Snap Shot
- The question: What may a witness say, directly or indirectly, about whether a complainant or an accused is telling the truth?
- What the research shows: People are poor lie detectors: in a meta-analysis of 206 studies, average accuracy was 54%; professionals such as police officers do not appear substantially more accurate. The commonly cited police-file studies place confirmed false reports at roughly 2% to 10%, with many cases that could not be classified.
- What it does not show: A base rate cannot tell the factfinder whether a particular report is true or false, and unfounded, unprosecuted, or acquitted cases do not measure falsity. Offender profiles have not been shown to distinguish reliably between the guilty and the innocent, and the research does not show that a complainant’s behaviors matching educational testimony make the account more likely true, because most studies describe only victims and do not compare accurate and inaccurate reports. Validated actuarial risk tools estimate group recidivism after a finding of guilt, which is a different use.
- The law: No witness, expert or lay, may vouch, including through false-report statistics, mirroring of the complainant’s account, or reading the accused’s demeanor (Kasper, Brooks, Mullins, Flesher, Knapp, Martin); profile evidence is generally barred as proof of guilt (Banks, Mellette, Haskie). Arizona bars credibility opinions and truth-telling percentages (Lindsey, Moran), and argument is held to the same line (Norwood, Matti).
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors should keep experts general, avoid statistics and case-tracking hypotheticals, and not ask witnesses whether they believed the complainant; defense counsel should object promptly to indirect vouching but may not offer false-report figures or opinions that the complainant is lying, and eliciting them risks invited error.
Sexual assault prosecutions often turn on whether the factfinder believes the complainant or the accused. Sexual assault is common and substantially underreported; in the National Crime Victimization Survey, about one in four rape and sexual assault victimizations were reported to police in 2024 (23.6%); the estimate has varied considerably from year to year (46.0% in 2023), so no single figure should be treated as fixed (Tapp & Coen, 2025). Many cases have no independent eyewitness and limited physical evidence, and credibility becomes the central issue. That is precisely why the law forbids any witness, expert or lay, from telling the factfinder whom to believe.
Three related rules enforce that limit. The rule against vouching, which military courts call the rule against “human lie detector” testimony, bars opinions that a witness is or is not telling the truth, including opinions conveyed indirectly through statistics or general descriptions that track the witness’s account. The rule against profile evidence bars using the characteristics of a group, such as offenders, as substantive proof that a particular person is guilty. And the rules of evidence limit character evidence for truthfulness to opinion or reputation about a witness’s general character, offered only after that character has been attacked.
This paper explains the scientific basis for those rules, which rests on research showing that people, including professionals, are poor detectors of deception and that group statistics cannot answer the question of whether a particular account is true. It then reviews the military, federal, and Arizona case law, explains how the rules apply equally to prosecution and defense, and offers practical guidance on objections and limiting instructions. A companion paper addresses the admissibility of counterintuitive behavior testimony generally.
Why No Witness Can Serve as a Lie Detector
The law’s distrust of credibility opinions is consistent with a large body of research. A meta-analysis of 206 studies involving 24,483 judges found that people attempting to distinguish lies from truths in real time achieved an average accuracy of 54%, correctly classifying 47% of lies and 61% of truths (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). A later meta-analysis found that individual differences in lie-detection ability are minute, that the best judges are no more accurate than chance variation would produce, and that the outcome of a deception judgment depends more on how credible the speaker appears than on the judge’s skill (Bond & DePaulo, 2008). Behavioral cues to deception are, on average, weakly related to actual lying, which helps explain why judgments based on demeanor so often fail (DePaulo et al., 2003; Hartwig & Bond, 2011).
These findings apply to investigators, clinicians, advocates, and family members as much as to anyone else, and they apply to judgments about complainants and accused persons alike. A witness’s sincere belief that someone is telling the truth, or lying, is not a reliable measure of whether that is so. The Supreme Court has described the principle as the premise that “the jury is the lie detector” in a criminal trial (United States v. Scheffer, 1998, quoting an earlier circuit decision).
