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Pretext Calls, Apologies, and Post-Incident Messages

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  • The question: What can a factfinder fairly infer from what the accused said in a police-directed pretext call or text, or in other messages exchanged with the complainant after an alleged sexual assault, including apologies, non-denials, and angry denials?
  • What the research shows: Research on pretext calls consists mainly of practice guidance, review chapters, a conference poster, one descriptive program report, and one quantitative study finding that police used them sparingly. Laboratory studies show that people apologize out of sympathy, habit, and concern for the other person, not only from a sense of blame, and that apologies for things a person did not cause are common. In one experiment, a denial-and-counterattack response lowered observers’ belief in the complainant and support for punishing the accused; an insincere apology had little effect. Courtroom studies find that informal messages are often read as if they were formal statements, and communication studies find that tone and emoji are often misread.
  • What it does not show: No study located tests whether apologies, non-denials, denials, or message content distinguish true from false allegations, or consensual from nonconsensual encounters. The research does not show that an apology is a confession, or that a denial or counter-accusation indicates innocence or guilt.
  • The law: The accused’s own statements are admissions of a party-opponent (Fed. R. Evid. and Mil. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)). A caller the accused does not know is working with police generally does not trigger Miranda or Article 31(b) (Perkins; Rios), but a superior or command-tasked questioner may (Gilbreath). In courts-martial, failure to deny is not an admission when the accused was under investigation (Mil. R. Evid. 304(a)(2); Ahern), admissions require corroboration (Mil. R. Evid. 304(c)), and witnesses may not tell members what facially coherent words meant (Byrd; Lopez). Federal and Arizona completeness rules were amended in 2023 and 2024.
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors should let the accused’s words speak with their context and avoid arguing that silence or an apology proves guilt; defense counsel should obtain the whole communication and its planning materials and challenge overreading, without arguing that a denial or an angry response shows innocence, an inference the research does not support either.

In many adult sexual assault cases, much of the trial turns on what the complainant and the accused said to each other afterward. Some messages are spontaneous; others are pretext communications, in which an investigator arranges for the complainant, or sometimes a friend or relative, to call or message the accused, usually recorded and often scripted, hoping he will discuss the event. Police also call these “controlled” or “confrontation” calls. The accused may respond with admissions, apologies, explanations, evasions, silence, or denial, and each side asks the factfinder to read those words in its favor.

The starting points are not in serious dispute. Sexual assault is common and substantially underreported; the National Crime Victimization Survey estimated that about one in four rape or sexual assault victimizations were reported to police in 2024 (23.6%), an estimate that has varied considerably from year to year (46.0% in 2023; Tapp & Coen, 2025). Most assaults are committed by people the victim knows, which helps explain why post-incident contact is common, as the paper on continued contact with the accused explains. Pretext calls are widely used because a person who believes he is speaking privately with someone he knows may describe events candidly, and true admissions obtained this way can be strong evidence. At the same time, apologies, non-denials, and messages are ordinary communications shaped by relationships, emotion, and the design of the conversation, and their meaning is often less certain than a transcript suggests.

This paper reviews how pretext communications are conducted, the research on apologies, denials, silence, and message interpretation and its limits, and federal, military, and Arizona law on recording, rights warnings, silence, corroboration, completeness, and interpretive testimony.

How Pretext Calls and Messages Are Conducted

An International Association of Chiefs of Police training key treats the pretext call as a planned conversation, advising investigators to script and rehearse questions with the victim, to prefer specific questions tied to the facts over harsh accusations, to allow the caller to make certain untrue statements while avoiding threats, to confirm that recording is lawful, and to put the victim’s safety first; it also notes that a lack of denial can be incriminating (Eisenga, 2004). Such guidance aims to obtain statements, not to assess their accuracy, and offers no data.

How often police actually use the technique has been measured once. Using case files from the Los Angeles Sexual Assault Study (n = 616), St. George (2026) found that pretext phone calls, witness interviews, and suspect interviews were all underused. Police were more likely to interview witnesses when the complainant was viewed as credible and the case had stereotypical “real rape” features, but the study’s other predictions about how such case features would shape investigative decisions were not supported. The data come from one metropolitan area, and the study did not examine what the calls produced or whether statements obtained were accurate.

