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Propensity Evidence in Adult Sexual Assault Cases

Published

Snap Shot

  • The question: When may evidence that the accused committed another sexual assault be used to show a propensity to commit the charged assault against an adult, and how much does such evidence prove?
  • What the research shows: In a pooled analysis of ten follow-up studies of 4,724 men (Harris & Hanson, 2004), those with a prior sexual conviction were detected reoffending sexually at about twice the rate of those without one (37% vs. 19% at 15 years); most men in both groups were not detected reoffending. Official records undercount reoffending, by an amount that only modeling can estimate, and risk declines with time offense-free. Self-report studies of undetected college perpetrators disagree about how many repeat. In several samples of convicted men, 20% to 48% (depending on the sample and dimension) had offended against more than one type of victim, and behavioral linkage research on solved stranger series reports moderate to high accuracy.
  • What it does not show: Group rates are not the probability that a particular accused committed a particular act. No verified study tests how jurors use other-act evidence in an adult acquaintance or consent-defense trial. Linkage research addresses identity in stranger cases, not consent. An unprosecuted or acquitted allegation has not thereby been shown to be false, and an act found by a preponderance or by clear and convincing evidence has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • The law: Fed. R. Evid. 413 and 415, Mil. R. Evid. 413, and Ariz. R. Evid. 404(c) permit propensity use subject to threshold findings and Rule 403 (Enjady, Porter, Wright, Aguilar). Arizona requires clear and convincing proof and specific findings, and Aguilar held that Rule 404(c) can reach adult consent cases. In courts-martial, charged offenses may not serve as Rule 413 propensity evidence for other charged offenses (Hills), but may in some cases be used under Rule 404(b) to show a common plan (Hyppolite).
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors should build a record on every required finding and keep group statistics out of the proof of guilt; defense counsel should test proof, similarity, remoteness, and the line between plan and propensity, without asserting that an earlier allegation was false.

Sexual assault is common and substantially underreported; in the National Crime Victimization Survey, about one in four rape and sexual assault victimizations were reported to police in 2024 (23.6%); the estimate has varied considerably from year to year (46.0% in 2023), so no single figure should be treated as fixed (Tapp & Coen, 2025). Adult sexual assault cases often have no eyewitness, and when the accused admits sexual contact but says it was consensual, the trial can turn almost entirely on whether the factfinder believes the complainant. In that setting, evidence that the accused sexually assaulted someone else, or is accused of having done so, can be persuasive and can be prejudicial. The other act may itself be disputed, uncharged, remote, or the subject of an acquittal.

The general rule forbids using other acts to prove character and conforming conduct, and sexual offense cases are the main exception. Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 415 (the latter for civil cases), Military Rule of Evidence 413, and Arizona Rule of Evidence 404(c) permit propensity use, subject to threshold findings and balancing for unfair prejudice. The companion paper “Other-Act and Propensity Evidence in Child Sexual Abuse Cases,” in the Child Abuse Allegations resource, covers Rule 414, the general recidivism and jury research, and the independence of multiple child complainants; this paper is its adult counterpart.

This paper covers adult recidivism, undetected and repeat perpetration, crossover, linkage, and jury research, then the limits of the evidence, the law, and the issues for each side.

The Propensity Inference in Adult Cases

In adult cases identity is rarely disputed; the accused usually asserts consent or a reasonable belief in consent, and the other act is offered to show that the accused is a person who has engaged in sexual contact without consent, which bears on whether he did so on the charged occasion and, where the law makes it relevant, on intent or mistake.

As the child paper explains, drawing on Lyon and Koehler’s (1996) relevance ratio, probative value turns on how much more likely the other act would be for an accused who committed the charged assault than for one who did not, which depends on how well the act is proved, how closely it resembles the charged conduct, and how much time has passed. The research below bears on parts of that question; none of it supplies the ratio for an individual case.

Recidivism Among Men Convicted of Sexual Assault

In a pooled analysis of ten follow-up studies of 4,724 adult men, Harris and Hanson (2004) found detected sexual recidivism of 14% at five years, 20% at ten years, and 24% at fifteen years. Men whose index offense was rape had similar rates (14%, 21%, and 24%). Prior record mattered more than offense type: men with no prior sexual conviction were detected reoffending at 10%, 15%, and 19%, compared with 25%, 32%, and 37% for men with a prior sexual conviction. The authors noted that because few of their data sets counted charges that did not result in conviction, the estimates are closer to reconviction rates than to rearrest rates. The child paper summarizes the broader meta-analytic literature (e.g., Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, 2005).

