Snap Shot
- The question: When court-martial members have received years of mandatory sexual assault prevention training, how does that training bear on voir dire, evidence, argument, instructions, and deliberations in a sexual assault trial?
- What the research shows: Meta-analyses of civilian prevention programs find small to moderate improvements in measured attitudes that fade over time and depend on program length and audience; programs aimed at men improved attitudes by about a quarter of a standard deviation. Military studies show uneven exposure by branch, rank, and gender, and a standard Army briefing produced only a very small decline in scale scores.
- What it does not show: I located no study that has measured court-martial members’ beliefs or votes, linked training to verdicts, or tested whether training makes members’ judgments more accurate, less accurate, or simply different. The claim that training predisposes panels toward conviction is a hypothesis that the principal published commentary advancing it acknowledges has not been tested.
- The law: Training is not evidence and may not be argued as such (Bodoh); testimony about consent training was assumed to be error (Washington). A member’s training-derived misstatement of the law on intoxication and consent required excusal (Rogers), and inaccurate voir dire answers about involvement in the sexual assault response system required a mistrial (Commisso). An instruction telling members to disregard intoxication altogether misstated the law (Casillas). Passing references to sexual assault policy in deliberations were not “some evidence” of unlawful command influence (Rosario-Martinez, N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2024).
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors should keep training out of evidence and argument and seek curative instructions when a member misstates the law; defense counsel should ask specific questions about what members were taught and about response-system roles, and ground challenges in each member’s answers rather than in the fact of training.
Every service member receives recurring instruction on sexual assault prevention and response, through the Department of Defense Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) program and service programs such as the Army’s Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) program. The officers and senior enlisted members who sit on court-martial panels have typically received this training many times, and some have served as victim advocates, prevention trainers, or members of the boards that review sexual assault cases. Civilian jurors rarely bring such institutional instruction to trial.
Sexual assault is common in the military and substantially underreported, and prevention training exists because the problem is real. Responses to assault vary widely, and behaviors such as delay, freezing, and continued contact occur in many true cases; some training addresses those topics, much as counterintuitive behavior testimony (expert testimony explaining why behaviors jurors may not expect are common among people who have been assaulted) does in court. The legal difficulty is not whether training is valuable but what happens when it enters the courtroom. Training reaches trial in four ways: through voir dire and challenges for cause, through evidence and argument that invoke it, through requested instructions, and through claims that training or command climate shaped deliberations. The case law on each route cuts in both directions.
This paper reviews what is known about prevention training’s effects on attitudes and knowledge, the military studies, and the untested link between training and verdicts, and then the law. Panel selection under Article 25, randomization, panel size, the liberal grant mandate, and court stacking are covered in Court-Martial Panel Selection: Article 25, Random Selection, and Challenges, and the three-fourths voting rule in Deliberation, Unanimity, and Court-Martial Verdicts, both in the Jurors and Jury Decision-Making resource on this site, and are summarized here only where they bear on training. General research on juror and member beliefs is reviewed in Juror Beliefs About Sexual Assault: What the Research Shows, and directions, expert evidence, and screening in Correcting Juror Misconceptions.
What Prevention Training Is and Who Receives It
Department of Defense policy requires sexual assault education and training at initial entry and accession, annually, before and after deployment, and at points tied to position or rank, such as before command; the content of that general-population training is set in a separate volume of the governing instruction (Department of Defense Instruction 6495.02, Vol. 1, Encl. 10, as changed March 18, 2025). Response personnel receive additional specialized training. What a particular member was taught depends on service, era, position, and instructor; policy describes requirements, not what was said in a given briefing.
Exposure is not uniform. An analysis of more than 24,000 active-duty respondents to the 2010 Department of Defense Workplace and Gender Relations Survey classified training exposure as none, minimal, partial, or comprehensive (Holland et al., 2014). Comprehensive training predicted more accurate knowledge of sexual assault resources and protocols and lower reported incidence, but the likelihood of receiving comprehensive training, and members’ judgments of its effectiveness, differed by branch, rank, gender, and sexual assault history. The study was cross-sectional, relied on self-report, and used 2010 data, but it undercuts the premise that all members share the same training or absorbed it the same way.
