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Post-Assault Demeanor and Functioning

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Snap Shot

  • The question: Does a complainant’s calm demeanor or apparently normal functioning after an alleged sexual assault say anything about whether the assault happened?
  • What the research shows: In prospective studies, significant early distress is the common outcome: a meta-analysis estimated that 74.6% of survivors met PTSD criteria at one month and 41.5% at twelve months. Avoidance can look like normal functioning, and in one meta-analysis 60.4% of female survivors did not label their experience as rape; labels can change over time in either direction. Laypeople and some police observers judge distressed complainants more credible than calm ones.
  • What it does not show: Demeanor has not been shown to be diagnostic in either direction: composure is not a reliable sign of fabrication, and distress is not a reliable sign that an account is accurate. PTSD rates among survivors cannot show that a complainant’s symptoms corroborate the account, because the rate among inaccurate reports is unknown and the diagnosis rests on the reported event. Whether some survivors show little early disruption is disputed, and I located no peer-reviewed research establishing that a pattern of social media use is typical or atypical of survivors (as of Nov. 2026).
  • The law: Testimony must satisfy Rule 702 and Houser; Flesher allows counterintuitive-behavior testimony but found experience-based testimony mirroring the complainant’s account improperly admitted, and Brooks, Mullins, and Lindsey bar vouching. Post-event conduct can implicate M.R.E. 412 or A.R.S. § 13-1421, and records must be authenticated and weighed under Rule 403.
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors should state the actual figures, acknowledge the resilience debate, and not rely on tears to bolster credibility; defense counsel should use post-event records for their content, not to argue that the complainant did not behave like a victim.

What a complainant did in the hours, days, and weeks after an alleged sexual assault is often among the most contested evidence at trial. Witnesses may describe a complainant who was tearful and shaken, or one who went to a party the next night, posted cheerful messages on social media, continued to work or train without apparent difficulty, or described the encounter to friends without calling it rape. Sexual assault is common and substantially underreported, and each of these patterns occurs in many cases in which an assault genuinely happened. Jurors, however, may expect a person who has been assaulted to appear visibly distressed and to withdraw from ordinary life.

Counterintuitive behavior testimony—expert testimony explaining that behaviors jurors might find surprising occur among people who have been sexually assaulted—is often offered to explain composed demeanor and apparently normal functioning. The defense, in turn, may emphasize post-event behavior as inconsistent with the complainant’s account. Both uses rest on assumptions about how often people who have been assaulted show visible distress and about whether observers can read demeanor accurately.

This paper reviews prospective research on distress and recovery after sexual assault, the debate over how often resilience occurs, the research on unacknowledged rape, studies of how demeanor affects judgments of credibility by laypeople, police, and judges, and what can be said about social media and other post-event conduct. It then addresses the limits of the evidence and the legal rules that govern this testimony.

Distress and Recovery After Sexual Assault

Prospective studies, which follow survivors from soon after the assault, show that significant early distress is the common outcome but that recovery is also common. A meta-analysis of 22 prospective samples (N = 2,106) estimated that 74.6% of survivors met criteria for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) at one month and 41.5% at twelve months; symptom severity averaged about 48% of scale maximums at one month and about 30% at twelve months, and most recovery occurred in the first three months (Dworkin et al., 2023). Most of those samples (81%) consisted only of women, so the estimates describe female survivors most directly. Two findings bear on male complainants: a review of sex differences found that the greater PTSD risk among women after most kinds of trauma did not appear among victims of sexual assault (Tolin & Foa, 2006), and the share of women in a sample did not predict the size of the association between sexual assault and psychopathology (Dworkin et al., 2017). A broader meta-analysis found that sexual assault was associated with elevated risk for every form of psychopathology studied, with an average effect size (Hedges’ g) of 0.61 (Dworkin et al., 2017).

These figures support two propositions that are sometimes presented as if they conflicted. Most people who have been sexually assaulted experience substantial distress in the first weeks. And a meaningful minority do not meet PTSD criteria even at one month, while most no longer meet them a year later. A complainant who appears distressed is behaving as most survivors do in the early weeks; a complainant who appears composed is behaving as a substantial minority of survivors do, and as most do by the end of the first year. These are group findings; similar presentations also occur in mistaken or inaccurate accounts, so neither presentation shows what happened in this case.