These findings support the premise of the propensity rules at the group level: a prior sexual offense is associated with a higher rate of detected reoffending. They also show that most men convicted of sexual assault were not detected reoffending within fifteen years, which bears on how much weight one prior act can carry.

Risk also changes over time. Hanson et al. (2018), analyzing 20 samples of 7,225 men, found that the rate of new sexual offenses fell the longer a person remained offense-free in the community, and that for most men the rate fell below the level of people with nonsexual criminal histories after 10 to 15 years; those rated highest risk at release took longer. This finding bears on the remoteness factor in every jurisdiction’s balancing test, although it concerns convicted persons rather than uncharged acts.

Undetected and Repeat Perpetration

Official figures undercount offending. Using a probabilistic simulation built on victim reporting rates, offender self-reported victim counts, and varying conviction assumptions, Scurich and John (2019) concluded that actual reoffending is substantially higher than official rates under any combination of assumptions. Lave et al. (2021) responded that the model contained errors and that its conclusions followed from its assumptions. The undercount is real; its size is a matter of modeling assumptions, not observation.

Self-report studies of men who were never prosecuted address a different question: how many perpetrators offend more than once. Pooling four samples in which 1,882 men were assessed, Lisak and Miller (2002) identified 120 men (6.4%) whose self-reported acts met legal definitions of rape or attempted rape; none had been prosecuted. Of those 120, 76 (63%) reported more than one, and those repeat perpetrators averaged 5.8 rapes each; the 120 men accounted for 1,225 acts of interpersonal violence. In a survey of 12,624 men at 49 colleges, Foubert et al. (2020) found that more than 87% of reported incidents of taking sexual advantage of someone under the influence of alcohol were attributed to men who reported more than one incident; the authors noted that the measure was a single survey item.

Longitudinal research presents a different picture. In two cohorts of college men (n = 1,642), Swartout et al. (2015) found that 10.8% reported at least one rape from age 14 through college, that 72.8% of those who reported a college rape did so in only one academic year, and that no consistently high-rate group emerged; men who raped across multiple college years were a minority, in the authors’ words a significant one, of college perpetrators. Other researchers argued that the study’s handling of attempted rape and missing data undercounted repeat offending, and an erratum concerning missing cases appeared in the same issue (JAMA Pediatrics, 2015).

These studies support the proposition that repeat perpetration is common among some undetected offenders. They do not settle how common, and none estimates the probability that a particular accused committed the charged assault.

Crossover and Similarity

Courts treat similarity as a central measure of probative value. Research on crossover, offending against victims of different ages, genders, or relationships, complicates that measure. When admissions made in treatment under polygraph testing were added to official records, most incarcerated men in one study admitted assaulting both children and adults; rates were lower among parolees, who had more reason to withhold admissions (Heil et al., 2003). In official records for 1,345 men with multiple victims in England and Wales, 24.5% crossed at least one dimension, which the authors considered an underestimate (Cann et al., 2007). In archival records of 789 incarcerated men, among the 208 with prior sexual convictions, crossover across convictions reached 20% for gender, 40% for age, and 48% for relationship (Kleban et al., 2013).

The findings cut both ways. An earlier act against a different type of victim is not, for that reason alone, uninformative. But the samples are convicted or treated men, some admissions were obtained under polygraph (inadmissible in courts-martial under Military Rule of Evidence 707), and none of this shows whether a particular dissimilar act reflects a disposition relevant to the charged act.

Pattern, Modus Operandi, and Behavioral Linkage

Other-act evidence is sometimes described as showing a “pattern” or modus operandi. Behavioral linkage research tests whether crimes by the same offender can be distinguished, by behavior, from crimes by different offenders. A review concluded that offenders show some consistency across crimes and that differences between offenders are usually large enough to distinguish them, but that consistency varies by type of behavior (Woodhams et al., 2007). A review of studies using the area under the curve (AUC; 0.5 is chance, 1.0 perfect) found mostly moderate accuracy, varying by crime type, behavioral domain, and jurisdiction (Bennell et al., 2014). Using 3,364 sexual assaults from five countries, Tonkin et al. (2017) reported AUC values between 0.86 and 0.91 across statistical methods.