The only published program evaluation found concerns children. Canavan and colleagues (2021) reviewed four years of New York State Police control calls placed by children aged 3 to 18 after a forensic interview. The authors described the calls as highly effective forensically, reported that suspects often pleaded guilty, sparing children from testifying, and cautioned about serious adverse effects on the child. The study is descriptive, has no comparison group, and does not assess whether the statements obtained were accurate.

Davis and colleagues (2021) describe pretext callers as surrogate interrogators who share the interrogator’s goal of obtaining an admission and can use similar tactics, such as presenting the evidence as settled, minimizing the act, or suggesting that acknowledging it will lead to a better outcome, with fewer legal constraints, because the caller is a private person and the suspect does not know the police are involved. They also identify a motive formal interrogation lacks: a suspect may apologize or concede points to calm a distressed partner, friend, or relative and preserve the relationship (see also Livingston et al., 2019). These review chapters draw partly on unpublished work; they describe how pretext calls can produce misleading statements, not how often they do. For pretext texts and social media, the parallel questions are who wrote the complainant’s messages and whether the exchange was preserved in full.

What an Apology Does and Does Not Show

An apology that acknowledges a specific act can be an admission of that act. Research on everyday apologies shows, however, that people apologize for many reasons. In a laboratory study, 139 university students were maneuvered into accidental bodily contact with a confederate; whether they blamed themselves played a negligible role in whether they apologized, while sympathy and a desire to help were somewhat associated with apologizing, and the authors concluded that apologies are often scripted or sympathetic responses rather than admissions of blame (Blackman & Stubbs, 2001). In diary and rating studies, women reported more apologies than men but also more offenses, with no gender difference in the proportion of offenses that drew an apology; men rated offenses as less severe, and perceived severity predicted apologizing (Schumann & Ross, 2010). People also apologize for circumstances they plainly did not cause, such as bad weather, and across four studies such “superfluous” apologies increased trust in the person apologizing (Brooks et al., 2014). In civil injury scenarios, apologies accepting responsibility and expressions of sympathy that did not were perceived differently (Robbennolt, 2003).

The offenses studied were trivial or hypothetical, the participants were mostly students, and none of the studies involved an accusation of sexual assault or a pretext call. They support a modest point: an apology, standing alone, does not reliably show that the speaker believes he did what he is accused of. They do not show that apologies on pretext calls are usually innocent. Many such apologies refer to specific acts, and the words, the question asked, and the surrounding conversation determine what a particular apology admits.

Denials, Silence, and Counter-Accusation

Pretext calls often produce neither admission nor denial. The accused may change the subject, say he does not remember, or respond with anger, and practice guidance treats the absence of a denial as potentially significant (Eisenga, 2004). No study located measures how often falsely or mistakenly accused people fail to deny an accusation on a pretext call, or how often people who committed the act deny it.

Research on a different response points the other way. Freyd’s concept of DARVO (deny, attack, reverse victim and offender) describes a response in which the accused denies the act, attacks the accuser’s credibility, and presents himself as the true victim. In a vignette experiment with about 230 undergraduates, a professor was accused of groping a student. Compared with versions in which he offered no denial (no statement, or only an apology), participants who read his DARVO response rated him as less abusive, less responsible, and more believable, and rated the student as more abusive and less believable; 82.3% in the no-DARVO conditions said he should be punished, compared with 60.7% in the DARVO conditions. A conditional apology (“I am very sorry if I made Emily uncomfortable”), which the authors called insincere, had minimal effect, slightly lowering perceived abusiveness and not changing punishment judgments (Harsey & Freyd, 2023). The authors note a student sample, a brief manipulation, and small effects on some measures.

The study cuts more than one way: a denial with an attack on the complainant shifted observers against her, a reason not to treat an angry denial as evidence of innocence, and an apology admitting no wrongdoing did little to increase perceived culpability, which offers no support for treating such an apology as an admission. Self-reported use of DARVO responses correlates with sexual harassment perpetration and rape-myth acceptance (Harsey et al., 2024), but the correlations were small, and DARVO is a descriptive category, not a diagnostic sign. People who are falsely or mistakenly accused also deny and push back, so neither a denial nor a counter-accusation distinguishes the two situations.

