Snap Shot
- The question: How do juries and panels deliberate, and do rules on unanimity, deadlock, and size affect how verdicts are reached?
- What the research shows: The strength of the evidence is the most important determinant of verdicts, and the first-ballot majority usually prevails. In mock-jury research, factions favoring acquittal were more influential than equal factions favoring conviction, a group-level tendency tied to the reasonable-doubt standard, although later work has debated its size and generality. In mock-jury studies, majority rules shortened deliberation and reduced attention to minority views, and traditional “dynamite” charges pressured holdouts.
- What it does not show: Much of the research is decades old and relies on mock juries; this review identified no published study of court-martial deliberation. The research cannot show how a particular jury reached its verdict or whether a holdout was reasonable, and it does not settle the value judgments in the unanimity debate.
- The law: Ramos requires unanimity to convict of a serious offense in federal and state courts, and Arizona requires unanimous criminal verdicts. Courts-martial convict on three-fourths of members by secret ballot, and a shortfall is an acquittal; Anderson held that Ramos does not apply to courts-martial. Arizona Rule 22.4 lets the court ask a deadlocked jury how it can assist.
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors are likely to encounter the research on evidence strength, hung juries, and impasse procedures, and defense counsel the research on majority rules and dynamite charges; for each side the record is not one-sided and court-martial claims rest on analogy.
Most of what happens at trial is designed for the moment when the factfinders retire to decide. Deliberation is the stage at which individual impressions of the evidence become a collective verdict, and the rules governing it — how many people decide, how many must agree, and what happens when they cannot — differ markedly across the systems in which attorneys practice. A federal criminal jury of twelve must be unanimous. An Arizona felony jury has twelve or eight members depending on the authorized sentence, and must also be unanimous. A non-capital general court-martial panel of eight members convicts on the vote of six, by secret written ballot, and a vote that falls short is an acquittal rather than a mistrial.
Those differences reach court in several ways: in constitutional challenges to non-unanimous verdicts, in disputes over supplemental instructions to deadlocked juries, in decisions about jury size and the number of alternates, and in arguments about what the deliberation rules imply for the reliability of verdicts. Social scientists have studied deliberation for more than half a century, using real-juror interviews, archival data, and mock juries, and in one unusual Arizona project, videotapes of actual civil deliberations.
This paper summarizes that research on deliberation styles, the first ballot, the asymmetry in influence that favors acquittal, decision rules, hung juries and “dynamite” instructions, and jury size. It then describes voting in courts-martial and reviews the governing federal, military, and Arizona law. Throughout, “juror” refers to civilian jurors and “member” or “panel member” to court-martial members, who serve the jury’s function in a court-martial with members.
How Juries Deliberate
The most detailed early study of deliberation is Inside the Jury (Hastie et al., 1983). The researchers recruited people from Massachusetts jury pools, formed 69 twelve-person mock juries, showed them a filmed reenactment of a murder trial, and recorded their deliberations. They identified two broad styles. In verdict-driven deliberation, juries begin with a public vote and organize discussion around the competing verdict positions, with jurors citing evidence to support their side. In evidence-driven deliberation, juries review the evidence and attempt to construct an account of events before voting, often postponing a formal ballot. Evidence-driven juries tended to deliberate longer and to discuss the evidence more systematically, although deliberation style was not strongly related to which verdict a jury reached.
The distinction matters because the timing of the first vote shapes what follows. An early public ballot commits jurors to positions, and later discussion tends to be organized around defending or attacking those positions. A later or secret ballot allows more discussion before commitment. Juries choose their own procedures in most civilian systems; in courts-martial, as described below, the rules prescribe secret written ballots.
