Snap Shot
- The question: What does research show about how adults signal and read sexual consent and refusal, and how does it bear on a claimed mistaken belief in consent?
- What the research shows: In the mostly college-student samples studied, consent and refusal were most often described as communicated indirectly, and men report relying more on nonverbal cues than women do. Explicit communication tends to drop as a couple’s sexual history grows. On average, men perceive more sexual interest than women report intending. Newer studies tie that gap to individual differences: lower perceptual sensitivity, projection of one’s own interest, sociosexual orientation, and rape-supportive attitudes. In qualitative studies, young men recognized indirect refusals well. Alcohol shifts perception toward reading sexual interest and slows recognition of refusal.
- What it does not show: No study can tell a factfinder what a particular accused perceived, whether a claimed misperception was genuine, or whether a particular encounter was consensual. Most studies use heterosexual college samples, vignettes, or ratings of interest rather than consent to a specific act.
- The law: In courts-martial, a mistake of fact as to consent is an affirmative defense only if it was both honest and reasonable (R.C.M. 916(j)(1); McDonald). The accused’s own intoxication does not make a belief reasonable. Federal circuits differ on whether the government must prove knowledge of nonconsent or incapacity (Bruguier; Price). Arizona requires proof that the defendant knew the act was without consent (Witwer; Kemper; RAJI 14.06.01).
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors can use the refusal-recognition and token-resistance research, but should not offer misperception findings as character evidence. Defense counsel can show that cues are often indirect and read inconsistently, but should not treat honest misperception as legally sufficient where the law also requires reasonableness, or offer opinions on the accused’s belief.
Many contested adult sexual assault cases turn not on whether sexual contact occurred but on whether the complainant consented and, in many jurisdictions, on what the accused believed about consent. Sexual assault is common and substantially underreported; in the National Crime Victimization Survey, about one in four rape and sexual assault victimizations were reported to police in 2024 (23.6%); the estimate has varied considerably from year to year (46.0% in 2023), so no single figure should be treated as fixed (Tapp & Coen, 2025). In cases where the encounter itself is not disputed, counsel on both sides look to research on how people communicate sexual consent and refusal and how accurately they read each other’s signals.
Either side can overstate that research. Defense counsel may cite indirect signaling or male overperception of interest to suggest an innocent misunderstanding; prosecutors may cite links between misperception and coercive attitudes, which risks suggesting bad character, or qualitative findings that young men read indirect refusals well, to suggest that no misunderstanding was possible.
This paper reviews research on consent and refusal signals, relationship history, token resistance, misperception of sexual interest, and alcohol, then the limits of the evidence and the law of consent and mistake of fact in military, federal, and Arizona courts. The paper on freezing and tonic immobility addresses the complainant’s side of the same encounter, noting that testimony about a complainant’s internal state does not by itself address what the accused could observe.
How Adults Communicate Consent and Refusal
The leading review, focused mainly on U.S. and Canadian college students, distinguishes consent as an internal state of willingness, as an act of agreeing, and as behavior that another person interprets as willingness (Muehlenhard et al., 2016). The three can come apart: a person may feel willing and signal nothing, signal agreement without feeling willing, or behave in ways a partner reads as willingness when none was intended. Wanting and consenting are also distinct. Among college women, unacknowledged rape victims (in the study’s terms) reported wanting the intercourse more than acknowledged victims did, although they had not consented (Peterson & Muehlenhard, 2007).
In the college-student samples studied, consent was most often described as signaled indirectly. In open-ended responses from 185 Midwestern college students, men and women defined consent the same way, but women reported more verbal ways of signaling consent and nonconsent, men reported more nonverbal ways, and men relied more on nonverbal cues when interpreting a partner’s consent (Jozkowski et al., 2014). In one of the few samples extending beyond college age, 553 young, middle-aged, and older adults, 57.4% of written definitions included the basic elements of agreement to sexual acts (Graf & Johnson, 2021).
