complainant by repeating her explanation for not struggling. The court set aside the sexual assault finding and authorized a rehearing (Flesher, 2014). A hearing that identifies the expert’s field, the specific opinions to be offered, and the research supporting each opinion protects both parties: the prosecution against a reversal and the defense against testimony that exceeds its basis.

Useful subjects for motions include the specific behaviors the expert will address, limited to those actually at issue; whether the expert will testify as a general educator or apply the research to the complainant; whether hypothetical questions will be used and how closely they will track the complainant’s account; exclusion of any testimony quantifying the likelihood that complainants tell the truth (United States v. Brooks, 2007; State v. Lindsey, 1986); and a limiting instruction under Mil. R. Evid. 105 or Arizona Rule of Evidence 105 explaining that the testimony is offered to help evaluate the evidence and not as evidence that an assault occurred. In Arizona, Haskie directs trial courts to exercise caution in admitting such evidence, to give a limiting instruction on request, and not to permit broad, categorical claims about what is common without empirical support.

Both parties benefit from a ruling made on the record. In Flesher, the defense asked for a Daubert hearing, and the military judge admitted the testimony without one and without stating a Houser analysis; rulings made without stated reasoning receive less deference on appeal. A proponent who obtains explicit findings on each Houser factor protects the result, and an opponent who obtains them preserves a clear record. Objections should also be specific. In United States v. Webb (2021), an objection limited to helpfulness was held to forfeit the broader argument that the military judge had not applied Daubert and Houser, and the court found no plain error. Counsel who contest qualifications, basis, reliability, or fit should say so expressly, and counsel defending the testimony should ask the judge to address each ground raised.

Direct Examination That Stays Within Scope

For prosecutors, testimony that is durable on appeal tends to share several features. The expert is qualified on the basis of knowledge of the research literature, not solely on the basis of a position or caseload. The testimony addresses only the behaviors at issue in the case and states their frequency as the studies report it, with the range of estimates and the populations studied. The expert explains why the behavior occurs only to the extent the research addresses mechanisms, and identifies where explanations are theoretical. The expert does not repeat or adopt the complainant’s own explanation for her conduct, which Flesher treated as bolstering.

Direct examination is also more transparent when the expert states the limits of the testimony before cross-examination does: that the expert has not evaluated the complainant, that some of the behaviors described may also occur in reports that turn out to be inaccurate, and that the research cannot say whether an assault occurred in this case. An expert who presents these points as part of the science, rather than conceding them under pressure, is more likely to be seen as an educator, which is the role the case law permits. These principles apply equally to an expert the defense calls.

Cross-Examination Topics Grounded in the Science

Cross-examination of a counterintuitive behavior expert is most effective when it seeks concessions that the research itself supports and that a careful expert will readily give. Arguing with the expert about whether the behaviors occur in true cases is usually unproductive, because the research reports that they do. The topics below are the recurring ones; how they are developed depends on the direct examination and the facts.

Non-specificity is the central topic. The expert can usually agree that the studies relied upon describe people who reported an assault; that they do not compare those people with people whose reports were mistaken or untrue; and that the behavior therefore does not distinguish between those groups (Hunley et al., 2023). Counsel should apply the point evenly. If the behavior is not evidence that an assault occurred, its absence is not evidence that one did not, and an argument that the complainant’s behavior is “consistent with” fabrication rests on the same unsupported reasoning.

Fit concerns whether the studies describe people like the complainant in circumstances like the case. Relevant dimensions include age, sex, the relationship with the accused, alcohol involvement, military versus civilian setting, country, and whether participants were recruited because they sought medical or counseling services. A study of college women assaulted by friends or dating partners (Edwards et al., 2012) or of help-seeking Dutch adolescents and young women (Bicanic et al., 2015) may or may not describe the complainant’s situation, and the expert can usually say which features of the case the studies did and did not include.

Variability concerns the range of reported frequencies and the many responses that occur. Estimates of tonic immobility, for example, vary widely across studies depending on sample and measurement (Hunley et al., 2023). The expert can usually agree that many people who are assaulted resist, report promptly, or end contact, and that the research describes common responses rather than a typical victim.

The absence of an evaluation matters when the expert testifies as a general educator. The expert can agree that he or she has not met or assessed the complainant, has no basis to say which research findings apply to her, and is not offering an opinion about whether an assault occurred. These concessions accurately describe the testimony and are consistent with the role the courts permit.

Study limitations include reliance on self-report, retrospective measurement, low participation rates, attrition, and the absence of people who never sought help. Each can be developed from the authors’ own limitations sections, which allows the point to be made from the research rather than from counsel’s characterization of it. A related topic, where the expert has asserted that factfinders hold particular misconceptions, is that this premise is disputed in the research literature (Thomas, 2020; Daly et al., 2023), although that dispute is often better suited to a pretrial hearing on helpfulness than to examination before members.