What Prevention Programs Change
Most outcome research comes from college campuses. A meta-analysis of 69 studies involving 102 interventions and 18,172 participants found significant average effects on rape-supportive attitudes, related attitudes, knowledge, behavioral intent, and incidence of sexual assault, but not on empathy or awareness behaviors; longer interventions changed attitudes more than brief ones (Anderson & Whiston, 2005). A later meta-analysis of programs aimed at men found improvement in attitudes about sexual assault (d = −0.24 across 25 studies), in inclinations toward sexually aggressive behavior (d = −0.20), and in inclinations toward prevention behavior (d = 0.27), with nonsignificant effects on several other outcomes, including perpetration (Wright et al., 2020). By conventional benchmarks these are small effects.
Effects also fade. A meta-analysis of 24 studies of campus bystander programs found more favorable attitudes and more bystander behavior among participants, with effects that diminished over time but remained meaningful for at least three months; longer programs again had larger effects on attitudes (Jouriles et al., 2018). Effects also depend on who receives the program. In a randomized trial with 146 college men, an intervention improved scores on rape myth acceptance, the measure researchers use for these beliefs, and on victim empathy at five weeks, but men classified as high risk for sexual coercion were generally unaffected (Stephens & George, 2009). A systematic review of 20 randomized studies in institutional settings, undertaken to inform juror education, concluded that such interventions can reduce rape myth acceptance in the short term; effective approaches included information about these beliefs, empathy components, and bystander programs, and short programs, most often delivered by video, could work (Hudspith et al., 2023). The review measured attitudes, not decisions.
Changes in attitude scores are not the same as changes in behavior. A Centers for Disease Control and Prevention review of 140 outcome evaluations found that most prevention programs were brief psychoeducational sessions aimed at knowledge or attitudes and that none of those had shown effects on sexually violent behavior in a rigorous evaluation (DeGue et al., 2014). Attitude scales are also only a proxy for how a person will evaluate evidence in a specific case; a program that moves scale scores has not been shown to change factfinding in either direction.
Military Studies
The military studies are few. In a pretest-posttest study of 481 enlisted soldiers in Germany, 237 received a one-hour workshop for men and 244 received a standard briefing that covered risk reduction, information about myths and facts concerning sexual assault, and how to avoid being accused of sexual assault (Foubert & Masin, 2012). The workshop produced low to medium changes on several measures, including rape myth acceptance; the standard briefing produced no change except a decline in rape myth acceptance with a very low effect size. The study measured only enlisted men immediately after training, and its comparison briefing, which paired discussion of misconceptions with advice on avoiding accusation, shows that training content has not been uniform. At the U.S. Air Force Academy, a sexual assault resistance program for female cadets (Enhanced Access, Acknowledge, Act) reduced overall scores on the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance Scale, with changes on specific beliefs (Garcia et al., 2024). The abstract does not state the sample size, the program is a resistance program for women rather than general prevention training, and cadets are not panel members. The finding that service academy and civilian men endorsed these beliefs more than women (Carroll et al., 2016) is summarized in Juror Beliefs About Sexual Assault.
Two more recent studies address how training is received. In a survey of 282 active-duty male soldiers aged 18 to 24 at one installation, positive attitudes toward bystander intervention were associated with lower rape myth acceptance, and perceived peer approval was among the strongest predictors (Orchowski et al., 2022). In interviews with 17 male current and former service members from four branches, leadership emerged as the most influential factor in whether training was taken seriously; leaders’ engagement made training more meaningful, while leaders’ inaction reinforced skepticism (Ortiz Diaz et al., 2026). Neither study measured verdicts, and the second was small and exploratory, but both suggest that the same training can be received very differently.
