Snap Shot
- The question: When may an expert tell jurors that behaviors such as freezing, delayed reporting, or continued contact are common after sexual assault, and when does that testimony become improper?
- What the research shows: Mock-juror research indicates that misconceptions about victim behavior can affect judgments of blame and verdict, but evidence on how widely actual jurors hold them is mixed, and the evidence that expert testimony corrects them is limited. Claims that a behavior is “typical” or that victims “almost never” do something need specific empirical support.
- What it does not show: These behaviors also occur in mistaken and false reports, so their presence does not distinguish a true report from an inaccurate one. Experience with service-seeking victims is a nonrandom sample, and a cold expert cannot assess whether the research fits the case.
- The law: Federal, military, and Arizona courts admit general, educational testimony (Flesher, Lindsey, Salazar-Mercado) but bar vouching, profile evidence, and statistics bearing on truthfulness (Brooks, Mullins, Haskie, Escalante). Flesher reversed where the expert’s qualifications and basis were not established and the testimony bolstered the complainant.
- Issues for each side: A proponent can build a record with matched qualifications, a published-research basis, testimony limited to behaviors in dispute, and no categorical or syndrome claims; an opponent can seek hearings, scope limits, and limiting instructions rather than total exclusion, without denying that the behaviors occur.
In many adult sexual assault trials, the prosecution calls an expert to explain that behaviors jurors may find puzzling, such as freezing during an assault, delaying a report, continuing contact with the accused, or giving an account that changes over time, are common among people who have been sexually assaulted. This paper calls that evidence counterintuitive behavior testimony: general expert testimony about how people respond to sexual assault, offered to correct beliefs that might otherwise lead a factfinder to discount a complainant’s account. Sexual assault is common and substantially underreported; in the National Crime Victimization Survey, about one in four rape and sexual assault victimizations were reported to police in 2024 (23.6%); the estimate has varied considerably from year to year (46.0% in 2023), so no single figure should be treated as fixed (Tapp & Coen, 2025). The behaviors at issue genuinely occur in many true cases, and the testimony exists because jurors may not know that.
The admissibility question is not whether such behaviors occur but what an expert may properly say about them in a particular case. Some of the same behaviors may also occur in mistaken and false reports, although research rarely measures this directly, so group research cannot tell a factfinder whether a particular complainant was assaulted. Courts therefore admit the testimony to educate, and they exclude or limit it when it corroborates, vouches, profiles, or rests on an unreliable or poorly fitting basis.
This paper summarizes the development of the testimony from rape trauma syndrome to its current educational form, the research bearing on whether it helps factfinders, the reliability and fit questions it raises, and the risks of the “cold expert” model. It then reviews the governing federal, military, Arizona, and other state law. A companion paper addresses vouching, profile evidence, and the rule against “human lie detector” testimony in more detail.
From Syndrome to Education
Burgess and Holmstrom (1974) introduced the term rape trauma syndrome (RTS) to describe an acute phase of disorganization and a longer-term phase of reorganization they observed among women treated at a hospital emergency department after rape. RTS was a clinical description, not a forensic test, and it was never a diagnosis in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Prosecutors nonetheless offered RTS evidence in the 1980s, sometimes to prove that a rape had occurred, and courts divided. Some excluded it as an unreliable test of whether a rape occurred (State v. Saldana, Minn. 1982); others admitted it (State v. Marks, Kan. 1982). The California Supreme Court held that it could not be used to prove that a rape occurred but could help rebut misconceptions about post-incident behavior, such as delay in reporting, when the defense raises such conduct (People v. Bledsoe, 1984; the admission there was error but not prejudicial), and the New York Court of Appeals admitted it to explain behavior such as delayed reporting or a calm demeanor while excluding it where it bore solely on proving that a rape occurred (People v. Taylor, 1990).
The scientific literature reflects the same division. A 1992 review concluded that some courts’ reliability concerns may not have been warranted, that testimony about RTS could help educate jurors, and that it appeared to influence verdicts without unfairly prejudicing defendants (Frazier & Borgida, 1992). A later analysis distinguished levels of testimony, from general descriptions of victims’ reactions to opinions that a particular person was raped, and argued that the scientific basis weakens as testimony moves toward the individual case (Boeschen et al., 1998). A 2014 critique concluded that RTS was vague, inconsistent with the most common sequelae of trauma, and inattentive to mediating variables, and recommended that it no longer be used in court (O’Donohue et al., 2014). Commentators favorable to the testimony have similarly urged a move away from syndrome language toward “nonsyndromic” testimony that explains behavior without diagnosing anyone (Tuerkheimer, 2024).
