Snap Shot
- The question: Do jurors hold mistaken beliefs about how people respond to sexual assault, and do those beliefs affect verdicts?
- What the research shows: In the one large survey of real jurors that I located (771 jurors in England and Wales; Thomas, 2020), few endorsed overt misconceptions, but 43% expected a complainant to be very emotional when testifying and many were unsure about intoxication and delay. Mock-jury and interview studies show beliefs disclaimed in the abstract, especially about resistance and demeanor, being applied to concrete cases.
- What it does not show: Effect on real verdicts is unknown; a 2026 meta-analysis of mock-jury studies found these beliefs related strongly to blaming the complainant but only weakly to guilt judgments. The evidence is correlational, the survey’s design is disputed, no study located has measured court-martial members (the absence of data supports neither side’s assumption), and no study can say what a particular panel believes.
- The law: Rule 702 requires that expert testimony help the trier of fact, so this research bears on helpfulness; Flesher and Salazar-Mercado permit educational testimony, and Haskie cautions against categorical claims. In courts-martial, argument about misconceptions must rest on record evidence, not members’ training (Bodoh, Washington).
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors should tie testimony to the specific, documented expectations the case raises and present false-report uncertainty accurately; defense counsel should ask which belief the testimony addresses and whether the case raises it, without arguing that misconceptions do not exist.
Counterintuitive behavior testimony—expert testimony explaining that behaviors such as delayed reporting, calm demeanor, or continued contact with the accused occur among people who have been sexually assaulted—rests on a premise about jurors rather than about complainants. The premise is that many jurors hold mistaken beliefs about how a person who has been assaulted would behave, that those beliefs can affect verdicts, and that education can correct them. As a monograph prepared for prosecutors put it, the word “counterintuitive” describes how a juror may perceive a behavior, not the behavior itself (Fanflik, 2007, p. 2).
Whether the premise holds matters in court. Under the federal, military, and Arizona versions of Rule 702, expert testimony must help the trier of fact, and testimony about matters within common understanding is not helpful. Sexual assault is common and substantially underreported, responses to it vary widely, and the behaviors at issue genuinely occur in many true cases. The question addressed here is narrower: what the research shows about what jurors and prospective jurors believe, how firmly, and whether those beliefs change decisions. That research documents misconceptions, and it is also the subject of a genuine scientific dispute about how widespread and influential they are among people who actually serve on juries.
This paper explains how researchers define and measure these beliefs, reviews public surveys and the one large survey of real jurors that I located, sets out the published debate over that survey, examines whether beliefs affect verdicts and whether deliberation corrects them, reviews the evidence belief by belief, and addresses male complainants and military populations. Methods of correcting misconceptions are treated in the companion paper, Correcting Juror Misconceptions: Directions, Expert Evidence, and Juror Screening.
What Researchers Mean by Misconceptions
The research literature calls these beliefs “rape myths,” a term long standard in psychology and law-reform writing. A recent evidence review defines them as false and prejudicial beliefs about rape and rape victims, and stresses a qualification that matters for courtroom use: a belief of this kind is false when it is stated as a general rule for all cases, even though the same statement may be true in some cases (Leverick, 2020; Leverick et al., 2025a). Some people who are assaulted do report immediately, resist, are injured, or are visibly distressed. The error lies in treating the absence of those features as a sign that an assault did not occur.
The beliefs the review identifies as most relevant to trials are that rape is always accompanied by significant violence or injury; that a person being raped would forcefully resist or call for help; that a genuine victim would report immediately; that a genuine victim will be emotional when testifying; that a genuine victim can give a consistent and detailed account; and that false allegations are common (Leverick et al., 2025a). The first five concern expectations about behavior that the clinical and survey research addressed elsewhere in this hub has not shown to be reliable stand-alone indicators, although some research finds a modest relationship between consistency or detail and accuracy. The sixth is different in kind: it concerns a base rate that is itself measured with substantial uncertainty, and that difference recurs below.