Later research has generally confirmed that deliberation does real work. A comprehensive review of 45 years of research on deliberating groups found that deliberation corrects some individual errors, that jurors pool their recollections, and that the strength of the evidence is the most important determinant of verdicts (Devine et al., 2001). Field data from 179 criminal trials reached a similar conclusion: ratings of evidence strength closely tracked verdicts, and some case characteristics were associated with verdicts only when the prosecution’s evidence was of moderate strength (Devine et al., 2009). Real juries also agree with the trial judge’s view of the case in most cases. In a partial replication of Kalven and Zeisel’s (1966, as cited in Eisenberg et al., 2005) classic study using cases from four jurisdictions, judges and juries agreed at essentially the same rate as in the original study, roughly three-quarters of cases, and when they disagreed the judge more often would have convicted where the jury acquitted (Eisenberg et al., 2005). Deliberation does not always bring key issues to the surface, however. In a content analysis of mock juries of up to 12 members who watched an actual coerced false confession, some jurors identified the coercive elements, but jurors seldom mentioned police coercion, contamination, promises of leniency, or the length of the interrogation, and many attributed the confession to guilt (Stevenson et al., 2023).
Virtual deliberation has also been compared directly with in-person deliberation. In 54 mock juries of community members deciding a civil auto-accident case, in-person and virtual juries did not differ on most outcomes; in-person juries interrupted each other more and discussed more topics, while virtual jurors reported more effort (Reed et al., 2026).
The First Ballot and the Direction of Influence
A robust finding is that the verdict favored by a majority on the first ballot usually becomes the final verdict. Kalven and Zeisel (1966, as cited in Devine, 2012) reconstructed the first vote in 225 criminal jury trials from post-trial juror interviews. In the 215 trials in which the first vote was not evenly divided, the jury’s final verdict matched the first-vote majority in 91 percent, roughly nine in ten, and evenly split juries convicted about half the time (Devine, 2012, pp. 159-160). Devine’s review concludes that initial majority factions usually prevail but notes how little is known about civil juries, multiple charges, and verdict options beyond guilty and not guilty (Devine, 2012, pp. 160-161). The finding suggests that deliberation more often confirms the verdict favored at the outset than reverses it. Sandys and Dillehay (1995), interviewing people who had served on felony juries, confirmed that first ballots predicted verdicts at a high level, but found that many juries discussed the case before taking a first ballot. Some influence therefore occurs before any vote, and first-ballot positions are not a pure measure of where jurors started.
The minority does not always yield, and influence is not symmetrical. In a series of mock-jury experiments and a review of earlier data, MacCoun and Kerr (1988) found that factions favoring acquittal were more influential than equally sized factions favoring conviction, so that evenly split juries more often ended in acquittal. The authors linked this leniency asymmetry to the reasonable-doubt standard: a juror arguing for acquittal needs only to establish doubt, while a juror arguing for conviction must eliminate it. The asymmetry is a group-level tendency, not a rule, and it can be overcome by strong evidence; later work has debated how large and how general it is. Because it is tied to the burden of proof, the asymmetry may reflect the reasonable-doubt standard operating as designed. Recent mock-jury studies show a similar shift, though neither was designed to test the asymmetry. In 70 juries made up mostly of students, 26.0% of individual jurors favored conviction before deliberation, but only 5.8% of the juries convicted (jurors and juries are different units); the authors suggested that the low cost of a mistaken acquittal in a simulation may have contributed (Maeder et al., 2026). In five- to six-person student juries hearing a murder case, jurors who first voted guilty were the more likely to change their votes (Golding et al., 2022).
The predictive power of the first ballot suggests that the evidence and arguments heard at trial do most of the work. The leniency asymmetry suggests that a minority view favoring acquittal can prevail in deliberation, which is one reason decision rules that allow a verdict without addressing the minority have drawn concern.
Unanimity and Majority Decision Rules
Inside the Jury compared juries instructed to reach unanimous verdicts with juries permitted to return verdicts by ten-of-twelve or eight-of-twelve majorities (Hastie et al., 1983). The distribution of verdicts did not differ greatly across rules, but the process did. Majority-rule juries deliberated for less time, often stopped deliberating once the required majority was reached, and gave less attention to members in the minority, who participated less; jurors in majority-rule juries also rated their deliberations as less thorough. Unanimous juries tended to delay their first vote, discussed the evidence more fully, and were more likely to correct errors raised during discussion, and they hung more often. The most severe verdict, first-degree murder, which the researchers regarded as legally incorrect on the evidence, was returned only by majority-rule juries.
