Snap Shot
- The question: How are court-martial members chosen and challenged, and what limits does the law place on the convening authority’s choices?
- What changed: For courts-martial convened on or after December 23, 2024, the convening authority still applies the Article 25 “best qualified” criteria but must detail a larger pool (at least 16 members for a non-capital general court-martial), which the military judge randomizes. Panel sizes are fixed, and non-capital sentencing has moved to military judges.
- What the research shows: Research on military panels is thin. A DAC-IPAD study of 260 sexual offense cases found minority members detailed at rates close to service representation in the Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force but lower in the Navy; no published study located has examined members’ votes, rank effects, or outcomes since randomization.
- The law: Members may not be chosen or systematically excluded solely because of rank, or chosen by gender or race (Kirkland, Riesbeck, Jeter); court stacking is unlawful command influence; and composition alone does not show a violation (Bess). The liberal grant mandate applies to defense challenges for cause (Clay, Keago). Arizona uses random selection and has no peremptory challenges.
- Issues for each side: Case law indicates that documentation of how the pool was compiled bears on whether a selection process can be defended, and that opposing a doubtful defense challenge carries risk under the liberal grant mandate; defense counsel can examine selection records and tailor voir dire to specific attitudes, rather than relying on general claims about military culture or untested hypotheses.
A court-martial with members is the military counterpart of a jury trial. The members serve the jury’s function: they hear the evidence, receive the military judge’s instructions, and decide guilt or innocence. Throughout this paper, “member” or “panel member” refers to court-martial members and “juror” to civilian jurors. The way members are chosen has little in common with civilian jury selection. For most of the history of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), the commander who refers charges to trial, the convening authority, has also personally chosen the members, applying statutory criteria that look for the “best qualified” rather than for a cross-section of the community.
That arrangement reaches court in motions alleging improper selection or unlawful command influence, in challenges for cause, and in objections to peremptory challenges. Congress changed the system in 2022 by requiring randomized selection “to the maximum extent practicable,” and the President implemented that requirement for courts-martial convened on or after December 23, 2024. Congress has also moved non-capital sentencing from members to military judges, so members’ work now centers on findings.
This paper describes the Article 25 criteria and the debate over the convening authority’s role, the randomized-selection reform, enlisted representation and panel size, voir dire and challenges for cause, peremptory challenges and the military application of Batson v. Kentucky, and the limited empirical research on military panels. It then reviews the governing military law and contrasts it briefly with Arizona’s civilian practice.
Article 25 and the Convening Authority’s Role
Article 25, UCMJ, directs the convening authority to detail as members those persons who, in the convening authority’s opinion, are best qualified for the duty by reason of age, education, training, experience, length of service, and judicial temperament. The accuser, a prosecution witness, the preliminary hearing officer, and counsel in the case are ineligible, and when it can be avoided an accused may not be tried by a member junior in rank or grade.
In practice, subordinate commands nominate candidates, staff judge advocates compile lists, and the convening authority chooses. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (C.A.A.F.) permits reliance on staff assistance but requires the convening authority to select the members personally and to apply the statutory criteria (United States v. Benedict, 2001; United States v. Gooch, 2011). The court has held that members may not be selected or systematically excluded solely because of rank (United States v. Kirkland, 2000; United States v. Bartee, 2017), that screening out potential members because they might know about the case is not a valid criterion (Gooch, 2011), and that neither gender nor race is an Article 25 factor (United States v. Riesbeck, 2018; United States v. Jeter, 2023). Where an improper criterion was used without an improper motive and qualified members were not systematically excluded, the court has found the error harmless (United States v. Ward, 2015; United States v. Sullivan, 2015).
The Debate Over Convening-Authority Selection
Convening-authority selection has drawn criticism for decades. According to the Defense Advisory Committee on Investigation, Prosecution, and Defense of Sexual Assault in the Armed Forces (DAC-IPAD, 2023), a 1977 General Accounting Office review recommended random selection, and a 1999 Joint Service Committee study considered and declined it. The core concern is structural: the official who decides whether to refer charges also chooses who will decide them, and the officials who choose the members also command and rate them. Critics have argued that this creates at least an appearance that panels can be shaped to reach a result, a perception concern that the 2021 Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the Military also raised, as summarized by the DAC-IPAD.