This research was developed to link stranger offenses for investigation, in samples where true linkages are known and the proportion of linked pairs is set by the researchers. It addresses identity, not consent, and its accuracy for acquaintance assaults, where features such as alcohol, a social setting, or a sleeping complainant are common to many encounters, has not been established. Testimony describing a “pattern” in that setting can function as profile evidence, which courts may exclude (see “Vouching, Profile Evidence, and the Human Lie Detector Rule”).

Multiple Complainants and Independence

The child paper explains that similar accounts from several complainants corroborate one another to the extent they are independent in origin, and that contact between complainants shows an opportunity for influence, not that influence occurred. The same reasoning applies to adults, who may share units, workplaces, and social networks. In the military, the Catch a Serial Offender (CATCH) program lets an eligible adult sexual assault victim enter suspect information anonymously and learn of a “potential match” with another entry or an investigation (Department of Defense Instruction 6495.02, Vol. 1, 2025). A match can identify complainants who had no contact before their first statements; it does not establish that either report is accurate, and what each knew of the other’s account, and when, remains a question for the record.

How Jurors Use Other-Act Evidence

The jury research is summarized in the child paper and in “Limiting Instructions, Inadmissible Evidence, and Instructions to Disregard” in the Jurors and Jury Decision-Making resource. Older mock-jury studies found that prior-conviction evidence, especially for a similar crime, increased convictions despite instructions limiting its use (Wissler & Saks, 1985), and a meta-analysis found that instructions to disregard do not reliably remove the effect of inadmissible evidence (Steblay et al., 2006). More recent deliberation research is more qualified: in a study of 325 jury-eligible citizens, evidence of uncharged sexual acts increased ratings of culpability, but juries were reluctant to convict on the complainant’s word alone and showed little sign of impermissible reasoning (Goodman-Delahunty & Martschuk, 2020).

For adult cases the main point is a gap. The deliberation studies used child sexual abuse scenarios under Australian tendency-evidence law, and the older studies mostly used nonsexual prior convictions and rules that forbade propensity reasoning. No study located for this paper tests how jurors weigh a disputed prior act in an adult acquaintance or consent-defense trial, where the other act may itself turn on consent. Claims from either side about how jurors will use it rest on extrapolation.

Limits of the Evidence

Recidivism research counts detected offenses by convicted people in older samples, and simulation estimates of undetected reoffending depend on their assumptions. Repeat-perpetration estimates rest on college samples and self-report, and the leading studies disagree. Crossover figures come from convicted or treated men, partly through polygraph-assisted admissions, and linkage research concerns solved stranger series. No verified study addresses military populations or adult consent-defense trials.

No study can tell a court whether a particular accused committed a particular other act, whether that act reflects a disposition, or whether a disposition explains the charged allegation. An uncharged, unprosecuted, or acquitted allegation has not thereby been shown to be false; it also has not been shown to be true. The research identifies the questions a court asks about proof, similarity, time, and independence; the answers depend on the evidence in the case.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When the 37% fifteen-year rate for men with a prior sexual conviction (Harris & Hanson, 2004) is offered to support the weight of a prior act, a use the prosecution commonly makes, counsel can ask what exactly was counted: detected offenses among convicted men, not the likelihood that an accused committed a charged act. When the 24% fifteen-year rate for rapists in the same report is offered to minimize a prior act, a use the defense commonly makes, the parallel question is how complete the measure is, since official records undercount offending. When Lisak and Miller (2002) or Swartout et al. (2015) is cited on serial perpetration, ask who was studied and compared with whom: college men, by self-report, in studies whose methods and conclusions are disputed. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Propensity Evidence and the Law

Federal Standards

Federal Rule of Evidence 413, enacted in 1994 and effective July 9, 1995, provides that when a defendant is accused of sexual assault, the court may admit evidence that the defendant committed any other sexual assault, to be considered on any matter to which it is relevant. The prosecutor must disclose it at least 15 days before trial, or later for good cause. Rule 413(d) defines sexual assault by reference to chapter 109A of title 18 and to nonconsensual genital or anal contact, and includes attempts and conspiracies. The Rule 404(b) framework is summarized in the child paper.

