Snap Shot
- The question: Do a juror’s sex, age, race, education, or life experience predict how that juror will vote?
- What the research shows: In a major meta-analysis, most demographic characteristics showed weak or negligible average associations with guilt judgments, while case-relevant attitudes such as legal authoritarianism and trust in the legal system showed larger but still modest associations. In sexual offense cases, women were on average somewhat more likely to convict in many mock-jury studies; in child abuse cases the difference was largely explained by attitudes and empathy, in one recent adult rape study by beliefs about rape, and it did not reliably persist through deliberation. Evidence strength remains a powerful influence on judgments.
- What it does not show: These are group-level associations from mostly mock-jury and single-jurisdiction studies, and the distributions of groups overlap substantially. No study can establish how a particular juror will vote, and no peer-reviewed study was identified of court-martial members’ votes by rank or service history.
- The law: Peremptory challenges based on race or sex are barred (Batson, J.E.B., Foster, Flowers), including in courts-martial (Santiago-Davila, Moore, Witham). Members may not be selected by sex or race (Riesbeck, Jeter). Arizona, with no peremptories since 2022, removes jurors only for cause.
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors are likely to encounter attitude-focused voir dire questions and research that is limited to group-level associations; defense counsel are likely to encounter the same research in challenges for cause, which rest on what a prospective juror or member actually said, not on sex, race, or untested beliefs about how members of a given rank vote.
Lawyers have long wondered whether a juror’s sex, age, race, education, occupation, or life experience predicts how that juror will vote. Trial folklore is full of confident generalizations, and some jury-selection practice has rested on them. The empirical question is narrower and more answerable: across many cases and many jurors, are particular characteristics associated with a greater or lesser likelihood of voting guilty, and if so, by how much?
The question reaches court in several ways. It shapes how counsel frame voir dire questions, how judges evaluate challenges for cause, and how courts assess claims that a party used race or sex as a proxy for bias. In courts-martial it intersects with the statutory criteria of age, education, training, experience, length of service, and judicial temperament, which the convening authority applies in detailing the pool from which members, who serve the function of a jury in a court-martial, are now randomly drawn. And it bears on debates about whether jury pools that underrepresent particular groups produce different outcomes, a subject addressed in this hub’s companion paper on jury diversity.
This paper reviews the meta-analytic evidence on individual characteristics and guilt judgments; the research on juror gender, with particular attention to sexual assault and child sexual abuse cases; the evidence on age, education, prior jury service, prior victimization, and occupation; the evidence that case-relevant attitudes predict verdicts better than demographic characteristics; and what is and is not known about rank and service history among court-martial members. It then summarizes the limits of the evidence and the legal rules that govern the use of these characteristics in jury selection. Throughout, the findings described are group-level associations. None of them can tell a court or counsel how a particular person will decide a particular case, and the law forbids using several of these characteristics in selection regardless of what the research shows.
How the Question Is Studied
Most research on juror characteristics measures mock jurors’ characteristics and attitudes and then has them decide a simulated trial; a smaller body of field research links the composition of real jury pools or juries to outcomes. Mock-jury studies hold the evidence constant but lack real consequences; field studies use real decisions but cannot randomly assign cases to juries, so an association between a juror characteristic and a verdict may partly reflect differences in the cases.
Two further features of this literature matter. First, in studies that vary it, the strength of the evidence is a powerful influence on judgments (e.g., Bottoms et al., 2014). Second, the research shows real strengths in jury decision-making. In Kalven and Zeisel’s classic survey of judges who presided over jury trials, the judge would have reached the same verdict as the jury in roughly three-quarters of criminal cases (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966, as cited in Eisenberg et al., 2005), and a partial replication with a modern data set found essentially the same rate of judge-jury agreement, with disagreements concentrated in cases of middling evidentiary strength and, where they occurred, usually involving judges who would have convicted where the jury acquitted, a pattern the data were consistent with differences between judges and juries in the thresholds for conviction (Eisenberg et al., 2005). In the research reviewed here, juror characteristics were weak predictors of verdicts compared with the strength of the evidence, though they may matter more in close cases.
