Snap Shot
- The question: What does research show about the effect of victim advocates on complainants, and what do the rules allow the parties to learn from, and about, advocates, sexual assault response coordinators (SARCs), and victims’ counsel?
- What the research shows: In observational and qualitative studies, survivors with an advocate were more likely to have a police report taken, reported less negative treatment and distress, and described formal supports as important to staying involved. In the laboratory, retelling an event for an audience can shape later memory, and rapport-building reduced misinformation.
- What it does not show: No study tests whether contact with an advocate changes the accuracy or content of an adult complainant’s account, and nothing in the advocacy research distinguishes accurate from inaccurate reports. Selection effects are not ruled out.
- The law: Mil. R. Evid. 514 protects confidential victim–advocate communications (not victims’ counsel), keeps a “constitutionally required” exception that Rule 513 no longer has, and requires specific findings before in camera review; a friend present only for moral support defeated confidentiality in Harpole. Victims may seek mandamus on 514 rulings (Art. 6b(e)). Arizona’s A.R.S. § 13-4430 protects communications even when others are present, yielding for perjury and exculpatory material. Federal law has no statutory advocate privilege.
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors should keep SARCs and advocates to fact testimony unless an expert foundation is laid (Flesher) and document the timing of early statements; defense counsel should tie claims of advocate or counsel influence to specific content in the record, recognizing that such claims may open the door to prior consistent statements.
A complainant in an adult sexual assault case rarely goes from the event directly to an investigator. In the military, the first formal contact is often a sexual assault response coordinator (SARC) or a sexual assault prevention and response victim advocate (SAPR VA), sometimes through a restricted report that triggers no investigation, and Special Victims’ Counsel or Victims’ Legal Counsel (SVC/VLC) may become involved soon after. In civilian cases, a hospital or rape crisis center advocate may accompany the complainant to a forensic examination and police interview. These professionals may hear the earliest account of the events and may be in contact with the complainant throughout the case. Sexual assault is common and substantially underreported, and the support advocates provide is a legitimate and widely endorsed response to it; their presence in a case says nothing, by itself, about whether an assault occurred.
Advocates reach the courtroom in three ways: they hold information about the earliest disclosures, which privilege rules may protect; they may testify, as fact witnesses or occasionally as experts offering counterintuitive behavior testimony (expert testimony explaining behaviors jurors may not expect from a person who has been assaulted); and advocates and victims’ counsel take part in the proceedings, asserting privileges and seeking appellate relief. This paper reviews the research on advocacy, on retelling and rapport, advocates as witnesses, and the federal, military, and Arizona law, building on the paper on memory contamination.
Who the Advocates Are
The term “advocate” covers roles with different legal consequences. In the Department of Defense, SARCs manage the sexual assault response at an installation and SAPR VAs provide direct support; both may take a restricted or unrestricted report. Policy directs that all SARCs be authorized to perform victim advocate duties, and that SARCs and SAPR VAs be trained in, and brief victims on, the confidentiality of restricted reporting and the protections and exceptions of Military Rule of Evidence 514 (Department of Defense, 2025, Encl. 6).
Special Victims’ Counsel and Victims’ Legal Counsel are different. They are attorneys who represent eligible victims of alleged sex-related offenses, whether the report is restricted or unrestricted, and their relationship with the victim is an attorney–client relationship (10 U.S.C. § 1044e). Rule 514 expressly excludes “any victims’ counsel,” as well as prosecutors, law enforcement officers, and military criminal investigators in the case, from its definition of victim advocate (Mil. R. Evid. 514(b)(2)). Communications with victims’ counsel therefore fall under the attorney–client privilege, not Rule 514. Chaplains, victims’ counsel, and legal assistance attorneys cannot accept a restricted report, and disclosures directly to law enforcement carry no expectation of confidentiality (Department of Defense, 2025, Encl. 4).
Civilian advocates work for prosecutors’ offices, law enforcement agencies, hospitals, and rape crisis centers, and their confidentiality depends on state law or, in federal court, on the federal common law of privilege.