The courts of appeals have upheld Rule 413 on the condition that Rule 403 continues to apply. In United States v. Enjady (1998), the Tenth Circuit rejected due process and equal protection challenges because Rule 403 balancing remains available; it required evidence from which a jury could reasonably find by a preponderance that the other act occurred, and listed considerations including how clearly it was proved, how seriously the fact is disputed, less prejudicial alternatives, and the risks of an improper verdict, distraction, and delay.

United States v. Porter (2024) is a recent adult, consent-contested example. The charges arose from an attempted rape of a male coworker; the defendant testified that the complainant was the aggressor. The district court admitted, with a limiting instruction, a former girlfriend’s testimony that he had repeatedly forced nonconsensual sex on her during a relationship that had ended several years earlier. In a published opinion, the Ninth Circuit held that Rule 413 does not violate due process when courts retain discretion to exclude unduly prejudicial evidence under Rule 403, while stating that the rule is not a blank check for the government. An accompanying unpublished memorandum, applying the factors of United States v. LeMay (2001, a child case), found no abuse of discretion.

In Carroll v. Trump (2024), a civil case under Rule 415, the Second Circuit affirmed admission of two women’s testimony about decades-old incidents and of a recorded statement. In a per curiam opinion, the court held that Rule 403 applies to Rule 415 evidence, that testimony describing an attempt (intent plus a substantial step) can qualify under Rule 413(d)(5), and that the lapse of time did not so reduce probative value as to make admission an abuse of discretion; certiorari was denied in 2026.

Military Standards

Military Rule of Evidence 413, in the 2024 Manual for Courts-Martial, follows the federal rule: in a court-martial for a sexual offense (including any conduct prohibited by Article 120), the military judge may admit evidence that the accused committed any other sexual offense, for any relevant purpose. Disclosure is due at least five days before entry of pleas, or later for good cause. The 2024 Manual predates Executive Order 14130 (Dec. 20, 2024), but that order did not amend Rule 413 (its only change to the Military Rules of Evidence was to Rule 513(a)), and the Army’s 2025 Criminal Law Deskbook reproduces the same text. Military Rule of Evidence 1102(b) provides that Federal Rule 415 does not apply in courts-martial.

In United States v. Wright (2000), the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (C.A.A.F.) upheld Rule 413 in a lead opinion joined by one other judge, with separate opinions from the remaining judges, and required three threshold findings: that the accused is charged with an offense of sexual assault, that the proffered evidence is evidence of the accused’s commission of another sexual assault, and that it is relevant under Rules 401 and 402. Rule 403 balancing follows, under factors including strength of proof, probative weight, less prejudicial alternatives, distraction, time, temporal proximity, frequency, intervening circumstances, and the relationship between the parties.

In United States v. Berry (2005), a forcible sodomy case involving another adult soldier in which the accused claimed consent, the military judge admitted testimony that the accused, at age 13, had committed a similar act on a 6-year-old eight years earlier. The court held that the evidence met the threshold, but that the judge’s findings did not address several balancing factors, that properly balanced the evidence was inadmissible, and that it was prejudicial because it portrayed the accused as a child molester; the force and lack-of-consent findings and the sentence were set aside. In United States v. James (2006), a Rule 414 case whose reasoning the Army’s Deskbook applies equally to Rule 413, the court held that the rule is not limited to acts committed before the charged offense. In United States v. Solomon (2013), the court held that conduct underlying a prior acquittal may be admitted under Rule 413 with a proper Rule 403 analysis, but found an abuse of discretion where the military judge did not address alibi evidence, gave little weight to the acquittal, and underestimated the risk of distraction.

In United States v. Hills (2016), the court unanimously held that charged sexual offenses may not be used under Rule 413 to show a propensity to commit other charged offenses in the same court-martial, and that instructions allowing members to find the charged acts by a preponderance and use them for propensity undermined the presumption of innocence and the reasonable-doubt standard. The holding does not affect joinder or the use of similar offenses to show identity, absence of mistake, or modus operandi under other rules. Later decisions applied Hills in judge-alone trials regardless of the number of victims (United States v. Hukill, 2017), rejected an exception based on the direction of the inference (United States v. Williams, 2018), and tested forfeited but clear errors for harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt (United States v. Tovarchavez, 2019). Uncharged acts and prior convictions remain admissible under Rule 413, and members must be told that propensity evidence does not relieve the government of its burden and cannot alone support a conviction (United States v. Schroder, 2007, a Rule 414 case).