Two procedural points recur. Counsel who wish to confront the expert with a contrary opinion of another professional must lay a foundation that the expert relied on it or that it otherwise qualifies for use; the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces upheld limits on cross-examination about other clinicians’ contrary diagnoses where that foundation was not laid (United States v. Halford, 1999). And under Federal and Military Rule of Evidence 705, the expert may be required on cross-examination to disclose the facts or data underlying an opinion.

Learned Treatises

Federal Rule of Evidence 803(18), Mil. R. Evid. 803(18), and Arizona Rule of Evidence 803(18) except from the hearsay rule a statement in a treatise, periodical, or pamphlet that is called to the expert’s attention on cross-examination or relied on by the expert on direct examination, if the publication is established as a reliable authority by the expert’s admission or testimony, by another expert, or by judicial notice. If admitted, the statement may be read into evidence but may not be received as an exhibit. In practice, counsel should identify the specific passages in advance, provide copies to opposing counsel and the court, and be prepared to establish reliability through the expert’s acknowledgment that the journal or author is authoritative, through another expert, or by asking the court to take notice. Passages from a study’s own limitations section, or from a peer-reviewed review addressing the evidence for a behavior, are often the most useful because they come from sources the expert is likely to accept. The rule serves both sides; a prosecutor may use it on redirect, or to examine a defense expert, in the same way.

What Both Sides Should Avoid

Vouching in either direction is the most serious risk. No witness may opine that the complainant or the accused is telling the truth, directly or through testimony that functions as such an opinion (Brooks, 2007; United States v. Mullins, 2010; United States v. Kasper, 2003). The prohibition applies to defense experts as well: in United States v. Griffin (1999), the court upheld exclusion of a defense psychologist’s testimony about a confession, noting among other reasons that an opinion on whether the confession was false would run into the same rule. When improper credibility testimony comes in, prompt and specific curative instructions are required (Kasper, 2003).

Statistical credibility evidence is a closely related risk. Testimony that only a small percentage of reports are false, offered to suggest that this complainant is probably truthful, was held to be the functional equivalent of vouching in Brooks and Mullins, and Arizona bars experts from quantifying the proportion of complainants who tell the truth (Lindsey, 1986). The same reasoning applies to defense efforts to suggest falsity from the proportion of reports that are not prosecuted or do not end in conviction; as the companion paper False, Unfounded, and Unresolved Reports: What the Research Shows explains, those figures do not measure falsity.

Recent military appellate decisions add three practical cautions. First, argument should rest on the evidence. In United States v. Bodoh (2019), trial counsel’s reference to “victim myths” taught in the members’ SHARP training was error because the training was not evidence; it was harmless because the prosecution’s expert had testified to the same point. A prosecutor who wishes to argue that a behavior is not unusual needs expert or other record support for the point, and the same principle bars defense argument that relies on what members are assumed to know rather than on the evidence. Second, invited error works against the party who opens the subject. When defense counsel elicited a witness’s view of truthfulness on cross-examination, the appellate courts declined relief (United States v. Martin, 2016; United States v. Burnett, 2022); in Martin, the answers trial counsel then drew out on redirect were still human lie detector testimony, and only the invitation avoided reversal. Third, when improper credibility or profile testimony is heard, the objecting party should promptly request a specific curative instruction. The absence of one weighed toward reversal in United States v. Knapp (2014), an instruction helped cure a fleeting improper remark in Bodoh, and testimony that became profile evidence required relief even though the judge had barred an ultimate opinion in United States v. Mellette (2025, on remand).

Overclaiming weakens either side’s position. For the expert, this includes describing a behavior as typical or universal when the research reports a range, presenting animal or laboratory findings about fear responses as if they described human sexual assault, or attributing a particular complainant’s conduct to a neurobiological mechanism. For cross-examining counsel, it includes characterizing the research as having no value, which a careful expert can correct and which a factfinder may hold against the party. A sound examination on either side presents the research as it is: informative about the range of human responses and silent about what happened in a particular case.