Base Rates and the Limits of Statistics
Statistical testimony about the frequency of false reports is a particular form of indirect vouching. The commonly cited studies of police and campus reports estimate that confirmed false reports of sexual assault are a small share of reports. A ten-year review of reports at a university found 8 of 136 reports (5.9%) coded as false, while 44.9% did not proceed to prosecution or disciplinary action and 13.9% had too little information to classify, and, with prior research, placed the prevalence of false allegations between 2% and 10% (Lisak et al., 2010). A study of reports to the Los Angeles Police Department estimated a false-report rate of 4.5% (Spohn et al., 2014). A meta-analysis of seven studies in which researchers evaluated case files found a confirmed false-report rate of 5.2%, while noting that the total including equivocal cases would be higher (Ferguson & Malouff, 2016). Each study also found a substantial number of cases that could not be classified, and an unresolved case is not evidence that a report was false; these figures describe case classifications and cannot be applied to any one complainant. Nor is a case that was not prosecuted, was dismissed, or ended in acquittal; those outcomes reflect the evidence available and the burden of proof, not a finding of falsity.
These figures are important to policy and to understanding the overall landscape of reporting. They cannot answer the question in a trial. A base rate describes a population of reports defined in a particular way; it does not tell the factfinder whether the report before it falls among the confirmed false reports, the true reports, or the cases that could not be resolved. When an expert testifies that only a small percentage of reports are false, the testimony invites the factfinder to conclude that this complainant is very probably truthful, which is the inference the law forbids. The same reasoning applies in reverse: testimony that a large proportion of some category of reports is “unfounded” or “unsubstantiated” invites the conclusion that this complainant is probably not truthful, and it rests on categories that do not measure falsity. Under military and Arizona authority, neither use of statistics is permitted.
Profile Evidence
Profile evidence describes characteristics said to be typical of people who commit a type of crime and invites the inference that a defendant who shares them is guilty. Courts have long rejected it as substantive proof, because characteristics common among offenders may also be common among non-offenders, and profiles have not been shown to distinguish reliably between the guilty and the innocent. Validated actuarial risk tools, which estimate group recidivism after a finding of guilt, are a different use. The Court of Military Appeals held such evidence impermissible when offered to show that an accused fit the pattern of child abusers (United States v. Banks, 1992), and the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces later held that testimony that a child’s killer was overwhelmingly likely to be a biological parent was improper profile evidence (United States v. Traum, 2004) and that a shaken-baby-syndrome expert’s statements that biological parents are the most common abusers and that persistent crying is the most common trigger were inadmissible profile evidence, though harmless (United States v. Harrow, 2007). More recently, in a child case, the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals held that a forensic psychologist’s testimony describing the accused’s conduct as consistent with “grooming” was improper profile evidence used to support the complainant’s credibility, even though the judge had barred an opinion that abuse occurred (United States v. Mellette, 2025, on remand). Profile evidence may be admitted only in narrow circumstances, such as rebuttal when the defense has opened the door (United States v. Bresnahan, 2005).
Testimony about victims’ behavior is different, and courts have distinguished it. In United States v. Rynning (1998) (child complainant), testimony that delayed reporting is common among abuse victims was permissible because it explained the complainant’s behavior without presenting a profile and placing the accused within it. In United States v. Brooks (2007) (a child-complainant case), the court noted that profile evidence concerns using a profile to prove an accused’s guilt rather than a witness’s credibility, while holding the testimony in that case inadmissible on vouching grounds. The Arizona Supreme Court has held that testimony primarily explaining victim behavior is not inadmissible merely because it refers to offender characteristics, but that profile evidence may not be used as substantive proof of guilt (State v. Haskie, 2017), and it found fundamental error where testimony implied that a defendant fit a criminal profile (State v. Escalante, 2018).
The logic of these cases runs in both directions. Testimony that an accused lacks characteristics associated with offenders, offered to suggest innocence, rests on the same non-specificity problem, and courts evaluate it with the same skepticism.
Mirroring and Indirect Vouching
Vouching need not be explicit. Testimony can convey a credibility opinion indirectly when an expert’s general description is tailored to match the complainant’s account, when hypothetical questions recite the facts of the case, or when an expert testifies that the complainant’s behavior is “consistent with” sexual assault in a way that functions as corroboration. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has held that expert testimony may not be used solely to bolster the credibility of the government’s fact witnesses by mirroring their version of events (United States v. Flesher, 2014). Military law permits an expert to describe symptoms associated with abuse and to say whether a complainant exhibits them, but draws a “fine line” at testimony that amounts to comment on credibility (United States v. Foster, 2007; United States v. Mullins, 2010, also a child-complainant case).