The arrangement has also had defenders. Supporters, including former convening authorities who addressed the DAC-IPAD, have argued that commanders’ knowledge of their personnel allows them to choose members with sound judgment and open-mindedness, that “judicial temperament” cannot be applied by a computer, that commanders are best placed to judge who can be spared from operational duties, and that random selection could produce less experienced panels and require more members to be detailed (DAC-IPAD, 2023).
The DAC-IPAD (2023) concluded that the rationale for subjective selection had weakened because members now serve essentially as factfinders and modern personnel systems make objective selection feasible. It recommended removing the “best qualified” standard, adopting objective eligibility criteria, assigning selection to a court administrator independent of the command staff, and documenting availability and excusal decisions. As of November 2026, neither the Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act (Pub. L. No. 118-159) nor the Fiscal Year 2026 Act (Pub. L. No. 119-60) changed Article 25’s member-selection provisions: the codified text of Article 25 still contains the “best qualified” standard (10 U.S.C. § 825(e)(2)) alongside the randomization requirement added in 2022, and the codification’s amendment notes show no later substantive change to those provisions.
Randomized Selection After 2024
Section 543 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 added Article 25(e)(4), which requires the convening authority to detail members under presidential regulations for the randomized selection of qualified personnel, to the maximum extent practicable. The amendment took effect two years after enactment and applies to courts-martial convened on or after that date. Executive Order 14130, signed December 20, 2024, amended Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 503(a)(1) effective December 23, 2024.
As amended, R.C.M. 503(a)(1) still requires the convening authority to detail qualified persons as members under the criteria in Article 25, and Congress left the “best qualified” language in place. What changed is that the convening authority must detail a larger pool than will sit: at least 24 members for a capital general court-martial, 16 for a non-capital general court-martial, and 8 for a special court-martial. The convening authority provides the list to the military judge, who randomizes it under R.C.M. 911 by randomly assigning numbers to the detailed members; that randomization procedure was already in the Manual from the 2023 amendments (Exec. Order No. 14103), and Executive Order 14130 did not amend R.C.M. 911. If the convening authority determines that exceptional circumstances, such as military necessity or exigency, make the minimum pool impracticable, the convening authority must still provide enough members to permit randomization, after consulting the staff judge advocate and documenting the determination in writing.
The implemented model is therefore a hybrid: the convening authority applies the Article 25 criteria to choose the pool, and randomization determines which members of that pool are reached. Commentators have debated whether Congress intended random selection to displace the “best qualified” standard or to coexist with it, and whether the President’s model satisfies the “maximum extent practicable” requirement. no decision of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces resolving those questions was located in a November 2026 search of its 2025 and 2026 opinions, and no published study has examined whether the change has altered panel composition or outcomes.
Enlisted Members, Rank, and Panel Size
Any enlisted member on active duty is eligible to serve. Before assembly, an enlisted accused may personally request, orally on the record or in writing, either an all-officer panel or a panel in which enlisted members make up at least one-third of the membership (Article 25(c)). The request binds unless physical conditions or military exigencies make eligible members unavailable, in which case the convening authority must explain the reasons in writing. Because members should not be junior to the accused when it can be avoided, cases involving senior accused draw from a narrower pool.
Since January 1, 2019, under the Military Justice Act of 2016, panel sizes have been fixed: eight members in a non-capital general court-martial, four in a special court-martial, and twelve in a capital case (Article 29, UCMJ). Before then, panels varied in size above a statutory minimum, so the number of votes needed to convict depended on how many members remained after challenges. The convening authority may authorize alternate members, who replace members excused after impanelment. Civilian research suggests that larger groups are more likely to include minority members and to deliberate longer (Saks & Marti, 1997); it has not been replicated with military panels.
Voir Dire and Challenges for Cause
Voir dire in courts-martial typically combines written questionnaires with group and individual questioning by the military judge and counsel, within limits the military judge sets (R.C.M. 912). Because members come from the same military community as the parties and witnesses, voir dire commonly explores command and professional relationships, involvement with investigations or victim support programs, and views about the offense and the military justice system.
R.C.M. 912(f)(1)(N) requires excusal whenever a member should not sit in the interest of having the court-martial free from substantial doubt as to legality, fairness, and impartiality. C.A.A.F. reads the provision to cover two distinct grounds. Actual bias is personal bias that will not yield to the evidence and the military judge’s instructions; it turns on credibility, and the military judge’s ruling receives great deference. Implied bias is an objective test that asks whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the risk that the public will perceive that the accused received less than a fair and impartial panel is too high (United States v. Woods, 2015). Review of implied-bias rulings is less deferential than abuse of discretion but more deferential than de novo, with more deference when the military judge states the correct law and explains the ruling on the record (United States v. Peters, 2015; United States v. Keago, 2024).