Practitioners hold their own beliefs about training. In interviews, some military lawyers attributed reports they viewed as illegitimate partly to an institution that, in their view, teaches young women victimization (Tosto & Bonnes, 2026), while military prosecutors described invoking military discourse to counter victim stereotypes they expected panels to hold (Bonnes & Tosto, 2023). These studies document beliefs running in opposite directions; they do not measure what training does to members.
From Attitudes to Verdicts: An Untested Link
Two opposite hypotheses about trained members circulate in practice. One holds that training corrects misconceptions, so that trained members are less likely to discount a complainant because of delay, demeanor, or continued contact. The other holds that training predisposes members toward belief in complainants or teaches simplified legal rules, such as that any alcohol use negates consent, that members may apply in place of the law. A narrative commentary advanced the second hypothesis, relying on research on stereotypes, decision-making, and conditioning and on criticism, including material before the congressionally established Judicial Proceedings Panel, that such training biases members (Umbrasas, 2020). The author recommended expert testimony on how institutional training can influence judgment, but stated in the article’s limitations section that no empirical testing of the explanations had occurred within a military context and that the nature of the suggested bias had not been empirically examined.
Neither hypothesis has been tested. I located no published study (as of Nov. 2026) that has measured court-martial members’ beliefs, compared trained and untrained factfinders deciding the same case, or linked training dose to verdicts. The general research connecting attitude scores to mock-juror verdicts, and its limits, is reviewed in Juror Beliefs About Sexual Assault; Correcting Juror Misconceptions reviews studies in which educational material given to mock jurors changed some judgments but not others. The nearest tested analogue to information absorbed before trial is pretrial publicity; a meta-analysis of mock-juror studies found that publicity unfavorable to the defendant modestly increased guilty verdicts (r = .16 for individual jurors and r = .35 for deliberating juries; Hoetger et al., 2022); that research is reviewed in Pretrial Publicity, Social Media, and Juror Misconduct in the Jurors and Jury Decision-Making resource. Publicity concerns a specific defendant; training is generic, so the analogy is loose.
The more defensible concern is specific rather than general. In reported cases, a member’s understanding of a legal standard has at times been traced to training (Rogers; Casillas), which suggests that training can convey a simplified version of a legal standard. A member who has absorbed a statement that a person too drunk to remember cannot consent, or that consent must be verbal, holds a belief about the law that may differ from the elements the military judge will instruct on. That concern involves an identifiable belief in an identifiable member, which voir dire can detect and an instruction can address; it is the concern the case law addresses most directly.
Limits of the Evidence
The outcome literature on prevention programs comes mostly from college students, uses short follow-up, and measures attitudes and intentions rather than behavior. The military studies are few, use enlisted or academy samples rather than the officers and senior enlisted members who typically sit on panels, and in the largest study rely on data from 2010. None measures court-martial members, deliberations, or verdicts, which are closed to researchers by Military Rule of Evidence 509 and the limits of Rule 606(b). The commentary arguing that training biases members offers hypotheses, not data. Nothing in this research can show that a particular member was or was not influenced by training, or that a particular verdict was affected.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When the Wright et al. (2020) meta-analysis is cited to show that prevention programs change beliefs, ask how large the effect is in absolute terms: about a quarter of a standard deviation on attitude measures, with nonsignificant effects on perpetration and other outcomes. When Foubert and Masin (2012) is cited to show that soldiers’ beliefs are resistant or malleable, ask who was studied: 481 enlisted men in Germany measured immediately after a single session, not officers or senior enlisted members years after repeated training. When Umbrasas (2020) is cited to show that trained members are biased, ask how much evidence the conclusion rests on: the article is a commentary whose author acknowledges that its explanations were untested in a military context. The same question applies when the absence of data is offered to show that training has no effect, since an untested hypothesis has not been disproved either. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Prevention Training and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
Voir dire and challenges for cause. A member must be excused for cause when he or she has formed or expressed a definite opinion as to guilt or innocence, or should not sit in the interest of having the court-martial free from substantial doubt as to legality, fairness, and impartiality (R.C.M. 912(f)(1)(M), (N)). The second ground includes actual and implied bias, and a liberal grant mandate applies to defense challenges; those doctrines are reviewed in Court-Martial Panel Selection. In United States v. Rogers (2016), a member said during voir dire that a person too drunk to remember giving consent is too drunk to give it, and attributed that understanding to what the Coast Guard taught in its sexual assault class (United States v. Rogers, C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2015, unpublished). The Court of Appeals held that denying the defense’s implied-bias challenge was an abuse of discretion, because the member’s misunderstanding of the law on intoxication and consent, and her inferred shift of the burden of proof, would cause an objective observer substantial doubt about the fairness of the panel; the military judge gave no curative instruction, and when the member asked what “competent” meant, the response effectively endorsed her understanding.