The Resilience Debate

Whether some survivors show little disruption at all is disputed. In a study of 119 women assessed monthly from one to four months after a sexual assault, Steenkamp et al. (2012) identified four PTSD trajectories, all involving elevated early symptoms, and did not find the minimal-symptom resilience trajectory common in studies of other events; nearly all participants were highly distressed at one month. Bonanno (2013) argued that the absence of a resilient group most likely reflected sampling bias and a sample too small for the statistical method, observing that it seemed highly unlikely that no sexual assault survivors would be resilient. Steenkamp et al. (2013) replied that sexual assault is intentional victimization that differs from the events studied in much resilience research, and that only data from the acute period can distinguish resilience from early disruption followed by recovery. Across 54 trajectory studies of potentially traumatic events of many kinds, resilience was the most common pattern, averaging about 66% (Galatzer-Levy et al., 2018), but those studies did not focus on sexual assault.

The disagreement matters in court in both directions. If marked early distress is nearly universal after sexual assault, as Steenkamp et al. found, then its absence is less common than an expert might suggest, though still not evidence that an assault did not occur. If resilience is more common than that study found, as Bonanno argued, then composed demeanor is less unusual than jurors might assume. In either case the research describes groups, and recruitment matters: survivors who come to hospitals and agree to be studied may differ from those who do not.

Symptoms Versus Functioning

Distress and outward functioning are not the same thing. Avoidance—efforts to avoid reminders, thoughts, and feelings associated with the event—is a core feature of PTSD, and avoidance coping was associated with more severe PTSD symptoms in a large sample of sexual assault survivors (Ullman et al., 2007). A person who keeps to routine, goes out with friends, or throws herself or himself into work may be avoiding, and observers may see that behavior as evidence of being unaffected. Alternatively, the person may in fact be relatively unaffected. Observers outside the person’s private life usually cannot tell the difference, and neither can an expert who has not evaluated the person.

The context of the alleged assault also shapes functioning. In military settings, a complainant may continue to train, deploy, or work alongside the accused because duty requires it. In college settings, a complainant may share classes, housing, or friends with the accused. Continued functioning in such circumstances may reflect obligations and constraints rather than the absence of harm.

What PTSD Rates Can and Cannot Show

The PTSD figures above describe people who were known or presumed to have been assaulted. They do not show how often the same symptoms are reported by people whose accounts are inaccurate, and that rate has not been measured, because researchers rarely know with certainty which reports are accurate. A symptom supports the accuracy of a report only to the extent that it is more common among accurate reports than among inaccurate ones; without that comparison, a high rate of PTSD among survivors does not show that a particular complainant’s symptoms corroborate the account (see Behavioral Indicators, Base Rates, and the Limits of Inference). PTSD is also not specific to sexual assault. The diagnosis requires exposure to a traumatic event, that exposure is usually established by the person’s own account, and the same symptoms can follow other traumatic experiences. Earlier trauma also matters. In a U.S. emergency-department cohort of 2,423 adults followed for a year after a new trauma, mostly motor-vehicle crashes, those who reported earlier sexual violence had higher PTSD symptoms at every assessment, after controlling for earlier nonsexual trauma, and some symptoms recovered more slowly (Mellen et al., 2026). The new traumas were not sexual assaults, but the finding means that symptoms measured after a reported assault may partly reflect earlier experiences. Symptoms can show that a person is suffering; they cannot by themselves show what caused the suffering or whether a report is accurate.

PTSD symptoms are assessed largely through self-report, and they can be exaggerated or feigned, particularly when an evaluation bears on litigation, compensation, or criminal charges (Hall & Hall, 2007; Matto et al., 2019). Brief symptom checklists are especially open to exaggeration; in a sample of 210 veterans, the most sensitive of the validity indices recently derived from the PTSD Checklist for DSM-5 identified 39% of invalid responders when its specificity was held at 90% or higher (Schroeder & Bieu, 2024). Validity scales on broader instruments such as the MMPI-2 and MMPI-2-RF separate honest from feigning groups with large effects in meta-analyses, but group separation is not individual accuracy, and several MMPI-2-RF overreporting scales are also markedly elevated in people with genuine depressive or somatoform disorders (Ingram & Ternes, 2016; Nijdam-Jones et al., 2020; Sharf et al., 2017). Estimates of how often symptoms are overreported vary widely and should be applied cautiously. In a survey of board-certified clinical neuropsychologists, probable malingering or symptom exaggeration was estimated in 29% of personal-injury, 30% of disability, and 19% of criminal cases, but these were practitioners’ estimates drawn mostly from neuropsychological referrals, not PTSD evaluations (Mittenberg et al., 2002); 53% of Vietnam veterans in a Veterans Affairs residential PTSD program showed clear exaggeration by Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms criteria, a treatment-seeking sample in a disability-linked system (Freeman et al., 2008); and one reviewer of the psychological-injury literature, describing base rates as contested, put malingered PTSD at about 15% ± 15% (Young, 2017). None of these figures can be applied to sexual assault complainants, whose circumstances differ from those of the groups studied and who have not been studied in this way. Among women in treatment for the after-effects of childhood sexual abuse, elevations on the MMPI-2 F scale were associated with genuine dissociation and posttraumatic distress (Klotz Flitter et al., 2003). An elevated validity score therefore indicates an atypical or exaggerated presentation, not that the reported event did not occur, and a valid presentation does not establish what caused the symptoms.