Limits of the Evidence

The research on post-assault behavior consists largely of self-report studies of people who identified themselves as victims, often recruited through medical, counseling, or university settings. These samples underrepresent people who never sought help, men, and some cultural and occupational groups, including military members. Measurement is frequently retrospective. Frequencies vary substantially across studies. Most importantly for courtroom use, the studies rarely include comparison groups that would permit a conclusion about whether a behavior is more common after an assault than in other circumstances. Research on juror beliefs and on the effect of expert testimony relies on surveys and mock trials whose relationship to real deliberations is debated. No study, test, or expert has been shown to determine from a complainant’s behavior whether an assault occurred.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When an expert cites the finding that about 70% of 298 women seen at a Swedish emergency clinic reported significant tonic immobility (Möller et al., 2017), counsel can ask who was studied: of 1,047 eligible women, 317 were enrolled and 298 analyzed, and a substantial share were lost to follow-up. The same question, and whether the findings apply to this complainant, arises for the roughly three-quarters of 254 college women whose relationship with the assailant continued (Edwards et al., 2012) and the 41% of 323 help-seeking Dutch rape victims who disclosed after more than a week (Bicanic et al., 2015). When prosecution testimony offers such frequencies as support for the complainant’s account, the question is whether that conclusion follows from the design, because the studies rarely compare true reports with mistaken or untrue ones (Hunley et al., 2023). When the defense relies on the finding that few of 771 serving jurors endorsed common misconceptions (Thomas, 2020), counsel can ask what the survey counted and whether the finding has held up, given the published critique of its design (Daly et al., 2023); studies find that some jurors hold mistaken expectations, most consistently about demeanor and delay, but the extent to which this affects verdicts, and whether any particular panel holds them, is less well established. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Examining the Expert and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) assigned trial judges a gatekeeping role for scientific testimony, and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999) extended it to all expert testimony, including testimony grounded in clinical experience. The 2023 amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and its incorporation through Mil. R. Evid. 1102 are described above. In courts-martial, Houser (1993) supplies the six-factor framework, which Griffin (1999) applied together with Daubert; Flesher (2014) addresses qualification, scope, and bolstering in counterintuitive behavior testimony specifically; Brooks (2007), Mullins (2010), and Kasper (2003) define the human lie detector rule and its application to statistical credibility testimony; Halford (1999) addresses the foundation for cross-examination about other professionals’ opinions; and Anderson (2010) sets out the necessity showing for defense expert assistance. Among more recent decisions, Webb (2021) addresses forfeiture through a narrow objection, Bodoh (2019) addresses argument based on training not in evidence, Martin (2016) and Burnett (2022) apply invited error, and Mellette (2025, on remand) addresses expert testimony that becomes profile evidence. Mil. R. Evid. 105, 403, 705, and 803(18), Articles 39(a) and 46, UCMJ, and Rules for Courts-Martial 701, 703, and 914 supply the procedural framework.

Arizona

Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 was amended in 2012 to conform to the federal rule. State v. Salazar-Mercado (2014) held that Rule 702 permits “cold” expert testimony educating the jury about general behavioral patterns without applying them to the case, if the testimony is reliable and survives Rule 403. Haskie (2017) extended that reasoning to testimony about adult victims of domestic violence, while directing caution, limiting instructions on request, and restraint in categorical claims. Lindsey (1986) held that experts may describe general behavioral characteristics but may not opine on the truthfulness of a particular witness or quantify the proportion of complainants who tell the truth. Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.1(b)(4) governs the State’s disclosure of experts, and Arizona Rule of Evidence 803(18) governs learned treatises.

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party may need to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports educational testimony that tonic immobility, delayed disclosure, continued contact, and inconsistent accounts occur in a substantial share of the people who report sexual assaults in the samples studied, and the case law permits that testimony when it is reliable and confined. Prosecutors can keep it confined: by qualifying the expert on the research rather than on a job title, by limiting the testimony to behaviors actually at issue, by disclosing the specific studies relied on, by having the expert acknowledge on direct that the behaviors do not indicate whether an assault occurred, and by requesting a limiting instruction. Flesher shows that testimony exceeding the expert’s field or repeating the complainant’s explanations creates appellate risk, and Brooks and Mullins show the same for any testimony that conveys a probability of truthfulness.

The research also counsels caution about what the testimony can prove. Because the studies describe people who reported assaults and rarely include comparison groups, the testimony can explain that a behavior is not unusual but cannot corroborate the complainant’s account. Frequencies should be stated as ranges tied to identified populations, and explanations of mechanism should be presented as theory where that is their status. Testimony framed this way is more accurate and more consistent with the case law.

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports cross-examination establishing that counterintuitive behavior testimony is educational and non-specific: the behaviors described occur in true cases, but the studies do not show that they distinguish true reports from mistaken or untrue ones, and a general educator has no basis to apply them to the complainant. Defense counsel can ensure that the factfinder hears these limits, through discovery of the underlying studies, pretrial motions defining scope, cross-examination drawn from the studies’ own limitations sections, use of learned treatises, and requests for limiting instructions.

