Snap Shot
- The question: Can voir dire reliably detect juror bias, and which methods of questioning elicit the most accurate information?
- What the research shows: Nondisclosure was common in one older study: about one quarter of 190 jurors later reported a crime victimization of themselves or family that they had not disclosed, although the study could not tell why. A juror’s assurance of impartiality is an imperfect guide to later decisions. In one older experiment, open-ended questioning elicited more disclosure, specific attitude questions predicted verdicts better than general ones in online civil experiments, and rehabilitation may change what jurors say more than how they decide.
- What it does not show: The research does not show that voir dire is futile or that any category of juror is biased. Most studies use mock jurors and are small or old, no study has tested whether any procedure reduces biased verdicts in real trials, and no attitude scale has been validated for excusing an individual juror.
- The law: Inquiry into specific bias is constitutionally required only in limited circumstances (Ham, Turner, Morgan; compare Mu’Min). Courts-martial recognize actual and implied bias under a liberal grant mandate (Clay). Arizona requires a preponderance showing for cause, encourages questionnaires, discourages leading rehabilitation, and holds that written questionnaires may winnow the panel but do not replace oral voir dire with an opportunity for the parties to question jurors under Rule 18.5 (Lucas).
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors are likely to encounter the issue in case-specific, open-ended questioning and in whether a juror’s assurance of impartiality can be relied on when a challenge is opposed; defense counsel are likely to encounter it in questionnaires, individual questioning, and time for voir dire; for both, a single answer supports only limited inferences.
Voir dire is the questioning of prospective jurors to determine whether they can decide a case fairly on the evidence and the law. It is the principal procedural safeguard of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of an impartial jury, and in Arizona, which abolished peremptory challenges effective January 1, 2022, it is now the only means by which a party can seek the removal of a prospective juror. Voir dire rests on an unstated empirical assumption: that prospective jurors can and will accurately report what bears on their ability to be fair, and that judges and lawyers can recognize bias from what jurors say.
Psychological research has tested that assumption for more than four decades. It addresses whether prospective jurors disclose relevant information candidly, whether their assurances of fairness predict their decisions, how the questioner and the form of questions affect candor, what “rehabilitation” of a juror who has expressed bias accomplishes, and whether standardized attitude scales identify predispositions. This paper summarizes that research, describes its limits, and reviews the federal, military, and Arizona law governing voir dire and challenges for cause. Peremptory challenges, Batson v. Kentucky, and Arizona’s abolition of peremptories are addressed in a companion paper in this hub.
The research does not show that voir dire is futile, and it does not show that any category of prospective juror is biased. It shows that some methods of questioning elicit more accurate information than others, and that a prospective juror’s own confident statement of impartiality is a weaker guide to later decisions than the law has traditionally assumed. Those findings apply equally to predispositions favoring either side.
Juror Candor and Nondisclosure
The most direct test of candor compares what jurors say in voir dire with what they disclose later in a setting with less public pressure. In a study of 31 criminal trials in Washington, D.C., researchers observed voir dire and then interviewed 190 jurors after their trials, repeating many of the questions asked in court. About one quarter of the jurors reported in the interview that they or a family member had been the victim of a crime without having disclosed it in voir dire, and nearly 30% reported knowing a police officer without having said so (Seltzer et al., 1991). The study did not determine whether the omissions were deliberate, forgotten, or the result of panel-wide questions that individual jurors did not think applied to them, and it is more than three decades old. It nonetheless found that nondisclosure of facts relevant to a challenge for cause was common in that sample.
Nondisclosure need not reflect dishonesty. Group voir dire is formal and public, and the questions often signal the expected answer. Psychologists call the resulting tendency to present oneself favorably socially desirable responding. In voir dire, the socially desirable answer is usually the one that implies impartiality.
Who Asks the Questions
Whether judges or attorneys conduct voir dire has been debated for decades, and the limited empirical record on candor suggests that participants may adjust their answers more when questioned by a judge, although attorney-conducted questioning carries its own risks. In an experiment with 116 randomly selected jury-eligible citizens who were told the judge and attorneys conducting a mock voir dire were real, participants completed an attitude questionnaire and were then questioned by an actor playing either a judge or an attorney. Participants changed their answers from the questionnaire to the oral examination almost twice as much when questioned by the judge as when questioned by the attorney, and a warmer interpersonal style did not reduce the judge’s effect (Jones, 1987). The author interpreted the result as reflecting pressure to conform to perceived judicial expectations. The study used a single simulated proceeding with actors, so it does not establish the size of the difference in actual courtrooms.
