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Correcting Juror Misconceptions: Directions, Expert Evidence, and Juror Screening

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  • The question: If some jurors hold mistaken beliefs about how people respond to sexual assault, do judicial directions, expert testimony, or juror screening correct them?
  • What the research shows: The evidence base is small. In the most realistic mock-trial study, guidance changed deliberations about demeanor and delay but not about resistance, and jurors responded similarly whether it came from the judge or an expert. A 2025 meta-analysis found small effects, with expert testimony and juror education more effective than instruction; in one study expert testimony lost its effect under cross-examination. The only direct test of timing found no effect of when a direction was given. Several studies finding effects used content more categorical than a court would allow.
  • What it does not show: I located no study that tested any intervention with actual American criminal juries or court-martial members in sexual offense cases (the American studies used mock jurors), and I located no study showing that voir dire or attitude screening reduces biased verdicts.
  • The law: Rule 702 helpfulness requires both a likely misconception and testimony likely to correct it; the research supports the first for some beliefs and is inconclusive on the second. There is no federal, military, or Arizona standard instruction on delay, resistance, or demeanor. Bodoh bars arguing “victim myths” from SHARP training; Arizona eliminated peremptory challenges in criminal trials in 2022.
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors should offer focused testimony and tailored instructions that explain why people delay or stay calm, without categorical claims; defense counsel may ask whether a neutral instruction would serve instead of an expert, without arguing that education is useless.

Research reviewed in this hub’s companion paper, Juror Beliefs About Sexual Assault: What the Research Shows, indicates that some jurors hold mistaken expectations about how people respond to sexual assault—most consistently about emotional demeanor when testifying, and in applied reasoning about resistance and delayed reporting—while the extent and influence of those beliefs among real jurors remain disputed. Sexual assault is common and substantially underreported, and responses to it vary widely. If some jurors hold misconceptions, the practical question is what the legal system can do about them.

Courts have three principal tools. A judge can instruct the jury, either generally or on specific issues such as delay or the absence of resistance. A party can call an expert to provide counterintuitive behavior testimony—general educational testimony that behaviors such as delayed reporting or calm demeanor occur among people who have been assaulted. And the parties can try to identify and remove prospective jurors who hold strong misconceptions through voir dire and challenges for cause. Studies find that some jurors hold mistaken expectations, most consistently about demeanor and delay; the extent to which this affects verdicts, and whether any particular panel holds them, is less well established. Each tool rests on an empirical assumption: that instructions change how jurors reason, that expert testimony does so better or differently, or that screening can identify biased jurors without excluding others unfairly.

This paper reviews the evidence on each assumption: the rape-specific research on directions and expert evidence, including timing and content; the broader research on whether jurors follow instructions; jurisdictional approaches in England and Wales, Scotland, the federal and military systems, and Arizona; the evidence on juror screening, including emerging artificial intelligence tools; and what the evidence means for the helpfulness requirement of Rule 702 and for choosing between an expert and an instruction.

The Rape-Specific Evidence on Directions and Expert Evidence

The evidence base is small. A 2024 systematic review of studies comparing mock jurors who received information countering these beliefs with mock jurors who received none identified eight eligible studies and described the evidence as compromised by problems of internal and external validity (Flynn Hudspith et al., 2024). A 2025 evidence review identified 13 experimental studies, 12 of which tested statistically whether a judicial direction or expert evidence changed verdicts or ratings of the complainant’s credibility (Leverick et al., 2025). Seven found no significant effect. The reviewers cautioned against drawing conclusions from those null results, because five of the seven used written vignettes or transcripts, four used only student participants, two recruited online, and only one included deliberation, with just 12 participants. The most realistic of the seven, which presented a 20-minute trial video to participants drawn from the electoral roll, with a video in which an experienced police investigator addressed force, freezing, delay, and demeanor, found higher credibility ratings and more guilty verdicts, but the differences were not statistically significant.