Restricted Reporting and the Path to a Formal Report
A restricted report allows a service member to receive medical care, advocacy, and counseling without triggering an investigation or command notification. In fiscal year 2025, service members initially made 3,574 restricted reports, and 598 of them (17%) were later converted to unrestricted reports (Department of War, 2026, p. 20). Conversion (see the papers on delayed disclosure and on Department of Defense data) is a structural feature of the system that supports no inference about accuracy in either direction. Civilian systems have a parallel: in 296 U.S. medical records of people who had forensic evidence collected without reporting to police, the reasons recorded fell into four themes, reporting won’t help, reporting will harm, not now, and not what I’m here for (Goodman-Williams et al., 2024).
Restricted reporting confidentiality is an administrative protection, not an evidentiary privilege. The governing instruction lists five exceptions, including the victim’s written authorization, a serious and imminent threat to the health or safety of the victim or another person (multiple reports against the same suspect are given as an example), and disclosure ordered by a military official, such as through a duly authorized court-martial subpoena, or by a federal or state judge; a SARC discloses only after a legal advisor analyzes the effect of Rule 514 (Department of Defense, 2025, Encl. 4, ¶ 8). The instruction does not set policy for legal processes under the Uniform Code of Military Justice; in court, access to advocate communications is a question for Rule 514.
What Research Shows About Advocacy, Reporting, and Participation
The most direct study is a naturalistic quasi-experiment with 81 rape survivors interviewed at two urban hospitals. Survivors who had the assistance of an advocate were significantly more likely to have a police report taken, were less likely to report negative treatment by police, received more medical services such as emergency contraception and prophylaxis for sexually transmitted infections, and reported less distress after contact with the legal and medical systems (Campbell, 2006). The design is the study’s main limit: advocates were not randomly assigned, outcomes were self-reported, and the sample came from one city. Negative contacts with these systems can themselves add to distress (Campbell, 2008). A more recent prospective study qualifies the picture of police contact: of 706 women who had a sexual assault nurse examination after presenting to 12 U.S. emergency departments, most of the 630 followed at six weeks wanted to speak with police, did so, and described positive experiences, although Latinas and lower-income women were less likely to speak with police and those with more posttraumatic stress or prior trauma described worse experiences (McLean et al., 2026). That study describes police contact, not advocacy.
Qualitative research describes how advocacy relates to participation. In interviews with 20 survivors who reported to police in a large Midwestern county, informal supports played the larger role in the decision to report, while formal supports, including forensic nurses and advocates, were influential in survivors’ continued engagement in the investigation (Patterson & Campbell, 2010). Interviews with forensic nurses and advocates in a sexual assault nurse examiner program identified components of advocacy that may address barriers to participation (Patterson & Tringali, 2015), and a study in one area of England, using referral data and interviews with 15 survivors and 14 practitioners, described specialist sexual violence services as supporting engagement with the criminal justice system (Hester & Lilley, 2018). These studies are small, qualitative, and drawn from people already in contact with services; Patterson and Tringali relied on providers’ descriptions.
Withdrawal after reporting is common. In 544 cases reported to one Midwestern police department, coded from investigators’ narratives, complainants were more likely to keep participating when the assault resembled stereotypical scenarios (Alderden & Long, 2016); advocacy was not studied. Among eight survivors who stopped disclosing for a significant period, negative reactions from professionals led them to doubt that further disclosure would help (Ahrens, 2006).
These small observational and qualitative studies associate advocacy with more reports taken, better treatment, less distress, and continued engagement, and selection effects may account for part of the association. They measure help-seeking and participation, not the accuracy of accounts. Advocates describe their role as standing between survivors and systems that can treat them poorly (Maier, 2008; Ullman & Townsend, 2007). In interviews with 41 U.S. advocates, most perceived that survivors were doubted or blamed, questioned repeatedly, and left out of legal processes, and they described reducing that harm by preparing, empowering, and listening to survivors (Maier, 2025). That perspective is relevant when an advocate testifies, and it is not evidence that any account was shaped. In interviews with 35 victim-survivors in Iceland, the author argued that treating complainants as witnesses with few or no procedural rights misframes their position in the criminal process (Antonsdottir, 2018); the study concerns a Nordic system, rests on a small interview sample, and does not address the accuracy of accounts.
Retelling, Support, and Memory
Co-witnesses who discuss an event can adopt each other’s details; in one study, 71% of witnesses who discussed an event later mistakenly recalled items acquired during the discussion (Gabbert et al., 2003; see the paper on memory contamination). An advocate, however, is usually not a co-witness and has no independent knowledge of the event, so the more relevant mechanisms are retelling and audience tuning.