Attorney-conducted voir dire carries its own risks. Attorneys may use questioning to preview their case or elicit commitments. In two studies in which attorneys and law students wrote voir dire questions to test a hypothesis about a prospective juror’s attitudes and then drew conclusions from hypothetical answers, their conclusions were shaped by the questions they chose and, compared with a statistical benchmark, relied too heavily on the juror’s answers (Otis et al., 2014). The authors concluded that even accurate answers may not lead attorneys to accurate inferences. Questions can also affect the jurors who hear them. In two experiments, watching death-qualification questioning raised participants’ pretrial estimates of the defendant’s guilt, but the effect did not survive the trial evidence; exposed participants were less likely to convict and said they would require more evidence of guilt (Vitriol & Kovera, 2018). How strikes are exercised can also affect those who remain: in an online experiment with 228 participants, those who watched a simulated jury selection in which Black prospective jurors were disproportionately excluded rated the process as less fair and reported more negative emotions, especially Black participants (Abramowitz & Douglass, 2023). The study measured perceptions, not verdicts. The research shows that who asks and how both matter, not that judges or attorneys are categorically better.
Open-Ended and Closed Questions
Closed questions, which can be answered yes or no, are efficient and are common in group voir dire. They also make the expected answer obvious. Open-ended questions ask the juror to describe experiences or views in his or her own words. In an experiment comparing directive and nondirective styles of attorney questioning, participants questioned in a nondirective style were rated as more self-disclosing and were more willing to acknowledge that they could not follow legal guarantees such as the defendant’s right not to testify and the absence of any defense burden to present evidence (Middendorf & Luginbuhl, 1995). Hearing voir dire also increased stated acceptance of these guarantees, which suggests that voir dire educates as well as screens, and that later answers may reflect what jurors have just been told.
Questions about specific attitudes also predict decisions better than general questions about fairness. In three online experiments with 2,041 participants in civil cases, minimal voir dire, consisting of questions about prior legal experience and self-rated bias, did not predict verdicts, and demographic characteristics did not predict them either. Extended voir dire asking about specific attitudes toward civil litigation, the parties, and the relevant law predicted most verdict and damages outcomes (Salerno et al., 2021). The participants were paid online workers and the cases were civil, but the pattern is consistent with the research on individual differences discussed below. Case-specific attitudes can also govern how jurors use particular evidence. In one experiment, participants who gave little support to coercive interrogation rated a suspect’s guilt lower when the confession had been coerced, while those who supported such tactics did not change their verdicts (Holt & Palmer, 2024). The study used a written confession transcript and no deliberation.
Juror Questionnaires
Written questionnaires completed before oral examination allow each prospective juror to answer every question individually, reduce the pressure of answering aloud, and give a basis for follow-up questioning outside the presence of other jurors. The authors of the Washington, D.C., nondisclosure study recommended pre-voir dire questionnaires and private questioning on sensitive topics as likely to produce more truthful answers (Seltzer et al., 1991). The Supreme Court in Skilling v. United States (2010) relied in part on an extensive written questionnaire in holding that the trial court’s voir dire was adequate in a case with substantial pretrial publicity.
Questionnaires remain self-reports subject to social desirability pressures, and a questionnaire that asks only whether a juror can be fair adds little to an oral question asking the same thing.
Self-Assessed Impartiality and the “Can You Be Fair?” Question
The central question of traditional voir dire, whether a prospective juror can set aside what he or she has heard or believes and decide the case on the evidence, asks for a self-diagnosis. Research suggests that many people have difficulty detecting their own biases, even when they readily recognize the same biases in others (see Yokum et al., 2019, for one test in the context of pretrial publicity). In two experiments in which participants were exposed to prejudicial pretrial information about a civil defendant, only 5% to 11% of exposed participants said they could not be impartial. After those who admitted bias or were unsure were removed, exposed participants remained more likely than unexposed participants to find for the plaintiff, a difference of 16 to 19 percentage points that was statistically significant in the larger online sample but not in the smaller law-student sample; in the online sample, exposed participants also awarded significantly higher damages (Yokum et al., 2019). Participants who denied bias in themselves readily predicted that other people exposed to the same information would be biased.