Five studies found significant effects, and the reviewers noted that they were on the whole more realistic. Each, however, had a feature that limits its application to real trials. In Brekke and Borgida’s (1988) two studies, expert testimony on false accusations and resistance raised credibility ratings, and in one study guilty verdicts, but the expert testified without challenge that few women falsely accuse men. In Spanos et al. (1991), expert testimony increased guilty verdicts only when the expert was not cross-examined; when cross-examination elicited concessions, including that documented false allegations exist, the effect disappeared. Lee et al. (2024) found that a set of legally accurate directions modeled on the English Crown Court Compendium significantly increased guilty verdicts, but participants heard only the complainant’s evidence, with nothing from the defense. A study the review described as a 2025 working paper, since published, found that a 30-minute educational video shown before participants read a five-page trial transcript produced more guilty verdicts than a 30-minute control video on climate change (84% against 75%, a difference the authors describe as marginally significant, p = .050), along with lower ratings of the complainant’s responsibility and more empathy toward her; but the 391 participants were recruited online through Prolific and social media, there was no deliberation, the authors acknowledged that demand characteristics and the placement of a consent questionnaire may have contributed, and, as the review noted, the video made categorical statements, such as a precise average false-report rate, that would be unlikely to be permitted at trial (Kelleher et al., 2026; Leverick et al., 2025). A 2023 study testing trauma-education directions on complainant credibility found no significant effect (Nitschke et al., 2023).

The most realistic study remains Ellison and Munro’s (2009) reconstruction of a 75-minute rape trial performed live by actors and barristers before community participants, who deliberated in groups of eight or nine for up to 90 minutes. Complainant resistance, delay in reporting, and courtroom demeanor were varied, and one-third of trials included a judicial direction on freezing, delay, and emotional responses, one-third the same information from an expert called by the prosecution and cross-examined by the defense, and one-third no guidance. Guidance changed deliberations about demeanor and delay: educated jurors were less likely to rely on calm demeanor and more likely to say a three-day delay did not trouble them. It made no discernible difference to expectations about resistance. Jurors responded similarly whether the guidance came from the judge or the expert (Ellison & Munro, 2009; Leverick et al., 2025).

Evidence from real trials is thin. In the New Zealand study of 121 jurors from 18 sexual violence trials, directions on delay were given in two trials and appeared effective in one; directions cautioning against reliance on demeanor were given in four and appeared to have little effect, possibly because jurors received several overlapping credibility directions. The researchers concluded that directions were not a panacea and were sometimes confusing (Tinsley et al., 2021). In interviews with five jurors from one Australian trial, jurors recalled an expert’s explanation of the complainant’s laughing and crying after the incident and felt it corrected some jurors’ views, though the trial ended in acquittal (Horan & Goodman-Delahunty, 2020).

A 2025 meta-analysis of 44 studies of interventions aimed at jury bias in sexual offense trials found that interventions addressing bias against complainants produced small effects, with expert testimony and juror education more effective than judicial instruction, and called for greater ecological validity (Walters et al., 2025). In a later experiment with 155 participants, neither general expert testimony about these beliefs nor testimony addressing one specific belief changed verdicts, although general testimony produced the most favorable ratings of the victim (Grella & Burd, 2026). The most recent review, adding new data from the Scottish Jury Research, concludes that the jury is still out on whether directions or expert evidence can address false beliefs, in part because directions that try to change attitudes face a harder task than directions that convey legal rules (Leverick et al., 2026).

Timing and Content

Almost all studies delivered directions at the end of the trial. Research on how jurors process evidence suggested that this might be the least effective point, because jurors tend to construct a story early and fit later evidence into it (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). The 2025 review noted that both studies that delivered education before the evidence (Lee et al., 2024, and Kelleher et al., 2026, then a working paper) found significant effects, while cautioning that research on timing specific to sexual offense directions is almost nonexistent and that the two studies had the limitations described above (Leverick et al., 2025). A 2026 experiment designed to test timing directly did not support the timing hypothesis. In an acquaintance rape case, Australian community members (N = 250) were randomly assigned to a direction on freezing and the absence of resistance given before, during, or after cross-examination, or both before and after, or to no direction; timing had no significant effect on verdicts or complainant believability, while higher scores on a scale measuring what the authors call rape myth acceptance predicted acquittal (Wieberneit, Notebaert, et al., 2026). It tested one direction on one issue, without deliberation, so it does not show that timing never matters. In Victoria, Australia, where statute requires a delay direction before the relevant evidence is heard, an analysis of trial transcripts found that in most trials in which the defense suggested delay, no mid-trial direction was given, which illustrates that a timing rule does not ensure practice (Leverick et al., 2025).

