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Jurors and Jury Decision-Making

Explicit and Implicit Bias in Jurors

Published

Snap Shot

  • The question: How do jurors’ conscious attitudes and implicit associations affect verdicts, and do courtroom remedies for bias work?
  • What the research shows: Implicit associations with social groups are widespread and measurable, but at the group level they bear a small and variable relationship to behavior; meta-analyses disagree on how much the Implicit Association Test predicts. Case-relevant attitudes, such as legal authoritarianism or distrust of the legal system, in either direction, predict verdicts better than demographics, though the associations are modest. Mock jurors also tend to distort new evidence to fit an emerging verdict.
  • What it does not show: No test, scale, or study can tell whether a particular juror is biased or how that juror will vote. Of the five studies summarized here, three found no effect of implicit-bias instructions or videos on verdicts; two found verdict effects, one in a civil case (a judge’s instruction shifted verdicts toward Black plaintiffs) and one in Canada with effects in both directions.
  • The law: The Sixth Amendment requires an impartial jury, and questioning on racial prejudice is required in some circumstances (Ham, Turner, Rosales-Lopez). Peña-Rodriguez lets courts consider a juror’s clear statement of racial animus; it does not reach implicit bias. Courts-martial apply implied bias and liberally grant defense challenges in close cases (Clay, Woods); Arizona, with no peremptories, relies on challenges for cause.
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors may pursue attitude-based voir dire on jurors’ distrust of police or heightened doubt thresholds, without denying that implicit associations exist; defense counsel may seek questioning on case-relevant attitudes and prejudice, presenting implicit-bias research as a reason for individualized inquiry rather than proof of bias.

Trial by jury rests on the premise that jurors can set aside what they bring into the courtroom and decide the case on the evidence and the law. Jurors hold attitudes, expectations, and associations about crime, police, defendants, complainants, and social groups. Some are consciously held and can be reported when a juror is asked; others are thought to operate with less awareness, shaping how a person reads ambiguous evidence.

The topic reaches court from both directions. A defendant may argue that jurors’ attitudes about race, crime, or the defendant’s group will distort their judgment; the prosecution may argue that jurors distrust police or are inclined to acquit in a particular kind of case. Courts must decide how much questioning to allow, when stated attitudes require removal, and whether to instruct on bias.

This paper defines explicit and implicit bias, reviews the Implicit Association Test and the debate about what it predicts, and examines studies testing implicit-bias jury instructions and juror videos. It then reviews attitudinal tendencies that favor the prosecution or the defense, the coherence processes that affect how any fact-finder evaluates evidence, and the governing law in federal, military, and Arizona courts. Race and political identity are addressed in more detail in companion papers.

Defining Explicit and Implicit Bias

An explicit attitude or belief is one a person can identify and report, such as agreement with a statement that most people who are arrested probably committed a crime. Explicit bias, in the legal sense, is a consciously held preference or belief that would lead a juror to favor or disfavor a party for reasons unrelated to the evidence. It is the traditional subject of voir dire: the juror who says she could not be fair in a particular kind of case, or would believe a police officer over any other witness.

Implicit bias refers to associations between concepts (for example, a social group and an attribute such as “guilty”) that are measured indirectly, usually by reaction times. The theory holds that such associations can be activated automatically and influence judgment even in people who sincerely reject the corresponding belief. Two cautions are important at the outset. First, “implicit” describes a method of measurement; whether the associations measured are truly outside awareness is itself debated. Second, an implicit association is not the same as a discriminatory act. Whether, how strongly, and under what conditions implicit measures predict behavior is the central scientific question, and it remains contested.

Measuring Implicit Bias: The Implicit Association Test

The most widely used implicit measure is the Implicit Association Test (IAT), introduced by Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz (1998). The test asks a person to sort words or images into categories as quickly as possible, using shared response keys for paired categories, on the premise that people respond faster when paired categories are closely associated in memory. A race IAT compares sorting speed when “White” shares a key with “good” and “Black” with “bad,” and when the pairings are reversed; the difference is converted to a score.