Modern counterintuitive behavior testimony largely reflects that shift. It typically describes the range of responses documented in research, such as the frequency of tonic immobility during assault (Möller et al., 2017), without asserting that a complainant has a syndrome. That change narrows, but does not eliminate, the admissibility questions.
Does the Testimony Help the Factfinder?
Rule 702 requires that expert testimony help the trier of fact. The justification for counterintuitive behavior testimony is that jurors hold beliefs about how a “real” victim would behave that the research does not support. A comprehensive review concluded that mock jurors’ scores on scales measuring such beliefs significantly predict their judgments of responsibility, blame, and verdict, and that in deliberation even jurors who score low on abstract scales may express problematic expectations about a particular case (Leverick, 2020). A study of jurors who had served in England and Wales reported that only minorities endorsed several commonly discussed misconceptions, and its author questioned how widely such beliefs are held by actual jurors (Thomas, 2020). The disagreement is partly methodological: abstract survey items measure different things from deliberation about a specific case.
Whether education works is a separate question. In mock-jury studies, expert testimony about rape has influenced verdicts, with case-linked testimony more influential than purely general testimony (Brekke & Borgida, 1988). Educational guidance about delayed reporting and demeanor had some effect on mock jurors’ deliberations about those issues, but the effect was uneven (Ellison & Munro, 2009). A 2026 review of jury directions and expert evidence concluded that the evidence base is limited and that “the jury is out” on how well either corrects false beliefs (Leverick et al., 2026, p. 1). The research thus supports the premise that misconceptions can affect decisions, offers mixed evidence about the size of the problem among actual jurors, and leaves open how effective expert testimony is in correcting it. Each of these points bears on helpfulness and on Rule 403 balancing.
Reliability, Basis, and Fit
Counterintuitive behavior testimony raises reliability questions of three kinds. The first concerns the expert’s basis. Some witnesses rely on published research; others rely on experience with victims. Experience can qualify an expert, but an experience-based opinion still requires an explanation of how the experience leads to the conclusion and why it is reliably applied, and a job title alone does not establish expertise (United States v. Flesher, 2014). Experience with people who sought services is also a nonrandom sample: it does not include people who never disclosed, and it does not include people whose reports were mistaken or false, so it cannot establish how often a behavior occurs among all people who report.
The second concerns the strength of the general claim. Research supports statements that particular behaviors are common, such as immobility during assault, delayed reporting, and continued contact with an acquaintance offender. Statements that a behavior is “typical,” “normal,” or “usual,” or that victims “almost never” do something, require empirical support for the specific claim, and the Arizona Supreme Court has cautioned trial courts against categorical statements unsupported by data (State v. Haskie, 2017).
The third concerns non-specificity and fit. A behavior that is common among people who were assaulted may also be common among people who were not. Without information about how often the behavior occurs in the comparison group, its presence does not distinguish a true report from an inaccurate one, and expert testimony implying otherwise overstates the science. Fit asks whether the research describes people and circumstances like those in the case, for example adult acquaintance assaults involving alcohol rather than stranger assaults, or military rather than college samples. The companion papers on base rates and fit address these questions in detail.
The Cold Expert Model and Its Risks
Arizona and many other jurisdictions permit a “cold” expert who has not met the complainant or reviewed the case file and testifies only about general research (State v. Salazar-Mercado, 2014). The model has real advantages: an expert who knows nothing about the complainant cannot easily vouch for the complainant, and the testimony is confined to general education.
It also has risks. First, a cold expert cannot assess fit, because the expert does not know the facts to which the research must apply. Second, the testimony is usually elicited to explain the particular behaviors in evidence, and an expert who describes exactly those behaviors, in the order they occurred in the case, may function as corroboration even without mentioning the complainant. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has held that expert testimony may not be used solely to bolster the credibility of the government’s fact witnesses by mirroring their version of events (Flesher, 2014). Third, closing argument can do what the expert did not, by mapping the general testimony onto the complainant and arguing that the complainant’s behavior fits the pattern the expert described. Fourth, a cold expert may be asked hypothetical questions that track the case facts closely, which can convey a case-specific opinion in general form. These risks do not make cold testimony inadmissible; they are reasons for careful scoping, limiting instructions, and attention to how the testimony is used.