Refusals are usually indirect too. Conversation analysis shows that refusals in ordinary talk typically involve delays, prefaces, softening remarks, and explanations rather than a bare “no”; young women in the authors’ data articulated these norms, and the authors argued that a woman should not need to say “no” to be understood as refusing sex (Kitzinger & Frith, 1999). In two focus groups, young Australian men showed a refined ability to recognize verbal refusals without the word “no” and subtle nonverbal refusals (O’Byrne et al., 2006); a related study found young men drawing on a lay “miscommunication” account, the claim that a man who was not told “no” could not have known, to excuse a perpetrator (O’Byrne et al., 2008). In accounts of casual sex, young women and men described the same communication methods and reported understanding their partners’ acceptances and refusals (Beres, 2010). These qualitative studies are small and do not concern disputed encounters, but they cut against the assumption that indirect refusals are commonly missed.
Relationship History and Sexual Precedent
In a vignette study of 414 undergraduates, encounters with ambiguous consent were seen as more consensual, acceptable, and clear as the couple’s prior intimacy increased, and men rated every version as more consensual than women did (Humphreys, 2007). A 30-day diary study of 84 adults found that participants reported fewer consent cues as their sexual history with a partner grew, up to about 575 prior sexual behaviors, and more after that point; the authors stressed that consent cannot be assumed from earlier encounters (Willis & Jozkowski, 2019). In a factorial vignette study of 145 college men, participants conflated desire with consent, perceived more consent after prior intercourse and as intimacy escalated, and perceived more desire and consent across scenarios when they held stronger rape-supportive attitudes (Lofgreen et al., 2021).
Article 120 provides that a current or previous dating, social, or sexual relationship “by itself” does not constitute consent (10 U.S.C. § 920(g)(7)(A)). A prior relationship remains one of “all the surrounding circumstances” (§ 920(g)(7)(C)) and may bear on what an accused could reasonably have believed (United States v. DiPaola, 2008, discussed below), but it does not settle consent.
Token Resistance: What the Surveys and Narratives Show
“Token resistance” means refusing sex while intending to engage in it. Several earlier surveys found that more than a third of college women sampled reported having done so. When 65 women and 64 men were asked to write narratives of experiences meeting that definition, both sexes reported token resistance, but most narratives did not meet the definition; the authors concluded that the earlier prevalence data were in doubt and that the overwhelming majority of people who say no to sex mean it (Muehlenhard & Rodgers, 1998).
Belief in token resistance is distinct from its occurrence and predicts how men interpret refusals. Among 131 male undergraduates, men with weaker token-resistance beliefs saw a scenario as rape more strongly when the woman said no than when she said yes, while men with stronger beliefs perceived rape only weakly in either case (Osman, 2003). Among 370 college men, token-resistance beliefs and rape myth acceptance (the study’s term) were negatively associated with some consent-related attitudes and intentions, while assertive sexual communication was positively associated with all of them (Shafer et al., 2018). These are questionnaire associations, not observations of behavior.
Misperception of Sexual Interest
That men, on average, perceive more sexual interest in women’s behavior than women report intending traces to a laboratory study of mixed-sex conversations in which men read a woman’s friendly behavior as more sexual than women did (Abbey, 1982) and has been replicated in many studies (Lindgren et al., 2008), although newer work indicates that the difference largely reflects individual factors. A major review found the effect consistent but suggested it may be driven largely by a subgroup, such as sexually coercive men and men endorsing sex-role stereotypes, and found that alcohol use by either party, clothing, and dating behaviors raise estimates of interest (Farris et al., 2008b).
Newer work has changed how the effect is understood. Signal-detection modeling found no evidence that men use a more lenient threshold; the difference reflected lower perceptual sensitivity, and men misread sexual interest as friendliness as well as friendliness as sexual interest (Farris et al., 2008a). In the largest study, 1,226 speed-dating participants, men overperceived and women underperceived, but the sex difference became negligible once sociosexual orientation and raters’ projection of their own interest were taken into account (Lee et al., 2020). Misperception is therefore better described as varying across individuals than as a uniform feature of men.