The Predictive Validity Debate

Two large meta-analyses reached different conclusions about how well the IAT predicts behavior. Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, and Banaji (2009) analyzed 122 research reports involving 184 independent samples and about 14,900 participants. The average correlation between IAT scores and behavioral, judgment, or physiological criteria was r = .27; self-report measures averaged r = .36 but varied far more across studies. In the 32 samples examining Black–White interracial behavior, the IAT predicted outcomes significantly better than self-report measures did, which the authors interpreted as support for using implicit measures in socially sensitive domains where people may be reluctant to report their attitudes.

Oswald, Mitchell, Blanton, Jaccard, and Tetlock (2013) reanalyzed the question for racial and ethnic discrimination specifically, using 46 reports, 86 samples, and roughly 300 IAT–criterion correlations under different inclusion and coding rules. They found an average correlation of about r = .14, similar to the average for explicit measures (about r = .12), and concluded that the IAT was a poor predictor of every category of criterion except brain activity and did not outperform simple explicit measures. Greenwald, Banaji, and Nosek (2015) responded that statistically small effects can have large aggregate consequences when they operate across many people and many decisions, and they disputed some of Oswald and colleagues’ inclusion and coding choices. Oswald and colleagues (2015) replied that the societal significance of effects of this size is unknown and has not been demonstrated. The two groups thus disagree both about method and about whether correlations of the size these meta-analyses report are meaningful in practice; neither side claims that the IAT predicts an individual’s behavior well.

A later meta-analysis by Kurdi and colleagues (2019), whose authors included two of the IAT’s developers, analyzed 217 reports with 36,071 participants and found an average implicit–behavior correlation of about r = .10, with a prediction interval running from slightly negative to about .32. Implicit and explicit measures each predicted behavior beyond the other to a similar small degree. Study design mattered a great deal: the few studies combining several design features, including close correspondence between the implicit and behavioral measures, averaged about r = .37, while the few lacking them averaged about r = .02. The authors also reported that most studies were severely underpowered (the median sample was 40 participants).

A separate question is whether changing implicit associations changes behavior. Forscher and colleagues (2019) meta-analyzed 492 studies with 87,418 participants testing procedures intended to change implicit measures, most of them brief, single-session manipulations. Some procedures shifted implicit scores, but the effects were usually weak; explicit measures changed less consistently, behavioral changes were generally trivial, and changes in implicit measures did not mediate changes in explicit measures or behavior. The authors cautioned that measurement error could have obscured such links. The finding is still relevant to courtroom interventions: a procedure that reduces an implicit score cannot be assumed to make a juror’s verdict fairer.

Taken together, the research supports three propositions: implicit associations with social groups are widespread and measurable; at the group level, they bear a small and variable relationship to behavior; and an individual’s IAT score is not a reliable basis for predicting that person’s decisions.

Implicit Bias in Legal Judgments

Researchers have adapted implicit measures to legal concepts. Levinson, Cai, and Young (2010) developed a “Guilty/Not Guilty” IAT that paired Black and White faces with words associated with guilt and innocence. Their participants, a small sample of jury-eligible university students, showed an association between Black faces and guilt, and those scores predicted how participants rated the probative value of ambiguous evidence in a robbery scenario, while explicit measures did not. It is frequently cited, but it is a single study with a small, non-representative sample and has not been replicated with deliberating juries.

Field research on civil awards points to the role of discretion. Girvan and Marek (2016) combined tort verdict data with Census-based estimates of plaintiffs’ race and ethnicity. Where jurors had broad discretion, as with pain-and-suffering damages, Black plaintiffs received less than White plaintiffs; where awards were tied to economic figures such as lost income, the differences that appeared were ones the authors tentatively attributed to structural income disparities. The design was correlational and cannot isolate juror bias from other influences, but it is consistent with laboratory findings that bias operates most readily when the evidence or the decision standard is ambiguous.

Implicit-Bias Instructions and Juror Videos

Several courts now address implicit bias directly with jurors. In 2017 the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington adopted pattern criminal instructions on unconscious bias, given at the start of trial, with the credibility instructions, and at the close of evidence, and produced a juror-orientation video on the subject. The rationale is that naming a potential influence and asking jurors to examine their reasoning may reduce reliance on automatic associations.