Indirect vouching is especially likely when the expert’s testimony addresses exactly the behaviors in evidence, in the order they occurred, and closing argument then maps the testimony onto the complainant. The research basis for counterintuitive behavior testimony supports general education about the range of responses to assault; it does not show that a complainant’s particular behaviors make the account more likely true, because most studies describe only victims and do not compare accurate and inaccurate reports, and some of the same behaviors may also occur in mistaken and false reports.
The Rule Applies to Both Sides
The human lie detector rule is not a rule about complainants; it is a rule about credibility. Several of the leading military cases involved testimony about the accused. In United States v. Kasper (2003), an investigator’s opinion that the accused was untruthful when she denied drug use, based on the investigator’s training in interrogation, was plain error. In United States v. Knapp (2014), an agent’s testimony that the accused’s nonverbal behavior during an interview indicated deception was impermissible. In federal court, an investigator’s expert testimony that a defendant was not truthful during an interview affected substantial rights and required reversal (United States v. Hill, 2014).
Defense experts are subject to the same limits. A defense expert may not testify that a complainant is lying, that a complainant’s memory is false, or that a particular account was contaminated; the expert may describe general principles of memory, suggestion, and intoxication and leave application to the factfinder. Under military and Arizona authority, a defense expert may not offer false-report statistics any more than a prosecution expert may offer true-report statistics. When defense counsel elicited a false-allegation figure from a prosecution expert on cross-examination and emphasized it in closing, an appellate court treated any error as invited (United States v. Belt, 2023). And a complainant’s prior accusation is admissible as a false accusation only if it is shown to be false; in United States v. Erikson (2017), a Mil. R. Evid. 412 and prior-accusation case rather than a vouching case, the court held that the accused had not proved the prior accusation false, so it was inadmissible.
Limits of the Evidence
Deception research relies mostly on laboratory studies of low-stakes lies told by students, and accuracy may differ in high-stakes settings, although meta-analytic evidence does not indicate that professionals such as police officers are substantially more accurate than laypeople (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). False-report research depends on how cases are classified, the information available to researchers, and the jurisdictions studied; estimates are not transferable to every population, and the large undetermined category in every study limits any conclusion about prevalence. Profile research describes group differences that do not identify individuals. No study, test, or statistic can establish whether a particular complainant or accused is telling the truth.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When prosecution testimony cites confirmed false-report estimates of 2% to 10% (Lisak et al., 2010), 4.5% (Spohn et al., 2014), or 5.2% (Ferguson & Malouff, 2016), counsel can ask what exactly was counted: each study also found a substantial number of cases that could not be classified, and Ferguson and Malouff noted that the total including equivocal cases would be higher. The same question applies when defense testimony suggests that reports categorized as “unfounded” or “unsubstantiated” were probably false, because those categories do not measure falsity. In either direction, the next question concerns the base rate and whether it applies to this person: a figure describing a population of reports does not say where the report before the court falls. When a witness relies on the 54% average accuracy across 206 studies (Bond & DePaulo, 2006), whether to challenge an investigator’s reading of the accused’s demeanor or to caution against misreading the complainant’s, counsel can ask who was studied, since most studies involved low-stakes laboratory lies by students, although professionals did not appear substantially more accurate. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Vouching and the Law
Military Standards
The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces and its predecessor have built a detailed body of law. In United States v. Bostick (A.C.M.R. 1991), the Army Court of Military Review held that a psychologist’s testimony that a complainant had not feigned her condition on a rape-aftermath symptom test was an impermissible opinion on credibility. In United States v. Birdsall (1998), the court held that expert testimony conveying a view of the complainants’ truthfulness exceeded the experts’ expertise and usurped the members’ exclusive function to weigh evidence and determine credibility. In Kasper (2003), the court held that human lie detector testimony is inadmissible from lay as well as expert witnesses, that the military judge is responsible for preventing it regardless of whether the defense objects, and that when it is offered the judge must give prompt cautionary instructions. In Brooks (2007), the court held that an expert’s testimony about the rate of false allegations, which the court treated as implying a probability of roughly 98% that the child complainant was truthful, was the functional equivalent of vouching and was plain error in a case that turned on credibility. In Mullins (2010), testimony implying that only about one in two hundred such allegations is false was error. In Knapp (2014), the court applied the rule to an investigator’s interpretation of the accused’s demeanor. In United States v. Martin (2016), the court reaffirmed that human lie detector testimony is inadmissible, including testimony that is its functional equivalent, but declined relief where the defense had invited the testimony. The rule rests on three grounds: such testimony exceeds any witness’s expertise, it violates the limits Military Rule of Evidence 608 places on character evidence for truthfulness, and it invades the members’ province. Military Rule of Evidence 707 separately bars polygraph evidence, a rule the Supreme Court upheld in Scheffer (1998).