When people retell an event, they shape the telling to their purpose and audience. In four experiments, participants who read a story and then wrote a biased letter about a character later remembered the story differently, in several experiments with errors in the direction of the letter’s perspective; the bias appeared even when the letters contained little specific story information, suggesting that the perspective adopted while retelling, not only selective rehearsal, affected memory (Tversky & Marsh, 2000; see Marsh, 2007). In “saying-is-believing” research, communicators who tuned a description of a person to an audience later remembered the person in line with their message; the effect appeared with an in-group but not an out-group audience and was mediated by trust in the audience’s judgment (Echterhoff et al., 2005). These laboratory studies, using stories and ambiguous descriptions rather than traumatic events or forensic samples, describe a mechanism by which retelling to a trusted listener could affect later memory; they do not show that it occurs in advocate conversations or how large it would be.
Other laboratory research points the other way. In a mock-crime study with 111 college adults, an interviewer who built rapport before recall reduced the percentage of inaccurate and misinformation details reported, especially in response to open-ended questions (Vallano & Schreiber Compo, 2011). In a follow-up with 233 undergraduates, high rapport established before misinformation was presented increased the amount of accurate information later reported (Kieckhaefer et al., 2014). These studies involved interviewers rather than advocates and mock crimes rather than assaults, but they do not support a general claim that supportive contact contaminates memory.
Taken together, support and rapport are not shown to impair memory and may help, while retelling to a trusted audience can shape memory in the laboratory. Advocates describe preparing survivors for legal proceedings (Maier, 2025), but no study located examines what that preparation involves or whether it affects the content of an account. Whether support or retelling mattered in a particular case depends on content: what the complainant was told and whether a specific detail or interpretation first appears after a conversation that supplied it. Nothing in this research allows an expert to infer influence from the fact of advocate contact, or to rule it out without a record of what was said.
Advocates and SARCs as Witnesses
Advocates and SARCs most often testify as fact witnesses: about when and how a report was made, the complainant’s demeanor, the services offered, or a statement offered for a non-hearsay purpose or under a hearsay exception. Whether the content of a complainant’s statements to an advocate can be elicited depends first on privilege.
Expert testimony by an advocate or SARC raises distinct issues. In United States v. Flesher (2014), discussed in the papers on admissibility and on vouching, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held that a military judge abused his discretion by admitting a former SARC as a prosecution expert without a Daubert hearing, findings, or Houser analysis, where her qualifications rested largely on her position, and her testimony bolstered the complainant by repeating the complainant’s explanation of why she did not struggle; the court left open whether such testimony would be proper had the defense attacked the complainant’s behavior as improbable. An advocate who has supported a complainant and then testifies as an expert combines two roles, and any expert foundation must come from knowledge of the research rather than from the role.
Claims that an advocate or victims’ counsel influenced the complainant carry a further consequence, because under Military Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B)(i) a prior consistent statement made before an alleged improper influence arose may be admitted to rebut it. In United States v. Jones (2020, unpublished), the advocate had told the complainant of other reports about the accused, and the defense suggested that the advocate also encouraged an unrestricted report, which the complainant denied; the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals upheld admission, as a prior consistent statement, of her June 2017 call to her mother, which preceded her contact with the advocate in September. In United States v. Miller (2017, unpublished), the same court treated text messages sent about 12 hours after the incident as predating alleged influence from preparation by victims’ counsel, investigators, and prosecutors. The governing C.A.A.F. decisions are reviewed in the paper on delayed and incremental disclosure.
Limits of the Evidence
The advocacy research is observational or qualitative, small, and concentrated in a few Midwestern U.S. communities and one area of England. People who receive advocacy, and who remain engaged, may differ from those who do not, and outcomes are mostly self-reported. No study measures whether advocate contact changes the accuracy or content of adult complainants’ accounts, and no peer-reviewed study was located on what predicts conversion of restricted reports or whether converted cases differ in outcome.