The Meta-Analytic Evidence
The most comprehensive synthesis is a meta-analysis of the association between individual juror characteristics and guilt judgments in criminal cases (Devine & Caughlin, 2014). The authors pooled results across a large number of studies for demographic characteristics, such as gender, race, age, and education, and for attitudinal and personality characteristics, such as authoritarianism and trust in the legal system. Most demographic characteristics showed weak or negligible average associations with guilt judgments. Authoritarianism and trust in the legal system, attitudes tied closely to the legal task, showed larger associations, though still modest in absolute terms. Legal authoritarianism is a scale label in the research literature for attitudes favoring the prosecution’s perspective and crime-control values over defendants’ rights; it is not a judgment about any juror. For race, the analysis looked at whether jurors judged defendants of their own race more leniently, and found small similarity-leniency effects for some pairings of juror and defendant race (about d = 0.22 for White jurors and Latino defendants and d = 0.26 for Black jurors and White defendants, as reported in Hunt, 2015). A different analysis, of mock-juror studies of defendant race, reported d of about 0.09 for verdicts (Mitchell et al., 2005, as reported in Hunt, 2015); these are different measures from different analyses, and neither applies to a particular juror. The overall message is that individual characteristics, taken one at a time, have limited value for predicting how a juror will vote.
An earlier meta-analysis focused on authoritarianism reported that jurors scoring higher on authoritarianism measures were more likely to view defendants as culpable, and that the association was stronger for measures of legal authoritarianism, which ask about attitudes toward the legal system specifically, than for measures of general authoritarian personality (Narby et al., 1993). The Pretrial Juror Attitude Questionnaire, which measures conviction proneness, system confidence, cynicism toward the defense, and related attitudes, predicted mock-juror judgments better than older measures of pretrial bias (Lecci & Myers, 2008), although validation with mock jurors does not establish accuracy with real venires. In a more recent study of 451 jury-eligible adults choosing a sentence in a hypothetical capital case, right-wing authoritarianism linked a general need for certainty (need for cognitive closure) to choosing death (West & Yelderman, 2024); the design was correlational and concerned sentencing, not guilt.
Juror Gender
Across criminal cases generally, juror gender is a weak predictor of verdicts, and its direction is not consistent (Devine & Caughlin, 2014). Sexual offense cases are the principal exception. A meta-analysis of studies of sexual assault and child sexual abuse cases reported that women were, on average, more likely than men to render guilty verdicts (Schutte & Hosch, 1997). A later meta-analysis of studies of perceptions of rape victims found that men, on average, perceived victims more negatively than women did, but that the size of the difference depended on features of the scenarios studied (Hockett et al., 2016). An early mock-jury study found that participants’ acceptance of misconceptions about rape accounted for the relation between participant gender and guilt judgments (Schuller & Wall, 1998), and a 2026 meta-analysis of 40 studies (12,283 participants) found that participant gender did not moderate the association between such attitudes and perceptions of sexual violence, although men hold the attitudes more on average (Trottier et al., 2026).
Research on child sexual abuse cases has examined why the gender difference appears. In three experiments involving several types of child sexual assault allegations, women were more empathic toward child victims and more inclined to believe children generally, and these attitudes and levels of empathy largely accounted for women’s more pro-victim judgments; the pattern held in a community sample as well as a student sample (Bottoms et al., 2014). The same experiments found that the strength of the evidence was a powerful influence on judgments, and that 14-year-old complainants were blamed more than 5-year-olds. The finding that attitudes mediate the gender effect has a practical implication: what predicts verdicts is not gender as such but the attitudes that are, on average, somewhat more common among one gender, and those attitudes vary widely within each gender.