Military Decisions Since 2016
The functional-equivalent test from Martin now governs. In United States v. Lopez (2017), a child case, the accused’s wife testified over objection that his apology was loosely admitting guilt and that she was trying to learn who was telling the truth; the court held this was human lie detector testimony and improper lay opinion and set aside the affected finding. The Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals held that a commander’s lay testimony that she had no reason to doubt the complainant was the functional equivalent of such testimony and plain error, but found no material prejudice because the witness claimed no expertise, the defense impeached her, and DNA evidence strongly corroborated the complainant (United States v. Lattin, 2022). Invited error continues to limit relief: in Martin and in United States v. Burnett (2022), the defense first elicited the opinion on cross-examination. Burnett also treated investigators’ statements in a recorded interview that they disbelieved the accused as an interrogation tactic rather than plain human lie detector testimony.
The same principle governs trial counsel’s argument. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held repeated assurances that a child complainant was telling the truth to be a prohibited method of argument, although not prejudicial on findings (United States v. Norwood, 2021). In a 2026 domestic violence case it held that telling members “you know she’s telling the truth” was clear and obvious error but, on plain-error review, not materially prejudicial, and it appended a list of commonly violated argument rules (United States v. Matti, 2026). On plain-error review, the Air Force court assumed without deciding that arguments that two witnesses had told the truth were error and found no material prejudice; on reconsideration it set aside two charges for a separate argument error and reassessed the sentence (United States v. Kindred, 2026). In United States v. Bodoh (2019), trial counsel’s reference to “victim myths” taught in SHARP training was error because the training was not evidence, but harmless because the prosecution’s expert had testified to the same point. In United States v. Washington (2020), the court assumed without deciding that a unit SHARP trainer’s testimony that a person told “no” should stop and walk away was error and found no material prejudice, without endorsing the testimony. These decisions enforce the line against every party; relief usually turns on prejudice, which timely objections and prompt curative instructions shape.
Federal Standards
Federal courts apply the same principles under Federal Rules of Evidence 608 and 702. Rule 608(a) permits opinion or reputation testimony about a witness’s character for truthfulness only after that character has been attacked, and does not permit testimony about truthfulness on a particular occasion; a parent’s testimony that she believed her children was plain error on that basis (United States v. Jones, 10th Cir. 2023). Experts may not vouch for a complainant’s credibility under Rule 702 (United States v. Charley, 10th Cir. 1999 (en banc)). Testimony that a child was believable and telling the truth required reversal in United States v. Azure (8th Cir. 1986), and a diagnosis of abuse based solely on the complainant’s account was vouching in a “thinly veiled way” in United States v. Whitted (8th Cir. 1993). Testimony that 99.5% of children tell the truth was a due process violation warranting habeas relief in Snowden v. Singletary (11th Cir. 1998). Courts have also excluded expert opinions that police witnesses were truthful (Nimely v. City of New York, 2d Cir. 2005) and testimony that a defendant fit the profile of a child molester (United States v. Gillespie, 9th Cir. 1988). Testimony about the general incidence of abuse has been called problematic but not plain error where the expert did not opine on credibility (Belt, 2023).
Arizona
Arizona’s anti-vouching rule predates Daubert. In State v. Lindsey (1986), the Arizona Supreme Court held that an expert may describe general behavioral characteristics of sexual abuse victims but may not opine on the accuracy, reliability, or truthfulness of a particular witness or of witnesses of that type, and may not quantify the percentage of such victims who tell the truth; admission of such testimony was reversible error (149 Ariz. at 475–77). In State v. Moran (1986), the court held that an expert may not opine, directly or indirectly, on whether a particular complainant’s account is credible. Profile evidence may not be offered as substantive proof of guilt (State v. Lee, 1998; Haskie, 2017; Escalante, 2018). Arizona Rule of Evidence 608 parallels the federal rule.