Because the convening authority selects the panel and the defense has only one peremptory challenge, military judges must apply a “liberal grant mandate” and resolve close questions on defense challenges in favor of excusal (United States v. Clay, 2007). The mandate does not apply to government challenges (Keago, 2024). Reversals have involved a member who said he would be “merciless” in sentencing for rape (Clay), a member who wrote that being “guilty until proven innocent” was essential to military justice (Woods), and a ruling that relied on demeanor without addressing a member’s working relationships with trial counsel (Peters). In Keago, challenges to a member who appeared to believe that the bringing of charges proved part of the government’s case, and to another who doubted that mistake of fact was a viable defense to sexual assault, presented close questions requiring excusal. In United States v. Urieta (2025), the court reversed where a member described an accused’s retention of civilian counsel as unusual and suggestive of distrust of military counsel, holding that his agreement with leading questions did not rebut the possibility of bias.
The doctrine does not require excusal whenever a member has a connection to the subject matter. In United States v. Casillas (2025), the court upheld the denial of challenges to a member whose wife had been raped about thirty years earlier, because the military judge found the member candid and credible, considered public perception, explained the ruling on the record, and expressly applied the liberal grant mandate. Civilian research is consistent with the court’s caution about leading questions: in experiments, judicial rehabilitation changed what mock jurors reported about their own bias more than it changed how their attitudes affected their decisions (Crocker & Kovera, 2010; Salerno et al., 2021). Those studies involved civilian mock jurors, so their application to members is an inference.
Peremptory Challenges and Batson in Courts-Martial
Each side has one peremptory challenge, with an additional challenge when new members are detailed (Article 41(b), UCMJ; R.C.M. 912(g)). The military courts apply Batson through the Fifth Amendment with modifications. A timely objection to the government’s peremptory challenge of a member of a cognizable racial group requires trial counsel to give a reason without any further prima facie showing (United States v. Moore, 1989), and because members are selected as best qualified, the reason must not be unreasonable, implausible, or otherwise nonsensical (United States v. Tulloch, 1997). The court applied that framework in United States v. Thomas (2025). These rules are addressed further in this hub’s paper Peremptory Challenges, Batson, and Arizona’s Abolition of Peremptories.
What Research Shows About Military Panels
Empirical research on court-martial panels is thin. Deliberations are privileged and few researchers have had access to selection records. Most of what is known comes from government advisory bodies rather than peer-reviewed studies.
The most detailed data come from a DAC-IPAD (2024) study of 260 contested courts-martial with member panels and a finding on a sexual offense, tried in fiscal years 2021 and 2022, covering 4,376 detailed members in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. Racial and ethnic minority service members were detailed at rates close to their service representation in the Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force; in the Navy they were detailed at a significantly lower rate (about 43 percent versus 53 percent of the service). Once detailed, minority and white members were impaneled at broadly similar rates, and differences in peremptory-challenge excusals by race were not statistically significant. Women were detailed at or above their service representation in the Army and Air Force but below it in the Navy, and in every service detailed women were impaneled at lower rates than detailed men (the study did not examine why). In the Army, panels in cases with a minority accused had a higher proportion of minority members than panels in cases with a white accused. Across all 260 cases, 35.5 percent ended in a guilty finding on a sexual offense; the study did not examine why, and the figure is not comparable to civilian conviction rates without accounting for differences in charging and case selection. The study described composition, not decision-making, and predates randomized selection; its limits are noted below.
Older evidence is indirect: the DAC-IPAD (2023) describes a thirteen-month randomized-selection test at Fort Riley, Kansas, in 1973, which increased participation by warrant officers and lower- and middle-grade enlisted members and was associated with more requests for enlisted panels.