Unacknowledged Rape

Many people who describe experiences meeting researchers’ behavioral definitions of rape do not call those experiences rape. A meta-analysis of 28 studies (30 samples) of 5,917 female survivors estimated that 60.4% did not label their experience as rape, with substantial variation across studies and higher rates among college students than among noncollege samples (Wilson & Miller, 2016). The authors recommended that research screening use behaviorally specific questions rather than the word “rape.”

This research explains why a complainant might initially describe an encounter to friends as a bad experience, a misunderstanding, or bad sex, and only later describe it as assault. Labeling can also move in the other direction. In a study of 380 college students, mostly cisgender women, who rated how far they regarded their most recent sexual victimization as sexual assault one month afterward (recalled retrospectively) and at the time of the survey, 56.0% labeled it consistently, 36.1% labeled it more strongly as assault over time, and 7.9% less strongly; reasons included meaning-making, attributions, and uncertainty. Change did not differ between heterosexual women and men, heterosexual men had the lowest current labeling, and LGBTQ+ survivors showed the most change (Edwards et al., 2025). The study relied on retrospective self-report in a college sample. The labeling research also has limits that should be stated. Studies classify an experience as unacknowledged rape by applying the researchers’ definition to the participant’s answers to survey items; those definitions may not match the elements of a particular offense, and the classification does not test what actually happened. The research shows that not labeling an experience as rape is common among people whose experiences meet a behavioral definition; it does not show that a person who later relabels an experience was assaulted, any more than an initial label shows that the person was not.

Demeanor and Judgments of Credibility

Most experimental research finds that a complainant’s displayed emotion affects how credible observers find her, although some observer groups were not influenced (see below). In a Norwegian study, participants viewed one of several video versions of a rape complainant’s account, performed by an actress, with emotions that were congruent with the account (distress), neutral, or incongruent; credibility judgments were strongly influenced by the displayed emotion and not by the strength of the account’s content (Kaufmann et al., 2003). Researchers have called this the emotional victim effect. A replication with 189 police trainees found the effect again and showed that it was mediated both by violated expectations about how a victim should appear and by observers’ compassionate response to a distressed complainant (Ask & Landström, 2010). Police investigators in a related Norwegian study were likewise influenced by displayed emotion (Bollingmo et al., 2008). In a U.S. mock-juror study of 240 participants, a complainant who cried while testifying was judged more credible, which increased guilty verdicts; whether the complainant was male or female made no significant difference, and women were more favorable to the complainant than men overall (Pals et al., 2024). A meta-analysis of 20 studies (N = 3,128), all with female complainants, found a small-to-moderate effect of distress on credibility that did not differ between criminal justice professionals and laypeople (Nitschke et al., 2019); whether the observer’s own gender changes the size of the effect has seldom been reported. Credibility judgments also have consequences outside the courtroom. In a random sample of sexual assault reports from one U.S. police department, officers’ recorded expressions of doubt significantly reduced the likelihood of arrest and referral for prosecution, independent of other legal and extralegal factors (King & Bostaph, 2024); the study did not assess whether the doubt was warranted.

Not every group of observers shows the effect. Norwegian court judges who viewed the same materials were not influenced by the complainant’s displayed emotion, in contrast to laypeople (Wessel et al., 2006). In a juror simulation, a tearful complainant’s claim was judged more valid than a calm one’s, but only when she was portrayed in a gender-stereotypic way (Schuller et al., 2010). In English mock-jury reconstructions, many participants expected a genuine complainant to be visibly upset when testifying (Ellison & Munro, 2009), and in a post-service survey of 771 English and Welsh jurors, 43% agreed that they would expect a rape complainant to be very emotional when giving evidence (Thomas, 2020). A Scottish study of 863 mock jurors in 64 juries found that jurors relied on manner of delivery as a sign of credibility and argued that judicial directions should caution jurors about demeanor-based assessments rather than endorse them (Chalmers et al., 2022).

Demeanor Has Not Been Shown to Be Diagnostic in Either Direction

The research on demeanor and credibility shows that observers are influenced by emotional display; separate research shows that they are not good at using demeanor to detect deception. A meta-analysis of 206 studies found that people distinguished lies from truths only 54% of the time, slightly better than chance, without special aids (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). Emotional expression varies with temperament, culture, the passage of time, the setting, medication, and whether a person has told the account before; a person giving an account for the tenth time months later may appear flat for reasons unrelated to its accuracy.