Objections and Limiting Instructions
Because vouching is often indirect, many protections are prospective. A pretrial motion in limine can define the permissible scope of expert testimony, exclude statistics on false or true reporting, exclude terms such as “consistent with” when offered as corroboration, and limit hypothetical questions that recite the case facts. A proffer of the expert’s anticipated testimony allows the court to rule before the jury hears it. At trial, a timely objection, a request to strike, and a request for an immediate cautionary instruction preserve the issue; under Kasper, a military judge must give such an instruction promptly when human lie detector testimony is offered. A limiting instruction under Rule 105 can tell the factfinder that general testimony about victim behavior is not evidence that an assault occurred and that credibility is for the factfinder alone. Closing argument that converts educational testimony into corroboration, or that converts general memory testimony into an assertion that a witness is lying, is subject to objection on the same grounds.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party may need to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The vouching rules also reduce the risk that a conviction is reversed. Prosecutors can legitimately present general expert testimony about the range of responses to sexual assault, confined to behaviors in dispute and framed as education, and the research on deception supports reminding the factfinder that demeanor is an unreliable guide to truthfulness, which can help a complainant whose demeanor jurors might misread. The rule against human lie detector testimony also bars defense witnesses from opining that a complainant is lying and bars defense statistics suggesting that reports like the complainant’s are usually unfounded, and prosecutors can seek rulings enforcing those limits.
The research and case law also counsel caution. Brooks, Mullins, and Lindsey show that false-report statistics from a prosecution expert can require reversal, in Brooks and Mullins even without objection at trial (in Lindsey a pretrial motion to preclude preserved the objection, 149 Ariz. at 476), and Flesher shows that expert testimony mirroring the complainant’s account is treated as bolstering. Investigators, advocates, commanders, and family members should not be asked whether they believed the complainant, and argument should rest on record evidence, not members’ training (Bodoh, 2019) or counsel’s assurances (Norwood, 2021). Proffering the expert’s testimony in advance, avoiding case-tracking hypotheticals, and requesting a limiting instruction are ways to help keep testimony within its supported scope.
Special Issues for Defense
The research and case law support vigilance about indirect vouching. Defense counsel can seek pretrial limits on statistics, “consistent with” testimony, case-tracking hypotheticals, and offender-characteristic testimony; to object promptly and request immediate cautionary instructions; and to challenge testimony from investigators who interpret the accused’s demeanor as deceptive, which Kasper, Knapp, and Hill hold inadmissible. The deception research equally supports reminding the factfinder that nervousness or inconsistency in an accused’s interview is not a reliable indicator of guilt.
The same rules bind the defense. A defense expert may explain memory, suggestibility, and intoxication in general terms, but may not tell the factfinder that the complainant is lying, that a memory is false, or that a report is probably unfounded, and may not offer false-report statistics. Eliciting such figures, or a witness’s view of anyone’s truthfulness, on cross-examination risks waiving the objection (Belt, 2023; Martin, 2016; Burnett, 2022). Categories such as unfounded, unsubstantiated, not prosecuted, or acquitted do not measure falsity, and a prior accusation is admissible as false only if it is shown to be false (Erikson, 2017). Testimony that the accused lacks the characteristics of offenders raises the same profile problem as testimony that he or she shares them.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Bond, C. F., Jr., & DePaulo, B. M. (2006). Accuracy of deception judgments. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10(3), 214–234. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr1003_2
Bond, C. F., Jr., & DePaulo, B. M. (2008). Individual differences in judging deception: Accuracy and bias. Psychological Bulletin, 134(4), 477–492. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.134.4.477
DePaulo, B. M., Lindsay, J. J., Malone, B. E., Muhlenbruck, L., Charlton, K., & Cooper, H. (2003). Cues to deception. Psychological Bulletin, 129(1), 74–118. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.129.1.74
Ferguson, C. E., & Malouff, J. M. (2016). Assessing police classifications of sexual assault reports: A meta-analysis of false reporting rates. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 45(5), 1185–1193. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10508-015-0666-2
Hartwig, M., & Bond, C. F., Jr. (2011). Why do lie-catchers fail? A lens model meta-analysis of human lie judgments. Psychological Bulletin, 137(4), 643–659. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0023589
Lisak, D., Gardinier, L., Nicksa, S. C., & Cote, A. M. (2010). False allegations of sexual assault: An analysis of ten years of reported cases. Violence Against Women, 16(12), 1318–1334. https://doi.org/10.1177/1077801210387747
Spohn, C., White, C., & Tellis, K. (2014). Unfounding sexual assault: Examining the decision to unfound and identifying false reports. Law & Society Review, 48(1), 161–192. https://doi.org/10.1111/lasr.12060
Tapp, S. N., & Coen, E. J. (2025). Criminal victimization, 2024 (NCJ 310547). U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics.