Among 356 male students, hostile masculinity, interest in impersonal sex, and drinking in dating situations predicted how often men reported misperceiving women’s intentions, and more risk factors meant more misperception (Jacques-Tiura et al., 2007). Among 496 students judging photographed women, men and women gave similar average ratings, but women relied more than men on the women’s affect and men more on their attractiveness; students of both sexes who endorsed more rape-supportive attitudes relied less on affect and more on clothing and attractiveness, though explicit instruction improved attention to affect for higher- and lower-risk participants alike (Treat et al., 2017). Misreading sexual interest is thus common and runs both ways, and frequent misreading is associated with traits that also predict coercion; neither finding says which description fits a particular accused.
Alcohol and the Perception of Consent and Refusal Cues
Laboratory studies show that alcohol shifts perception toward sexual interest and slows recognition of refusal. In a balanced-placebo study of 88 unacquainted mixed-sex pairs, men perceived their partner and themselves as behaving more sexually than women did, both partners were perceived as behaving more sexually when alcohol was consumed, and intoxicated participants exaggerated strong cues and ignored ambiguous ones; the effects followed alcohol itself, not the belief that one had been drinking (Abbey et al., 2000). Among 180 students reading a story that ended with the woman saying “no” and the man applying verbal pressure, intoxicated participants saw the woman as more aroused and the man as behaving more appropriately, and participant gender did not significantly affect judgments of how likely the man was to force sex (Abbey et al., 2003). Men who drank, or only expected alcohol, took significantly longer to signal that the man in an audiotaped date-rape scenario should stop, and men who drank rated the woman as more aroused at her first two refusals (Gross et al., 2001). A moderate dose reduced men’s sensitivity to the difference between friendliness and sexual interest and increased their tendency to read ambiguous cues as sexual interest (Farris et al., 2010).
In a 30-day diary study of 86 young adults, those who binge drank relied less on active consent communication and more on context (Marcantonio et al., 2022). In 30 interviews about consensual alcohol-involved sex, college students described inferring consent from a sequence of cues, from being and socializing in drinking settings and leaving together, to communication just before sex, to reflection once sober afterward (Jozkowski & Marcantonio, 2025). A diary study of 121 female college drinkers found that on days with higher estimated blood alcohol, women reported less willingness for sex and less use of passive ways of expressing consent, but intoxication did not weaken the link between their willingness and how they expressed consent (Shaw et al., 2026). Both studies rely on self-report about consensual encounters and do not measure how partners read the cues.
Observers vary too. Young adults randomly assigned to drink or not were interviewed about a vignette in which an intoxicated character declines a sexual advance and the other persists; most eventually called it nonconsensual, but about 9% called it entirely consensual, 42% called it initially consensual and then nonconsensual, and participants recognized the risk at different points; these judgments did not differ significantly by beverage condition or participant gender, although women described more consent and refusal indicators than men (Jozkowski et al., 2024). Judgments also shift with hindsight: among 962 participants, momentary and retrospective views of when fictional characters became willing showed a hindsight bias for kissing (“making out”), with participants later placing willingness earlier than they had judged it at the time, but not for oral, vaginal, or anal sex (Willis & Jozkowski, 2022).
Observers also weigh whether partners drank similar amounts: across four vignette studies (N = 535), encounters in which one partner had 15 shots and the other one shot were rated less consensual, more coercive, and more likely to be assault than matched encounters, in same- and mixed-gender scenarios, and the vignette’s central character was rated less responsible for the outcome when drinking was unmatched (Laughlin et al., 2023). In written verdict explanations from 250 Australian jury-eligible adults who read an alcohol-related acquaintance rape transcript, intoxication often mitigated the defendant’s responsibility while undermining the complainant’s credibility, and directions that there is no typical response to rape were rarely reflected in the explanations (Wieberneit et al., 2026). Both used written materials, and the jury study is qualitative and reports individual explanations, not deliberation.