Judges’ rulings may nonetheless track jurors’ stated confidence. In an experimental study, small variations in a prospective juror’s expressed confidence in his or her ability to be fair changed judges’ assessments of bias but did not change the assessments of attorneys or of other jurors who viewed the same exchange (Rose & Diamond, 2008). The authors suggested that the judge’s role makes reliance on a juror’s assurance an understandable strategy. The study does not establish how often actual rulings turn on such assurances.
The law recognizes the limits of self-assessment in extreme cases: in Irvin v. Dowd (1961), jurors’ assurances of impartiality did not cure the prejudice of pervasive pretrial publicity. The research suggests the same limitation operates, to a lesser degree, in ordinary cases.
Rehabilitation Questioning
When a prospective juror expresses a view suggesting bias, a judge or the party opposing a challenge often asks whether the juror can nonetheless set the view aside and follow the court’s instructions. Most jurors answer yes. In the leading experiment, mock jurors who had or had not expressed bias about the insanity defense received either standard questioning or rehabilitative questioning from a judge and then viewed a trial. Compared with standard questioning, rehabilitation changed attitudes toward the insanity defense and perceptions of the defendant’s mental state and lowered scaled guilt judgments, but it affected unbiased jurors in the same way as biased ones rather than selectively correcting bias (Crocker & Kovera, 2010). In the civil experiments described above, judicial rehabilitation did not reduce the influence of preexisting attitudes on verdicts, but participants who were rehabilitated reported feeling less biased (Salerno et al., 2021). Rehabilitation, on this evidence, may change what jurors say about themselves more than it changes how they decide.
These findings cut in both directions. A juror skeptical of police testimony and a juror who believes that defendants who do not testify are probably guilty are equally susceptible to rehabilitation that produces agreement without changing views. The research does not show that every juror who agrees to follow the law is biased; it shows that the agreement, standing alone, is weak evidence either way.
Attitude Scales and Individual Differences
If self-assessed impartiality is a weak predictor, a natural question is whether standardized measures of attitudes do better. A meta-analysis of studies relating jurors’ individual characteristics to guilt judgments found that most demographic characteristics had small associations with verdicts, and that attitudinal measures, particularly those concerning the legal system and crime, showed stronger though still modest associations (Devine & Caughlin, 2014). This pattern is one scientific reason that attitude-based questioning in voir dire is preferable to assumptions based on demographic characteristics, and it coincides with the legal rule that selection may not be based on race, ethnicity, or sex (Batson v. Kentucky, 1986; J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 1994). Group-level associations, whether demographic or attitudinal, are small enough that they cannot predict how a particular juror will vote.
The Juror Bias Scale, developed in the early 1980s, measures predispositions toward conviction or acquittal through items about the probability that a charged defendant committed the crime and the threshold of doubt needed to acquit (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983). Later analyses revised its factor structure (Myers & Lecci, 1998; Lecci & Myers, 2002). The Pretrial Juror Attitude Questionnaire, a 29-item instrument with six subscales addressing such matters as conviction proneness, confidence in the justice system, and cynicism toward the defense, was developed to capture a broader range of attitudes and predicted mock-juror verdicts beyond the older scales (Lecci & Myers, 2008). In a study of 113 British jury-eligible adults deciding a hypothetical burglary case, the Juror Bias Scale and the Pretrial Juror Attitude Questionnaire each independently predicted verdicts (a third attitude measure did not), the newer questionnaire outperformed the older scales, and participants’ interpretation of the reasonable-doubt standard partly mediated the effect of attitudes on verdicts (Lundrigan et al., 2016). The sample was small, the case was hypothetical, and there was no deliberation.