The empirical tests of this approach are few, and three of the five studies summarized here did not find that such instructions or videos change verdicts. Elek and Hannaford-Agor (2013), of the National Center for State Courts, reviewed debiasing research and cautioned that some well-intended interventions can backfire by increasing prejudiced judgments. Their subsequent online experiment with 561 participants from a national panel (Elek & Hannaford-Agor, 2014) crossed defendant race, victim race, and a specialized implicit-bias instruction. The instruction did not significantly affect verdicts, confidence, or sentences, although it reduced one race-related difference in how some participants rated the strength of the defense case. The study did not reproduce the expected baseline bias against Black defendants, which limited the test, and found no backfire effect.

Lynch, Kidd, and Shaw (2022) conducted a larger test with 120 small deliberating groups who watched a simulated federal drug-conspiracy trial in which the defendant’s race was varied. Implicit-bias instructions did not measurably change verdicts compared with standard instructions. Groups that received them discussed bias more often, with effects that could help or hurt the defendant, and some jurors invoked the instructions in ways that interfered with ordinary assessments of witness credibility. Ruva and colleagues (2024) tested the Western District of Washington video and instructions in two online experiments with Black and White mock jurors (a murder trial with 554 participants and a battery trial with 539). The interventions did not reduce racial bias in verdicts, although the video changed some intermediate judgments about responsibility and credibility, and the authors suggested the interventions might work with modification.

Two newer studies found effects on verdicts, though not always in the intended direction. Lawrence, Gittings, Hans, and colleagues (2025) tested White mock jurors in a civil case with a Black or White plaintiff (N = 407 and 1,016). Jurors with higher explicit racial bias gave less favorable verdicts to Black plaintiffs only. A video of a judge giving implicit-bias instructions increased verdicts for Black plaintiffs and trust in the courts, an educational video had no effect, and neither reduced the link between explicit bias and verdicts. In a Canadian study with 1,091 community members, most comparisons showed no effect of the accused’s race, but general anti-bias instructions increased leniency when the victim was Indigenous, and general plus race-specific instructions produced harsher verdicts for White accused with racialized victims (Maeder et al., 2026). The authors urged further study before such instructions are adopted.

Related research on general impartiality instructions also found no reduction in bias. In a 2024 national survey experiment, standard instructions on the presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt, and avoiding prejudice did not measurably reduce a partisan gap, shown by both Democrats and Republicans, in verdicts for a defendant whose political affiliation was salient; the confidence intervals overlapped in every comparison, so the study does not show whether the instructions had any effect (Rhodes et al., 2025). On current evidence, the conclusion is mixed: three of the five studies summarized here found no effect of implicit-bias instructions or videos on verdicts, one civil study found that a judge’s instruction shifted verdicts toward Black plaintiffs without weakening the link between explicit bias and verdicts, and one Canadian study found unintended effects in both directions. These designs cannot show whether a shift corrects bias or adds a new one. Supporters respond that such instructions also affirm the court’s commitment to fairness. In one survey, White participants generally supported them, although more conservative participants and those skeptical of social scientists viewed them less favorably (Lawrence, Gittings, Thomas, et al., 2025).

Attitudinal Biases Favoring the Prosecution or the Defense

Jurors also differ in general attitudes toward crime and the criminal process, and those attitudes can favor either side. Kassin and Wrightsman (1983) developed the Juror Bias Scale, which measures two clusters of belief: how probable it is that a person who is charged committed the offense, and how much doubt should be required before convicting. Scores toward the prosecution end predicted guilty votes in mock trials, and scores toward the defense end predicted acquittals, although the associations were modest. Lecci and Myers (2008) later developed the Pretrial Juror Attitude Questionnaire, which measures several dimensions, including conviction proneness, system confidence, cynicism toward the defense, and racial bias, and validated it against mock-juror verdicts.