What Well-Scoped Testimony Looks Like
Testimony that is consistent with the research and case law shares several features. It addresses behaviors actually in dispute, because the defense has raised them or because they would otherwise invite a mistaken inference. It describes what research shows about the frequency and variability of those behaviors, with appropriate qualification and with citations the expert can defend. It states that the behaviors occur in true reports and may also occur in mistaken or false reports, so they are consistent with either and have not been shown to indicate whether an assault occurred. It does not use syndrome language, does not describe offenders or suggest that the accused fits a pattern, and does not offer statistics on false reporting. It comes from a witness whose qualifications match the opinions offered.
Overreach takes recognizable forms: testimony that a complainant’s behavior is “consistent with” sexual assault offered as corroboration; categorical claims about what victims “always” or “never” do; neuroscience claims stated more strongly than the research supports; generalizations from service-seeking samples to all complainants; descriptions of offender behavior that invite profile inferences; and any statement about the frequency of false reports, from either side.
Limits of the Evidence
Research on responses to sexual assault comes largely from people who disclosed and sought services or participated in surveys, which may not represent those who never disclosed. Most samples are of women, often college students, and many studies are retrospective. Studies of victim behavior generally cannot include the comparison groups needed to assess diagnostic value, because the truth of each report is not independently known. Juror research relies on mock trials, community surveys, and simulated deliberations, and its applicability to particular courtrooms is uncertain. No study can determine whether a particular complainant was assaulted or whether a particular behavior resulted from an assault.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When an expert relies on Leverick (2020) to show that misconceptions shape verdicts, counsel can ask who was studied and compared with whom, because the judgments came from mock jurors, and the question is how closely they resemble this jury. When Thomas (2020) is cited to show that only minorities of actual jurors endorse such beliefs, the parallel question is what exactly was counted, since abstract survey items measure something different from expectations voiced while deliberating about a specific case. When either side cites the conclusion of Leverick et al. (2026, p. 1) that “the jury is out” on whether education works, counsel can ask how much evidence that conclusion rests on, since a limited evidence base leaves the question open rather than showing that testimony helps or that it fails. When the figure that about one in four rape and sexual assault victimizations were reported to police in 2024 (23.6%; 46.0% in 2023; Tapp & Coen, 2025) is offered, counsel can ask whether it applies to this person: it describes underreporting in a national survey and does not address whether a particular complainant’s report is accurate. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Admissibility and the Law
Federal Standards
Under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993), the trial judge must ensure that expert testimony is relevant and reliable, considering such factors as testing, peer review, error rates, standards, and general acceptance, and must ensure that the testimony “fits” the issues in the case. General Electric Co. v. Joiner (1997) held that admissibility rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion and that a court may exclude an opinion connected to the data only by the expert’s say-so when there is too great an analytical gap. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999) extended gatekeeping to all expert testimony, including experience-based testimony. The 2000 amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 added the requirements that testimony rest on sufficient facts or data, be the product of reliable principles and methods, and reflect a reliable application of those methods to the facts. The amendment effective December 1, 2023, requires the proponent to show by a preponderance of the evidence that each requirement is met and that each opinion reflects a reliable application; its committee note cautions that sufficiency of basis and reliability of application are questions of admissibility, not merely weight. Rule 403 permits exclusion when probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or misleading the jury, and Rule 105 requires a limiting instruction on request.
Federal appellate courts, in cases mostly involving child complainants, have generally permitted general testimony about behaviors such as delayed disclosure while prohibiting testimony that abuse occurred or that a complainant is credible. The Eighth Circuit has described a “wall of precedent” permitting experts to discuss responses to sexual abuse so long as the expert does not diagnose a person as a victim (United States v. Roberts, 2023, citing United States v. Zephier, 2021, and United States v. Johnson, 2017), and the Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that experts may not vouch for a complainant’s credibility under Rule 702 (United States v. Charley, 1999).