Content matters as well. Ellison and Munro’s guidance on resistance did not explain why people may not resist, and research on instructions generally suggests jurors are more likely to follow a direction when they are told its rationale (Leverick et al., 2025). A 2026 synthesis combining research on how beliefs are updated with mock-jury intervention studies offers an explanation for the mixed findings: brief, superficial statements of fact are unlikely to change decisions, while more detailed information that addresses broad sets of beliefs, rather than single beliefs, can be reliably effective (Helm et al., 2026). The abstract does not state how many studies the synthesis drew on, its authors note that the findings could support prosecution of these offenses, and more detailed content raises the risk, noted below, of statements more categorical than a court would allow. In a qualitative analysis of 250 Australian mock jurors’ written verdict explanations after reading a transcript of an alcohol-involved acquaintance case, participants who received directions that there is no typical response to rape rarely referred to them explicitly, and intoxication tended to reduce the defendant’s responsibility while undermining the complainant’s credibility (Wieberneit, Tubex, et al., 2026). A further concern is that repeating a misconception in order to correct it may strengthen it. Drawing on research showing that repeated statements come to seem true, Krahé (2025) argued that the common “myth versus fact” format of education may backfire, and noted that it has rarely been tested. Finally, several studies that found effects used content more categorical than a court would allow. An instruction or testimony that overstates certainty may be effective in a laboratory and inadmissible, or appealable, in a courtroom.

What Instruction Research Shows More Generally

Research outside sexual offense cases gives reasons for caution about relying on instructions to control juror reasoning. A meta-analysis of 48 studies with about 8,500 participants found that inadmissible evidence reliably shifted mock jurors’ verdicts and that instructions to disregard it reduced but did not eliminate the effect; instructions were more effective when the judge explained why the evidence should be set aside (Steblay et al., 2006). Jurors are more willing to disregard evidence they view as unreliable than evidence excluded on procedural grounds (Kassin & Sommers, 1997). In a sexual assault transcript study (N = 339), a judicial warning about misinformation that fellow jurors might introduce during deliberation did not change memory or decisions (Cullen et al., 2024).

Two recent American studies extend these concerns to bias based on identity. In a national online experiment, mock jurors were more likely to convict a defendant of the opposing political party than a co-partisan, with gaps of roughly 21 to 25 percentage points; in a follow-up, standard instructions on impartiality, the presumption of innocence, and reasonable doubt did not reduce the gap, and if anything were associated with a wider one, though that difference was not statistically significant (Rhodes et al., 2025). A survey experiment with about 1,200 jury-eligible adults found that a codefendant’s confession redacted to refer to “the other person,” a form the Supreme Court accepted in Samia v. United States (2023), was rated nearly as incriminating as one naming the defendant, and the author assembled the research questioning whether limiting instructions work (Stillwell, 2025). Both studies used online samples without deliberation, and neither tested sexual offense directions; they show that instructions alone may not neutralize attitudes jurors bring with them, not that rape-specific directions are ineffective.

Expert Evidence Compared with Directions

Direct comparisons are rare. Ellison and Munro (2009), the only realistic head-to-head test, found little difference between judicial and expert guidance. The 2025 meta-analysis found expert testimony somewhat more effective than instruction across studies of varying design (Walters et al., 2025), while Spanos et al. (1991) showed that the effect of expert testimony can disappear under cross-examination. Each tool has distinct features. A direction comes from a neutral source, costs little, applies uniformly, and cannot be cross-examined, but it may be brief and abstract and must avoid commenting on the evidence. An expert can explain mechanisms and research in more depth and can be tested by cross-examination, but is called by one party, may be perceived as supporting that party’s account, and raises the risks of vouching and overstatement addressed elsewhere in this hub. Some law-reform bodies have recommended pre-recorded expert education videos to combine depth with uniformity; the evidence on them consists of a single study (Leverick et al., 2025). In interviews in England and Wales, 28 victim-survivors, barristers, and independent sexual violence advisers supported developing an intervention for jurors and raised design issues; the abstract does not say whether any barristers practiced for the defense (Flynn Hudspith et al., 2026).