How Beliefs Are Measured
Most research uses attitude scales. The Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance Scale (Payne et al., 1999) asks respondents to rate agreement with statements about victims, perpetrators, and circumstances; McMahon and Farmer (2011) revised it to capture more subtle beliefs because respondents had grown less willing to endorse overtly victim-blaming statements. The Acceptance of Modern Myths About Sexual Aggression scale (AMMSA), developed and validated in German and English samples, was designed for the same reason: its 30 items are worded subtly, use a seven-point response format, and target contemporary beliefs (for example, that complaints are exaggerated or that the issue receives too much attention) rather than crude statements that few people will endorse (Gerger et al., 2007). Meta-analytic work finds that scores on such scales are associated with hostile attitudes toward women and traditional gender-role beliefs (Suarez & Gadalla, 2010); differences between men and women are discussed below.
The measures have recognized limitations. They are self-reports, and respondents who know which answers are socially approved may give them; researchers on both sides of the current debate acknowledge this (Daly et al., 2023; Willmott et al., 2026). Abstract statements may draw different answers than the same idea applied to a specific case; qualitative studies repeatedly find people who reject a belief on a questionnaire and then apply it in discussion (Ellison & Munro, 2010). Some items address questions with no agreed empirical answer, such as how often people falsely accuse public figures, so disagreement with the researchers’ preferred answer is not necessarily a misconception (Thomas, 2020). A published critique goes further, arguing that the scales carry ideological assumptions, are applied one-sidedly, and give little attention to the risk that empathy for complainants could itself bias decisions (Waiton, 2024). Researchers who use the scales reply that methods with different weaknesses converge (Leverick et al., 2025a).
How Common Are These Beliefs?
Public Surveys
Surveys of the general public in the United Kingdom, as summarized in a 2025 evidence review, show low agreement with crudely worded statements and higher agreement or uncertainty on others. In the 2019 Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (959 respondents), 8% agreed that women often lie about being raped (29% unsure), 7% that women who take a while to report are probably lying (19% unsure), and 6% that a woman who did not fight back is probably lying (17% unsure). In a 2023 survey of 3,066 adults in England and Wales conducted for the Crown Prosecution Service, 44% agreed that rape typically involves violence, 35% that a victim would usually seem distressed when talking about the assault, 21% that a person who had been raped would always remember exactly what happened, 17% that women often make up allegations (41% unsure), and 8% that it is not rape unless the victim resists. A 2022 survey of 1,000 adults found 18% agreeing that accusations are often false (Leverick et al., 2025a). Differences in wording and response format limit direct comparison. In a U.S. national survey, 228 police officers, prosecutors, and jurors and 865 members of the public both averaged in the non-acceptance range, the decision-makers scoring higher (Gavin et al., 2026).
Real Jurors: The Thomas Study
The one large survey of people who had actually served on juries that I located (as of Nov. 2026) was conducted by the UCL Jury Project in England and Wales in 2018–2019 and reported by Thomas (2020). Anonymous questionnaires were completed immediately after verdict by 771 of 773 jurors (99.7%) on 65 juries in four court regions; the juries had tried a range of sexual and non-sexual cases, in proportions not reported. Jurors rated about 18 statements, some adapted from the Illinois scale and its update, as agree, not sure, or disagree.
Agreement with the crudest statements was very low: 2% agreed that men cannot be raped, 3% that a rape probably did not happen if the victim has no bruises or marks, and 3% that a person who did not physically fight back cannot really say it was rape (with 12% unsure on that item). On delay, 7% agreed that it is difficult to believe allegations not reported immediately, 20% were unsure, and 73% disagreed. Large majorities agreed with accurate statements: 80% that there are good reasons someone who has been raped may be reluctant to tell anyone or report it, and 77% each that rape within a relationship can continue for a long time before a complaint and that giving evidence about rape is hard. Responses were more divided elsewhere. On demeanor, 43% said they would expect anyone who was raped to be very emotional when giving evidence, 22% disagreed, and 35% were unsure. On intoxication, 25% agreed that if both people are drunk it is hard to know whether it was really rape, 36% were unsure, and 39% disagreed. On whether some women who say they were raped had agreed to sex and later regretted it, 12% agreed and 47% were unsure. Most jurors (64%) correctly said a person is more likely to be raped by someone known to them than by a stranger, but 31% were unsure (Thomas, 2020).