Reading Text Messages and Social Media

In transcripts of 108 rape and sexual offense trials in two Australian states, Quilter and colleagues (2026) found that complainants’ messages drew particular scrutiny in cross-examination and were often treated as if they were formal written records, like police statements, without regard to the informal way people message; the authors concluded that this disadvantaged complainants. A content analysis of 108 Canadian judgments found that both prosecution and defense used social media evidence to establish the parties’ relationship and to support competing readings of communications before and after the alleged assault, especially on consent (Ramirez & Denault, 2026). An ethnographic study of two Milwaukee trials described how attorneys and witnesses “animate” texts, attributing meaning and intent to their authors (Hlavka & Mulla, 2018).

In five experiments, people overestimated how well they could convey tone, such as sarcasm or humor, by email, because writers “hear” their own intended tone (Kruger et al., 2005). Participants rating the same rendering of an emoji disagreed about whether its sentiment was positive, neutral, or negative 25% of the time, and disagreement increased across platforms (Miller et al., 2016). A short message read months later in a courtroom can support more than one reading, and that is as true of the accused’s messages as of the complainant’s. Messages the complainant exchanges with friends can also carry post-event information, a separate concern addressed in the paper on memory contamination.

Selective presentation compounds the problem. A screenshot, transcript excerpt, or partial phone extraction may omit surrounding messages, deleted messages, or other platforms, which is why the completeness rules discussed below matter. In a review of applications to England’s Criminal Cases Review Commission, digital communications were mentioned in about half of rape-conviction applications, but only two files contained arguably new digital evidence and none was referred for appeal (Burman et al., 2024).

Pressure, Admissions, and How Factfinders Weigh Them

Interrogation research associates minimization, false-evidence ploys, and implied promises of leniency with false-confession risk (Kassin et al., 2010). In a classic experiment, false incriminating “witness” evidence led innocent participants to sign a confession to damaging a computer, to internalize guilt, and to confabulate details (Kassin & Kiechel, 1996). Some pretext calls use analogous techniques, but the relevance is by analogy only: the laboratory offense was trivial, no study located measures how often pretext calls produce false admissions, and a person on a pretext call is free to end the conversation.

Confession evidence is hard to discount: Kassin and Sukel (1997) found that a confession increased conviction rates even when mock jurors judged it coerced and even when the judge ruled it inadmissible. Whether that extends to the more equivocal statements typical of pretext calls is unknown. An unpublished poster reported lower guilt ratings when mock jurors perceived more caller pressure, particularly relationship threats (Livingston et al., 2018).

Limits of the Evidence

The research is thin and indirect. The pretext-call literature is described above; the apology and DARVO studies used trivial offenses or vignettes and student samples, and the courtroom studies are qualitative and largely non-American. Most important, no study located compares the communications of people who committed an assault with those of people who did not, or who believed the encounter was consensual, so there is no empirical basis for treating any response, whether apology, evasion, silence, denial, or counterattack, as a marker of guilt or innocence. Research also cannot determine what a particular person meant by particular words; that is for the factfinder, based on the whole communication and the rest of the evidence.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When Blackman and Stubbs (2001) is offered to show that an apology does not mean guilt, counsel can ask who was studied and compared with whom: the 139 participants were students who had bumped into a stranger, not people accused of a crime, and the study says nothing about what a specific apology on a recorded call admitted. When Harsey and Freyd (2023) is offered to show that a denial with a counterattack can mislead observers, counsel can ask what exactly was compared, because the comparison conditions were a professor who made no statement or only a conditional apology, the participants were undergraduates reading a brief vignette, and the study did not test whether such responses are more common among people who committed the act. When Canavan and colleagues (2021) is cited to show that pretext calls are effective, counsel can ask whether pleas and avoided testimony say anything about accuracy, and whether a study of child callers fits an adult case. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Pretext Communications and the Law