No published study located for this paper has measured how panel members’ attitudes relate to their votes, compared members with civilian jurors deciding the same case, or tested whether rank influences deliberation. Commentators have offered competing hypotheses. One forensic psychiatry article argued that sexual assault prevention training and leadership messaging could predispose some members toward conviction, while acknowledging that its explanations had not been tested in a military context (Umbrasas, 2020). Others have suggested that members’ experience supports careful factfinding, or that rank differences could inhibit junior members. None of these propositions has been tested directly. The most relevant general research is the civilian finding that attitudes predict verdicts better than demographic characteristics, although both associations are modest (Devine & Caughlin, 2014), which is consistent with the military courts’ emphasis on what members say in voir dire rather than on their background.
Limits of the Evidence
The research base for military panels consists largely of descriptive government studies and secondhand accounts of decades-old experiments. The DAC-IPAD composition study is the most rigorous, but it covered only sexual offense cases over two fiscal years, excluded members of unknown race or ethnicity (13 percent overall), aggregated minority groups, and relied on service data it could not verify; it cannot show why particular members were selected or excused. The civilian research cited here relies mainly on mock jurors, often students or online participants, deciding abbreviated cases without real consequences, and none of it involved service members deliberating with superiors and subordinates.
Randomized selection is too recent for outcome data. No study can determine whether a particular member was biased, whether a particular convening authority acted with an improper motive, or whether a particular verdict would have differed with a different panel. Those are questions for the record in each case.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When the DAC-IPAD (2024) study is cited to show that minority service members are detailed at rates close to their service representation, ask what exactly was counted: the study covered only sexual offense cases from two fiscal years, excluded members of unknown race or ethnicity (13 percent overall), aggregated minority groups, and found a lower rate in the Navy (about 43 percent versus 53 percent). When its 35.5 percent guilty-finding figure is offered, ask who was studied and compared with whom, since the study did not examine why and the figure is not comparable to civilian conviction rates without accounting for charging and case selection. When Umbrasas (2020) is cited for the view that prevention training predisposes members toward conviction, ask whether the claim has been tested; the article acknowledged that its explanations had not been tested in a military context. And when civilian findings on rehabilitation (Crocker & Kovera, 2010; Salerno et al., 2021) or panel size (Saks & Marti, 1997) are applied to members, ask whether they apply to this panel, because none involved service members deliberating with superiors and subordinates. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Court-Martial Panel Selection and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
The Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial right, including its fair-cross-section requirement, does not apply to courts-martial, so service members are not entitled to a panel drawn from a representative cross-section of the military community (Riesbeck, 2018). An accused does have a due process and statutory right to a fair and impartial panel (Gooch, 2011; Urieta, 2025), and Article 37, UCMJ, prohibits unlawful command influence. Intentionally selecting members to achieve a particular result, often called court stacking, is a form of unlawful command influence. In United States v. Smith (1988), the Court of Military Appeals rejected a convening authority’s intentional selection of women in a sex offense case. In Riesbeck, officials deliberately selected women, producing a detailed group that was about 70 percent female and a seated panel of five women, four of them victim advocates, in a sexual assault case. Because the government did not prove a benign purpose beyond a reasonable doubt, or harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt, C.A.A.F. dismissed the charges with prejudice; it also held that such claims are not waived by failure to object at trial. United States v. Dowty (2004) identified three considerations in evaluating a selection process: improper motive to pack the pool, systematic exclusion of qualified persons on an impermissible variable such as rank, and good-faith efforts at inclusiveness, to which courts defer, while cautioning that a desire for representativeness cannot be a subterfuge to pack a panel.
On race, United States v. Bess (2020) held that an accused has no right to members of his own race, that the absence of minority members is not a violation absent intentional exclusion or improper motive, and that the presumption of regularity applies to convening authorities; the majority declined to extend Batson to the convening authority’s selection, over dissents. In Jeter (2023), C.A.A.F. abrogated United States v. Crawford (1964), which had approved race-conscious selection to increase minority representation (the abrogation does not address Crawford‘s Article 25 rank-exclusion discussion), and held that a convening authority may neither exclude nor intentionally include prospective members based on race. Once the accused makes a prima facie showing that race played a role, a presumption arises that the panel was improperly constituted, which the government must rebut; in Jeter it could not explain how the members were chosen, and the findings and sentence were set aside.