Legal authoritarianism, the tendency to favor the authority of police and prosecution over the rights of the accused, has been studied for decades. A meta-analysis by Narby, Cutler, and Moran (1993) found a positive but small association between authoritarianism and judgments of defendant culpability, and the association was stronger for measures of legal authoritarianism than for general authoritarian personality measures. The opposite tendency also exists among jurors who distrust police or the legal system. A broader meta-analysis by Devine and Caughlin (2014) found that demographic characteristics such as gender, age, race, and education had small relationships with guilt judgments, while case-relevant attitudes, including legal authoritarianism and trust in the legal system, were somewhat stronger but still modest predictors. Mock-trial research in sexual-offense cases points the same way, with attitudes about that type of case predicting verdicts more consistently than demographics (Willmott et al., 2026).

These findings explain why questioning about attitudes is both lawful and more informative than assumptions based on demographics. Selection on the basis of race, ethnicity, or sex is forbidden; asking jurors about their experiences with and attitudes toward police, the burden of proof, and the offense charged addresses the characteristics the research actually links to verdicts. Even so, the associations are modest. No questionnaire score identifies how a particular juror will vote, and, in mock-jury research, the strength of the evidence is generally a stronger predictor of verdicts than juror attitudes or demographics (Devine et al., 2001; Devine & Caughlin, 2014); bias therefore matters mainly in close or ambiguous cases.

Confirmation Bias and Coherence in Fact-Finding

Some biases arise not from attitudes jurors bring to court but from the way people process evidence. Confirmation bias is the tendency to seek, interpret, and remember information in ways that support an existing belief, which at trial may be a tentative impression formed from the opening statements or the first witness.

Carlson and Russo (2001) gave mock jurors, including prospective jurors from a jury pool, trial evidence in installments. Participants distorted their evaluations of new evidence to favor whichever verdict they were leaning toward, and the distortion was greater among prospective jurors than among students. Simon, Snow, and Read (2004) found related “coherence shifts”: as participants moved toward a decision, their evaluations of logically independent items of evidence shifted to fit the emerging conclusion. Simon (2004) argued that this bidirectional process produces decisions that feel more certain than the underlying evidence warrants.

These processes are not specific to any party or kind of juror. Their relevance to bias is that any initial tilt, whether from an attitude, pretrial publicity, or an association with the defendant’s group, can be amplified as jurors integrate the evidence.

Limits of the Evidence

Most research on juror bias uses mock jurors reading summaries or viewing abbreviated trials, often online and without deliberation, who know their decisions have no consequences. The implicit-bias literature relies on laboratory criterion measures that may not resemble verdicts, and the meta-analyses disagree partly because they made different defensible inclusion choices. Publication bias may inflate reported effects. The studies of implicit-bias instructions are few and mostly online, several could not reproduce the baseline bias they were designed to correct, and none has tested real jurors over a full trial. Participants’ concern about appearing prejudiced may suppress racial bias in experiments (Salerno et al., 2023), so laboratory tests can understate real-world bias as well as overstate it.

Most importantly, no test, scale, or study can tell a court whether a particular juror is biased or how that juror will vote. An IAT score is not a diagnosis. Group-level research can inform voir dire questions and instructions; it cannot substitute for the individualized inquiry into impartiality that the law requires.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When the IAT meta-analyses are cited, ask how large the effect is in absolute terms: correlations of r = .27 (Greenwald et al., 2009), about r = .14 (Oswald et al., 2013), and about r = .10 (Kurdi et al., 2019), roughly 1 to 7 percent of variance, describe small group-level relationships, not a basis for predicting one juror’s decision. When the Guilty/Not Guilty IAT study (Levinson, Cai, & Young, 2010) is cited to show implicit associations shape how jurors weigh evidence, ask how much evidence it rests on and whether it has held up; it is a single study with a small student sample, not replicated with deliberating juries. When instruction studies (Elek & Hannaford-Agor, 2014; Lynch, Kidd, & Shaw, 2022; Ruva et al., 2024) are cited to oppose an implicit-bias instruction, ask whether the conclusion follows from the design, since several could not reproduce the baseline bias they were testing and none involved real jurors over a full trial. When Lawrence, Gittings, Hans, and colleagues (2025) is cited to support one, ask whether a civil study with White participants applies to this case, and note that the instruction did not weaken the link between explicit bias and verdicts. And when Juror Bias Scale scores or legal-authoritarianism findings (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983; Devine & Caughlin, 2014) support a challenge, ask whether modest group associations apply to this juror. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Juror Bias and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant trial by an impartial jury. Impartiality does not require jurors without views; it requires jurors who can set their views aside and decide on the evidence. The principal tools for protecting it are voir dire, challenges for cause, and instructions; in federal court, the judge controls voir dire (Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(a)). The Supreme Court has held that questioning about racial prejudice is constitutionally required when racial issues are inextricably bound up with the trial (Ham v. South Carolina, 1973) and in capital cases involving interracial crimes (Turner v. Murray, 1986), and, in a plurality opinion resting on its supervisory authority over federal courts, that federal trial courts should ask about racial or ethnic prejudice on request when a violent crime is charged and the defendant and victim are members of different racial or ethnic groups (Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 1981).