Recording and Constitutional Limits

Federal law permits interception when one party consents, by a person acting under color of law or by a private party unless the purpose is a criminal or tortious act (18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c)–(d)). Arizona makes unconsented interception a felony (A.R.S. § 13-3005) but exempts interception with the consent of a party or a person present (A.R.S. § 13-3012(9)), so a pretext call recorded with the complainant’s consent is generally lawful under both; calls involving other states may face stricter laws. A plurality in United States v. White (1971) held that the Fourth Amendment does not protect against a confidant who records a conversation for the police. Under Illinois v. Perkins (1990), an undercover officer posing as a fellow inmate need not give Miranda warnings to an incarcerated suspect, because the coercion Miranda addresses is absent when the suspect does not know he is speaking to police. Under Colorado v. Connelly (1986), coercive police activity is a necessary predicate for a due-process finding of involuntariness, so a private caller’s pressure raises that question only if the caller acted as a state agent.

Federal and Military Standards

The accused’s statements are admissions of a party-opponent when offered against him (Fed. R. Evid. and Mil. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A)), and a statement he “manifested that it adopted or believed to be true” is also admissible (801(d)(2)(B)), the theory on which silence is sometimes offered. In United States v. Hoosier (6th Cir. 1976), the court held that silence can be an adoptive admission when the probable human reaction would have been a prompt denial, stressing that presence and silence alone are not enough. Whether a denial would naturally be expected in an emotional, relationship-centered conversation is the factual question.

Military law adds a specific rule: failure to deny an accusation is not an admission if the person “was under investigation or was in confinement, arrest, or custody for the alleged wrongdoing” (Mil. R. Evid. 304(a)(2)). In United States v. Ahern (C.A.A.F. 2017), a child-complainant case, the accused’s stepdaughter and wife sent a pretext text and made a call with civilian police assistance, he responded evasively, and trial counsel argued that he never denied anything. The court held the claim waived because the defense did not object under Rule 304 and stated “no objection” when the call was offered, and did not decide whether an investigation the accused is unaware of triggers the rule; the rule’s text asks only whether the person “was under investigation.” An admission includes a self-incriminating statement “intended by its maker to be exculpatory” (Mil. R. Evid. 304(a)(1)(C)), so an account conceding sexual contact while asserting consent is an admission.

Article 31(b), UCMJ, requires a person subject to the code to warn a suspect before interrogating him or requesting a statement. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces applies it when the questioner is acting, or could reasonably be perceived as acting, in an official law-enforcement or disciplinary capacity. In United States v. Rios (C.A.A.F. 1998), a child-complainant case, a 14-year-old stepdaughter made a recorded call at investigators’ request; no warning was required because there was no coercion based on rank, duty, or similar relationship and the accused believed he was talking with his stepdaughter (two judges dissented). In United States v. Gilbreath (C.A.A.F. 2014), by contrast, warnings were required when an active-duty sergeant, looking into missing paperwork for a unit pistol, had junior Marines telephone a former subordinate then in the Individual Ready Reserve and then took the phone and questioned him; the finding and sentence were set aside. The analysis is fact-specific: a part-time military police augmentee acting from personal motives (United States v. Jones, C.A.A.F. 2014) and a victim advocate who asked a few questions (United States v. Harpole, C.A.A.F. 2021) were not official questioners. Military Rule of Evidence 305(b)(1) extends the warning requirement to “a knowing agent” of a person subject to the code or a military unit, and Rule 305(b)(2) defines interrogation to include “any formal or informal questioning in which an incriminating response either is sought or is a reasonable consequence”; no decision applying the knowing-agent language to a civilian pretext caller was found.

Admissions require corroboration by independent evidence that “would tend to establish the trustworthiness” of the admission and “need raise only an inference of the truth” of it; statements made before or during the act are exempt, but post-incident statements are not (Mil. R. Evid. 304(c)). The rule and United States v. Whiteeyes (C.A.A.F. 2022) are discussed in the Child Abuse Allegations resource’s paper on corroboration. Under Rule 304(g), the defense may present evidence on voluntariness, including how a call was designed, and members are instructed to give the statement the weight it deserves.