In United States v. Keago (2024), the court found implied bias as to two members in a sexual assault case: one who had written that a flimsy or easily disproved accusation would have been dropped by now and who appeared confused about the presumption of innocence and the right to remain silent, and one who said a person must give clear and unequivocal consent and could not imagine an honest but mistaken belief in consent. The first member had served as a Naval Academy sexual assault prevention mentor, but the majority focused on his statements about the presumption of innocence and treated other matters as contributing only to the totality of the circumstances; the case does not hold that a prevention role is disqualifying. Conversely, a personal or family connection to sexual assault is not disqualifying by itself. In United States v. Casillas (2025), the court upheld denial of challenges to a member whose wife had been raped three decades earlier, relying on the military judge’s detailed findings on the record. Such a connection can still support implied bias: in United States v. Terry (2007), the court held that a challenge should have been granted where a member’s girlfriend had been raped six years earlier. In United States v. Bodoh (2019), the court described voir dire questions designed to assess whether members’ SHARP training would improperly influence their deliberations as an appropriate line of inquiry, and noted that when four members agreed with a question about verbal consent, no one followed up.
Disclosure. Voir dire depends on accurate answers. The default written questionnaire under R.C.M. 912(a)(1) covers demographic and case-role items; additional questions, such as service as a victim advocate or on a case review board, require the military judge’s approval. In United States v. Commisso (2017), three members gave inaccurate voir dire statements about their association with the sexual assault response system and their exposure to the facts; the court held that denial of a mistrial was an abuse of discretion where honest answers to material questions would have given the defense a valid basis for a challenge for cause, and it emphasized the cumulative effect of three such members on one panel. By contrast, in United States v. Frank (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2017, unpublished), a victim advocate member had not mentioned informally counseling coworkers about alcohol-related sexual encounters, but the court denied relief because the record did not show that she answered any question dishonestly. The civilian counterpart is McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood (1984).
Evidence and argument. Training is not evidence. In Bodoh, trial counsel told members that “myths” about victims were taught in SHARP training and later told them they had the training. The court held both references improper because they rested on matters outside the evidence, but found no prejudicial error: an expert had testified to the same point about misconceptions, and the rebuttal reference was fleeting, drew no objection, and was followed by an instruction that argument is not evidence. In United States v. Washington (2020), a unit SHARP trainer testified that the lesson of consent training was that when a person says no, the other should stop and walk away. The court assumed without deciding that admitting the testimony was error and held any error harmless; it did not hold the testimony admissible. It also found no unlawful command influence on that record, stating that references to command policy are not a best practice but do not, without more, constitute unlawful command influence. One judge saw a grave risk of unlawful command influence in such evidence, though the objection at trial had not raised it; the dissent would have found prejudice, noting that trial counsel had argued the training bore on the reasonableness of the accused’s claimed mistake and that members were never told that training is not the legal standard for consent.