United States v. Hyppolite (2019) marks the boundary. In a 4–1 decision, the court held that the military judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting some charged specifications under Rule 404(b) to show a common plan for others, where the accused was charged with touching the genitals of men who were asleep or falling asleep after nights of drinking; the evidence could be used for the plan, not for propensity. The dissent viewed it as propensity evidence in practice. Since December 27, 2023, special trial counsel have made charging decisions for covered sexual offenses, including whether to join allegations. No published C.A.A.F. decision from 2022 through 2026 deciding a Rule 413 propensity question was located for this paper.

Arizona

Arizona Rule of Evidence 404(c), whose findings the child paper sets out, permits other-act evidence in sexual offense cases (defined by reference to A.R.S. § 13-1420(C)) to show a character trait giving rise to an aberrant sexual propensity to commit the charged offense. Under Rule 404(c)(1), the court must find that the evidence is sufficient to permit the trier of fact to find that the defendant committed the other act, that it gives a reasonable basis to infer an aberrant sexual propensity, and that its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the dangers listed in Rule 403 (considering factors such as remoteness, similarity, strength of the evidence, and frequency), and it must make specific findings on each; Rule 404(c)(2) requires a limiting instruction. Arizona rejects the federal preponderance standard: the clear and convincing standard for proof that the defendant committed the other act comes from the rule’s 1997 comment, which cites State v. Terrazas (1997, a Rule 404(b) case), rather than from the rule’s text.

State v. Aguilar (2004) is the leading adult case. One indictment charged sexual assaults of four adult women; the defendant admitted contact with three and said each consented. The Arizona Supreme Court held that Rule 404(c) can apply to adult cases in which the defendant claims consent, because the question is whether the other act supports an inference of aberrant propensity, not whether the act itself was abnormal. The trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant committed the other act and must make findings that do more than repeat the rule. Because consent turned largely on credibility, cross-admissibility could not be found on a grand jury transcript and argument without hearing from the complainants; denial of severance under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 13.4(b) was error, and the convictions were reversed. Aguilar also notes that the rule’s comment eliminated the State v. Treadaway (1977) requirement of expert testimony for remote or dissimilar acts.

Arizona’s standard instruction adds a second screen: the jury may use the other acts for propensity only if the State proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant committed them and that they show a character predisposed to commit “abnormal or unnatural sexual acts,” and it may not convict simply because it finds the other acts (Standard Criminal 25). How jurors apply that phrase in an adult consent case, where Aguilar held that the other act need not itself be aberrant, has not been addressed in any Arizona appellate decision located for this paper. Unlike Hills, Arizona permits charged acts against one complainant to be considered on counts involving another when the Rule 404(c) findings are made.

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party may need to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The law permits the use of well-proved, similar other acts in adult cases, including consent cases, and the research does not show how much weight any single act deserves. Aguilar, Porter, and the Wright line confirm that a prior nonconsensual act can be probative where credibility is central, and the recidivism data associate a history of sexual offending with higher detected reoffending, which official figures undercount. Prosecutors can present that evidence on a record consistent with the research and case law: presenting the other-act witness, or that witness’s prior testimony, where consent is disputed (Aguilar); building a record on each finding and balancing factor, since Berry and Solomon turned on thin findings; proposing a limiting instruction that does not mix standards of proof; and, in courts-martial, structuring charges and Rule 404(b) notice with Hills and Hyppolite in mind.

The research and the case law also counsel caution. Recidivism or serial-perpetration figures presented as the likelihood that the accused committed the charged act misstate the research and approach profile evidence, and the serial-perpetration data are contested; validated actuarial tools estimate group recidivism after a finding of guilt, which is a different use from proving that the accused committed a charged act. Remote, adolescent, dissimilar, or weakly proved acts carry less weight, and a trial that becomes a series of disputed incidents risks exclusion or reversal. A “common plan” theory for charged acts must rest on genuine features of a plan, not on generalized similarity.

Special Issues for Defense

The law and the research support rigorous scrutiny of other-act evidence. Defense counsel can test whether the other act is proved to the required standard and qualifies under the governing definition, how similar and remote it is, and whether the prosecution needs it; can insist on specific findings under Wright, Enjady, and Aguilar; and can object to propensity use of charged acts under Hills and to plan theories resting only on generalized similarity. The decline in risk with time offense-free bears on remoteness, Berry shows the prejudice of juvenile and dissimilar acts, and the older jury research supports requests for limiting instructions and limits on cumulative other-act witnesses.