Military Standards
Military Rule of Evidence 702 tracks the federal rule; the 2000 federal amendment entered the military rules in 2004, and under Military Rule of Evidence 1102 later federal amendments generally apply eighteen months after their effective date unless the President directs otherwise. The December 1, 2023 amendment to Federal Rule 702 accordingly became part of Military Rule of Evidence 702 in 2025: the proponent of expert testimony in a court-martial must now show the military judge that it is more likely than not that each admissibility requirement is met, so gaps in an expert’s basis or in the application of the method are questions of admissibility rather than of weight for the members (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025). United States v. Houser (1993) identified six factors the proponent must establish: the expert’s qualifications, the subject matter of the testimony, its basis, its legal relevance, its reliability, and whether its probative value outweighs other considerations. United States v. Griffin (1999) held that the proponent of technical or specialized testimony must satisfy Daubert and Houser, and United States v. Sanchez (2007) confirmed that general acceptance is not required. Military courts admitted RTS testimony in United States v. Carter (C.M.A. 1988), where the court held that RTS evidence “is probative … on the issue of consent by the victim” (as quoted in United States v. Halford, 1999) and that Frye does not exclusively govern the admissibility of expert testimony. Halford itself involved a treating psychologist’s acute stress disorder testimony rather than RTS; the court found no plain error in its admission where the defense had attacked the complainant’s credibility through her inconsistencies, retractions, and refusal to talk and had not objected under Military Rule of Evidence 403, and it noted that the expert did not opine on her credibility. In United States v. Rynning (1998) (child complainant), the court found no plain error in testimony that delayed reporting is common among abuse victims where the defense had attacked the complainant’s credibility on that ground and the expert did not comment on credibility or place the accused within a profile.
United States v. Flesher (2014) is the leading modern decision. The court reaffirmed that expert testimony about the sometimes counterintuitive behaviors of sexual assault victims may be admitted to help members set aside widely held misconceptions. It held that the military judge abused his discretion in admitting testimony from a former sexual assault response coordinator because her qualifications were not established, her experience-based opinions were not shown to be reliable, her testimony exceeded the scope the parties and judge had set, and in a case that turned on consent it served to bolster the complainant’s own explanation of her conduct. The court set aside the sexual assault conviction and authorized a rehearing. Two judges dissented, finding the testimony adequately supported or the error harmless. Military decisions also permit an expert to describe symptoms associated with abuse and to say whether a complainant exhibits them, while barring testimony on credibility or guilt (United States v. Mullins, 2010), a broader scope than Arizona’s cold model.
Courts of Criminal Appeals and Recent C.A.A.F. Decisions
Since Flesher, the service courts of criminal appeals have generally affirmed general, educational testimony when the expert had not evaluated the complainant or offered no opinion that an assault occurred, the military judge barred case-specific conclusions, and the testimony addressed a behavior that members might otherwise misread. The Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed testimony from a forensic psychologist who had not evaluated the complainant about why victims of domestic violence stay in or return to abusive relationships (United States v. Webb, 2021), and testimony drawing on research on obedience and compliance with authority to explain why patients might not resist or report touching by a medical provider, finding no abuse of discretion after the defense opened the door (United States v. Solomon, 2022). The Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed testimony describing trauma-related symptom clusters and the frequency of delayed reporting, including a statement that alcohol and sexual assault co-occur in more than 60% of cases; it distinguished United States v. Brooks (2007) because that figure did not quantify the likelihood that the complainant was truthful (United States v. Flores, 2022). Statistics bearing on a particular witness’s truthfulness remain inadmissible under Brooks and Mullins. The Flores expert also said he had observed such symptoms in the complainant, a step beyond the cold model that may draw a challenge in other cases.
Relief has followed when expert testimony became profile evidence. In a child case, the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals held that a forensic psychologist’s testimony describing the accused’s conduct as consistent with “grooming” was improper profile evidence used to support the complainant’s credibility, even though the military judge had barred an opinion that grooming or abuse occurred; the court narrowed the finding to the corroborated incident and reassessed the sentence (United States v. Mellette, 2025, decided on remand after the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces resolved a separate mental health records issue in the same case). The profile rule is not limited to child cases.
Preservation shapes outcomes for both parties. In Webb, a defense objection limited to helpfulness forfeited the broader argument that the military judge had not applied Daubert and Houser. Flesher shows the value of requesting a hearing and obtaining the judge’s reasoning on the record, because rulings made without stated reasoning receive less deference; explicit findings protect a proponent’s conviction as much as they preserve an opponent’s objection.