Attitudinal bias toward either side is addressed by the same framework. In capital cases, a juror whose views on the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair performance of the juror’s duties may be excused (Wainwright v. Witt, 1985), and so must a juror who would automatically impose death (Morgan v. Illinois, 1992). Once a verdict is reached, Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) generally bars juror testimony about deliberations, and Warger v. Shauers (2014) held that the rule applies even to evidence offered to show that a juror lied during voir dire. In Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado (2017), however, the Court held that when a juror makes a clear statement indicating reliance on racial stereotypes or animus to convict, the Sixth Amendment requires the no-impeachment rule to give way so the trial court can consider the evidence. The decision concerns explicit statements of bias; it does not create a remedy for implicit bias.

No federal statute or rule requires an implicit-bias instruction. The Ninth Circuit’s model criminal instructions on the duty of the jury, given at the start of trial (Instruction 1.1) and before deliberation (Instruction 6.1), include bracketed language directing jurors not to be influenced by unconscious biases, described as stereotypes, attitudes, or preferences that people may consciously reject but express without awareness; the commentary to Instruction 1.1 refers courts to the Western District of Washington’s ten-minute juror video.

In courts-martial, the members perform the function of the jury. Article 25, UCMJ, governs their detail, and R.C.M. 912 governs voir dire and challenges. R.C.M. 912(f)(1)(N) requires removal of a member who should not sit in the interest of having the court-martial free from substantial doubt as to legality, fairness, and impartiality. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces evaluates implied bias objectively, from the standpoint of public perception of fairness, and has directed military judges to grant defense challenges liberally in close cases (United States v. Clay, 2007; United States v. Woods, 2015). Each side has one peremptory challenge. Military Rule of Evidence 606(b) parallels the federal rule, with exceptions for extraneous prejudicial information, outside influence, and unlawful command influence.

Arizona

The Arizona Constitution guarantees an accused the right to a trial by an impartial jury (Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24). Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 18.4(b) requires the court, on motion or on its own, to excuse a juror when there is a reasonable ground to believe the juror cannot render a fair and impartial verdict, and A.R.S. § 21-211 disqualifies, among others, persons interested directly or indirectly in the matter and persons biased or prejudiced in favor of or against either party. Effective January 1, 2022, the Arizona Supreme Court eliminated peremptory challenges in all criminal and civil trials (Order No. R-21-0020). Challenges for cause and voir dire under Rule 18.5 are therefore the only means of removing a juror whose attitudes may prevent impartial service, which places greater weight on questioning that elicits case-relevant attitudes.

In State v. Hickman (2003), the Arizona Supreme Court held that a trial court’s erroneous refusal to strike a juror for cause does not require reversal when the defendant removed the juror with a peremptory challenge and no biased juror sat. With peremptory challenges abolished, a juror who is not excused for cause will sit, and the significance of the cause ruling has increased accordingly. Among other state models, California’s preliminary admonitions (CALCRIM No. 101) tell jurors that people often have biases of which they are unaware, sometimes called implicit or unconscious biases, and its pre-deliberation instruction (CALCRIM No. 200, revised in 2019 and 2020) tells jurors that many people hold assumptions, biases, or stereotypes without being aware of them and directs them not to let bias affect their decision.