The memory research has the opposite limits: it is experimental and permits causal conclusions, but uses students, mock events, stories, and interviewers rather than complainants, assaults, and advocates. It cannot establish what happened in any particular conversation. Neither literature can tell a factfinder whether a particular complainant’s account is accurate or whether an assault occurred.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When Campbell (2006) is cited to show that advocates improve outcomes, ask how the groups were formed: advocates were not randomly assigned among the 81 survivors, and the study measured self-reported treatment and distress, not accuracy. When Tversky and Marsh (2000) or Echterhoff et al. (2005) is cited to suggest that advocate conversations shaped an account, ask whether the conclusion follows for this complainant: the studies used stories and ambiguous descriptions in the laboratory, and they show a mechanism, not that it operated here. When Vallano and Schreiber Compo (2011) is cited to suggest that support cannot affect memory, ask what was tested: an interviewer’s rapport before 111 college adults recalled a mock crime, not repeated conversations with an advocate about an assault. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Advocates, Victims’ Counsel, and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
Military Rule of Evidence 514, created by Executive Order 13593 (2011) and amended by Executive Orders 13696 (2015) and 13825 (2018), gives a victim, defined as a person alleged to have suffered direct physical or emotional harm from a sexual or violent offense, a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent others from disclosing, a confidential communication with a victim advocate or Department of Defense Safe Helpline staff made to facilitate advice or assistance. A communication is confidential if not intended for third persons other than those whose involvement furthers the advice or assistance or is reasonably necessary to transmit it. The victim may claim the privilege, as may the advocate on the victim’s behalf or counsel the victim authorizes (Mil. R. Evid. 514(a)–(c), as printed in the 2024 Manual for Courts-Martial). Its six exceptions cover a deceased victim, a legal or regulatory duty to report, a victim who is a danger to any person, future crime or fraud, military safety and security, and disclosure that is “constitutionally required” (514(d)(1)–(6)). That last exception distinguishes Rule 514 from Rule 513: the 2015 order deleted the constitutional exception from the psychotherapist–patient privilege but not from Rule 514, and the 2018 order did not amend Rule 514’s exceptions. The Joint Service Committee’s 2025 compilation lists Executive Order 14130 (Dec. 20, 2024), which postdates the 2024 Manual, as amending Rule 513 but not Rule 514 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025), and the order itself confirms that its only change to the Military Rules of Evidence was to Rule 513(a). The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has declined to decide whether a constitutional exception survives under Rule 513 (In re B.M., 2024); Rule 514(d)(6) states one expressly.
Before ordering production or admission of advocate communications, the military judge must hold a closed hearing at which the victim may be heard, including through counsel (514(e)(2)). In camera review requires findings that the moving party has shown a specific, credible factual basis demonstrating a reasonable likelihood that the communications would contain or lead to admissible evidence under an exception; that the request meets an enumerated exception; that the information is not merely cumulative; and that reasonable efforts were made to obtain it from non-privileged sources (514(e)(3)). Production must be narrowly tailored and may be subject to protective orders and sealing (514(e)(4)–(6)). No authority located addresses whether an advocate’s notes that qualify as a witness’s “statement” under Rule for Courts-Martial 914 can be reached notwithstanding Rule 514. Subpoenas for a victim’s personal or confidential information, including from civilian counselors, generally require notice so the victim can seek relief (R.C.M. 703(g)(3)(C)(ii)).
Two decisions apply the rule. In United States v. Harpole (2018), a Coast Guard member who had been accused of sexual assault, and who said he believed he had been taken advantage of, spoke with a victim advocate who knew of the allegation, while a friend sat in for support; the court did not decide whether he was a “victim” under the rule. Applying the rule in effect at his 2014 trial, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held that he had not carried his burden, by a preponderance of the evidence, of showing the communication was confidential: “the mere provision of moral support is not enough to maintain the confidentiality of a statement,” the friend had no special relationship to him, and nothing showed his presence was needed for the advocacy. After a remand on whether counsel should have moved to suppress under Article 31(b), the court held in a 2021 per curiam opinion that warnings were not required because the advocate, whose role was supportive and who asked only a few questions, was not participating in a law enforcement or disciplinary inquiry; two judges concurred in the judgment on the narrower ground that the fact-finding judge found no incriminating statements resulted from her questions. In In re AL (2022, unpublished order), the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals denied a complainant’s Rule 514 petition because nothing showed that the records ordered produced contained advocate communications, while granting relief under Rule 513 because Family Advocacy Program records had been ordered produced without the required closed hearing.