Instructions. An instruction addressing training must state the law accurately. In Casillas, the defense requested an instruction telling members that training may have told them intoxicated women cannot consent, that this misstated the law, and that they could not consider whether the complainant was too intoxicated to consent. The military judge refused it as inaccurate, and the Court of Appeals agreed: although the prosecution may not prove absence of consent merely by establishing that the complainant was too intoxicated to consent, evidence of intoxication remains admissible on the question of consent, and the proposed instruction would have barred members from considering it at all. Together, Rogers and Casillas indicate that a training-derived misstatement of the law calls for correction, and the correction must itself be accurate.
Deliberations and command influence. Article 37, UCMJ, bars attempts to coerce or, by any unauthorized means, influence members, and since amendments applicable to violations on or after December 20, 2019, a finding may not be held incorrect on that ground unless the violation materially prejudices the substantial rights of the accused (Art. 37(a)(3), (c)). Article 37(a)(4)(A) lists general courses in military justice designed solely to instruct on court-martial law and procedure among conduct that may fall outside the prohibition; prevention training is not that kind of course, and whether references to it amount to unlawful influence has been decided case by case. Military Rule of Evidence 606(b) bars member testimony about deliberations except under narrow exceptions, including whether outside influence was improperly brought to bear. In United States v. Rosario-Martinez (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2024, published), member declarations stated that members discussed a Marine Corps and SAPR policy of “having to believe her” and a policy that a person who has been drinking cannot consent. The court held that the declarations fell outside the Rule 606(b) exceptions and did not contain “some evidence” of unlawful command influence, describing the references as more innocuous than the evidence in Washington and distinguishing United States v. Schloff (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2018, unpublished), in which, as the Navy-Marine Corps court described it, a declaration stated that two members argued in deliberations that the Army could not afford to seem weak on sexual harassment and assault, and the Army court found unlawful command influence that the prosecution could not show was harmless. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces later affirmed the findings and sentence on June 2, 2026, on a different Rule 606(b) question, concerning a claimed mistake on the findings worksheet, holding that a senior member’s affidavit was not competent evidence.
Selection. The 2024 Manual for Courts-Martial already requires the military judge to randomly number members detailed by the convening authority (R.C.M. 503(a)(1)(C), 911(a)); randomized selection of the pool under Article 25(e)(4), for courts-martial convened on or after December 23, 2024, rests on Executive Order 14130, which postdates that Manual and is described in Court-Martial Panel Selection. Selection aimed at a panel’s composition is a different matter: in United States v. Riesbeck (2018), where four of the five women on a seven-member panel were victim advocates, the court held that the selection was improper gender-based court stacking and dismissed the charges with prejudice.
Arizona
Arizona jurors share no single mandatory training program, but many have received workplace, campus, or professional training on sexual harassment and assault, and the same questions arise: what the juror was taught, whether it conflicts with the court’s instructions, and whether the juror can set it aside. A.R.S. § 21-211(4) disqualifies persons biased or prejudiced in favor of or against either party, and Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 18.4(b) requires excusal when there is reasonable ground to believe a juror cannot render a fair and impartial verdict. In State v. Puga (2025), a published sexual assault decision, the Court of Appeals held that the party challenging a juror must prove inability to be fair and impartial by a preponderance of the evidence, reviewed denial of the challenges for abuse of discretion, and held that a juror need not be struck simply because she was the victim of a similar crime; a judge concurring in part and dissenting in part would have struck one juror, citing an equivocal first answer, leading rehabilitative questions, and an emotional reaction. No published Arizona decision on a juror’s prevention training or advocacy work was located. Because Arizona eliminated peremptory challenges in criminal cases effective January 1, 2022 (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-21-0020), voir dire under Rule 18.5 and challenges for cause are the only means of removing a juror whose training-based beliefs conflict with the law.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party may need to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research does not support a claim that training-exposed members are biased as a group: training effects on attitudes are small and fade, exposure varies, and the bias hypothesis is untested. In several decisions, courts have treated a member’s own answers as more significant than the fact of training, a prior prevention role, or a family member’s victimization (Keago, Casillas). A proponent can build a record that is consistent with the research and case law: point to admitted evidence, including properly admitted expert testimony, rather than to members’ training when addressing misconceptions (Bodoh); avoid offering training content as evidence of what the accused knew or of the legal standard without careful analysis of relevance and Military Rule of Evidence 403 (Washington); and ensure that response-system roles are disclosed, because inaccurate answers are judged objectively and can require a mistrial (Commisso).