The Arizona Jury Project, in which researchers with court approval videotaped the deliberations of 50 real civil juries in Pima County operating under Arizona’s rule that six of eight jurors may return a civil verdict, provides rare field evidence (Diamond et al., 2006). Sixteen juries returned non-unanimous verdicts. The holdouts did not differ from other jurors in background, spoke as much as other jurors, and based their positions on the evidence, chiefly on credibility, rather than on misunderstanding or eccentric views. The authors judged that the majority view would probably have prevailed in most of these cases under a unanimity rule. They also found that some majorities invoked the quorum to end debate, that the trial judge agreed with the holdouts in several cases, and that jurors on non-unanimous juries, holdouts and majority alike, rated their deliberations as less thorough and open-minded. The authors concluded that the benefits of unanimity outweigh its costs. The study involved civil cases and a three-quarters rule, so it does not directly test criminal juries.
The research thus supports competing positions in the unanimity debate. Proponents of unanimity point to evidence that majority rules shorten deliberation, reduce attention to minority views, and lower jurors’ confidence in the fairness of the process, and they emphasize unanimity’s role in requiring the group to address every juror’s doubts. Proponents of majority rules point to evidence that unanimity increases hung juries and the cost of retrials, that a single holdout can block a verdict supported by the rest of the jury, and that in the one field study of real majority-rule deliberations the majority view would probably have prevailed in most cases even under unanimity. One recent review of research on sexual offence trials noted the argument that, under a unanimity rule, a small number of jurors holding beliefs about complainant behavior that research does not support could prevent a conviction (Leverick et al., 2025); the empirical record does not show whether that occurs in any particular case. The empirical record does not resolve these value judgments, which concern how the system should weigh the risk of erroneous convictions, erroneous acquittals, and retrials.
The form of the verdict question can also matter. In two civil defamation experiments, one with deliberation, mock jurors using a general verdict form found for the plaintiff more often than those using a special verdict form or a form requiring reasons (Burd et al., 2025). In a staged murder trial in Scotland, 227 mock jurors convicted more often under a guilty/not guilty system than under a proven/not proven system or a three-verdict system that added not proven (Curley et al., 2022). Whether such effects extend to court-martial findings worksheets is untested.
Hung Juries and Supplemental Instructions
The most comprehensive study of hung juries in American courts was conducted for the National Institute of Justice by the National Center for State Courts (Hannaford-Agor et al., 2002). It combined a survey of federal and state courts with an in-depth study of nearly 400 felony trials in four jurisdictions. Hung-jury rates averaged about 6.2 percent in the state courts surveyed, with considerable variation, and about 2.5 percent in federal criminal trials from 1980 to 1997. Hung juries were consistently associated with weak or closely balanced evidence, problematic deliberations, and jurors’ perceptions of unfairness; hung-jury rates were not correlated with community characteristics such as diversity or crime rates. Juries that hung rated their cases as more complex, and complexity ratings were lower where jurors could submit questions to witnesses.
When a jury reports a deadlock, courts may give a supplemental instruction urging further deliberation. The traditional form, approved in Allen v. United States (1896), asks jurors in the minority to reconsider whether their doubt is reasonable in light of the majority’s views, which is why it is sometimes called the “dynamite charge.” Mock-jury research has examined its effects. In one study, minority jurors who received the charge felt more coerced and were more likely to change their votes, and majority jurors applied increasing pressure (Kassin et al., 1990). In a study of 63 deadlocked mock juries, the charge produced similar pressure on minority jurors and, in juries leaning toward conviction, faster verdicts (Smith & Kassin, 1993). These findings are consistent with the concern that the traditional charge can pressure holdouts rather than encourage fresh consideration of the evidence, although the experiments are few and used mock juries. Arizona’s approach, described below, is to ask the jury how the court might assist rather than to urge the minority to reconsider.