Limits of the Evidence
Nearly all of this research uses heterosexual undergraduates in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, or New Zealand; military samples are essentially absent, and same-sex encounters and male complainants are barely studied (see the paper on male complainants and sexual assault in military settings). Several key studies sampled only men (Gross et al., 2001; Jacques-Tiura et al., 2007; Farris et al., 2010; Lofgreen et al., 2021) or only women (Peterson & Muehlenhard, 2007; Shaw et al., 2026), and the misperception research mostly concerns how women’s cues are read; far fewer studies examine how men’s interest or refusals are read (Lee et al., 2020, is an exception for interest). Most studies use vignettes, photographs, audiotapes, or brief meetings rather than consent to a specific act with a real partner, and diary studies capture mostly consensual sex between established partners. Laboratory alcohol doses may be lower than those in many contested cases. “Misperception” is usually measured against the target’s self-report of her own interest, itself an uncertain criterion (Farris et al., 2008b), and retrospective accounts by complainants and accused persons alike are subject to the hindsight effects the vignette studies document.
Most fundamentally, group research cannot tell a court what a particular accused perceived, whether a claimed misperception was genuine or constructed afterward, or whether an encounter was consensual. That men on average overperceive interest does not show that this accused did; that frequent misperceivers share traits associated with coercion does not show that this accused has them; that young men recognize indirect refusals well does not show that this accused recognized this complainant’s refusal.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When a witness cites the finding that men overperceive sexual interest, ask how strong the evidence is and whether it applies to this person: the sex difference became negligible after accounting for sociosexual orientation and projection (Lee et al., 2020), and errors ran in both directions (Farris et al., 2008a). When Muehlenhard and Rodgers (1998) or Osman (2003) is cited, ask what exactly was counted: whether reported token resistance met its definition, and beliefs about scenarios, not behavior in real encounters. When alcohol studies are cited, ask what participants did: they rated vignettes, audiotapes, or brief conversations after moderate laboratory doses. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Consent, Mistake of Fact, and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
The paper on alcohol, blackouts, and memory reviews Article 120’s definition of consent (10 U.S.C. § 920(g)(7)), its without-consent, asleep, and incapacity theories, and United States v. Mendoza (2024). The elements of sexual assault without consent are a sexual act and lack of consent; unlike the asleep and incapacity theories, which require that the accused knew or reasonably should have known of the condition, no element requires knowledge of nonconsent (Manual for Courts-Martial [MCM], 2024, pt. IV, ¶ 60.b).
Under Rule for Courts-Martial 916(j)(1), a mistake going to an element requiring specific intent, willfulness, or knowledge of a particular fact need only be honest; a mistake going to an element requiring only general intent or knowledge must be honest and reasonable under all the circumstances. In United States v. McDonald (2019), the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held that sexual assault on a nonconsent theory carries a general-intent mens rea with no mens rea as to consent, described “an honest and reasonable (nonnegligent) mistake of fact as to consent” as an affirmative defense, and stated that the burden is on the actor to obtain consent rather than on the victim to manifest its absence. Once the defense is raised, the prosecution must disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt (R.C.M. 916(b)(1)), and it may be raised without the accused testifying (United States v. Paige, 2009). An instruction is required when the record contains some evidence of an honest and reasonable mistake to which the members could attach credit (United States v. Hibbard, 2003). Both components need support: in United States v. Davis (2017), no instruction was required because, given the physical force used, there was “not an iota of evidence” that the belief was reasonable, whereas in DiPaola the omission was prejudicial error because consent to some of the charged acts and a prior consensual relationship created a mixed message.