The conclusion applies equally to both sides. A composed demeanor does not suggest that a complainant is fabricating, and visible distress does not suggest that a complainant is truthful. People who give false or mistaken accounts can display distress, and people who were assaulted can appear calm. Testimony or argument that treats either display as evidence of what happened asks the factfinder to rely on a cue that the research has not shown to be reliable.

Social Media and Other Post-Event Behavior

Digital records now provide detailed evidence of what people did after an alleged assault: messages to friends and to the accused, posts, photographs, location data, and attendance at social events. Peer-reviewed research specifically examining how people who have been sexually assaulted use social media in the following days and weeks is sparse, and I located no peer-reviewed research establishing that any particular pattern of posting is typical or atypical of survivors. The general principles above apply: people present themselves selectively online, upbeat posts may reflect efforts to maintain normalcy or avoid questions, and the same posts may also reflect a genuinely unremarkable experience.

Post-event records can nonetheless be highly probative of other matters—the timeline, what the complainant and the accused said to each other or to others close in time to the event, and whether later accounts are consistent with contemporaneous statements. Those uses depend on the content of the records, not on inferences about how a survivor would be expected to behave. Analysis of what was said in contemporaneous messages is a different inquiry from inferring an assault, or its absence, from the complainant’s mood.

Limits of the Evidence

Prospective studies of distress after sexual assault draw on survivors who sought care or reported soon after the assault and agreed to research, and the resilience debate shows how much estimates depend on sampling. Most samples are female, few are military, and findings on male survivors rest on thinner evidence. Demeanor studies use actors, short video clips or transcripts, and student, police-trainee, or community participants, and most were conducted in Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia; whether American jurors or court-martial members respond the same way has been studied far less, although one U.S. mock-juror study found the same effect of crying (Pals et al., 2024). Research on unacknowledged rape depends on survey definitions, and research on social media behavior after assault is minimal.

No study, test, or expert observation can determine from a person’s demeanor or functioning after an event whether that person was sexually assaulted or is telling the truth.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When the Dworkin et al. (2023) estimate that 74.6% of survivors met PTSD criteria at one month is cited, counsel should ask who was studied, namely survivors who sought care or reported soon after the assault and agreed to research, and should restate the figure in absolute terms: about 25 of every 100 did not meet criteria at one month. The same figure raises the question of probability of what, given what: because the rate of the same symptoms among inaccurate reports has not been measured, a high PTSD rate among survivors cannot show that a complainant’s symptoms corroborate the account. When Steenkamp et al. (2012) or Galatzer-Levy et al. (2018) is cited on resilience, counsel should ask how much evidence the finding rests on and whether it fits: 119 women in the first, and 54 studies that did not focus on sexual assault in the second. When the emotional victim effect (Kaufmann et al., 2003; Ask & Landström, 2010) is cited, counsel should ask whether studies using an actress and participants mostly outside the United States apply to American jurors or court-martial members. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Post-Assault Behavior and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

Expert testimony that composed demeanor and normal functioning occur among survivors is admissible only if it satisfies Rule 702: under the December 1, 2023 amendment to the Federal Rules, the proponent must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the testimony will help the trier of fact and rests on reliable principles reliably applied. Military Rule of Evidence 702 tracks the federal rule, subject to the conforming process of Military Rule of Evidence 1102, and military judges apply the Houser factors. The December 1, 2023 amendment to Federal Rule 702 accordingly became part of Military Rule of Evidence 702 in 2025: the proponent of expert testimony in a court-martial must now show the military judge that it is more likely than not that each admissibility requirement is met, so gaps in an expert’s basis or in the application of the method are questions of admissibility rather than of weight for the members (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025). In United States v. Flesher (2014), the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces recognized that testimony about the sometimes counterintuitive behaviors of sexual assault victims is allowed, but held that experience-based testimony about how victims typically behave was improperly admitted without a showing of expertise and reliability and impermissibly bolstered the complainant by mirroring her account. United States v. Brooks (2007) and United States v. Mullins (2010) bar an expert from vouching for a complainant’s truthfulness, directly or by implication.

Evidence of post-event conduct can implicate Military Rule of Evidence 412, which generally excludes evidence offered to prove that a victim engaged in other sexual behavior or to prove a victim’s sexual predisposition, subject to enumerated exceptions, including evidence whose exclusion would violate the accused’s constitutional rights. Social media and messaging evidence must be authenticated under Military Rule of Evidence 901 and Federal Rule of Evidence 901, and its use to suggest that a complainant did not act like a victim is subject to Rule 403 balancing.