Attitude Scales in Sexual Assault Cases
Scales measuring acceptance of misconceptions about sexual assault, such as the Acceptance of Modern Myths About Sexual Aggression scale (AMMSA; Gerger et al., 2007), have been studied as predictors of mock-juror verdicts. In two English mock-trial studies, one using a video trial and the other a live re-enactment before participants drawn from the electoral register, higher AMMSA scores were the most consistent predictor of not-guilty votes both before and after deliberation (Willmott et al., 2026). The authors argue for some pretrial screening of attitudes. A 2025 evidence review rejects screening as impractical and unlikely to be effective, reasoning that a valid cutoff would be difficult to set, that self-report scales are vulnerable to socially desirable answering, and that because men and older people score higher on average, screening by scale score would remove them disproportionately and make juries less representative (Leverick et al., 2025). The Willmott chapter reports no effect sizes, although a 2026 meta-analysis found a weak average association between such beliefs and guilt judgments (Bouillaut et al., 2026), and both studies were simulations in a system with essentially no voir dire. In a Canadian online study of 260 participants, scores on a newer, less direct measure of these beliefs also predicted not-guilty verdicts in a written trial transcript (Blais & Bolduc, 2026); the finding concerns group prediction, not the screening of an individual juror. The research on these beliefs, and the broader debate over their prevalence, is reviewed in “Juror Beliefs About Sexual Assault: What the Research Shows” and “Correcting Juror Misconceptions: Directions, Expert Evidence, and Juror Screening” in the Counterintuitive Testimony hub, and is not repeated here.
In American courts, case-specific attitude questions are generally permitted, and a juror’s answers can support a challenge for cause. A published scale, however, is a research instrument for measuring group differences, and none has been validated as a basis for excusing an individual juror. Questions about the content such scales measure differ from a numerical cutoff, and the concerns about social desirability, representativeness, and individual prediction apply to attitude measures favoring either side.
Limits of the Evidence
Most voir dire research uses mock jurors, such as students, paid online participants, or volunteers who know no real case depends on their answers. Several foundational studies are decades old and small, and field studies of actual jurors could not determine why jurors failed to disclose information. Studies of rehabilitation and self-assessed bias typically test one exposure or attitude in one case, and few include deliberation. No study has tested whether any voir dire procedure reduces biased verdicts in actual trials, because the counterfactual verdict cannot be observed.
Above all, the research describes tendencies in groups. It cannot show that a particular prospective juror is or is not biased, and it cannot show that a particular verdict was or was not affected by bias.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When the finding that about one quarter of 190 jurors later reported an undisclosed crime victimization (Seltzer et al., 1991) is cited to show that jurors conceal bias, ask what exactly was counted, since the study did not determine whether omissions were deliberate or forgotten. When the finding that exposed participants who denied bias still favored the plaintiff by 16 to 19 points (Yokum et al., 2019) is cited to discount a particular juror’s assurance, ask whether a group finding applies to this person, noting that the difference was significant only in the online sample. When higher AMMSA scores in two English mock-trial studies (Willmott et al., 2026) are offered to support excusing a juror in a sexual assault case, ask who was studied, since they came from a system with essentially no voir dire, and whether any scale has been validated for an individual. When a juror’s agreement after rehabilitation is offered to defeat a challenge, ask whether the conclusion follows from the design of Crocker and Kovera (2010), in which rehabilitation shifted biased and unbiased jurors alike. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Voir Dire, Challenges for Cause, and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant trial by an impartial jury, and the Due Process Clause independently requires a fair tribunal. The Constitution requires inquiry into specific forms of bias only in limited circumstances. In Ham v. South Carolina (1973), the Court held that a Black civil rights worker was entitled to have prospective jurors questioned about racial prejudice. Ristaino v. Ross (1976) held that such questioning is not constitutionally required in every interracial case. In Rosales-Lopez v. United States (1981), a plurality held that federal courts, under their supervisory authority, should ask about racial or ethnic prejudice on request when a violent crime is charged and the defendant and victim are members of different racial or ethnic groups. Turner v. Murray (1986) held that a capital defendant accused of an interracial crime is entitled on request to have prospective jurors informed of the victim’s race and questioned about racial bias. In Mu’Min v. Virginia (1991), the Court held that the Constitution does not require questions about the content of pretrial publicity a juror has seen, so long as the inquiry is adequate to assess impartiality.