Under Article 52, UCMJ, conviction requires the concurrence of at least three-fourths of the members present, in capital as well as non-capital cases; a sentence of death may be adjudged only if the members unanimously find the accused guilty of the capital offense (or the military judge accepts a guilty plea to it) and unanimously determine that the sentence shall include death, and R.C.M. 1004 requires further unanimous findings on aggravating factors. For offenses committed after December 27, 2023, the military judge determines the sentence in non-capital cases (Articles 25(d) and 53, UCMJ). These rules, and C.A.A.F.’s holding that Ramos v. Louisiana does not require unanimity in courts-martial, are discussed in this hub’s paper Deliberation, Unanimity, and Court-Martial Verdicts.
Arizona Contrast
Arizona jury selection begins from a master jury list compiled from voter registration and driver license and identification records (A.R.S. § 21-301), and courts must use random selection to choose the persons to be qualified or summoned (A.R.S. § 21-313); statutory disqualifications are set by A.R.S. § 21-211. No official chooses individual jurors. Since January 1, 2022, Arizona has had no peremptory challenges in criminal or civil cases (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order No. R-21-0020). Jurors may be removed only for cause, by good-faith stipulation, or for statutory disqualification, and a challenge for cause must be granted when there is reasonable ground to believe the juror cannot render a fair and impartial verdict (Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.4(b); McMurdie et al., 2024). In both systems, therefore, the decisive record on impartiality is made in voir dire and in rulings on challenges for cause; a court-martial accused has a single peremptory, and an Arizona defendant has none.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The available data indicate that, in the sexual offense cases studied, minority members were detailed and impaneled at rates broadly similar to their representation in the Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force (lower in the Navy), and that peremptory-challenge excusals did not differ significantly by race. The law presumes regularity in the convening authority’s conduct and requires more than statistics or the composition of a single panel to establish improper selection (Bess, 2020; Riesbeck, 2018). Case law indicates that documentation bears on whether a selection process can be defended against a challenge, including how the member pool was compiled, how the Article 25 criteria were applied, how availability and excusal decisions were made, and, under the 2024 rules, any determination that the minimum pool was impracticable. Jeter shows that a selection process that cannot be explained on the record may itself require reversal.
The case law also counsels caution. Efforts to select members by gender or race, even to increase representation, are impermissible (Riesbeck, 2018; Jeter, 2023), although Dowty (2004) recognizes that good-faith inclusiveness efforts without an improper motive receive deference, and the government bears a heavy burden once improper selection is raised. On challenges for cause, Keago and Urieta show that a member’s agreement with leading rehabilitative questions does not cure an implied-bias problem, and the civilian research on rehabilitation is consistent with that caution (an inference from civilian studies). Because the liberal grant mandate applies to defense challenges and an unexplained denial of a close challenge receives little deference, opposing a doubtful challenge carries risk of reversal.
Special Issues for Defense
Case law indicates that the defense can examine the selection process: nomination instructions, questionnaires, excusal records, and the information given to the convening authority may reveal an improper criterion, a systematic exclusion, or an unexplained selection, and Riesbeck and Jeter place the burden on the government once the issue is raised by evidence. The liberal grant mandate, the sliding standard of review, and the reversals in Keago and Urieta bear on voir dire focused on specific attitudes, such as views about the presumption of innocence, defenses such as mistake of fact, and the defense function itself, and on whether to ask the military judge to address implied bias separately on the record.
The research and the case law also counsel caution. The DAC-IPAD data do not show racial underrepresentation among detailed members in the Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force, although the Navy rate was lower, and Bess holds that a panel’s composition, without evidence of intent or improper criteria, does not establish a violation. Casillas shows that a member’s personal connection to the subject of the case does not require excusal when the record shows candor and careful analysis. Claims that members as a group are predisposed toward conviction, or that randomization has changed outcomes, rest on untested hypotheses. Selection challenges grounded in documents and voir dire answers rest on firmer footing than general assertions about military culture.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Crocker, C. B., & Kovera, M. B. (2010). The effects of rehabilitative voir dire on juror bias and decision making. Law and Human Behavior, 34(3), 212–226. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-009-9193-9
Defense Advisory Committee on Investigation, Prosecution, and Defense of Sexual Assault in the Armed Forces. (2023). Randomizing court-martial panel member selection: A report on improving an outdated system. U.S. Department of Defense. https://dacipad.whs.mil/sites/default/files/Public/08-Reports/DACIPAD_Report-Randomizing-Member-Selection_Final_20231219.pdf
Defense Advisory Committee on Investigation, Prosecution, and Defense of Sexual Assault in the Armed Forces. (2024). Exploring the race, ethnicity, and gender of military panels at courts-martial. U.S. Department of Defense. https://dacipad.whs.mil/images/Docs/Reports/DACIPAD_2024-Panel-Selection-Demographics_Final%20Report%20002.pdf
Devine, D. J., & Caughlin, D. E. (2014). Do they matter? A meta-analytic investigation of individual characteristics and guilt judgments. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 20(2), 109–134. https://doi.org/10.1037/law0000006
McMurdie, P. J., Carroll, L., Freed, R., & Wilkins, E. M. (2024). Arizona’s elimination of peremptory challenges: A first look. Arizona State Law Journal, 56, 1793.