Reasonableness is judged from a sober person’s standpoint. Voluntary intoxication may raise reasonable doubt only about actual knowledge, specific intent, willfulness, or premeditation (R.C.M. 916(l)(2)), and consent is none of these. The Military Judges’ Benchbook instruction on voluntary intoxication and mistake of fact, also quoted by the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals, defines a reasonable belief as one that “an ordinary, prudent, sober adult would have under the circumstances” (Department of the Army, 2025, Instruction 3A-60-2, Note 10; United States v. Hunt, A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2025); similar language was codified for offenses committed between 2007 and 2012 but is not in the current statute (MCM, 2024, app. 21).
Hunt involved consent said to have been withdrawn after penetration began. The Air Force court stated that consent can be withdrawn at any time, found a “real possibility” that the appellant used due care but was unaware of the withdrawal, held the conviction factually insufficient, and dismissed the charge with prejudice; that opinion is unpublished and not precedent. On certification, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces affirmed, holding that a Court of Criminal Appeals reviewing a challenged finding for factual sufficiency may consider the whole record, including a mistake-of-fact theory the appellant had not specifically raised (United States v. Hunt, C.A.A.F. 2026). It did not modify the honest-and-reasonable standard. In United States v. Keago (2024), a challenge for cause to a member who doubted that mistake of fact was a viable defense to sexual assault presented a close question requiring excusal under the liberal grant mandate (see “Court-Martial Panel Selection: Article 25, Random Selection, and Challenges” in the Jurors and Jury Decision-Making resource on this site). Research on how laypeople apply a reasonable-belief standard points the other way as well: in a qualitative study of 50 potential jurors in New Zealand, participants tended to treat consent as something implied and nonconsent as something that must be explicit, which the authors read as favoring a defendant’s sense of implied consent over a complainant’s attempt to refuse (Gillies-Goldsmith et al., 2026). New Zealand’s standard differs from R.C.M. 916(j), and the study did not measure verdicts.
As published in the 2024 Manual, Military Rule of Evidence 704 states only that an opinion is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue; it has no counterpart to Federal Rule 704(b). The limits on expert testimony about an accused’s state of mind come instead from Military Rules 702 and 403 and the case law barring opinions on credibility or guilt (United States v. Brooks, 2007; United States v. Mullins, 2010). Executive Order 14130 (December 20, 2024) did not amend R.C.M. 916, the Part IV provisions on Article 120, or Military Rules of Evidence 403, 702, or 704. The Joint Service Committee’s table of Military Rules of Evidence amendments (2025) lists no executive-order amendment to Rules 403, 702, or 704; later changes to R.C.M. 916 or Part IV, if any, were not checked (as of Nov. 2026).
In federal civilian courts, 18 U.S.C. § 2242 reaches whoever “knowingly” engages in a sexual act with a person incapable of appraising the conduct or of declining or communicating unwillingness (§ 2242(2)) or, under a paragraph added in 2022, without the other person’s consent (§ 2242(3)); § 2244(b) reaches knowing sexual contact without permission. The circuits differ on how far “knowingly” reaches. The Eighth Circuit held that it applies to the victim’s incapacity or inability to communicate unwillingness under § 2242(2), so the government must prove the defendant knew of it (United States v. Bruguier, 2013). The Ninth Circuit held that under § 2244(b) the government must prove knowing sexual contact that was in fact without permission, but not that the defendant knew it was without permission (United States v. Price, 2020, amending a 2019 opinion). No appellate decision on the knowledge element of § 2242(3) was located. Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) bars an expert from opining whether the defendant had a mental state that is an element of the crime or a defense; in Diaz v. United States (2024), the Supreme Court held that the rule reaches only opinions about the defendant himself, so testimony about what most people in a group know or believe is not barred by Rule 704(b), though Rules 702 and 403 still apply.
