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Jurors and Jury Decision-Making

Jury Instructions: Comprehension and Effectiveness

Published

Snap Shot

  • The question: Do jurors understand the instructions they are given, and which practices improve comprehension?
  • What the research shows: Comprehension of pattern instructions is often low, particularly for technical terms, multi-element offenses, and the burden of proof, and plain-language rewriting improves it only partly. In videotaped deliberations of 50 real Arizona civil juries, about 79 percent of jurors’ comments on the instructions were accurate and about 47 percent of errors were corrected, but errors about technical legal meaning were corrected only about a quarter of the time. “Firmly convinced” reasonable-doubt language performed best in one mock-jury study, though the research does not show that any definition gives jurors a stable threshold. Preliminary and written instructions showed modest benefits and no demonstrated harm, and the harms predicted for note-taking and juror questions largely did not appear. An instruction aimed at a specific eyewitness reasoning problem helped in one recent study, while instructions aimed at bias have shown null or unintended effects.
  • What it does not show: Most studies use mock jurors and questionnaires, and almost none involve court-martial members. No study can show that the jurors in a particular case misunderstood their instructions or that a verdict rested on a misunderstanding.
  • The law: Reasonable-doubt instructions are tested under Cage, Sullivan, and Victor; Arizona requires the firmly convinced instruction (Portillo), and the military uses a similar one (McClour). Courts presume jurors follow and understand instructions (Weeks). Arizona Rule 18.6 provides for preliminary instructions, note-taking, and juror questions.
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors are likely to encounter research on responsive clarifications and on argument about reasonable doubt; defense counsel are likely to encounter research on clarifying and early instructions; for both sides the reforms concern the accuracy of the process, not distrust of jurors.

At the close of every jury trial, the judge tells the jurors what the law is and how to apply it. The instructions define the elements of each offense, allocate the burden of proof, explain the presumption of innocence, and tell jurors how to treat particular kinds of evidence. The legal system assumes that jurors understand and follow these instructions; appellate review of instructional error, the presumption that jurors follow limiting instructions, and the decision to leave many contested questions to the jury all rest on that assumption. In courts-martial, the instructions are given by the military judge to the members, the panel of service members who serve the function a jury serves in civilian court.

Whether jurors in fact understand their instructions has been studied for nearly fifty years. The research reaches court in requests for clarifying or nonstandard instructions, in disputes over how to answer a jury’s question during deliberations, in arguments about reasonable-doubt definitions, and in rulemaking about juror note-taking, juror questions, and the timing of instructions. Arizona has been a national laboratory for these reforms since the mid-1990s.

This paper summarizes what the research shows about how well jurors understand pattern instructions, whether plain-language rewriting helps, how reasonable-doubt definitions affect jurors, what difference the timing and written form of instructions make, and what is known about juror note-taking and juror questions. It then reviews the governing federal, military, and Arizona law. The overall picture is mixed: comprehension of standard instructions is often poor, but it is measurably improvable, and jurors show real strengths as well as real difficulties.

How Well Jurors Understand Standard Instructions

The foundational work came from Amiram Elwork, Bruce Sales, and James Alfini, who tested pattern instructions on simulated jurors. In their early studies, presenting Michigan’s existing negligence instructions produced about the same level of understanding as presenting no instructions at all, while versions rewritten using principles from research on language comprehension and memory significantly improved understanding (Elwork et al., 1977). Their work established two lasting themes: standard instructions are often poorly understood, and the problem lies partly in how they are written.

Studies of real jurors agree. In a survey of 224 Michigan citizens summoned for jury duty, those who had served and received instructions understood fewer than half of the instructions tested; instructed jurors did better than uninstructed jurors on questions of procedure but no better on questions of substantive criminal law, and jurors who had asked the judge for help understood more than those who had not (Reifman et al., 1992). In England and Wales, a Ministry of Justice study of 797 jurors at three court centers found that only a minority (31%) fully understood a judge’s direction on the legal questions in a case, and that the proportion rose to 48% when jurors were also given a written summary of the direction (Thomas, 2010, p. vi). Comprehensive reviews have reached consistent conclusions: comprehension of pattern instructions is often low, particularly for technical legal terms, the structure of multi-element offenses, and the burden of proof, and improvements are possible through rewriting and procedural change (Lieberman & Sales, 1997; Ellsworth & Reifman, 2000; Daftary-Kapur et al., 2010).

Capital Sentencing Instructions

Comprehension problems have been documented most thoroughly in capital sentencing, where jurors must apply concepts such as aggravating and mitigating circumstances, weighing, and the standard of proof for each. Using the approved instructions from Missouri capital murder cases, Richard Wiener and colleagues found that participants frequently misunderstood the instructions on mitigation and on how aggravating and mitigating factors were to be weighed (Wiener et al., 1995). Shari Seidman Diamond and Judith Levi revised the Illinois capital sentencing instructions using linguistic principles and tested the revision on jury-eligible participants; comprehension improved on the points the revision targeted, but misunderstandings remained even with the revised text (Diamond & Levi, 1996). Rewriting helps, but it does not eliminate the problem.