Thomas concluded that claims of widespread juror bias in sexual offense cases were not supported, that polls and mock-jury studies cannot stand in for real jurors, and that jurors would benefit from guidance on two issues with an agreed factual basis—acquaintance rape and emotion when testifying. She reported “little to no” differences by gender, age, region, or case type, without statistics, and noted that several items with large “unsure” responses concern matters with no agreed empirical answer (Thomas, 2020).
The Debate Over Real-Juror and Mock-Jury Evidence
The Thomas study prompted published responses. Chalmers, Leverick, and Munro (2021b) argued that the findings were narrower than presented and defended mock-jury research against the claim that participants behave differently from real jurors. A commentary by eleven researchers made four principal criticisms (Daly et al., 2023). First, the survey items were not drawn verbatim from a validated scale, internal consistency was not reported, the three-point format captures less variation than longer scales, the “not sure” option may conceal socially undesirable views, and no social desirability measure was used. Second, a post-verdict attitude survey is still an attitude survey: it measures beliefs in the abstract, not reasoning during deliberation, and a 99.7% response rate inside a courthouse may reflect institutional pressure as well as willingness. Third, people who reject beliefs in the abstract may apply them to concrete cases. Fourth, the conclusions underweighted the items with substantial agreement or uncertainty; converted to a 12-person jury, Thomas’s figures imply about five jurors expecting very emotional testimony and three agreeing that shared intoxication makes rape hard to judge, more if “unsure” jurors are counted.
Thomas’s position also has substantial support in her data and design. Her sample consisted of people who actually served, with near-complete participation, avoiding the volunteer bias of mock-jury and online samples; in a related UCL Jury Project survey of 1,175 serving jurors on 99 juries, 87% said they would have opted out of jury service if it were voluntary, which she argued means volunteer mock jurors cannot represent real jurors (Thomas, 2020). Mock-jury studies use short trials, simulated stakes, and samples that often include students. A broader critique argues that the claim of overwhelming evidence of juror prejudice rests on methods with these limits (Waiton, 2024).
Each method answers a different question. Attitude surveys estimate how many people endorse a belief in the abstract. Mock-jury studies show how beliefs are argued in deliberation and whether scale scores predict verdicts, at the cost of realism. Interviews with real jurors are rare because most jurisdictions restrict inquiry into deliberations; a New Zealand study of 121 jurors from 18 sexual violence trials found jurors in 11 trials describing resistance, and in 7 describing demeanor, as affecting credibility assessments, subject to the recall and self-presentation limits of interviews (Tinsley et al., 2021; Leverick et al., 2025a). The 2025 review concludes that all three methods show at least some jurors hold false beliefs, while acknowledging that their influence on verdicts cannot be known with certainty (Leverick et al., 2025a); a peer-reviewed article by the same authors, who advocate juror education, adds that deliberation may not reliably correct these beliefs (Leverick et al., 2025b). Several authors appear across the commentary, the review, and the mock-jury studies it relies on, and the critics include researchers whose work Thomas criticized; that overlap does not make their arguments wrong, but the literature is not a set of independent assessments.
A fair summary is that both sides are partly right. Overt misconceptions—that rape requires bruises, that men cannot be raped—appear to be held by few people who serve on juries. Expectations about demeanor and uncertainty about intoxication, delay, and false allegations are held by substantial minorities, and qualitative research shows beliefs disclaimed in the abstract being applied to concrete cases. What the research cannot yet say is how often those beliefs change the outcome of real trials.
Do Beliefs Affect Verdicts?