Recent studies show how variable the gender effect is in adult sexual assault cases. In two English mock-trial studies using the same acquaintance-rape case, men were more likely than women to vote not guilty before deliberation in the study that drew 100 participants from the electoral register, but not in the larger convenience-sample study, and the difference did not persist after deliberation in either (Willmott et al., 2026). A third English study, in which 156 jury-eligible participants watched a video recreation of a genuine contested rape trial and deliberated in 13 twelve-person juries, found a similar pattern: men were more likely to vote not guilty before deliberation, gender was not among the reported predictors afterward, and women were among the jurors most likely to change their votes (Willmott & Woodhams, 2026). In an online study of 435 mock jurors who watched a recreated intimate partner rape trial without deliberating, women were more likely to vote guilty, but the difference disappeared once acceptance of misconceptions about rape was controlled (Lilley et al., 2026). A survey of 771 real jurors in England and Wales reported little to no difference by gender or age in responses to statements about sexual assault, although it reported no statistics for those comparisons and did not link responses to verdicts (Thomas, 2020). The extent of such misconceptions among real jurors is disputed; the Counterintuitive Testimony hub reviews that literature and the disagreement between Thomas (2020) and her critics. The point here is that juror gender is, at most, a small and inconsistent predictor even in the case types where it appears most often.
Most of this evidence concerns individual votes in mock juries, which do not translate directly into group verdicts: deliberation can attenuate individual tendencies, and a verdict depends on the combination of members rather than on any one characteristic.
Age, Education, and Prior Jury Service
Age has received more field research than most characteristics. A study of Florida felony jury trials found that prosecutors tended to use peremptory challenges to remove younger prospective jurors and defense counsel to remove older ones, and, exploiting random variation in the age composition of jury pools, that older jurors were significantly more likely to convict, after controlling for county, time, and judge (Anwar et al., 2014). In the working-paper version, which drew on 785 trials in two counties, conviction rates rose by about one percentage point for each year of the jury pool’s average age (Anwar et al., 2012). The study shows an association in those counties during that period; it does not show that any particular older juror is likely to convict.
Education shows weak and mixed associations with guilt judgments in the meta-analytic literature (Devine & Caughlin, 2014), and recent single studies point in different directions. In the online intimate partner rape study, university-educated mock jurors were more likely to vote guilty (Lilley et al., 2026). In a survey experiment comparing university graduates, those educated in the biological and behavioral sciences chose less severe sentences than other graduates across cases with and without a neurobiological explanation for the offense (Thomaidou & Berryessa, 2022); that study concerned sentencing, not verdicts. Mock-jury samples that overrepresent students or highly educated online participants make education particularly difficult to study.
Prior jury service has been studied in real trials. In a year of criminal trials in one state circuit court, conviction probability rose modestly but significantly as the number of jurors with prior service on the panel increased, and experienced jurors were more likely to be chosen as foreperson; the data did not support the hypothesis that attorneys had removed jurors based on their earlier verdicts (Dillehay & Nietzel, 1985). The study is dated, single-jurisdiction, and correlational.
Prior Victimization and Occupation
The evidence on prior victimization suggests a narrower effect than is often assumed. In a study of 2,435 mock jurors who watched a videotaped residential burglary trial, roughly 1,000 of whom reported having been crime victims, jurors who had been victims of the same type of crime as the one charged convicted at a significantly higher rate than non-victims, but victims of violent crime, a category different from the charged offense, did not (Culhane et al., 2004). In the English acquaintance-rape studies, prior sexual victimization predicted guilty votes before deliberation in one study but not in the other and not after deliberation (Willmott et al., 2026). A related mock-trial study of an intimate partner rape case found that experience of sexual victimization predicted guilty votes after deliberation but not before (Lilley et al., 2023). These results suggest that when victimization matters, it does so through case-specific similarity and attitudes, and inconsistently.
Systematic research on occupation as a predictor of verdicts is sparse. The federal Jury Selection and Service Act exempts active-duty service members, police, and firefighters from federal juries. Because occupation is related to education, income, and attitudes, any association with verdicts may run through those variables, but no research testing this was identified.