Jury Size
In Williams v. Florida (1970), the Supreme Court held that a six-person jury in a non-capital felony case satisfies the Sixth Amendment, relying in part on the premise that smaller juries would perform no differently. In Ballew v. Georgia (1978), citing social science research, the Court held that five-person juries are too small. A meta-analysis of 17 studies comparing six- and twelve-person juries, covering more than 2,000 juries, found that larger juries were more likely to include members of minority groups, deliberated longer, hung more often, and possibly recalled testimony more accurately (Saks & Marti, 1997). Size thus affects both representativeness and the breadth of perspectives available in deliberation, which bears on Arizona’s eight-person felony juries and on fixed court-martial panel sizes. Jury size and diversity are addressed further in this hub’s paper Jury Diversity, Representativeness, and Deliberation.
Deliberation in Courts-Martial
Court-martial deliberation differs from civilian deliberation in structure. Since January 1, 2019, under the Military Justice Act of 2016, panel sizes are fixed: eight members in a non-capital general court-martial, four in a special court-martial, and twelve in a capital case (Article 29, UCMJ). Conviction requires the concurrence of at least three-fourths of the members present when the vote is taken (Article 52, UCMJ), which on a full eight-member panel means six votes; before 2019 the requirement was two-thirds. A sentence of death requires both a unanimous finding of guilty of an offense punishable by death and a unanimous vote for death. Members vote on findings by secret written ballot; the junior member counts the votes, and the president checks the count and announces the result to the members (Article 51, UCMJ; R.C.M. 921). If fewer than the required number vote for a finding of guilty, the result is a finding of not guilty. A court-martial therefore cannot hang on findings in the way a civilian jury can, and a ballot short of the required majority produces an acquittal rather than a mistrial and possible retrial. A finding may be reconsidered before it is announced under the procedures of R.C.M. 924.
For offenses committed after December 27, 2023, the military judge, not the members, determines the sentence in non-capital cases, under sentencing parameters; in capital cases, members determine whether death or life without eligibility for parole will be imposed (Article 53, UCMJ). Members’ deliberations therefore now concern findings in nearly all cases.
This review identified no published empirical research on court-martial deliberation. Members’ deliberations are privileged (Mil. R. Evid. 509), and members are selected by the convening authority under criteria and procedures that differ from civilian jury selection, as described in this hub’s paper Court-Martial Panel Selection: Article 25, Random Selection, and Challenges. Because Article 25 directs selection by criteria that include age, education, training, experience, length of service, and judicial temperament, panels may differ from civilian juries in those respects; for courts-martial convened on or after December 23, 2024, the convening authority details a larger pool that the military judge randomizes. Members deliberate alongside others of different rank. The secret ballot is understood as a safeguard against the influence of rank; the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has described it as protecting junior members from the influence of senior members (United States v. Anderson, 2023); whether it fully offsets status effects has not been studied. Whether civilian findings about majority rules, the first ballot, and the leniency asymmetry apply to such panels is an open question; applying them to courts-martial is an inference, not a finding.
Limits of the Evidence
Much of the research on deliberation is decades old. Inside the Jury and the core leniency research date from the 1980s, although recent mock-jury studies show a similar leniency shift, Kalven and Zeisel’s data from the 1950s, and the jury-size research largely from the 1970s. Mock juries deliberate briefly over abbreviated trials without real consequences, often with student participants. Real-juror interview studies depend on jurors’ recollection and willingness to report, and archival studies cannot observe deliberation directly. The Arizona Jury Project is a rare exception, but it involved civil cases under a specific three-quarters rule.