Completeness matters when a call or thread is presented in part. Federal Rule of Evidence 106, as amended effective December 1, 2023, allows an adverse party to require introduction of any other part of a statement, or any other statement, that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time, reaches unrecorded oral statements, and permits completion over a hearsay objection. The Military Rule 106 text in the 2024 Manual for Courts-Martial is the earlier version, limited to writings and recorded statements. Under Military Rule of Evidence 1102(a), federal amendments outside Articles III and V amend the military rules 18 months after their effective date unless the President acts otherwise, which for Rule 106 would be about June 1, 2025; the Joint Service Committee’s 2025 compilation lists no presidential amendment to Rule 106 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025), and Executive Order 14130 (Dec. 20, 2024), whose only change to the Military Rules of Evidence was to Rule 513(a), did not amend it. Practitioners should confirm the current text. Independently, Rule 304(h) lets the defense introduce “the remaining portions” of a partly introduced admission, recorded or not. Authentication under Rule 901 is addressed in the Child Abuse Allegations resource’s paper on technology-facilitated abuse.

Courts also limit witnesses who interpret what words meant. In United States v. Byrd (C.A.A.F. 2004), a case about the accused’s own letters rather than apologies or pretext calls, a lay witness (the accused’s wife) could not, under Military Rule of Evidence 701, interpret facially coherent passages in letters the accused wrote, and could interpret ambiguous passages only with a particularized showing of a special basis for knowing his meaning; the error was held harmless. In United States v. Lopez (C.A.A.F. 2017), a child case involving a family conversation rather than a pretext call, the accused’s wife testified that his statement that he was sorry if he had done anything wrong was loosely admitting guilt; the court held this was improper lay opinion and human lie detector testimony, stated that when facially coherent communications are at issue no lay interpretation will be helpful or admissible absent a foundation calling their coherence into question, and found prejudice (see the paper on vouching). The D.C. Circuit vacated a conviction where an FBI agent’s lay opinion interpreting recorded conversations, drawn from his listening to about 20,000 calls of which about 100 were admitted, violated Rule 701 and was not harmless (United States v. Hampton, D.C. Cir. 2013); the case does not concern pretext calls or apologies and is cited only for lay-opinion interpretation of recordings. The Ninth Circuit, which includes Arizona, allows an officer to interpret ambiguous conversations based on direct knowledge of the investigation but not to rest on speculation or hearsay or to interpret clear statements (United States v. Gadson, 9th Cir. 2014).

Arizona

Arizona’s voluntariness statute requires the judge to decide voluntariness outside the jury’s presence and, if the statement is admitted, to let the jury hear evidence on voluntariness and give the statement the weight it deserves (A.R.S. § 13-3988(A)). Subsection (C) provides that the statute does not bar a confession made voluntarily “to any other person without interrogation by anyone,” or when the person was not under arrest or detention, and defines “confession” to include any self-incriminating statement. The standard instruction tells jurors not to consider statements made “to a law enforcement officer” unless they find beyond a reasonable doubt that they were voluntary (RAJI (Criminal) Standard 19). Whether it reaches statements to a complainant or relative placing a police-directed call is an agency question the instruction does not answer, and no Arizona appellate decision on pretext calls was found. Arizona Rule of Evidence 106 was amended effective January 1, 2024, to conform to the 2023 federal completeness amendment, and Arizona Rule 801(d)(2) parallels the federal rule. In State v. Damper (App. 2010), a text message was adequately authenticated where it came from the victim’s phone and the defendant offered no evidence that anyone else sent it.

Other Jurisdictions

In State v. Cassidy (Utah Ct. App. 2026), a rape prosecution involving a 16-year-old complainant and a detective-arranged pretext call, the court affirmed exclusion of a defense linguist who would have used conversation analysis to explain what the defendant’s words meant, reasoning that the subject was within the average juror’s knowledge and that the defense cited no authority that jurors need an expert to understand plain English.

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party may need to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The accused’s own words, recorded in full and presented with their context, can be highly probative in an acquaintance case, and research on trivial apologies does not undermine specific, fact-referencing admissions. Prosecutors can also anticipate responses that may mislead: a denial combined with an attack on the complainant reduced observers’ belief in the complainant (Harsey & Freyd, 2023), and complainants’ informal messages are often read as if they were formal statements (Quilter et al., 2026). Prosecutors can reduce appellate risk by using fact-specific questions without threats or promises (Eisenga, 2004); considering who places the call in a military case, since a superior or command-tasked caller raises Article 31(b) issues that a spouse or friend generally does not (Gilbreath; Rios); and preserving every communication on every platform.