Juror Screening and Voir Dire

Some researchers argue that, because scores on scales measuring what researchers call rape myth acceptance predict mock jurors’ verdicts and deliberation does not neutralize them, some pretrial screening of jurors is warranted (Willmott et al., 2026). The 2025 review rejects screening as impractical and unlikely to be effective: choosing a valid instrument and cutoff would be difficult; self-report scales are vulnerable to socially desirable answering, and people who score low can still express these beliefs in deliberation; and because men and older people score higher on average, screening by scale score would remove them disproportionately and make juries less representative (Leverick et al., 2025). The Law Commission for England and Wales also considered and rejected screening in its consultation (Leverick et al., 2025).

American voir dire allows questioning that British systems do not, but its effectiveness depends on candid self-report. In an experiment, small changes in a prospective juror’s stated confidence in being fair changed judges’ rulings on challenges without changing how attorneys or other jurors perceived the juror’s bias (Rose & Diamond, 2008). Rehabilitative questioning—asking a juror who has expressed bias whether he or she can set it aside—affected the decisions of biased and unbiased jurors alike rather than correcting bias specifically (Crocker & Kovera, 2010). These findings cut both ways. A juror’s assurance that victims respond in many ways does not show the juror holds no misconceptions; a juror’s endorsement of a general statement does not show the juror cannot fairly evaluate a particular case. I located no study that tested whether voir dire on these topics reduces biased verdicts.

Commercial tools that use artificial intelligence to simulate jurors or profile venires have begun to appear. A study comparing three general-purpose language models with about 1,200 human mock jurors found that every model’s predictions of individual jurors’ judgments were significantly less accurate than the variation among the humans themselves, that the models often refused tasks or invented implausible jurors, and that they tended to assign views by demographic stereotype; a model fine-tuned on human data performed substantially better (Harrington & Stillwell, 2026). The authors caution that commercial jury-selection tools have not been validated. Profiling by demographic characteristics also raises the representativeness concerns that screening does and, in American courts, runs into constitutional limits on the use of race and sex in jury selection (Batson v. Kentucky, 1986; J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 1994).

Limits of the Evidence

The studies of directions and expert evidence are few, mostly low in realism, rarely include deliberation, and seldom compare methods or timing. Several that found effects used content or procedures a court would not permit, and several that found no effect were too small or artificial to detect one. The general instruction research involves different subject matter and online samples. I located no study that tested any intervention with actual American criminal juries or court-martial members in sexual offense cases (the American studies used mock jurors), and I located no study showing that voir dire or screening reduces biased verdicts. Research on interventions measures group averages and cannot predict whether a particular instruction or expert will change the reasoning of a particular jury.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When the 2025 meta-analysis of 44 studies is cited to show that expert testimony and juror education outperform judicial instruction (Walters et al., 2025), counsel can ask how large the effect is in absolute terms, since the effects were small and the studies varied in design. When a study finding that directions increased guilty verdicts is offered, such as Lee et al. (2024), counsel can ask who was studied and compared with whom, because participants heard only the complainant’s evidence, with nothing from the defense. When the seven studies finding no significant effect are offered to show that education does not work (Leverick et al., 2025), counsel can ask how much evidence that conclusion rests on, given written vignettes, student and online samples, and a single deliberation study with just 12 participants. When Ellison and Munro (2009) is cited for the view that an instruction serves as well as an expert, counsel can ask whether the finding applies to this jury, since I located no study that tested any intervention with actual American criminal juries or court-martial members in sexual offense cases. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Correcting Juror Misconceptions and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