Most evidence on verdicts comes from mock-jury studies that measure attitudes and then ask participants to decide a simulated case. Leverick (2020) identified 28 such studies from several countries and found a statistically significant relationship between scale scores and verdicts in 25; she characterized the three exceptions as poor quality. An earlier systematic review reached a similar conclusion that these attitudes influence mock jurors’ judgments of complainants and defendants (Dinos et al., 2015). Beliefs may also affect how other evidence is weighed: in one experiment (N = 196), higher scorers were more likely to acquit and rated an eyewitness more favorably only when the eyewitness supported the defense (Parsons & Mojtahedi, 2022).
Willmott et al. (2026) report two English mock-trial studies using the same acquaintance-rape case involving intoxication, prior acquaintance, and no independent witnesses. In the first, 324 participants recruited by poster (mean age 24) watched a filmed trial of about 30 minutes and deliberated in 27 juries of 12; 45% voted guilty before deliberation, 41% afterward, and the juries returned 5 guilty and 22 not guilty verdicts. In the second, 100 participants sampled from the electoral register (mean age 45) watched a live three-hour re-enactment and deliberated in nine juries; 22% favored guilty before deliberation, 15% afterward, and all nine juries acquitted. In both studies, higher AMMSA scores were significantly associated with not-guilty votes before and after deliberation and were the most consistent predictor tested. The chapter reports significance but not effect sizes.
A 2026 meta-analysis of 20 mock-jury studies published from 2012 to 2025 (N = 7,682) adds an important qualification. Higher scores were strongly associated with blaming the complainant (r = .52) but only weakly with guilt judgments (r = −.16), with substantial heterogeneity that neither sample type nor study location explained; the authors concluded that these beliefs continue to shape evaluation of complainants but that their effect on verdicts appears smaller and more context-dependent than earlier reviews suggested (Bouillaut et al., 2026). A second 2026 meta-analysis of perceptions rather than verdicts (40 studies, 12,283 participants) found a similar pattern: these beliefs, with sexism and gender-role expectations, correlated with victim blame (r = .558) and lower victim credibility (r = −.492) more strongly than with perpetrator blame (r = −.288) or sanction severity (r = −.191) (Trottier et al., 2026). The distinction between beliefs that color perception of a complainant and beliefs that change verdicts is important for evaluating what education can accomplish.
Two cautions apply to all of this evidence. The relationship is correlational: scale scores may predict verdicts partly because both reflect broader attitudes, including attitudes toward the burden of proof. And no study links real jurors’ measured beliefs to real verdicts; the evidence concerns which mock jurors lean toward conviction or acquittal, not whether outcomes are correct.
Juror Gender
Because most complainants in these cases are women and most defendants are men, juror gender draws particular attention. On average, men score higher than women on these scales (Suarez & Gadalla, 2010), younger men scored highest in the U.S. survey (Gavin et al., 2026), and men perceive rape victims more negatively than women, by margins that depend on the scenario (Hockett et al., 2016). Verdict differences are smaller and less consistent. In an early mock-jury study, rape-myth acceptance accounted for the relation between participant gender and guilt judgments (Schuller & Wall, 1998); men were more likely to acquit in one recent experiment (Parsons & Mojtahedi, 2022); and in the Willmott studies gender predicted votes only before deliberation in the electoral-register sample, while women were more likely than men to move from guilty to not guilty during deliberation (Willmott et al., 2026). The 2026 meta-analysis of perceptions found that participant gender did not moderate the link between these attitudes and judgments, meaning the attitudes operated similarly in men and women (Trottier et al., 2026). The association therefore runs through attitudes, which vary widely within each sex, not through sex itself; the Jurors and Jury Decision-Making resource’s paper Juror Demographics and Verdicts reviews these findings and the constitutional bar on selecting or striking jurors by sex (J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 1994).