The research and law also counsel caution. No study located shows that apologies, evasions, or non-denials distinguish guilty from innocent speakers, and a conditional apology had little effect on observers in the one experiment that tested it. Arguing that the accused “never denied it” risks error under Military Rule of Evidence 304(a)(2) when he was under investigation, and adoptive-admission arguments elsewhere require circumstances in which a denial would naturally be expected. No witness, whether complainant, investigator, or expert, should tell the factfinder what facially coherent words meant (Byrd; Lopez; Hampton); foundation about nicknames, prior events, and the parties’ history is permissible.

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports several legitimate challenges. People apologize from sympathy, habit, and a low threshold for perceiving offense, not only from guilt, and sympathy differs from accepting responsibility (Blackman & Stubbs, 2001; Schumann & Ross, 2010; Brooks et al., 2014; Robbennolt, 2003). Pretext callers can use minimization, emotional appeals, and relationship pressure with fewer constraints than police (Davis et al., 2021), and tone in messages is often misread (Kruger et al., 2005). Defense counsel can obtain the script, preparation notes, the complete recording, and any unrecorded contacts; to invoke the completeness rules, Military Rule of Evidence 304(g), and, where the facts support it, Article 31(b) and Rule 305(b)(1); to object at trial to “he never denied it” arguments under Rule 304(a)(2), since the issue in Ahern was lost by waiver; and to object when a witness interprets plain words.

The research also counsels caution about defense arguments. Arguing that a denial or an angry response shows innocence mirrors the “consistent with guilt” reasoning the defense challenges, and the DARVO research indicates that such responses can mislead observers. Courts may also limit defense experts from interpreting particular words (see Cassidy, a Utah intermediate-court decision affirming the exclusion of one linguist), so research on apologies and message ambiguity is better used for cross-examination, argument, or general context than for an expert’s reading of particular words. Requests to search a complainant’s phone are more persuasive when tied to a specific basis (Burman et al., 2024).

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

Blackman, M. C., & Stubbs, E. C. (2001). Apologies: Genuine admissions of blameworthiness or scripted, sympathetic responses? Psychological Reports, 88(1), 45–50. https://doi.org/10.2466/pr0.2001.88.1.45

Brooks, A. W., Dai, H., & Schweitzer, M. E. (2014). I’m sorry about the rain! Superfluous apologies demonstrate empathic concern and increase trust. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 5(4), 467–474. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550613506122

Burman, M., Smith, O., Brooks-Hay, O., & Brunger, Y. (2024). Digital communications as evidence (DCE) in sexual offence applications to the Criminal Cases Review Commission. Criminal Cases Review Commission. https://cdn.websitebuilder.service.justice.gov.uk/uploads/sites/5/2025/06/Download-research-paper.pdf

Canavan, J. W., Borowski, C., Essex, S., & Perkowski, S. (2021). Multidisciplinary responses to the sexual victimization of children: Use of control phone calls. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 36(1–2), NP384–NP401. https://doi.org/10.1177/0886260517730565

Davis, D., Leo, R. A., Livingston, T. N., & Rerick, P. O. (2021). On the synergy between pretext caller and police interrogator. In N. Deslauriers-Varin & C. Bennell (Eds.), Criminal investigations of sexual offenses (pp. 115–130). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-79968-7_9

Eisenga, H. (2004). Pretext phone calls in sexual assault investigations (Training Key No. 574). International Association of Chiefs of Police. https://evawintl.org/wp-content/uploads/IACP-574PretextPhoneCalls.pdf

Harsey, S. J., Adams-Clark, A. A., & Freyd, J. J. (2024). Associations between defensive victim-blaming responses (DARVO), rape myth acceptance, and sexual harassment. PLOS ONE, 19(12), e0313642. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0313642