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports the proposition that jurors bring case-relevant attitudes to court in both directions, including distrust of police, skepticism about particular kinds of evidence, and heightened doubt thresholds, and that these attitudes predict verdicts better than demographics do. Prosecutors are well positioned to pursue attitude-based voir dire and cause challenges on those grounds, which is a lawful approach consistent with the research linking case-relevant attitudes, modestly, to verdicts, particularly in Arizona, where peremptory challenges no longer exist.

The research also counsels caution in responding to bias claims. Of the five studies summarized here, three found no effect of implicit-bias instructions or videos on verdicts, and the studies that found effects reported shifts in different directions, so current evidence does not show a consistent effect favoring either party. Arguments that implicit associations do not exist go beyond the evidence, which shows that such associations are measurable and common even though their link to individual verdicts is weak. Prosecutors also share responsibility for an untainted verdict: a juror’s explicit statement of reliance on stereotypes, if it comes to light, can require a new trial under Peña-Rodriguez, and a record that shows careful attention to impartiality bears on whether a later claim of juror bias can be evaluated.

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports the proposition that associations linking social groups to crime and guilt are widespread, that they can influence judgments of ambiguous evidence, and that bias of every kind operates most readily where discretion is broad and evidence is unclear. Defense counsel are well positioned to seek voir dire on specific case-relevant attitudes, including legal authoritarianism, assumptions about the probability that a charged person is guilty, and attitudes about the offense charged, and to request questioning on racial or ethnic prejudice where the law requires or permits it. In courts-martial, the liberal-grant mandate and the implied-bias doctrine provide a framework for challenges grounded in the appearance of fairness.

The research also counsels caution about the limits of current remedies and measures. Of the five studies summarized here, three found no effect of implicit-bias instructions or videos on verdicts; the civil study that found a shift did not find that the instruction weakened the link between explicit bias and verdicts, and the Canadian study found effects that ran against some accused. One study also found that some jurors invoked the instructions in ways that interfered with ordinary credibility assessments, an effect that could work against either party. IAT scores cannot identify biased individuals, and the meta-analyses disagree about how much the IAT predicts behavior at all. Arguments that rest on implicit-bias research are most defensible when they are presented as reasons for careful, individualized inquiry rather than as proof that a particular juror or jury was biased.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

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Legal Authorities

Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973).

Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992).

Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 580 U.S. 206 (2017).

Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981).

State v. Hickman, 205 Ariz. 192, 68 P.3d 418 (2003).

Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986).

United States v. Clay, 64 M.J. 274 (C.A.A.F. 2007).

United States v. Woods, 74 M.J. 238 (C.A.A.F. 2015).

Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985).

Warger v. Shauers, 574 U.S. 40 (2014).

U.S. Const. amend. VI.

Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24.

10 U.S.C. § 825 (Article 25, Uniform Code of Military Justice).

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21-211.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 24.

Fed. R. Evid. 606(b).

Mil. R. Evid. 606(b).

Rule for Courts-Martial 912.

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.4.

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.5.

Arizona Supreme Court Order No. R-21-0020 (2021) (abolishing peremptory challenges effective Jan. 1, 2022).

Ninth Circuit Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions, Instruction 1.1 (Duty of Jury) and Instruction 6.1 (Duties of Jury to Find Facts and Follow Law).

Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions (CALCRIM) No. 101 (rev. Sept. 2023).

Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions (CALCRIM) No. 200 (rev. Apr. 2020).

United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions on Unconscious Bias (adopted Feb. 2017).

Related topic papers: Race and Juror Decision-Making · Political Identity and Juror Bias · Voir Dire and the Detection of Juror Bias · Peremptory Challenges, Batson, and Arizona’s Abolition of Peremptories · Jury Instructions: Comprehension and Effectiveness · Court-Martial Panel Selection: Article 25, Random Selection, and Challenges

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Courts-Martial