Several questions remain open. No published C.A.A.F. decision since Flesher has re-examined counterintuitive behavior testimony; no military appellate decision located has ruled on the admissibility of testimony about the neurobiology of trauma or tonic immobility; and none located has applied the 2025 amendment to Military Rule of Evidence 702 to this testimony. Unpublished service-court opinions are thinly indexed, so practitioners should search for later decisions.
Arizona
Arizona amended Rule 702 in 2012 to follow the federal rule and Daubert. In State v. Lindsey (1986), the Arizona Supreme Court held that experts may describe general behavioral characteristics of sexual abuse victims but may not opine on the truthfulness of a particular witness or of witnesses of that type. In Salazar-Mercado (2014), the court held that Rule 702 permits cold, educational testimony about the behavior of child sexual abuse victims that satisfies Rule 702 and Rule 403. In Haskie (2017), the court extended that reasoning to adult domestic violence victims, held that profile evidence may not be used as substantive proof of guilt, and directed trial courts to screen such testimony carefully, give a limiting instruction on request, confine experts to their expertise, and avoid categorical claims about what is common without empirical support. Admission of testimony implying that a defendant fit a criminal profile was fundamental, prejudicial error in State v. Escalante (2018).
Other State Approaches
States continue to differ. Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court held RTS testimony inadmissible in Commonwealth v. Gallagher (1988), where it was offered to bolster the complainant’s credibility on identification, a matter for the jury; the legislature later enacted a statute permitting qualified experts to testify about specific types of victim responses and behaviors in sexual offense cases while barring opinions about the credibility of any witness, including the victim (42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5920). New Jersey’s Supreme Court held that expert testimony about child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome was not sufficiently reliable to be admitted, except as to delayed disclosure, for which it found adequate scientific support (State v. J.L.G., 2018). These approaches illustrate that courts can admit testimony about specific, well-supported behaviors while rejecting broader syndrome frameworks.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party may need to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
Courts in federal, military, and Arizona practice admit counterintuitive behavior testimony when it is reliable, relevant to behaviors in dispute, and confined to education, and research supports the premise that misconceptions about victim behavior can influence decisions. A proponent can build a record that is consistent with the research and case law: an expert whose qualifications match the opinions offered, a basis in published research rather than experience alone, a proffer that addresses each Houser or Rule 702 factor on the record, testimony limited to the behaviors actually at issue, and an express statement that the behaviors do not indicate whether an assault occurred. Flesher shows that a thin foundation and drift beyond the agreed scope can cost a conviction even when the subject matter is admissible.
The research also counsels caution. Categorical claims, syndrome language, overstated neuroscience, and testimony that mirrors the complainant’s account invite reversal under Flesher, Haskie, and the vouching cases. Closing arguments that treat the testimony as corroboration convert permissible education into impermissible bolstering. A limiting instruction, requested or not, protects the record.
Special Issues for Defense
The research supports several grounds for challenging overstatement. Courts require a reliable basis and fit under Rule 702 as amended in 2023 and under Houser; experience with service-seeking victims is a nonrandom sample that cannot establish how often a behavior occurs among all people who report; behaviors common among victims are not shown to distinguish true from false reports; and cold experts cannot evaluate whether their research fits the case. Defense counsel can request a pretrial hearing, to seek limits on scope, terminology, and hypotheticals, and to request limiting instructions, without asserting that the behaviors do not occur.