Harsey, S. J., & Freyd, J. J. (2023). The influence of deny, attack, reverse victim and offender and insincere apologies on perceptions of sexual assault. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 38(17–18), 9985–10008. https://doi.org/10.1177/08862605231169751

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Kassin, S. M., Drizin, S. A., Grisso, T., Gudjonsson, G. H., Leo, R. A., & Redlich, A. D. (2010). Police-induced confessions: Risk factors and recommendations. Law and Human Behavior, 34(1), 3–38. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-009-9188-6

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Kassin, S. M., & Sukel, H. (1997). Coerced confessions and the jury: An experimental test of the “harmless error” rule. Law and Human Behavior, 21(1), 27–46. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024814009769

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Livingston, T., Rerick, P., & Davis, D. (2018, May). The effect of caller threats on guilt ratings in a “pretext” phone call [Poster presentation]. Association for Psychological Science 30th Annual Convention, San Francisco, CA, United States. https://www.psychologicalscience.org/conventions/archive/2018annual/paper/11320/

Livingston, T. N., Rerick, P. O., Villalobos, J. G., & Davis, D. (2019). Deception induced confession: Strategies of police interrogators and their lay collaborators. In T. Docan-Morgan (Ed.), The Palgrave handbook of deceptive communication (pp. 747–767). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96334-1_39

Miller, H., Thebault-Spieker, J., Chang, S., Johnson, I., Terveen, L., & Hecht, B. (2016). “Blissfully happy” or “ready to fight”: Varying interpretations of emoji. Proceedings of the International AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media, 10(1), 259–268. https://doi.org/10.1609/icwsm.v10i1.14757

Quilter, J., McNamara, L., Porter, M., & Bowles, G. (2026). Text messages and social media posts as evidence in rape trials: A new entry point for rape myths? Crime, Media, Culture. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1177/17416590261429130

Ramirez, F., & Denault, V. (2026). He posted/she posted: Unpacking the affordances of social media evidence in sexual assault cases. Crime, Media, Culture, 22(4), 668–689. https://doi.org/10.1177/17416590251345744

Robbennolt, J. K. (2003). Apologies and legal settlement: An empirical examination. Michigan Law Review, 102(3), 460–516. https://doi.org/10.2307/3595367

Schumann, K., & Ross, M. (2010). Why women apologize more than men: Gender differences in thresholds for perceiving offensive behavior. Psychological Science, 21(11), 1649–1655. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797610384150

St. George, S. (2026). Before arrest: The effects of rape myths on evidence collection decisions in sexual assault investigations. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 44(2), 265–280. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.70037

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Legal Authorities

Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).

Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990).

State v. Cassidy, 2026 UT App 125.

State v. Damper, 223 Ariz. 572, 225 P.3d 1148 (App. 2010).

United States v. Ahern, 76 M.J. 194 (C.A.A.F. 2017).

United States v. Byrd, 60 M.J. 4 (C.A.A.F. 2004).

United States v. Gadson, 763 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2014).

United States v. Gilbreath, 74 M.J. 11 (C.A.A.F. 2014).

United States v. Hampton, 718 F.3d 978 (D.C. Cir. 2013).

United States v. Harpole, No. 20-0142/CG (C.A.A.F. Feb. 16, 2021) (per curiam).

United States v. Hoosier, 542 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1976).

United States v. Jones, 73 M.J. 357 (C.A.A.F. 2014).

United States v. Lopez, 76 M.J. 151 (C.A.A.F. 2017).

United States v. Rios, 48 M.J. 261 (C.A.A.F. 1998).

United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).

United States v. Whiteeyes, 82 M.J. 168 (C.A.A.F. 2022).

10 U.S.C. § 831 (Article 31, UCMJ).

18 U.S.C. § 2511.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3005.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3012.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3988.

Ariz. R. Evid. 106, 801, 901.

Fed. R. Evid. 106, 701, 801, 901.

Mil. R. Evid. 106, 304, 305, 701, 801, 901, 1102.

Revised Arizona Jury Instructions (Criminal), Standard Criminal 19 (6th ed. 2022).

Exec. Order No. 14130, 2024 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 89 Fed. Reg. 105343 (Dec. 27, 2024).

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