Saks, M. J., & Marti, M. W. (1997). A meta-analysis of the effects of jury size. Law and Human Behavior, 21(5), 451–467. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024819605652
Salerno, J. M., Campbell, J. C., Phalen, H. J., Bean, S. R., Hans, V. P., Spivack, D., & Ross, L. (2021). The impact of minimal versus extended voir dire and judicial rehabilitation on mock jurors’ decisions in civil cases. Law and Human Behavior, 45(4), 336–355. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000455
Umbrasas, K. (2020). Panel bias during sexual assault courts-martial. Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 48(3), 350–357.
Legal Authorities
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83 (2020).
United States v. Bartee, 76 M.J. 141 (C.A.A.F. 2017).
United States v. Benedict, 55 M.J. 451 (C.A.A.F. 2001).
United States v. Bess, 80 M.J. 1 (C.A.A.F. 2020).
United States v. Casillas, 86 M.J. 94 (C.A.A.F. 2025).
United States v. Clay, 64 M.J. 274 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
United States v. Crawford, 15 C.M.A. 31, 35 C.M.R. 3 (1964), abrogated in part by United States v. Jeter, 84 M.J. 68 (C.A.A.F. 2023).
United States v. Dowty, 60 M.J. 163 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
United States v. Gooch, 69 M.J. 353 (C.A.A.F. 2011).
United States v. Jeter, 84 M.J. 68 (C.A.A.F. 2023).
United States v. Keago, 84 M.J. 367 (C.A.A.F. 2024).
United States v. Kirkland, 53 M.J. 22 (C.A.A.F. 2000).
United States v. Moore, 28 M.J. 366 (C.M.A. 1989).
United States v. Peters, 74 M.J. 31 (C.A.A.F. 2015).
United States v. Riesbeck, 77 M.J. 154 (C.A.A.F. 2018).
United States v. Smith, 27 M.J. 242 (C.M.A. 1988).
United States v. Sullivan, 74 M.J. 448 (C.A.A.F. 2015).
United States v. Thomas, 86 M.J. 15 (C.A.A.F. 2025).
United States v. Tulloch, 47 M.J. 283 (C.A.A.F. 1997).
United States v. Urieta, 85 M.J. 352 (C.A.A.F. 2025).
United States v. Ward, 74 M.J. 225 (C.A.A.F. 2015).
United States v. Woods, 74 M.J. 238 (C.A.A.F. 2015).
U.S. Const. amend. V.
U.S. Const. amend. VI.
10 U.S.C. § 825 (Article 25, Uniform Code of Military Justice), as amended by the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, Pub. L. No. 117-263, § 543 (2022).
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025, Pub. L. No. 118-159 (2024); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026, Pub. L. No. 119-60 (2025).
10 U.S.C. § 829 (Article 29, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
10 U.S.C. § 837 (Article 37, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
10 U.S.C. § 841 (Article 41, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
10 U.S.C. § 852 (Article 52, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
10 U.S.C. § 853 (Article 53, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21-211.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21-301.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21-313.
Exec. Order No. 14103, 2023 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 88 Fed. Reg. 50535 (Aug. 2, 2023).
Exec. Order No. 14130, 2024 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 89 Fed. Reg. 105343 (Dec. 27, 2024).
R.C.M. 503(a).
R.C.M. 911.
R.C.M. 912.
R.C.M. 1004.
Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order No. R-21-0020 (Aug. 30, 2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2022).
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.4.
Related topic papers: Voir Dire and the Detection of Juror Bias · Peremptory Challenges, Batson, and Arizona’s Abolition of Peremptories · Deliberation, Unanimity, and Court-Martial Verdicts · Jury Diversity, Representativeness, and Deliberation · Juror Demographics and Verdicts: What Predicts Guilt Judgments
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Courts-Martial