The research and the case law also counsel caution. Low official recidivism rates do not show that a history of sexual offending is uninformative, because detection is incomplete, and the crossover research means that a different victim type alone does not make a prior act irrelevant. One recent deliberation study of 325 jury-eligible citizens did not find routine improper reasoning, while older studies found that limiting instructions do not reliably remove the effect of such evidence (Wissler & Saks, 1985; Steblay et al., 2006); arguments premised on inevitable prejudice therefore rest on mixed evidence. An uncharged, unprosecuted, or acquitted allegation has not been shown to be false, and challenges are better supported when they address the evidence for the other act, alibi, and the risk of a trial within a trial than when they assert fabrication. Contact between complainants shows an opportunity for influence, not that influence occurred.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

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Cann, J., Friendship, C., & Gozna, L. (2007). Assessing crossover in a sample of sexual offenders with multiple victims. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 12(1), 149–163. https://doi.org/10.1348/135532506X112439

Foubert, J. D., Clark-Taylor, A., & Wall, A. F. (2020). Is campus rape primarily a serial or one-time problem? Evidence from a multicampus study. Violence Against Women, 26(3–4), 296–311. https://doi.org/10.1177/1077801219833820

Goodman-Delahunty, J., & Martschuk, N. (2020). Mock jury and juror responses to uncharged acts of sexual misconduct: Advances in the assessment of unfair prejudice. Zeitschrift für Psychologie, 228(3), 199–209. https://doi.org/10.1027/2151-2604/a000410

Hanson, R. K., Harris, A. J. R., Letourneau, E., Helmus, L. M., & Thornton, D. (2018). Reductions in risk based on time offense-free in the community: Once a sexual offender, not always a sexual offender. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 24(1), 48–63. https://doi.org/10.1037/law0000135

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Legal Authorities

Carroll v. Trump, 124 F.4th 140 (2d Cir. 2024) (No. 23-793-cv), reh’g denied (2d Cir. June 13, 2025), cert. denied, No. 25-573 (U.S. June 29, 2026), reh’g denied (U.S. Aug. 17, 2026).

State v. Aguilar, 209 Ariz. 40, 97 P.3d 865 (2004).

State v. Terrazas, 189 Ariz. 580, 944 P.2d 1194 (1997).

State v. Treadaway, 116 Ariz. 163, 568 P.2d 1061 (1977).

United States v. Berry, 61 M.J. 91 (C.A.A.F. 2005).

United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427 (10th Cir. 1998).

United States v. Hills, 75 M.J. 350 (C.A.A.F. 2016).

United States v. Hukill, 76 M.J. 219 (C.A.A.F. 2017).

United States v. Hyppolite, 79 M.J. 161 (C.A.A.F. 2019).

United States v. James, 63 M.J. 217 (C.A.A.F. 2006).

United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2001).

United States v. Porter, No. 22-10286 (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2024) (published opinion), and No. 22-10286 (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2024) (unpublished memorandum).

United States v. Schroder, 65 M.J. 49 (C.A.A.F. 2007).

United States v. Solomon, 72 M.J. 176 (C.A.A.F. 2013).

United States v. Tovarchavez, 78 M.J. 458 (C.A.A.F. 2019).

United States v. Williams, 77 M.J. 459 (C.A.A.F. 2018).

United States v. Wright, 53 M.J. 476 (C.A.A.F. 2000).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1420(C).

Fed. R. Evid. 403.

Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).

Fed. R. Evid. 413.

Fed. R. Evid. 415.

Mil. R. Evid. 403.

Mil. R. Evid. 404(b).

Mil. R. Evid. 413.

Mil. R. Evid. 707.

Mil. R. Evid. 1102.

Ariz. R. Evid. 403.

Ariz. R. Evid. 404(c).

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 13.4.

Department of Defense Instruction 6495.02, Vol. 1, Adult Sexual Assault Prevention and Response: Program Procedures (Mar. 28, 2013, incorporating Change 9, Mar. 18, 2025).

Revised Arizona Jury Instructions (Criminal), Standard Criminal 25 (6th ed. 2022).

Exec. Order No. 14130, 2024 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 89 Fed. Reg. 105343 (Dec. 27, 2024).

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