Arizona

Arizona courts admit cold expert testimony about general behavioral patterns under State v. Salazar-Mercado (2014), and State v. Haskie (2017) cautions against broad statements about what is common or usual without empirical support. Under State v. Lindsey (1986) and State v. Moran (1986), an expert may describe general behavioral characteristics of sexual abuse victims but may not opine on the truthfulness of a particular witness. A.R.S. § 13-1421 restricts evidence of a victim’s prior sexual conduct, admitting specific instances only on written motion and hearing, on a showing by clear and convincing evidence, when the evidence is relevant, its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative value, and it falls within one of five statutory categories. Post-event records are authenticated under Arizona Rule of Evidence 901 and weighed under Rule 403.

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party may need to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports testimony that visible distress is not a reliable indicator of whether an assault occurred, that composure and continued functioning occur among survivors, that avoidance can look like normal functioning, and that many survivors do not initially label their experience as rape. The emotional victim effect research documents that laypeople and some professionals give calm complainants less credibility, and the Scottish and English jury research supports the helpfulness of telling jurors that demeanor is an unreliable guide. Prosecutors can present this testimony accurately, including the prospective data showing that early distress is common, so that the testimony is not undermined on cross-examination.

The research also counsels caution. Because most survivors are significantly distressed in the first weeks, testimony that composed demeanor is “common” should be stated with the actual figures, and the Steenkamp–Bonanno exchange should be acknowledged rather than resolved in one direction. The same research that shows calm demeanor is not evidence of fabrication shows that distress is not evidence of truthfulness; arguments relying on a complainant’s tears or visible upset to bolster credibility rest on the cue the testimony tells jurors to set aside. Testimony that walks through the complainant’s specific post-event behaviors risks the bolstering concern identified in Flesher.

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports testimony and cross-examination making clear that early distress is the common outcome in prospective studies, that the resilience question is unresolved, that the unacknowledged-rape research rests on survey definitions that do not test what happened, and that I located no research establishing any pattern of social media use as typical of survivors. Defense counsel can insist that an expert who has not evaluated the complainant concede that the research cannot explain why this complainant behaved as she or he did, and to use contemporaneous records for what they actually say about the timeline and the parties’ communications.

The research also counsels caution. Arguments that a complainant who partied, posted, or kept working could not have been assaulted rest on the same unreliable demeanor inference the research identifies, and they invite the misconception educational testimony is offered to correct. The demeanor research cuts against reliance on a complainant’s distress, but equally against reliance on her composure. The defensible use of post-event evidence is to test the account against its content, not to argue that the complainant did not behave like a victim.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

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Ullman, S. E., Filipas, H. H., Townsend, S. M., & Starzynski, L. L. (2007). Psychosocial correlates of PTSD symptom severity in sexual assault survivors. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 20(5), 821–831. https://doi.org/10.1002/jts.20290

Wessel, E., Drevland, G. C. B., Eilertsen, D. E., & Magnussen, S. (2006). Credibility of the emotional witness: A study of ratings by court judges. Law and Human Behavior, 30(2), 221–230. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-006-9024-1

Wilson, L. C., & Miller, K. E. (2016). Meta-analysis of the prevalence of unacknowledged rape. Trauma, Violence, & Abuse, 17(2), 149–159. https://doi.org/10.1177/1524838015576391

Young, G. (2017). PTSD in court III: Malingering, assessment, and the law. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 52, 81–102. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijlp.2017.03.001

Legal Authorities

State v. Haskie, 242 Ariz. 582, 399 P.3d 657 (2017).

State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).

State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 (1986).

State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).

United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).

United States v. Flesher, 73 M.J. 303 (C.A.A.F. 2014).

United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).

United States v. Mullins, 69 M.J. 113 (C.A.A.F. 2010).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1421.

Fed. R. Evid. 403.

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

Fed. R. Evid. 901.

Ariz. R. Evid. 403.

Ariz. R. Evid. 901.

Mil. R. Evid. 412.

Mil. R. Evid. 702.

Mil. R. Evid. 901.

Mil. R. Evid. 1102.

Related topic papers: Variability, Confounds, and Individual Differences in Responses to Sexual Assault · Juror Beliefs About Sexual Assault: What the Research Shows · Continued Contact with the Accused · Delayed and Incremental Disclosure · Vouching, Profile Evidence, and the Human Lie Detector Rule · Behavioral Indicators, Base Rates, and the Limits of Inference

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Courts-Martial · Memory in the Courtroom