Attitudes Versus Demographics
A consistent finding in the mock-jury literature is that case-relevant attitudes predict verdicts better than demographic characteristics, although no study has linked real jurors’ pretrial attitudes to their votes in real trials. In sexual offense cases, scores on measures of acceptance of misconceptions about sexual assault predicted not-guilty votes before and after deliberation in both English mock-trial studies, and were the most consistent predictor of all the variables tested; the authors described demographic characteristics as generally poor predictors (Willmott et al., 2026). The chapter reports the direction and statistical significance of these associations but no effect sizes. In the 2023 intimate partner rape study, scores on the same type of measure were again associated with verdicts before and after deliberation, along with juror ethnicity and, after deliberation, lower empathy (Lilley et al., 2023); that study appears to draw on the same participant pool as the second Willmott study. The same measure predicted verdicts in the 2026 online study, where general legal attitudes did not (Lilley et al., 2026), and in the deliberating study of a genuine trial recreation, before and after deliberation (Willmott & Woodhams, 2026). These English studies share authors and methods, so they are not fully independent replications. Outside sexual offenses, in a small online study of 135 participants deciding a coercive control case, accepting attitudes toward controlling behavior were the only significant predictor of a not-guilty verdict, and age was not (Barnett et al., 2025). In child sexual abuse cases, the gender difference is largely carried by attitudes and empathy (Bottoms et al., 2014). Across criminal cases generally, attitudinal constructs outperform demographics (Devine & Caughlin, 2014).
Some characteristics appear to matter only in interaction with characteristics of the parties. In an online experiment with a census-matched sample of 1,462 U.S. adults evaluating a civil patent case, there was no overall effect of the defendant company’s country of origin on liability, but in a subgroup of only about 96 Asian participants a pattern consistent with similarity leniency appeared (about 31 percent found an Asian company liable, against 63 percent for non-Asian companies) (Huang, 2025). This is a single study, a small subgroup, and a civil case without deliberation, and the finding has not been replicated. The study and its ideology findings are reported in the Political Identity paper. Findings of this kind, reviewed in this hub’s papers on race and political identity, illustrate that a demographic association that does appear is conditional on the case.
The attitudinal findings have their own limits. Attitude scales are self-reports and are vulnerable to socially desirable responding, particularly when a person knows that the answers will affect whether he or she serves (Willmott et al., 2026). Most attitude-verdict studies use mock juries, and no study has linked real jurors’ pretrial attitudes to their votes in real trials. The defensible conclusion is comparative: attitudes are better predictors than demographics, and both are modest predictors compared with the evidence.
Rank and Service History Among Court-Martial Members
Article 25 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice directs the convening authority to detail members who are best qualified by age, education, training, experience, length of service, and judicial temperament; for courts-martial convened on or after December 23, 2024, the members who sit are then drawn by randomized selection from the pool the convening authority details. Rank, grade, branch, occupational specialty, command experience, and deployment history may still shape the pool, and practitioners sometimes hold beliefs about how senior officers, senior enlisted members, or members with command experience tend to vote; the research reviewed here does not test those beliefs.
Published empirical research on whether members’ rank, length of service, or command experience predicts their votes appears to be very limited, and this review identified no peer-reviewed study of actual court-martial members’ votes by rank or service history. Deliberations are secret, and panel data are not published in analyzable form, so beliefs about rank and voting are untested. Any association between rank and verdicts would likely run through attitudes, experience with the military justice system, and views about good order and discipline, all of which can be explored directly in voir dire.
Limits of the Evidence
Most of this research uses mock jurors, many of them students or online participants, deciding simulated trials without real consequences, and deliberation can attenuate individual tendencies, as the English studies found for gender and victimization (Willmott et al., 2026). Field studies come from particular jurisdictions and periods and cannot fully separate juror characteristics from differences in cases. Many findings come from single studies, published literatures may overrepresent significant results, and some sources report significance without effect sizes, which leaves practical importance unknown.