Article 6b, UCMJ, allows a victim to petition the Court of Criminal Appeals for a writ of mandamus when a ruling violates Rule 514, among other listed provisions (10 U.S.C. § 806b(e)). The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has required a “clear and indisputable” right to relief on such petitions and held that Rule 513’s hearing procedures apply before even non-privileged mental health records are produced (H.V.Z. v. United States, 2024); Rule 514(e)(2) uses parallel language, though no decision located applies H.V.Z. to it. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has held that it lacks jurisdiction to review a victim’s own petition challenging a court of criminal appeals ruling on an Article 6b(e) mandamus petition (M.W. v. United States, 2023). A privilege holder who is not a party may be heard through counsel, including legal argument, at Rule 412 and 513 hearings, subject to reasonable limits set by the military judge (LRM v. Kastenberg, 2013). Article 6b(f) requires defense requests to interview a victim to go through the victim’s counsel, if applicable, and on the victim’s request the interview takes place only in the presence of trial counsel, counsel for the victim, or, if applicable, a victim advocate.
In federal civilian court, the Crime Victims’ Rights Act provides rights including respect for dignity and privacy, with mandamus in the court of appeals (18 U.S.C. § 3771), but no federal statute creates an advocate privilege; protection depends on federal common law under Federal Rule of Evidence 501. Jaffee v. Redmond (1996) recognized a psychotherapist–patient privilege extending to licensed clinical social workers. In United States v. Lowe (D. Mass. 1996), a district court concluded that a rape crisis center client holds some form of waivable federal privilege for communications with a counselor, without deciding whether it is absolute or qualified, and conducted a limited in camera review, citing Pennsylvania v. Ritchie (1987). No federal appellate decision on such a privilege was located.
Arizona
Arizona’s statute is broader. A crime victim advocate may not disclose, as a witness or otherwise, any communication made by or with the victim, including communications made in the presence of others, without the victim’s written consent, and the same protection covers records and notes based on those communications (A.R.S. § 13-4430(A)–(B)). The privilege does not apply if the advocate knows the victim will give or has given perjured testimony, or if the communication contains exculpatory evidence (§ 13-4430(C)). On a defense motion, if the court finds reasonable cause to believe the material is exculpatory, it holds an in camera hearing and discloses material it finds exculpatory (§ 13-4430(D)). Privileged material that the advocate shares with a prosecutor or law enforcement with the victim’s consent must be disclosed to the defense only if it is otherwise exculpatory (§ 13-4430(E)). A “crime victim advocate” is a person employed or authorized by a public or private entity to provide counseling, treatment, or other supportive assistance to crime victims (A.R.S. § 13-4401). Unlike Rule 514 as applied in Harpole, the Arizona statute does not lose its protection because others were present. A parallel provision applies in juvenile cases (A.R.S. § 8-409).
No Arizona appellate decision construing § 13-4430 was located. R.S. v. Thompson (2021, ¶¶ 1, 17, 30) held that in camera review of a victim’s privileged mental health records requires a reasonable possibility, on a sufficiently specific basis, that they contain information material to the defense or necessary to cross-examine a witness, and that due process prevails when it directly conflicts with a victim’s state rights; the opinion did not address § 13-4430 or how its “reasonable cause” standard relates. Arizona victims also have a constitutional and statutory right to refuse a defense interview, deposition, or other discovery request (Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1(A)(5); A.R.S. § 13-4433).
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party may need to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports explaining why advocates are involved and why engagement with the process may change: advocacy is associated with more reports taken, less negative treatment and distress, and continued participation (Campbell, 2006; Patterson & Campbell, 2010), and rapport-building reduced misinformation in laboratory interviews (Vallano & Schreiber Compo, 2011), which bears on, but does not resolve, a general claim that support itself contaminates memory; the study used an interviewer rather than an advocate and a mock crime rather than an assault. A SARC or advocate is usually most useful as a fact witness about the reporting process; if one is offered as an expert, Flesher shows the value of qualifications grounded in the research, Houser findings on the record, and testimony that does not repeat the complainant’s explanations. Prosecutors can document the timing and content of early statements, which may become admissible if the defense alleges later influence (Jones; Miller), and to recognize that a third person present only for moral support may defeat Rule 514 confidentiality (Harpole).