Deliberation
Deliberation might correct mistaken beliefs, because jurors who do not share them can challenge them. The evidence suggests that this sometimes happens and cannot be relied on. In the Scottish Jury Research, 32 mock juries (431 jurors recruited to reflect the local population) watched a 75-minute filmed rape trial and deliberated for up to 90 minutes. The view that a genuine victim would resist was expressed in 28 juries, that she would scream or call for help in 16, that false allegations are common in 19, and the complainant’s emotion was used to judge her credibility in 24; by contrast, the emotion of the male complainant in a parallel non-sexual assault trial was commented on in only 3 of 32 juries. Some jurors challenged these views, sometimes vigorously, but challenges did not always occur and their effect was unclear (Chalmers et al., 2021a; Leverick et al., 2025a).
In the Willmott studies, individual guilty votes fell during deliberation in both samples, and a companion analysis of the live-trial deliberations reported that jurors who invoked these beliefs tended to hold to them when challenged, although jurors most often explained acquittal by saying they were not sure (Willmott et al., 2026). That explanation is consistent with beliefs generating doubt, and also consistent with jurors properly applying a demanding standard of proof to a case with no independent evidence. The 2025 review notes that under a unanimity requirement a small number of jurors holding mistaken beliefs could prevent a conviction (Leverick et al., 2025a); the same structural point applies to a juror whose mistaken beliefs favor the prosecution.
A conversation analysis of 435 minutes of mock deliberation found jurors comparing the complainant’s conduct with what a “typical” person would do, and other jurors supporting, resisting, or reformulating those comparisons (Richardson et al., 2025). Deliberation can also introduce error in either direction: in two transcript experiments, jurors misattributed misinformation voiced by fellow jurors to the trial evidence (pro-prosecution misinformation more often in one study, pro-defense in the other, where it also shifted decisions toward the defense), and a judicial warning had no effect (Cullen et al., 2024).
Specific Belief Domains
Demeanor
Expectations about emotional demeanor are the most consistently documented. Forty-three percent of Thomas’s real jurors expected a complainant to be very emotional when testifying, and 35% of the 2023 English public sample expected visible distress (Thomas, 2020; Leverick et al., 2025a). A meta-analysis of 20 studies with 3,128 participants, all involving female complainants and including criminal justice professionals as well as mock jurors, found that complainants who displayed distress were judged more credible than those who appeared controlled (Nitschke et al., 2019). Jurors also discount complainants who appear too emotional or whose demeanor changes between police interview and trial (Chalmers et al., 2022; Leverick et al., 2025a), although, as this hub’s paper on post-assault demeanor explains, demeanor is an unreliable indicator either way.
Delay
Few real jurors or members of the public endorse the statement that delayed reports are probably false (7% in both Thomas’s sample and the Scottish survey), but a fifth were unsure, and in the New Zealand interviews jurors in one delayed-report case said the delay cast doubt on the allegation despite a judicial warning (Thomas, 2020; Leverick et al., 2025a). In a transcript study of 709 mock jurors, the stated reason for delay affected verdicts, and only higher AMMSA scorers rated an immediate report as more truthful than a delayed one (Thompson & Pozzulo, 2025). Delay and demeanor are also the domains in which education has shown effects, as discussed in the companion paper.
Resistance and Injury
Statements that rape requires injury or resistance draw very low agreement in surveys (3% each in Thomas’s sample), yet the expectation of resistance was voiced in 28 of 32 Scottish mock juries and by real jurors in 11 of 18 New Zealand trials (Thomas, 2020; Leverick et al., 2025a). The gap between abstract and applied belief is widest here, and education in the leading mock-jury study did not change it (Ellison & Munro, 2009).
Intoxication
Intoxication produces divided responses: a quarter of Thomas’s jurors agreed and over a third were unsure whether it is hard to know if rape occurred when both people were drunk (Thomas, 2020). This statement mixes a misconception with a real evidentiary difficulty: intoxication can impair memory and complicate questions of consent and capacity, so agreement does not necessarily reflect a mistaken belief about victims.