The most important limit is the distinction between groups and individuals. A finding that women, or older jurors, or crime victims are on average somewhat more likely to vote guilty in some kinds of cases means that the distributions of men and women, or of older and younger jurors, overlap substantially. Knowing a juror’s demographic characteristics tells counsel very little about that juror’s attitudes, and nothing about how that juror will weigh the evidence in a specific case. No study, and no combination of studies, can establish that a particular juror will or will not vote to convict.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When the Florida age finding is cited to favor older jurors (Anwar et al., 2014), ask how large the effect is: the working-paper estimate of about one percentage point per year of the jury pool’s average age (Anwar et al., 2012) describes pools in two counties, not individual jurors. When the meta-analytic finding that women are more likely to convict in sexual offense cases is cited (Schutte & Hosch, 1997), ask whether the conclusion follows from the design, since later experiments found the difference largely explained by attitudes and empathy (Bottoms et al., 2014) and the English deliberating studies found it before deliberation in two of three, and none reported it after deliberation (Willmott et al., 2026; Willmott & Woodhams, 2026). When attitude scales are offered as the better predictor, ask about effect size, since the English chapter reports significance without effect sizes (Willmott et al., 2026). When counsel rely on beliefs about how senior members vote, ask what evidence supports them, since this review identified no peer-reviewed study of members’ votes by rank. For every figure, ask whether it applies to this person, because group distributions overlap substantially. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Juror Characteristics and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
The Equal Protection Clause forbids peremptory challenges based on race (Batson v. Kentucky, 1986) or sex (J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 1994). J.E.B. rejected the use of gender as a proxy for juror attitudes, even where some empirical support for a group-level difference might exist. Foster v. Chatman (2016) and Flowers v. Mississippi (2019) confirm that courts examine the full record, including disparate questioning and comparisons with jurors who were not struck, to determine whether a stated reason is pretextual. The research reviewed here is consistent with those rules: demographic characteristics are weak and unreliable proxies for attitudes. Voir dire directed to attitudes is permitted and, where a reasonable possibility of racial or ethnic prejudice exists, may be required (Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 1981, plurality opinion). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(a) gives the court control over the examination of prospective jurors.
In courts-martial, the convening authority details members under Article 25, which expressly lists age, education, training, experience, length of service, and judicial temperament as criteria. For courts-martial convened on or after December 23, 2024, Article 25(e)(4) and the implementing amendments to the Rules for Courts-Martial (Exec. Order No. 14130) require that the members who sit be chosen, to the maximum extent practicable, by randomized selection from the pool the convening authority details. Neither sex nor race is an Article 25 criterion. In United States v. Riesbeck (2018), the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held that deliberately selecting women for a sexual assault panel was improper, following United States v. Smith (1988), and because the government could not show a benign purpose or harmlessness, it dismissed the charges with prejudice. In United States v. Jeter (2023), the court abrogated United States v. Crawford (1964), which had approved race-conscious selection to increase minority representation, and held that race may be used neither to exclude nor to include members. Batson applies to the government’s peremptory challenge in courts-martial through the Fifth Amendment (United States v. Santiago-Davila, 1988), and on a timely objection to the government’s peremptory challenge of a member of a cognizable racial group, trial counsel must give a race-neutral explanation without any further prima facie showing (United States v. Moore, 1989). United States v. Witham (1997) held that sex, like race, is an impermissible basis for a peremptory challenge and that the rule binds the accused as well as the government. Each side has one peremptory challenge, and Rule for Courts-Martial 912(f)(1)(N) requires removal of a member whose service would raise substantial doubt as to the legality, fairness, and impartiality of the proceedings. Military judges are directed to grant defense challenges for cause liberally, and implied bias is evaluated objectively, from the perspective of the public’s perception of fairness (United States v. Clay, 2007).