In capital cases, Wainwright v. Witt (1985) permits exclusion for cause of a juror whose views on capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his or her duties, and Morgan v. Illinois (1992) entitles the defendant, on request, to ask whether prospective jurors would automatically impose death upon conviction, because such a juror must be excused. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(a) permits the court to examine prospective jurors itself or to allow the attorneys to do so; if the court conducts the examination, it must permit the parties to ask further questions it considers proper or to submit questions for the court to ask.
Bias that supports a challenge for cause may be actual, shown by the juror’s own statements or conduct, or implied, presumed from the juror’s circumstances. In Smith v. Phillips (1982), the Court held that due process does not require a new trial whenever a juror has been placed in a potentially compromising situation and that the remedy is a hearing at which the defendant may prove actual bias; Justice O’Connor’s concurrence observed that some circumstances, such as a juror who is an employee of the prosecuting agency or a close relative of a participant, may justify a finding of implied bias. When a juror fails to disclose information during voir dire, McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood (1984) requires a party seeking a new trial to show that the juror failed to answer honestly a material question and that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause. Skilling emphasized the deference owed to trial judges’ assessments of impartiality.
In courts-martial, members serve the jury’s function. Rule for Courts-Martial 912 governs their examination and challenge. Rule 912(f)(1)(N) provides for removal of a member who should not sit in the interest of having the court-martial free from substantial doubt as to legality, fairness, and impartiality; the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces evaluates actual bias subjectively and implied bias objectively, from the standpoint of public perception of fairness. Under the liberal grant mandate, military judges are directed to grant defense challenges for cause in close cases (United States v. Clay, 2007; United States v. Woods, 2015). The selection, examination, and challenge of court-martial members are addressed in detail in the hub’s paper on court-martial panel selection.
Arizona
Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 18.4(b) requires the court, on motion or on its own, to excuse a prospective juror when there is a reasonable ground to believe the juror cannot render a fair and impartial verdict. Arizona Revised Statutes § 21-211 lists statutory grounds for disqualification, including interest in the matter, relationship to a party, and bias or prejudice. Arizona recognizes a form of implied bias through this statute: in State v. Eddington (2011), the Arizona Supreme Court held that a peace officer employed by the agency that investigated the case is “interested” and automatically disqualified, and the Court of Appeals has since declined to extend that per se rule to a juror whose spouse worked for the investigating agency, holding that she was not disqualified under § 21-211(2) and that the trial court did not err in failing to strike her for cause on its own (State v. Guevara-Enriquez, 2025).
When the Arizona Supreme Court abolished peremptory challenges in Order R-21-0020, effective January 1, 2022, it also provided that the party challenging a juror for cause must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the juror cannot render a fair and impartial verdict, and it allowed the parties to stipulate in good faith to the excusal of a juror (Recent Ordinance, 2022). As amended, the rules direct the court to consider the totality of the juror’s conduct and answers (Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.5(h)). In December 2021, acting on recommendations of its Task Force on Jury Data Collection, Practices, and Procedures, the court adopted on an emergency basis further amendments to Rules 18.4 and 18.5 and to Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 47 that encourage case-specific written questionnaires when feasible, permit extended oral examination by the parties, and discourage rehabilitation through leading or conclusory questions. These provisions guide the trial judge’s discretion rather than impose fixed requirements (McMurdie et al., 2024; Recent Ordinance, 2022). Questionnaires are meant to supplement oral examination, not replace it. In State v. Lucas (2025), a published opinion, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred under Rule 18.5(d)-(f) when it selected the jury from a written questionnaire and individual questioning, without oral voir dire of the panel or a chance for counsel to question the panel as a group; the State conceded the error. The court accepted that questionnaires may be used to winnow the panel but treated them as no substitute for oral voir dire. It reviewed for harmless error, with the burden on the State to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the verdict, and declined to apply the more deferential rule that a defendant must show a fair and impartial jury was not chosen, because that rule applies when the trial court exercised discretion over voir dire. It vacated the convictions and remanded: the State did not argue harmlessness, and in any event the court lacked confidence the errors were harmless because one seated juror’s written answers raised serious doubt about her impartiality. The court did not decide whether the error was structural, although one judge, concurring, would have held that it is. A later memorandum decision, citable only for persuasive value under Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c), read Lucas as requiring oral voir dire and an opportunity for the parties to question prospective jurors, not oral questions to every prospective juror (State v. Cloud, 2026). Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 47 contains parallel provisions.