The case law counsels caution on challenges for cause. A member who states a training-derived version of the law that differs from the elements, such as that a person who cannot remember could not have consented or that consent must be verbal, presents the problem Rogers reversed for, and leading rehabilitation that elicits only agreement to follow instructions may not cure it. Opposing a close defense challenge risks reversal under the liberal grant mandate; requesting an accurate curative instruction when a member misstates the law, and making a record of the member’s response, is more likely to survive review. Deliberation arguments about institutional image, unlike passing references to policy, were treated as unlawful influence in an unpublished Army decision as a later court described it (Schloff).
Special Issues for Defense
The research and case law support specific voir dire. Bodoh treats questions about whether training would influence deliberations as appropriate, and Rogers shows that what a member was taught about alcohol and consent can be decisive. Defense counsel can ask what members were taught about intoxication, consent, mistake of fact, and believing complainants; to ask expressly about service as a victim advocate, prevention trainer or mentor, or member of a case review board, through supplemental questionnaire items approved under R.C.M. 912(a)(1); to follow up when members agree with a statement of a rule, which Bodoh noted did not happen; and to ask the military judge to rule on implied bias separately and on the record. When a member misstates the law, a requested instruction must be accurate: Casillas shows that an instruction overstating the law, by telling members to disregard intoxication entirely, will be refused.
The research also counsels caution about the defense’s own claims. No study located shows that training biases members toward conviction, and none shows that it does not; the absence of data supports neither side’s assumption, so an argument or expert opinion that trained members as a class cannot be fair rests on the same kind of untested generalization the defense would challenge if offered by the prosecution, as would an assertion that trained members cannot be biased; such testimony would likely face fit and reliability objections under Military Rule of Evidence 702. A prevention role or a family member’s victimization is not disqualifying by itself (Keago, Casillas), though the circumstances can support implied bias (Terry), and a nondisclosure claim failed where the record showed no dishonest answer to a question actually asked (Frank). Deliberation-room claims are difficult to establish under Rule 606(b), and passing references to policy have not been treated as some evidence of unlawful influence (Rosario-Martinez). Challenges grounded in what a particular member said and whether the court corrected a misstatement are the most defensible.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Anderson, L. A., & Whiston, S. C. (2005). Sexual assault education programs: A meta-analytic examination of their effectiveness. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 29(4), 374–388. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-6402.2005.00237.x
Bonnes, S., & Tosto, S. A. (2023). Prosecuting military sexual assault: The entanglement of military discourse and victim stereotypes in prosecutor case strategies. Feminist Criminology, 18(5), 459–489. https://doi.org/10.1177/15570851231197913
Carroll, M. H., Rosenstein, J. E., Foubert, J. D., Clark, M. D., & Korenman, L. M. (2016). Rape myth acceptance: A comparison of military service academy and civilian fraternity and sorority students. Military Psychology, 28(5), 306–317. https://doi.org/10.1037/mil0000113
DeGue, S., Valle, L. A., Holt, M. K., Massetti, G. M., Matjasko, J. L., & Tharp, A. T. (2014). A systematic review of primary prevention strategies for sexual violence perpetration. Aggression and Violent Behavior, 19(4), 346–362. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.avb.2014.05.004
Department of Defense. (2025). Adult sexual assault prevention and response: Program procedures (DoD Instruction 6495.02, Vol. 1, incorporating Change 9, March 18, 2025).