Federal Rule of Evidence 702(a) requires that expert testimony help the trier of fact, and since the December 1, 2023 amendment the proponent must establish admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence. Helpfulness has two parts that this research addresses: whether jurors are likely to hold the misconception at issue, and whether the testimony is likely to correct it. The research supports the first for some beliefs and is inconclusive on the second, for experts and instructions alike. Federal Rule of Evidence 105 provides for limiting instructions, and courts presume that jurors follow instructions (Weeks v. Angelone, 2000; Richardson v. Marsh, 1987), while recognizing that in some contexts the risk that jurors will not is too great (Bruton v. United States, 1968; see Samia v. United States, 2023). There is no federal pattern instruction on delayed reporting, demeanor, or resistance in sexual assault cases; pattern instructions address witness credibility and expert testimony generally, and a court may give a tailored, neutral instruction in its discretion.

Military Rule of Evidence 702 conformed to the 2023 federal amendment in 2025, and military courts apply the Houser factors; United States v. Flesher (2014) holds that the proponent of counterintuitive behavior testimony must establish expertise and reliability. Members are presumed to follow the military judge’s instructions (United States v. Maebane, 2025). The Military Judges’ Benchbook contains general instructions on credibility and expert testimony (Department of the Army, 2025, Instructions 7-7-1 and 7-9) but no standard instruction on delayed reporting or similar behaviors. United States v. Bodoh (2019) held that trial counsel may not argue “victim myths” taught in SHARP training because training is not evidence, finding the error harmless only because an expert had testified to the same point; United States v. Washington (2020) assumed error in admitting a SHARP representative’s testimony about consent training. Members may be challenged for cause under R.C.M. 912(f)(1)(N), which encompasses actual and implied bias, and military judges must liberally grant defense challenges in close cases (United States v. Clay, 2007; United States v. Urieta, 2025). Service members receive mandatory sexual assault prevention training, and its effect on members’ reasoning in deliberation has not been studied.

Arizona

Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 conforms to the federal rule. State v. Salazar-Mercado (2014) permits cold educational expert testimony that satisfies Rules 702 and 403, and State v. Haskie (2017) cautions against broad statements about what is “common” without empirical support. The Revised Arizona Jury Instructions (Criminal) include general instructions on expert witnesses and credibility but no standard instruction on delayed reporting, resistance, or demeanor in sexual offense cases. Arizona eliminated peremptory challenges in criminal trials effective January 1, 2022 (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-21-0020), so voir dire under Rule 18.5 and challenges for cause under Rule 18.4(b), which require excusal when there is reasonable ground to believe a juror cannot render a fair and impartial verdict, are the only means of removing a prospective juror.

England, Wales, and Scotland

England and Wales rely on judicial directions. The Court of Appeal has endorsed tailored directions cautioning juries against stereotypes about how complainants behave, and the Crown Court Compendium provides example directions on delay, inconsistency, demeanor, clothing, intoxication, and prior sexual activity, which judges may give at the outset or during trial as well as at the end (Thomas, 2020). The Court of Appeal has treated expert evidence on complainants’ reactions as unnecessary: in R v ER (2010), a historic child sexual abuse case, it quashed a conviction because a psychotherapist’s evidence on delayed reporting and complainants’ behavior should not have been admitted, holding that a judicial direction is the proper safeguard. The Law Commission’s 2025 final report recommended improved and additional directions and concluded that expert evidence on behavioral responses should be available in particularly complex trials (Leverick et al., 2026). Scotland requires directions on delay, absence of resistance, and absence of force when those issues arise (Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, ss. 288DA–288DB), and since 2023 its Jury Manual has included seven specimen directions, including a general direction intended for the start of trial. Scottish law generally excludes expert evidence on normal human behavior, but section 275C permits expert psychological or psychiatric evidence about a complainant’s subsequent behavior or statements to rebut an adverse inference about credibility (Leverick et al., 2025).