The research also counsels caution about the limits of the defense position. The behaviors at issue genuinely occur in many sexual assaults, and cross-examination that suggests otherwise is inaccurate and can be corrected. The non-specificity point applies equally to arguments that a complainant’s behavior suggests fabrication, and statistical arguments drawn from non-prosecution or acquittal rates are subject to the same credibility rules that bind the prosecution. Cross-examination that obtains accurate concessions about the scope of the research presents the most defensible use of the science.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

Bicanic, I. A. E., Hehenkamp, L. M., van de Putte, E. M., van Wijk, A. J., & de Jongh, A. (2015). Predictors of delayed disclosure of rape in female adolescents and young adults. European Journal of Psychotraumatology, 6, Article 25883. https://doi.org/10.3402/ejpt.v6.25883

Daly, E., Smith, O., Bows, H., Brown, J., Chalmers, J., Cowan, S., Horvath, M., Leverick, F., Lovett, J., Munro, V., & Willmott, D. (2023). Myths about myths? A commentary on Thomas (2020) and the question of jury rape myth acceptance. Journal of Gender-Based Violence, 7(1), 189–200. https://doi.org/10.1332/239868021X16371459419254

Edwards, K. M., Kearns, M. C., Gidycz, C. A., & Calhoun, K. S. (2012). Predictors of victim–perpetrator relationship stability following a sexual assault: A brief report. Violence and Victims, 27(1), 25–32. https://doi.org/10.1891/0886-6708.27.1.25

Hunley, B. T., O’Donohue, W., & Miller, M. K. (2023). Expert testimony regarding typical or counterintuitive adult sexual assault behavior: A review. UIC Law Review, 57(1), 1–38.

Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf

Leverick, F. (2020). What do we know about rape myths and juror decision making? International Journal of Evidence & Proof, 24(3), 255–279. https://doi.org/10.1177/1365712720923157

Möller, A., Söndergaard, H. P., & Helström, L. (2017). Tonic immobility during sexual assault: A common reaction predicting post-traumatic stress disorder and severe depression. Acta Obstetricia et Gynecologica Scandinavica, 96(8), 932–938. https://doi.org/10.1111/aogs.13174

Tapp, S. N., & Coen, E. J. (2025). Criminal victimization, 2024 (NCJ 310547). U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics.

Thomas, C. (2020). The 21st century jury: Contempt, bias and the impact of jury service. Criminal Law Review, 2020(11), 987–1011.

Legal Authorities

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).

State v. Haskie, 242 Ariz. 582, 399 P.3d 657 (2017).

State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).

State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).

United States v. Anderson, 68 M.J. 378 (C.A.A.F. 2010).

United States v. Bodoh, 78 M.J. 231 (C.A.A.F. 2019).

United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).

United States v. Burnett, No. ACM 39999 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. June 10, 2022) (unpublished).

United States v. Flesher, 73 M.J. 303 (C.A.A.F. 2014).

United States v. Griffin, 50 M.J. 278 (C.A.A.F. 1999).

United States v. Halford, 50 M.J. 402 (C.A.A.F. 1999).

United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).

United States v. Kasper, 58 M.J. 314 (C.A.A.F. 2003).

United States v. Knapp, 73 M.J. 33 (C.A.A.F. 2014).

United States v. Martin, 75 M.J. 321 (C.A.A.F. 2016).

United States v. Mellette, No. 201900305 (f rev) (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. July 8, 2025) (unpublished) (on remand from 82 M.J. 374 (C.A.A.F. 2022)).

United States v. Mullins, 69 M.J. 113 (C.A.A.F. 2010).

United States v. Webb, No. ACM 39904 (recon) (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 18, 2021) (unpublished).

10 U.S.C. § 839(a) (Article 39(a), Uniform Code of Military Justice).

10 U.S.C. § 846 (Article 46, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G).

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

Fed. R. Evid. 705.

Fed. R. Evid. 803(18).

Mil. R. Evid. 105.

Mil. R. Evid. 403.

Mil. R. Evid. 702.

Mil. R. Evid. 705.

Mil. R. Evid. 803(18).

Mil. R. Evid. 1102.

Rules for Courts-Martial 701, 703, and 914.

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.1(b)(4).

Ariz. R. Evid. 105.

Ariz. R. Evid. 702.

Ariz. R. Evid. 803(18).

Related topic papers: Admissibility of Counterintuitive Behavior Testimony · Vouching, Profile Evidence, and the Human Lie Detector Rule · Behavioral Indicators, Base Rates, and the Limits of Inference · Fit and Generalizability: Matching the Research to the Case · False, Unfounded, and Unresolved Reports: What the Research Shows

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Psychosexual Risk Evaluations · Courts-Martial · Memory in the Courtroom