Several findings are well replicated, including the predictive power of the first ballot and the association of hung juries with weak or closely balanced evidence; others, such as the effects of specific supplemental instructions, rest on a small number of experiments. This review identified no published study of deliberation in courts-martial. None of this research can determine how a particular jury or panel reached its verdict, whether a particular verdict was correct, or whether a particular holdout’s position was reasonable. The research describes tendencies of groups, not the reasoning of any individual juror or member.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When Inside the Jury (Hastie et al., 1983) is cited to argue that the three-fourths rule in courts-martial cuts deliberation short, ask whether the finding applies to this panel: it involved 69 mock juries watching a filmed reenactment in the 1980s, and this review identified no published study of court-martial deliberation, which uses secret written ballots. When the Arizona Jury Project (Diamond et al., 2006) is cited for the point that the majority would probably have prevailed under unanimity, ask who was studied and how much evidence the point rests on: sixteen non-unanimous verdicts among 50 civil juries operating under a three-quarters civil rule. When the dynamite-charge experiments (Kassin et al., 1990; Smith & Kassin, 1993) are cited, ask whether the finding has held up, since the effects of specific supplemental instructions rest on a small number of mock-jury experiments. And when the leniency asymmetry (MacCoun & Kerr, 1988) is offered, ask whether a group-level tendency that strong evidence can overcome applies to this jury’s verdict or this holdout’s reasoning. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Deliberation, Unanimity, and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
In Ramos v. Louisiana (2020), the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires a unanimous verdict to convict of a serious offense in both federal and state courts, overruling Apodaca v. Oregon (1972); the Court discussed the origins of Louisiana’s and Oregon’s non-unanimity rules. In Edwards v. Vannoy (2021), the Court held that Ramos does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(a) requires a unanimous verdict returned in open court, Rule 31(d) permits polling the jury, and Rule 23(b) provides for a twelve-person jury, with limited provision for fewer jurors by stipulation or court order. Williams v. Florida (1970) and Ballew v. Georgia (1978) govern minimum jury size in state cases, and Burch v. Louisiana (1979) held that a six-person jury must be unanimous.
Supplemental instructions to deadlocked juries are evaluated for coercion. The Supreme Court approved the Allen charge in 1896, held a judge’s statement that the jury had to reach a decision coercive in context in Jenkins v. United States (1965), a decision the Court has since described as resting on its supervisory power over federal trials rather than on a constitutional rule, and in Lowenfield v. Phelps (1988) upheld a supplemental instruction and polling in a capital sentencing proceeding after examining the instruction in its context and under all the circumstances. Lowenfield left open that other combinations might be coercive, and it is not a rule about guilt-phase unanimity or court-martial verdicts.
In courts-martial, Article 52, UCMJ, requires three-fourths concurrence for conviction and unanimity, both on findings and on the sentence, before death may be adjudged. In United States v. Anderson (2023), an Air Force case, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held that Ramos does not require unanimous verdicts in courts-martial, reasoning that the Sixth Amendment jury-trial right does not apply to courts-martial and that neither Fifth Amendment due process nor equal protection requires unanimity; the court pointed to the long history of non-unanimous courts-martial and to safeguards such as the secret ballot. The Supreme Court denied certiorari on February 20, 2024. Proponents of the current rule note Congress’s constitutional authority to regulate the armed forces, the historic use of non-unanimous verdicts in courts-martial, and the fact that a vote short of three-fourths produces an acquittal rather than a retrial. Critics note that an eight-member panel may convict over two dissents and point to civilian research indicating that majority rules can shorten deliberation and reduce attention to minority views. Article 29, UCMJ, fixes panel sizes; Article 51 requires secret written ballots; Article 53 assigns sentencing to the military judge for offenses committed after December 27, 2023; and Military Rules of Evidence 509 and 606(b) protect the secrecy of deliberations, subject to limited exceptions.
Arizona
The Arizona Constitution requires a twelve-person jury in criminal cases in which death or imprisonment for thirty years or more is authorized by law, and requires the unanimous consent of the jurors to render a verdict in all criminal cases (Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 23). Under A.R.S. § 21-102, other criminal juries in courts of record consist of eight persons, who must also be unanimous; civil juries consist of eight persons, six of whom may return a verdict; and the parties may agree before verdict to accept a verdict from fewer jurors. Because the jury size depends on the sentence authorized by law, the charging decision determines whether an eight- or twelve-person jury will hear the case.
Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 22.4, adopted as part of the state’s 1995 jury reforms, permits the court, when a jury reports an impasse, to ask the jurors in the parties’ presence whether and how the court and counsel can assist their deliberations, and then to direct further proceedings as appropriate. The rule’s approach — identifying the source of the difficulty, such as a question about the law or the evidence, rather than urging minority jurors to reconsider — is consistent with the research showing that hung juries are associated with confusion and complexity as well as with closely balanced evidence, and with the experimental evidence that traditional dynamite charges pressure holdouts. Any additional instruction remains subject to review for coercion.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research is relevant to the view that verdicts are driven mainly by the strength of the evidence, that real juries agree with judges in most cases, and that deliberation pools jurors’ recollections and corrects some individual errors. Hung juries are associated with weak or closely balanced evidence and with complexity and perceived unfairness, which bears on how evidence is presented and charged. In Arizona, the impasse procedure of Rule 22.4 allows the court to address a jury’s specific difficulty, and the experimental research on pressure is relevant to how that procedure is used.
The research also counsels caution. Experimental evidence indicates that supplemental instructions urging minority jurors to reconsider can produce coerced vote changes, and verdicts obtained that way carry appellate risk. The leniency asymmetry reflects the reasonable-doubt standard, so a minority favoring acquittal may legitimately prevail. In courts-martial, the three-fourths rule has been upheld in Anderson, but the civilian research on majority rules suggests only that a deliberation addressing dissenting members’ concerns may bear on how a verdict is viewed.
Special Issues for Defense
The research is relevant to concerns that majority decision rules can shorten deliberation and reduce attention to minority views, that traditional dynamite charges place pressure on holdouts, and that larger juries are more representative and hang more often. Those findings bear on objections to supplemental instructions, on requests for the full jury size the law allows, and on arguments about the three-fourths rule in courts-martial, while recognizing that Anderson rejected the constitutional challenge and that the Supreme Court denied review. The secret ballot and the rule that a vote short of three-fourths is an acquittal are also protections for the accused that have no civilian equivalent.
The research also counsels caution. The Arizona Jury Project, although its authors favored unanimity, found that holdouts were not idiosyncratic and judged that most outcomes would probably have been the same under a unanimity rule, so the empirical record on majority rules is not one-sided. The strong predictive power of the first ballot and of evidence strength suggests that deliberation rules are less likely to change the outcome when the evidence strongly favors one side. And because there is no empirical research on court-martial deliberation, claims about how members actually deliberate under the three-fourths rule rest on analogy rather than direct evidence.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
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Diamond, S. S., Rose, M. R., & Murphy, B. (2006). Revisiting the unanimity requirement: The behavior of the non-unanimous civil jury. Northwestern University Law Review, 100(1), 201–230.
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Kassin, S. M., Smith, V. L., & Tulloch, W. F. (1990). The dynamite charge: Effects on the perceptions and deliberation behavior of mock jurors. Law and Human Behavior, 14(6), 537–550. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01044880
Leverick, F., Chalmers, J., Keane, E., & Kinghan, J. (2025). Rape myths and jury decision making: An evidence review. University of Glasgow.
MacCoun, R. J., & Kerr, N. L. (1988). Asymmetric influence in mock jury deliberation: Jurors’ bias for leniency. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54(1), 21–33. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.54.1.21
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Legal Authorities
Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979).
Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U.S. 255 (2021).
Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445 (1965).
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988).
Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83 (2020).
United States v. Anderson, 83 M.J. 291 (C.A.A.F. 2023), cert. denied, No. 23-437 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2024).
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
U.S. Const. amend. VI.
Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 23.
10 U.S.C. § 829 (Article 29, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
10 U.S.C. § 851 (Article 51, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
10 U.S.C. § 852 (Article 52, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
10 U.S.C. § 853 (Article 53, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21-102.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b).
Fed. R. Crim. P. 31.
R.C.M. 921.
R.C.M. 924.
Mil. R. Evid. 509.
Mil. R. Evid. 606(b).
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 22.4.
Related topic papers: Introduction to Juror Decision-Making · Jury Diversity, Representativeness, and Deliberation · Court-Martial Panel Selection: Article 25, Random Selection, and Challenges · Jury Instructions: Comprehension and Effectiveness · How Jurors Evaluate Expert Testimony
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Courts-Martial