Prior Relationship
Thomas’s jurors overwhelmingly recognized that rape can occur within relationships, and most knew that assault by an acquaintance is more common than by a stranger, though nearly a third were unsure (Thomas, 2020). Mock-jury research finds that a prior relationship or prior sexual contact between complainant and defendant changes how participants interpret ambiguous evidence, and that admission of sexual history evidence substantially affected verdicts in one recent study (Ellison & Munro, 2013; Leverick et al., 2025a). In a study of 484 undergraduates, guilt ratings were higher when prior sexual history evidence was absent, which bears on rape-shield rulings (Fraser et al., 2026). In 11 experiments (n = 12,257), female victims were blamed more and seen as less morally virtuous when the assault followed voluntary sexual intimacy (Jordan & Sommers, 2024). None of these studies measured real verdicts.
False Allegations
Beliefs about false allegations show the widest uncertainty: 41% of the English public sample and 29% of the Scottish sample were unsure whether women often lie or make up allegations, and false allegations were described as common in 19 of 32 Scottish mock juries (Leverick et al., 2025a). This domain differs from the others because the underlying base rate is itself uncertain. The commonly cited estimates of confirmed false reports range from roughly 2% to 10% of reports to police or campus authorities, with a large remainder whose truth could not be determined (in the university study by Lisak and colleagues, 8 of 136 reports (5.9%) were coded false, while 44.9% did not proceed to prosecution or disciplinary action and 13.9% had too little information to classify); that remainder is not evidence of falsity, and it is not evidence of truth either (Lisak et al., 2010; Ferguson & Malouff, 2016). A juror who is unsure how often allegations are false is not necessarily mistaken, and the 2025 review notes that Scotland’s specimen directions omit the subject for this reason (Leverick et al., 2025a).
Male Complainants and Other Groups
Most research concerns female complainants and male defendants. Very few jurors (2% in Thomas’s sample) agree that men cannot be raped, but research on beliefs about male victims—that men cannot be overpowered, that arousal implies consent, or that assault by a woman is not serious—finds these beliefs persisting, though with change over time (Kambashi et al., 2023), and associated with lower empathy toward victims (Willmott & Widanaralalage, 2024). A replication of a 1984 study with a 2019 sample found that men became less likely, and women more likely, to judge that a male victim of a female assailant had encouraged the incident (40% to 15% among men; 4% to 27% among women), with persistent differences by victim and assailant gender (PeConga et al., 2022). Research on same-sex assault is growing but limited. The associations between attitudes and perceptions of victims were stronger in same-gender cases (Trottier et al., 2026), and in a male-on-male mock trial (463 participants), male-specific belief scores were associated with verdicts through both parties’ believability (Curley et al., 2026). Findings on complainant gender conflict: a male complainant drew lower credibility and fewer convictions in one online study (Ferreira et al., 2026) but more guilty verdicts in an undergraduate study (Fraser et al., 2026). There is very little research on juror beliefs in cases involving transgender complainants, complainants with intellectual disabilities, or complainants from minority communities, and findings about female complainants should not be assumed to apply to them.
Change Over Time and Military Populations
Beliefs appear to have shifted. Undergraduates at one university surveyed in 2017 scored significantly lower than a 2010 sample on every subscale of a revised Illinois scale (Beshers & DiVita, 2021). Single-institution studies cannot establish national trends, but they caution against assuming that attitudes measured decades ago describe today’s jurors.
Military data are limited. A study of incoming students at two service academies and a civilian comparison group of fraternity and sorority members found that men in every sample endorsed these beliefs more than women, with smaller gender differences at one academy (Carroll et al., 2016). A pretest-posttest study of 481 enlisted soldiers found that a standard Army sexual assault briefing produced a very small overall decline in scale scores, with improvement on some subscales and worsening on others, while a longer specialized program produced a moderate decline (Foubert & Masin, 2012). A sexual assault resistance program reduced Illinois-scale scores among female Air Force Academy cadets (Garcia et al., 2024). Interviews with military lawyers found some doubting the legitimacy of reports (Tosto & Bonnes, 2026) and prosecutors invoking military values to counter stereotypes they expected of panels (Bonnes & Tosto, 2023). None of these studies measured court-martial members, who may differ from civilian jurors in age, rank, selection under Article 25, UCMJ, and exposure to sexual assault prevention training. I located no published study that measured the beliefs of court-martial members as a group, and the research does not establish whether they hold these beliefs more or less strongly than civilian jurors or how training affects their deliberations.