Arizona
Arizona defines sexual assault as intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact with any person without that person’s consent (A.R.S. § 13-1406(A)). “Without consent” includes, among other circumstances, incapacity from drugs, alcohol, sleep, or similar impairment that is known or should reasonably have been known to the defendant (A.R.S. § 13-1401(A)(7)). In State v. Witwer (1993), a sexual abuse case, the Court of Appeals held that the culpable mental state applies to every element, so the State must prove that the defendant knew the contact was without consent; it also read the statutory list of without-consent circumstances as nonexclusive. In State v. Kemper (2011), an instruction that tracked the recommended instruction then in use was erroneous because it omitted the mens rea for “without consent.” The current Revised Arizona Jury Instructions list knowledge that the act was without consent as a separate element of sexual assault (RAJI (Criminal) 14.06.01) and of sexual abuse of a victim 15 or older (14.04.01).
Arizona does not treat mistake of fact as a freestanding defense with its own reasonableness requirement; a mistaken belief relieves liability when it negates the required culpable mental state (A.R.S. § 13-204(A); RAJI (Criminal) 2.04.01(A)). Because the State must prove knowledge of nonconsent beyond a reasonable doubt, an honest belief in consent negates that element under the general without-consent theory. Two qualifications apply. Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a required mental state (A.R.S. § 13-503), and the standard definition of “knowingly” includes an optional sentence telling jurors that unawareness solely because of voluntary intoxication is no defense (RAJI (Criminal) 1.0510(b)). Where the State proceeds on incapacity, the statute asks whether the condition was known or should reasonably have been known (§ 13-1401(A)(7)(b)); no Arizona appellate decision was located that squarely addresses how an honest mistake interacts with that standard when both theories are tried. Witwer adds a practical point: failing to give a mistake-of-fact instruction was not fundamental error because the defendant’s only theory was that the complainant had in fact consented, not that he mistakenly believed she had.
General educational expert testimony, without application to the parties, is permitted if it satisfies Arizona Rules of Evidence 702 and 403 (State v. Salazar-Mercado, 2014, a child-complainant case). Arizona does not permit expert evidence of diminished capacity to negate mens rea (State v. Mott, 1997), a rule upheld in Clark v. Arizona (2006); testimony that a particular defendant could not perceive refusal because of a mental condition would face that bar.
What Experts May Say About an Accused’s Perception
An expert may describe group research on consent and refusal cues, relationship history, and alcohol, with its samples and methods, but may not tell a federal jury that the accused did or did not believe there was consent. In courts-martial, reasonableness under R.C.M. 916(j) is an objective question for the members, and an expert opinion that a particular belief was or was not reasonable would answer it for them; testimony that intoxicated men commonly misread cues does not show what an ordinary, prudent, sober adult would have believed. The same limits bind the prosecution: testimony that an accused’s attitudes, such as token-resistance beliefs or hostile masculinity, show that he was not mistaken would be profile or propensity evidence (see the paper on vouching, profile evidence, and the human lie detector rule).
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party may need to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports several points prosecutors can legitimately use. Indirect refusal is the ordinary form of refusal (Kitzinger & Frith, 1999), and young men in qualitative studies recognized refusals that did not include “no” (O’Byrne et al., 2006; Beres, 2010). Alcohol slows recognition of refusal (Gross et al., 2001; Abbey et al., 2003), and the accused’s intoxication cannot make a belief reasonable in a court-martial (R.C.M. 916(l)(2)) or excuse unawareness in Arizona (A.R.S. § 13-503). The law places the burden on the actor to obtain consent (McDonald) and requires evidence of both honesty and reasonableness before a military instruction is given (Davis). Prosecutors can keep testimony at the level of group findings and to object when a defense expert suggests that general research shows what this accused perceived.