Legal Authorities
Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 2005).
Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732 (11th Cir. 1998).
State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 425 P.3d 1078 (2018).
State v. Haskie, 242 Ariz. 582, 399 P.3d 657 (2017).
State v. Lee, 191 Ariz. 542, 959 P.2d 799 (1998).
State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).
State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986).
United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336 (8th Cir. 1986).
United States v. Banks, 36 M.J. 150 (C.M.A. 1992).
United States v. Belt, 61 F.4th 594 (8th Cir. 2023).
United States v. Birdsall, 47 M.J. 404 (C.A.A.F. 1998).
United States v. Bodoh, 78 M.J. 231 (C.A.A.F. 2019).
United States v. Bostick, 33 M.J. 849 (A.C.M.R. 1991).
United States v. Bresnahan, 62 M.J. 137 (C.A.A.F. 2005).
United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
United States v. Burnett, No. ACM 39999 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. June 10, 2022) (unpublished).
United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
United States v. Erikson, 76 M.J. 231 (C.A.A.F. 2017).
United States v. Flesher, 73 M.J. 303 (C.A.A.F. 2014).
United States v. Foster, 64 M.J. 331 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
United States v. Gillespie, 852 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1988).
United States v. Harrow, 65 M.J. 190 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
United States v. Hill, 749 F.3d 1250 (10th Cir. 2014).
United States v. Jones, 74 F.4th 1065 (10th Cir. 2023) (No. 21-5079, June 26, 2023).
United States v. Kasper, 58 M.J. 314 (C.A.A.F. 2003).
United States v. Kindred, No. ACM 40607 (f rev) (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. May 26, 2026) (unpublished) (on reconsideration; vacating the Feb. 24, 2026 opinion), rev. denied, No. 26-0204/AF (C.A.A.F. Aug. 5, 2026).
United States v. Knapp, 73 M.J. 33 (C.A.A.F. 2014).
United States v. Lattin, No. ACM 39859 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Apr. 20, 2022) (unpublished).
United States v. Lopez, 76 M.J. 151 (C.A.A.F. 2017).
United States v. Martin, 75 M.J. 321 (C.A.A.F. 2016).
United States v. Matti, 86 M.J. 384 (C.A.A.F. 2026) (No. 25-0148/AF, Feb. 17, 2026).
United States v. Mellette, No. 201900305 (f rev) (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. July 8, 2025) (unpublished) (on remand from 82 M.J. 374 (C.A.A.F. 2022)).
United States v. Mullins, 69 M.J. 113 (C.A.A.F. 2010).
United States v. Norwood, 81 M.J. 12 (C.A.A.F. 2021).
United States v. Rynning, 47 M.J. 420 (C.A.A.F. 1998).
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998).
United States v. Traum, 60 M.J. 226 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
United States v. Washington, 80 M.J. 106 (C.A.A.F. 2020).
United States v. Whitted, 11 F.3d 782 (8th Cir. 1993).
Fed. R. Evid. 105.
Fed. R. Evid. 608.
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Ariz. R. Evid. 608.
Ariz. R. Evid. 702.
Mil. R. Evid. 608.
Mil. R. Evid. 702.
Mil. R. Evid. 707.
Related topic papers: Admissibility of Counterintuitive Behavior Testimony · Preparing for and Examining a Counterintuitive Behavior Expert · Behavioral Indicators, Base Rates, and the Limits of Inference · False, Unfounded, and Unresolved Reports: What the Research Shows
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Courts-Martial · Psychosexual Risk Evaluations · Child Abuse Allegations