The research also counsels caution. Advocacy research measures help-seeking and participation, not accuracy, and an expert should be expected to concede that it does not show advocate-supported accounts are more reliable. An expert who denies that conversations can ever shape memory overstates the rapport research, given the retelling and audience-tuning studies. Rule 514’s constitutional exception and in camera procedure mean that advocate communications are not beyond reach. Restricted-report conversion and the presence of victims’ counsel are features of the system, not corroboration.
Special Issues for Defense
The research supports several legitimate points. No study shows that advocate involvement makes an account more accurate, so testimony implying that it does overstates the science; the advocacy studies are observational and may fit a particular case poorly; and the retelling and audience-tuning research supplies a recognized mechanism by which retelling to a trusted listener could affect memory. Defense counsel can determine what information passed to the complainant and when, such as learning of other reports, as in Jones. A Rule 514 motion must meet the four in camera findings and should show that the material actually contains advocate communications (In re AL); unlike Rule 513, Rule 514 retains an express constitutional exception. An advocate who questions a person later treated as a suspect may raise Article 31(b) questions, although Harpole (2021) found warnings unnecessary on its facts.
The research also counsels caution about the defense’s own inferences. Support and rapport are not shown to impair memory, and the fact of advocate contact is not evidence of influence; a claim of contamination is supportable only when tied to specific content and exposure in the record. The non-specificity point applies evenly: an advocate’s involvement, a restricted report, or the presence of victims’ counsel is consistent with either an accurate or an inaccurate account and does not establish a motive or an influence. Allegations of advocate or counsel influence carry a cost, because they may open the door to earlier consistent statements (Jones; Miller). Because victims may seek mandamus on Rule 514 rulings, disclosure motions benefit from early filing and a complete record.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
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Alderden, M., & Long, L. (2016). Sexual assault victim participation in police investigations and prosecution. Violence and Victims, 31(5), 819–836. https://doi.org/10.1891/0886-6708.VV-D-14-00103
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Campbell, R. (2008). The psychological impact of rape victims’ experiences with the legal, medical, and mental health systems. American Psychologist, 63(8), 702–717. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.63.8.702
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Legal Authorities
Crime Victims R.S. v. Thompson, 251 Ariz. 111, 485 P.3d 1068 (2021).
H.V.Z. v. United States, 85 M.J. 8 (C.A.A.F. 2024).
In re AL, Misc. Dkt. No. 2022-12 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Dec. 7, 2022) (unpublished order).
B.M. v. United States (In re B.M.), 84 M.J. 314 (C.A.A.F. 2024) (No. 23-0233/NA).
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
LRM v. Kastenberg, 72 M.J. 364 (C.A.A.F. 2013), jurisdictional aspects superseded by Article 6b, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 806b, as treated in Randolph v. HV, 76 M.J. 27 (C.A.A.F. 2017), and M.W. v. United States, 83 M.J. 361 (C.A.A.F. 2023).
M.W. v. United States, 83 M.J. 361 (C.A.A.F. 2023) (No. 23-0104/AF).
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
United States v. Flesher, 73 M.J. 303 (C.A.A.F. 2014).
United States v. Harpole, 77 M.J. 231 (C.A.A.F. 2018).
United States v. Harpole, No. 20-0142/CG (C.A.A.F. Feb. 16, 2021) (per curiam).
United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).
United States v. Jones, No. ACM 39543 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. June 11, 2020) (unpublished).
United States v. Lowe, 948 F. Supp. 97 (D. Mass. 1996).
United States v. Miller, No. ACM 38922 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Mar. 21, 2017) (unpublished).
Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1.
10 U.S.C. § 806b (Article 6b, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
10 U.S.C. § 831 (Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
10 U.S.C. § 1044e.
18 U.S.C. § 3771.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-409.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4401.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4430.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4433.
Exec. Order No. 13593, 76 Fed. Reg. 78451 (Dec. 13, 2011).
Exec. Order No. 13696, 80 Fed. Reg. 35783 (June 17, 2015).
Exec. Order No. 13825, 83 Fed. Reg. 9889 (Mar. 1, 2018).
Exec. Order No. 14130, 2024 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 89 Fed. Reg. 105343 (Dec. 27, 2024).
Fed. R. Evid. 501.
Mil. R. Evid. 513.
Mil. R. Evid. 514.
Mil. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B).
R.C.M. 703(g)(3).
R.C.M. 914.
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