Training also creates a distinct legal issue. Members may bring to deliberation what they were taught, and counsel may be tempted to invoke it. In United States v. Bodoh (2019), trial counsel told members that “victim myths” were taught in SHARP training; the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held that the reference was improper because training is not evidence, but not prejudicial because the prosecution’s expert had testified to the same point. In United States v. Washington (2020), a unit SHARP representative testified about the lesson of consent training he had recently given; the court assumed error and found no material prejudice. Together the cases indicate that arguments about juror misconceptions in a court-martial must rest on evidence in the record, not on members’ institutional training.
Limits of the Evidence
Attitude surveys measure abstract endorsement and are vulnerable to social desirability effects; the only large real-juror survey used an unvalidated three-point instrument and did not measure deliberation or verdicts. Mock-jury studies range from student vignettes to live re-enactments; even the best use short trials, simulated stakes, and volunteers, and their attitude-verdict relationships are correlational. Interviews with real jurors are few. Most research comes from the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and American universities, under different verdict rules; very little involves American criminal juries and none involves court-martial panels. Most studies use a female complainant and a male defendant, and in the 2026 perceptions meta-analysis most results (133 of 164) came from convenience samples that reported nothing by participant gender (Trottier et al., 2026).
No study can determine whether the jurors in a particular case hold mistaken beliefs, or whether such beliefs would affect their verdict. The research describes tendencies across groups of participants.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When the Thomas (2020) survey is cited to show that real jurors rarely hold overt misconceptions, counsel should ask what exactly was counted: abstract agreement on an unvalidated three-point instrument, not deliberation, and the same data show 43% expecting a complainant to be very emotional when testifying. When Leverick’s (2020) finding that scale scores predicted verdicts in 25 of 28 mock-jury studies is cited to show that beliefs change outcomes, counsel should ask whether the conclusion follows from the design: the relationship is correlational, and Bouillaut et al. (2026) found a strong association with blame (r = .52) but a weak one with guilt judgments (r = −.16). Neither use answers whether the research applies to this panel, since no study located has measured court-martial members, and the absence of data supports neither side’s assumption. When testimony addresses false allegations, counsel should ask what the base rate is and how certain, for the reasons given above. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Juror Beliefs and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
Federal Rule of Evidence 702(a) requires that expert testimony help the trier of fact; since the December 1, 2023 amendment, the proponent must establish that requirement, along with the reliability requirements, by a preponderance of the evidence. Testimony on matters within common knowledge is generally not helpful, and the research reviewed here is the main evidence on whether the behaviors at issue fall within jurors’ common understanding. It supports a finding that some jurors hold some mistaken expectations, especially about demeanor and, in applied reasoning, about resistance and delay; it does not support a finding that most jurors do, and it varies by belief. Military Rule of Evidence 702 tracks the federal rule through Military Rule of Evidence 1102, the 2023 amendment became part of it in 2025 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025), and military courts apply the Houser factors, including helpfulness. In United States v. Flesher (2014), the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces acknowledged that expert testimony about the sometimes counterintuitive behaviors of sexual assault victims may be admitted, while holding that the proponent must establish the witness’s expertise and the reliability of the testimony. Bodoh and Washington, discussed above, limit argument and lay testimony about training.