Arizona
Arizona eliminated peremptory challenges in criminal and civil trials effective January 1, 2022 (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order No. R-21-0020). Prospective jurors may now be removed only for cause. Under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 18.4(b), the court must excuse a prospective juror when there is a reasonable ground to believe the juror cannot render a fair and impartial verdict, and A.R.S. § 21-211 disqualifies, among others, any person who has an interest in the matter or who has a bias in favor of or against either party. Voir dire is governed by Rule 18.5. Because removal depends entirely on cause, the question in each case is whether the record shows that a particular prospective juror cannot be fair; questioning about case-relevant attitudes and experiences develops that record, and the equal protection principles underlying Batson and J.E.B. continue to forbid using race or sex as a basis for any jury-selection decision.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports attention in voir dire to case-relevant attitudes and experiences, such as views about the legal system, beliefs about how people respond to the type of offense charged, and personal experiences closely resembling the facts. Those are the characteristics that the mock-jury research reviewed links most consistently to verdicts, and questioning about them develops the individualized record that Arizona’s for-cause-only system and Rule for Courts-Martial 912 require. Questions of this kind are most useful when framed neutrally, so that they elicit candid answers rather than signaling a preferred response, and the research supports only modest, group-level associations that do not identify any particular juror’s leanings.
The research counsels caution about inferences from demographic characteristics. Associations between gender, age, or victimization and verdicts are small and inconsistent, and they disappear or reverse across studies and after deliberation. A challenge or selection decision that rests on such a characteristic, rather than on a juror’s own answers, is both scientifically weak and, for race and sex, unconstitutional under Batson and J.E.B. The same caution applies to assumptions about members’ rank or command experience, which are untested.
Special Issues for Defense
The research supports questioning directed to attitudes such as legal authoritarianism, confidence in the legal system, and beliefs about the type of offense charged, which predict verdicts more consistently than demographics. A record on these attitudes, and on case-specific experiences such as prior victimization by a similar offense, is the basis on which challenges for cause rest on what a prospective juror or member actually said. In courts-martial, the liberal grant mandate applies to defense challenges for cause, and an attitude-focused record is the basis on which such challenges are evaluated.
The research also counsels caution about demographic assumptions. Women are on average somewhat more likely to convict in sexual offense cases in many mock-jury studies, but the difference is modest, is largely explained by attitudes that vary widely among both men and women, and does not reliably persist through deliberation. Using sex or race as a basis for a challenge is unconstitutional, and in Arizona, where only challenges for cause remain, it would also be unsupported by the record the rules require. Beliefs about how junior or senior members vote are not supported by published research.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
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Legal Authorities
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. 284 (2019).
Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488 (2016).
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981) (plurality opinion).
United States v. Clay, 64 M.J. 274 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
United States v. Crawford, 15 C.M.A. 31, 35 C.M.R. 3 (1964), abrogated in part by United States v. Jeter, 84 M.J. 68 (C.A.A.F. 2023).
United States v. Jeter, 84 M.J. 68 (C.A.A.F. 2023).
United States v. Moore, 28 M.J. 366 (C.M.A. 1989).
United States v. Riesbeck, 77 M.J. 154 (C.A.A.F. 2018).
United States v. Santiago-Davila, 26 M.J. 380 (C.M.A. 1988).
United States v. Smith, 27 M.J. 242 (C.M.A. 1988).
United States v. Witham, 47 M.J. 297 (C.A.A.F. 1997).
U.S. Const. amend. V.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
10 U.S.C. § 825 (Article 25, Uniform Code of Military Justice), including § 825(e)(4).
28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(6).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21-211.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(a).
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.4(b).
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.5.
Ariz. R. Civ. P. 47(e).
Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order No. R-21-0020 (Aug. 30, 2021) (amending Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.4 and 18.5 and Ariz. R. Civ. P. 47(e), effective Jan. 1, 2022).
Exec. Order No. 14130, 89 Fed. Reg. 105343 (Dec. 27, 2024) (amending R.C.M. 503(a), effective Dec. 23, 2024).
R.C.M. 912(f)(1)(N).
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