These amendments track the research on questionnaires, open-ended questioning, and rehabilitation. In Maricopa County after the change, most judges reported reducing or eliminating rehabilitation attempts and using open-ended questions (McMurdie et al., 2024). Before abolition, State v. Hickman (2003) held that a defendant who used a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause was not entitled to automatic reversal absent a showing that the jury actually seated was not impartial. Because an erroneous denial can no longer be cured with a peremptory challenge, the ruling on a challenge for cause now determines whether the juror sits, and the voir dire record carries greater weight on appeal.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research concerns questioning that identifies attitudes relevant to a juror’s ability to evaluate the State’s evidence fairly, such as views about police testimony, forensic evidence, the offense charged, and the burden of proof. Attitudes predicted decisions modestly better than demographics did, and case-specific attitude questions are generally permitted. Open-ended follow-up questions can develop a fuller record under the preponderance standard adopted in 2022 than a juror’s single answer.
The research also counsels caution about relying on a juror’s assurance of impartiality when a party opposes a challenge for cause. Rehabilitation may produce agreement without changing underlying views, and in Arizona a juror who should have been excused can no longer be removed peremptorily, so an erroneous denial may itself become an appellate issue. Questioning that tracks protected characteristics rather than expressed attitudes risks the constitutional problems addressed in the companion paper on Batson.
Special Issues for Defense
The research bears on written questionnaires, individual questioning on sensitive topics, open-ended questions, and adequate time for oral examination, which were associated with more candid disclosure in the studies reviewed, and it suggests that a juror’s assurance of fairness, particularly after rehabilitation, is imperfect evidence of impartiality or of bias. Defense counsel are likely to encounter predispositions bearing on the presumption of innocence, the right not to testify, and the absence of any defense burden.
The research also counsels caution about what voir dire answers can establish. A juror’s endorsement of a general attitude does not show that the juror cannot fairly evaluate a particular case, and the same research that questions rehabilitation also questions inferences drawn from a single answer in the other direction. Attitude scales, including those concerning sexual assault, predict group tendencies modestly and have not been validated for screening individuals. In courts-martial, the liberal grant mandate assists defense challenges, but it does not relieve counsel of developing a record that shows actual or implied bias.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
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Bouillaut, K., Hinton, W., Fitton, L., & Beazley, P. (2026). Rape myths and juror decision-making in sexual assault cases: An updated systematic review and meta-analysis. International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, 86, 100887. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijlcj.2026.100887
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Holt, G. A., & Palmer, M. A. (2024). Individual attitudes toward coerced confessions change perception of confession evidence: Why jurors may accept or reject poor-quality confessions. Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 31(6), 997–1014. https://doi.org/10.1080/13218719.2023.2242454
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Leverick, F., Chalmers, J., Keane, E., & Kinghan, J. (2025). Rape myths and jury decision making: An evidence review. University of Glasgow.
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Legal Authorities
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984).
Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992).
Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991).
Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981).
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010).
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982).
State v. Eddington, 228 Ariz. 361, 266 P.3d 1057 (2011).
State v. Cloud, No. 1 CA-CR 25-0445 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2026) (mem. decision) (citable for persuasive value only, Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)).
State v. Guevara-Enriquez, 576 P.3d 122 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2025) (No. 2 CA-CR 2024-0054, July 25, 2025) (no petition for review located as of November 2026).
State v. Hickman, 205 Ariz. 192, 68 P.3d 418 (2003).
State v. Lucas, 260 Ariz. 567 (App. 2025) (No. 1 CA-CR 24-0199, Sept. 11, 2025, as amended Oct. 1, 2025) (vacated and remanded).
Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
United States v. Clay, 64 M.J. 274 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
United States v. Woods, 74 M.J. 238 (C.A.A.F. 2015).
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
U.S. Const. amend. VI.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21-211.
Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order No. R-21-0020 (Aug. 30, 2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2022).
Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(a).
Ariz. R. Civ. P. 47.
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.4(b).
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.5.
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, R.C.M. 912.
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