Court-martial members are selected by the convening authority under Article 25, UCMJ, and must be excused for cause under Rule for Courts-Martial 912(f)(1)(N) when serving would raise substantial doubt about the legality, fairness, and impartiality of the proceedings. Under section 543 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, which requires randomized selection of qualified personnel to the maximum extent practicable, and Executive Order 14130, which amended Rule for Courts-Martial 503(a)(1) effective December 23, 2024, courts-martial convened on or after that date draw members at random from a larger pool that the convening authority details under the Article 25 criteria. In federal court, voir dire is governed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(a).
Arizona
Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 conforms to the federal rule. In State v. Salazar-Mercado (2014), the Arizona Supreme Court held that cold expert testimony educating jurors about general behavioral patterns may be admitted if it satisfies Rule 702 and Rule 403, and in State v. Haskie (2017) the court cautioned against broad, categorical statements about what is “common” without empirical support. State v. Lindsey (1986) and State v. Moran (1986) permit testimony on general behavioral characteristics but forbid opinions on the truthfulness of a particular witness. A prospective juror must be excused for cause under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 18.4(b) when there is reasonable ground to believe the juror cannot render a fair and impartial verdict.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party may need to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports the premise that some jurors hold mistaken expectations about how people respond to sexual assault, and it identifies the best-documented ones: emotional demeanor when testifying (expected by a substantial minority even of real jurors in the Thomas survey), and resistance and delay as applied in concrete deliberations. Leverick’s (2020) review, the Scottish mock-jury findings, the New Zealand juror interviews, and the Willmott et al. (2026) studies provide a documented foundation for educational testimony, although the extent to which mistaken expectations affect verdicts, and whether any particular panel holds them, is less well established. Testimony tied to the specific expectations the case raises is on the firmest ground; in a court-martial, any argument about misconceptions should rest on that evidence rather than on members’ training, as Bodoh requires.
The research also counsels caution. The one large survey of real jurors that I located found low endorsement of overt misconceptions (though 43% expected very emotional testimony), the newest meta-analysis finds that these beliefs predict blame much more strongly than verdicts, and I located no data on court-martial members. Testimony that asserts that jurors are generally biased, or that addresses beliefs few jurors hold, is vulnerable under Rule 702’s helpfulness requirement and Rule 403. Any reference to false-report figures should state their uncertainty accurately; courts bar experts from quantifying how often witnesses tell the truth (Brooks; Lindsey).
Special Issues for Defense
The research supports a careful inquiry into whether educational testimony is needed in a particular case. Few real jurors in the Thomas (2020) survey endorsed overt misconceptions; the Bouillaut et al. (2026) meta-analysis shows a weaker and more variable link to verdicts than often assumed; mock-jury evidence is correlational; and no study has measured court-martial members. Defense counsel can ask the proponent to identify which expectation the testimony addresses, what evidence shows jurors hold it, and whether the case actually raises it.
The research also counsels caution. The critiques of the Thomas survey are substantial, its own data show many jurors expecting emotional testimony or unsure about delay and intoxication, and qualitative studies document beliefs disclaimed in the abstract being applied in deliberation. The defense cannot fairly argue that misconceptions do not exist or never affect trials. The defensible position is that their prevalence and influence are uncertain and vary by belief, which bears on the helpfulness and scope of testimony rather than on whether misconceptions are real.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
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Legal Authorities
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
State v. Haskie, 242 Ariz. 582, 399 P.3d 657 (2017).
State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).
State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986).
State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).
United States v. Bodoh, 78 M.J. 231 (C.A.A.F. 2019).
United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
United States v. Flesher, 73 M.J. 303 (C.A.A.F. 2014).
United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).
United States v. Washington, 80 M.J. 106 (C.A.A.F. 2020).
10 U.S.C. § 825 (Article 25, Uniform Code of Military Justice), as amended by the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, Pub. L. No. 117-263, § 543 (2022).
Exec. Order No. 14130, 2024 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 89 Fed. Reg. 105343 (Dec. 27, 2024).
Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(a).
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.4(b).
Ariz. R. Evid. 403.
Ariz. R. Evid. 702.
Mil. R. Evid. 702.
Mil. R. Evid. 1102.
R.C.M. 912(f)(1)(N).
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