The research also counsels caution. Findings linking frequent misperception to hostile masculinity, rape-supportive attitudes, and coercion (Jacques-Tiura et al., 2007; Treat et al., 2017; Lofgreen et al., 2021) can legitimately test a framing of misperception as uniformly innocent, but offered as evidence that this accused has such traits they become profile evidence and invite reversal. Misperception runs in both directions (Farris et al., 2008a), and observers disagree about the same scenario (Jozkowski et al., 2024), so an expert asked whether a reasonable person could misread indirect cues should be expected to say yes in some circumstances. DiPaola shows that evidence of partial consent or a prior relationship may require a mistake instruction, and Kemper shows that Arizona instructions and argument must treat knowledge of nonconsent as an element.
Special Issues for Defense
The research supports several legitimate points. Consent is often communicated nonverbally and indirectly, men report relying on nonverbal cues more than women, and explicit communication declines in established relationships (Jozkowski et al., 2014; Humphreys, 2007; Willis & Jozkowski, 2019). Misperception reflects reduced sensitivity rather than a lenient threshold, and its size varies across individuals (Farris et al., 2008a; Lee et al., 2020). These findings bear on whether a belief could be reasonable under all the circumstances and support voir dire about members or jurors who reject mistake of fact as a defense (Keago). In Arizona, the defense can ensure that a mistaken belief in consent is presented as a distinct theory when the evidence supports it (Witwer) and that the jury is instructed on knowledge of nonconsent as an element (Kemper; RAJI (Criminal) 14.06.01).
The research also counsels caution. In courts-martial an honest belief is not enough, and research on intoxicated misperception may support honesty while undercutting reasonableness under the sober-adult standard. An expert cannot properly vouch for the accused’s belief, and in Arizona capacity-based testimony is barred (Mott). Citing token-resistance survey figures invites the narrative rebuttal (Muehlenhard & Rodgers, 1998), and general misperception findings open the door to evidence linking frequent misperception with coercive attitudes. The non-specificity point applies evenly: that misperception occurs does not show it occurred here, just as the finding that young men in focus groups recognized indirect refusals does not show this accused recognized one. Challenges grounded in what the record shows the accused could actually observe present the most defensible use of the science.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
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Legal Authorities
Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006).
Diaz v. United States, 602 U.S. 526 (2024).
State v. Kemper, 229 Ariz. 105, 271 P.3d 484 (App. 2011).
State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 931 P.2d 1046 (1997).
State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).
State v. Witwer, 175 Ariz. 305, 856 P.2d 1183 (App. 1993).
United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
United States v. Bruguier, 735 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2013).
United States v. Davis, 76 M.J. 224 (C.A.A.F. 2017).
United States v. DiPaola, 67 M.J. 98 (C.A.A.F. 2008).
United States v. Hibbard, 58 M.J. 71 (C.A.A.F. 2003).
United States v. Hunt, No. ACM 40563 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. May 16, 2025) (unpublished), aff’d, No. 25-0257/AF, ___ M.J. ___ (C.A.A.F. Aug. 6, 2026).
United States v. Keago, 84 M.J. 367 (C.A.A.F. 2024).
United States v. McDonald, 78 M.J. 376 (C.A.A.F. 2019).
United States v. Mendoza, 85 M.J. 213 (C.A.A.F. 2024).
United States v. Mullins, 69 M.J. 113 (C.A.A.F. 2010).
United States v. Paige, 67 M.J. 442 (C.A.A.F. 2009).
United States v. Price, 980 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2020) (amended opinion superseding 921 F.3d 777 (9th Cir. 2019)), reh’g en banc denied.
10 U.S.C. § 920 (Article 120, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
18 U.S.C. §§ 2242, 2244.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-204, 13-503, 13-1401, 13-1406.
Fed. R. Evid. 403, 702, 704.
Ariz. R. Evid. 403, 702.
Mil. R. Evid. 403, 702, 704.
Rule for Courts-Martial 916(b), (j), (l).
Revised Arizona Jury Instructions (Criminal) (6th ed. 2022), 1.0510(b), 2.04.01(A), 14.04.01, 14.06.01.
Exec. Order No. 14130, 2024 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 89 Fed. Reg. 105343 (Dec. 27, 2024).
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