The research also counsels caution about overclaiming. Courts widely admit properly limited testimony, and a motion to exclude the subject entirely is unlikely to succeed where narrower limits would address the concern. The behaviors at issue are well documented in true cases, and challenging their existence rather than their inferential use is both inaccurate and unpersuasive. Opening the door by arguing that a complainant’s behavior shows fabrication may make rebuttal testimony admissible (Rynning, 1998), and defense experts are bound by the same limits on credibility opinions and false-report statistics.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Boeschen, L. E., Sales, B. D., & Koss, M. P. (1998). Rape trauma experts in the courtroom. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 4(1–2), 414–432. https://doi.org/10.1037/1076-8971.4.1-2.414
Brekke, N., & Borgida, E. (1988). Expert psychological testimony in rape trials: A social-cognitive analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55(3), 372–386. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.55.3.372
Burgess, A. W., & Holmstrom, L. L. (1974). Rape trauma syndrome. American Journal of Psychiatry, 131(9), 981–986. https://doi.org/10.1176/ajp.131.9.981
Ellison, L., & Munro, V. E. (2009). Turning mirrors into windows? Assessing the impact of (mock) juror education in rape trials. British Journal of Criminology, 49(3), 363–383. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azp013
Frazier, P. A., & Borgida, E. (1992). Rape trauma syndrome: A review of case law and psychological research. Law and Human Behavior, 16(3), 293–311. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01044771
Joint Service Committee on Military Justice. (2025). Amendments to the Military Rules of Evidence since 1984 (G. E. Maggs, Ed.; 2025 ed.). https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/99/MRE%20Amendments%202025.pdf
Leverick, F. (2020). What do we know about rape myths and juror decision making? International Journal of Evidence & Proof, 24(3), 255–279. https://doi.org/10.1177/1365712720923157
Leverick, F., Chalmers, J., Keane, E. P. H., & Kinghan, J. (2026). What do we know about the effectiveness of juror education in rape and serious sexual offence trials? International Journal of Evidence & Proof. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1177/13657127261441447
Möller, A., Söndergaard, H. P., & Helström, L. (2017). Tonic immobility during sexual assault: A common reaction predicting post-traumatic stress disorder and severe depression. Acta Obstetricia et Gynecologica Scandinavica, 96(8), 932–938. https://doi.org/10.1111/aogs.13174
O’Donohue, W., Carlson, G. C., Benuto, L. T., & Bennett, N. M. (2014). Examining the scientific validity of rape trauma syndrome. Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 21(6), 858–876. https://doi.org/10.1080/13218719.2014.918067
Tapp, S. N., & Coen, E. J. (2025). Criminal victimization, 2024 (NCJ 310547). U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics.
Thomas, C. (2020). The 21st century jury: Contempt, bias and the impact of jury service. Criminal Law Review, 2020(11), 987–1011.
Tuerkheimer, D. (2024). Victim, reconstructed: Sex crimes experts and the new rape paradigm. University of Illinois Law Review, 2024(1), 55. https://illinoislawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Tuerkheimer.pdf
Legal Authorities
Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 519 Pa. 291, 547 A.2d 355 (1988).
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984).
People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 552 N.E.2d 131 (1990).
State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 425 P.3d 1078 (2018).
State v. Haskie, 242 Ariz. 582, 399 P.3d 657 (2017).
State v. J.L.G., 234 N.J. 265, 190 A.3d 442 (2018).
State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).
State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 647 P.2d 1292 (1982).
State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 1982).
State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).
United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
United States v. Carter, 26 M.J. 428 (C.M.A. 1988).
United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
United States v. Flesher, 73 M.J. 303 (C.A.A.F. 2014).
United States v. Flores, 82 M.J. 737 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2022).
United States v. Griffin, 50 M.J. 278 (C.A.A.F. 1999).
United States v. Halford, 50 M.J. 402 (C.A.A.F. 1999).
United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).
United States v. Johnson, 860 F.3d 1133 (8th Cir. 2017).
United States v. Mellette, No. 201900305 (f rev) (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. July 8, 2025) (unpublished) (on remand from 82 M.J. 374 (C.A.A.F. 2022)).
United States v. Mullins, 69 M.J. 113 (C.A.A.F. 2010).
United States v. Roberts, 86 F.4th 1183 (8th Cir. 2023).
United States v. Rynning, 47 M.J. 420 (C.A.A.F. 1998).
United States v. Sanchez, 65 M.J. 145 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
United States v. Solomon, No. ACM 39972 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 2022) (unpublished).
United States v. Webb, No. ACM 39904 (recon) (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 18, 2021) (unpublished).
United States v. Zephier, 989 F.3d 629 (8th Cir. 2021).
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5920.
Fed. R. Evid. 105.
Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Ariz. R. Evid. 403.
Ariz. R. Evid. 702.
Mil. R. Evid. 403.
Mil. R. Evid. 702.
Mil. R. Evid. 1102.
Related topic papers: Vouching, Profile Evidence, and the Human Lie Detector Rule · Preparing for and Examining a Counterintuitive Behavior Expert · From Rape Trauma Syndrome to Counterintuitive Behavior Testimony · Fit and Generalizability: Matching the Research to the Case · Juror Beliefs About Sexual Assault: What the Research Shows
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Courts-Martial · Child Abuse Allegations