Foubert, J. D., & Masin, R. C. (2012). Effects of the Men’s Program on U.S. Army soldiers’ intentions to commit and willingness to intervene to prevent rape: A pretest posttest study. Violence and Victims, 27(6), 911–921. https://doi.org/10.1891/0886-6708.27.6.911
Garcia, L. C., Ulbig, S., & Dickman, K. (2024). Sisters in arms: Lowering rape myth acceptance in a hypermasculine environment. Sex Roles, 90(6), 761–778. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11199-024-01479-w
Hoetger, L. A., Devine, D. J., Brank, E. M., Drew, R. M., & Rees, R. (2022). The impact of pretrial publicity on mock juror and jury verdicts: A meta-analysis. Law and Human Behavior, 46(2), 121–139. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000473
Holland, K. J., Rabelo, V. C., & Cortina, L. M. (2014). Sexual assault training in the military: Evaluating efforts to end the “invisible war.” American Journal of Community Psychology, 54(3–4), 289–303. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10464-014-9672-0
Hudspith, L. F., Wager, N., Willmott, D., & Gallagher, B. (2023). Forty years of rape myth acceptance interventions: A systematic review of what works in naturalistic institutional settings and how this can be applied to educational guidance for jurors. Trauma, Violence, & Abuse, 24(2), 981–1000. https://doi.org/10.1177/15248380211050575
Jouriles, E. N., Krauss, A., Vu, N. L., Banyard, V. L., & McDonald, R. (2018). Bystander programs addressing sexual violence on college campuses: A systematic review and meta-analysis of program outcomes and delivery methods. Journal of American College Health, 66(6), 457–466. https://doi.org/10.1080/07448481.2018.1431906
Orchowski, L. M., Berkowitz, A., Oesterle, D., Berry-Cabán, C., Borsari, B., Kahler, C. W., & Kazemi, D. M. (2022). Correlates of bystander intervention attitudes and intentions among young adult active duty male soldiers. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 37(23–24), NP23262–NP23280. https://doi.org/10.1177/08862605221080151
Ortiz Diaz, K., Gali, A., Solomon, D., Kenny, M. C., & Stephens, D. (2026). Male service members’ experiences of sexual assault prevention trainings in the U.S. military. Journal of Child Sexual Abuse. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1080/10538712.2026.2719687
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Legal Authorities
McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984).
State v. Puga, 564 P.3d 631 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2025) (No. 1 CA-CR 23-0162, Jan. 28, 2025) (published opinion).
United States v. Bodoh, 78 M.J. 231 (C.A.A.F. 2019).
United States v. Casillas, 86 M.J. 94 (C.A.A.F. 2025).
United States v. Commisso, 76 M.J. 315 (C.A.A.F. 2017).
United States v. Frank, No. ACM 38854 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Apr. 28, 2017) (unpublished).
United States v. Keago, 84 M.J. 367 (C.A.A.F. 2024).
United States v. Riesbeck, 77 M.J. 154 (C.A.A.F. 2018).
United States v. Rogers, No. 1391 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. July 8, 2015) (unpublished), rev’d, 75 M.J. 270 (C.A.A.F. 2016).
United States v. Rosario-Martinez, 85 M.J. 535 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2024) (No. 202300154, Dec. 18, 2024), aff’d, No. 25-0102/MC (C.A.A.F. June 2, 2026).
United States v. Schloff, No. ARMY 20150724, 2018 CCA LEXIS 350 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2018) (unpublished).
United States v. Terry, 64 M.J. 295 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
United States v. Washington, 80 M.J. 106 (C.A.A.F. 2020) (No. 19-0252/AR, May 29, 2020).
10 U.S.C. § 825 (Article 25, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
10 U.S.C. § 837 (Article 37, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21-211.
Exec. Order No. 14130, 89 Fed. Reg. 105343 (Dec. 27, 2024).
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.4(b), 18.5.
Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-21-0020 (2021).
Mil. R. Evid. 403.
Mil. R. Evid. 509.
Mil. R. Evid. 606(b).
Mil. R. Evid. 702.
R.C.M. 503(a)(1), 911(a), 912(a)(1), 912(f)(1)(M)–(N).
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