Choosing Between an Expert and an Instruction

Nothing in the federal, military, or Arizona rules requires a court to choose one tool, and some law-reform bodies recommend both. Because the evidence on relative effectiveness is mixed (the one realistic head-to-head study found little difference between judge and expert, while a 2025 meta-analysis found small effects, with expert testimony more effective than instruction), and because instructions come from a neutral source and cannot be heard as corroborating the complainant, a court weighing helpfulness and Rule 403 may consider whether an instruction, an expert, or both would serve the educational purpose. Conversely, where an issue requires explanation beyond what an instruction can provide, or where the defense raises a specific inference the jury may draw, a focused expert may be more helpful than a generic direction.

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party may need to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports the view that education can shift some expectations, particularly about demeanor and delay, and that explaining reasons and giving detailed rather than superficial content may help; the one direct test of early delivery found no advantage. It also shows that a generic instruction alone may not neutralize attitudes jurors bring with them, which supports offering focused expert testimony where the case raises a specific, documented misconception, and requesting a tailored instruction in addition. Testimony and instructions that explain why people may delay or remain calm, rather than simply asserting that they do, are more consistent with the research and less vulnerable on appeal.

The research also counsels caution. Studies finding the largest effects used unchallenged or categorical statements a court would not allow, and in one study expert testimony lost its effect under cross-examination; education had no measurable effect on expectations about resistance in the most realistic study. Testimony that overstates certainty, particularly about false-report rates, may be both less persuasive and more likely to be found improper. In a court-martial, arguments about misconceptions must rest on record evidence, not on members’ training (Bodoh).

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports asking whether an expert is needed and whether a neutral instruction would serve the same purpose. The evidence that expert testimony corrects misconceptions is limited and mixed, the one realistic comparison found no advantage over a judicial direction, and an instruction carries no risk of being heard as corroboration. Defense counsel can propose a balanced, tailored instruction, can ask that any expert’s content be no more categorical than the research allows, and can test overstatement through cross-examination; in one 1991 study (Spanos et al., 1991), the effect of an expert’s testimony disappeared under cross-examination.

The research also counsels caution. Arguing that education is useless overstates the evidence, which shows some effects on demeanor and delay. Voir dire answers disclaiming misconceptions are not proof that jurors hold none, and broad screening by attitude scores would raise representativeness and fairness concerns that cut against any party. The defensible position is that the effectiveness of every corrective tool is uncertain, which bears on choosing the least prejudicial means of educating the jury.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

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Willmott, D., Boduszek, D., & Booth, N. (2026). Profiling jury bias in rape trials: Examining the link between juror characteristics and trial decisions. In E. Dowds, S. Weare, & S. Leahy (Eds.), Researching rape trials: Methods, ethics and empirical perspectives. Routledge.

Legal Authorities

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).

J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).

R v ER [2010] EWCA Crim 2522.

Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987).

Samia v. United States, 599 U.S. 635 (2023).

State v. Haskie, 242 Ariz. 582, 399 P.3d 657 (2017).

State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).

United States v. Bodoh, 78 M.J. 231 (C.A.A.F. 2019).

United States v. Clay, 64 M.J. 274 (C.A.A.F. 2007).

United States v. Flesher, 73 M.J. 303 (C.A.A.F. 2014).

United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).

United States v. Maebane, 86 M.J. 173 (C.A.A.F. 2025).

United States v. Urieta, 85 M.J. 352 (C.A.A.F. 2025) (No. 24-0172/AR, Mar. 24, 2025).

United States v. Washington, 80 M.J. 106 (C.A.A.F. 2020).

Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225 (2000).

Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, ss. 275C, 288DA, 288DB.

Fed. R. Evid. 105.

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.4(b).

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.5.

Ariz. R. Evid. 403.

Ariz. R. Evid. 702.

Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order No. R-21-0020 (Aug. 30, 2021) (amending Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.4 and 18.5, effective Jan. 1, 2022).

Mil. R. Evid. 702.

R.C.M. 912(f)(1)(N).

Related topic papers: Juror Beliefs About Sexual Assault: What the Research Shows · Admissibility of Counterintuitive Behavior Testimony · Vouching, Profile Evidence, and the Human Lie Detector Rule · Preparing for and Examining a Counterintuitive Behavior Expert

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Courts-Martial