What Real Deliberations Show

The most realistic evidence comes from the Arizona Jury Project, in which the Arizona Supreme Court authorized researchers to videotape the deliberations of 50 real civil juries in Pima County. Jurors spent a substantial part of their deliberations discussing the law: at least one juror read an instruction aloud on 46 of the 50 juries, and jurors discussed about three-quarters of the instruction topics relevant to their cases. About 79 percent of jurors’ comments about the instructions were accurate. Of the remainder, most reflected comprehension errors rather than refusal to follow the law; the authors reported that only about 3 percent of the comments they coded reflected a juror’s understanding a rule and rejecting it. About 47 percent of comprehension errors were explicitly corrected, most often by another juror. Errors about the plain meaning of words were corrected three times out of four, but errors about technical legal meaning were corrected only about a quarter of the time. The most common source of error was not confusing language but gaps: questions the instructions simply did not address (Diamond et al., 2012).

These findings support two conclusions that cut in different directions. Deliberating juries take the law seriously, correct many of their own errors, and generally get most of it right, which is consistent with the broader finding that jury verdicts agree with what the trial judge would have decided in most cases (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966, as cited in Eisenberg et al., 2005). At the same time, a meaningful share of errors about technical terms survives deliberation, and the authors observed that judges’ responses to juror questions, often a rereading of the original instruction, frequently did not resolve the jurors’ confusion (Diamond et al., 2012).

Plain-Language Rewriting

The research led several jurisdictions to rewrite their pattern instructions. The most extensive effort was California’s. The Judicial Council of California adopted new plain-language civil instructions, the Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions (CACI), in 2003, and new criminal instructions, the Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions (CALCRIM), effective in 2006. Both were drafted to state the law accurately in language jurors can understand, and the California Rules of Court designate them as the official instructions. Other jurisdictions have revised their pattern instructions in similar ways, and Arizona’s pattern instructions, the Revised Arizona Jury Instructions (RAJI), are prepared and periodically revised by committees of the State Bar of Arizona.

Experimental research supports plain-language revision as a partial remedy. Rewritten instructions generally produced better comprehension than the originals in the controlled tests reviewed (Elwork et al., 1977; Diamond & Levi, 1996; Lieberman & Sales, 1997). Australian and New Zealand courts have gone further by using “question trails,” which break the law into a sequence of factual questions jurors answer in order; an experiment with jury-eligible participants found better comprehension and application of the law with question trails than with conventional instructions (Spivak et al., 2019). Instructions written for a specific reasoning problem can also help. In an online experiment (N = 289), mock jurors given revised eyewitness instructions stressing the witness’s first identification test convicted more often after an immediate high-confidence identification than after an initial lineup rejection (odds ratio 3.89), a distinction jurors given control instructions did not draw (Huang et al., 2026). But the gains from rewriting are typically partial. Because most errors in the Arizona deliberations arose from matters the instructions did not address, the authors of that study concluded that plain English alone would not solve the problem, and that clearer channels for jurors to ask questions and receive responsive answers were also needed (Diamond et al., 2012).

Reasonable Doubt

The reasonable-doubt standard is the instruction with the greatest constitutional significance and one of the most studied. The Constitution requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt but does not require courts to define the term; when they do, the question is whether, taken as a whole, the instruction creates a reasonable likelihood that jurors applied a lower standard (Victor v. Nebraska, 1994). The Supreme Court has held that an instruction equating reasonable doubt with “grave uncertainty” and “actual substantial doubt,” combined with “moral certainty,” could lead jurors to convict on less proof than due process requires (Cage v. Louisiana, 1990), and that a constitutionally deficient reasonable-doubt instruction is structural error (Sullivan v. Louisiana, 1993). In Victor, the Court upheld instructions using “moral certainty” and “substantial doubt” in context but did not endorse those phrases, and Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence praised the Federal Judicial Center’s pattern instruction, which describes proof beyond a reasonable doubt as proof that leaves the juror firmly convinced of the defendant’s guilt.

Experimental research supports the “firmly convinced” formulation, though with qualifications. In a study of 80 six-person mock juries given one of five reasonable-doubt instructions, juries given the firmly convinced instruction reported the highest standards of proof, reached verdicts that tracked the strength of the evidence, and spent proportionally more of their deliberations on the evidence and less on non-probative matters. The same study found, however, that no instruction produced self-reported standards of proof that the authors considered adequate, and that jurors’ self-reported thresholds were lower when the evidence was weak than when it was strong, which suggests that the threshold shifted with the case rather than remaining fixed (Horowitz & Kirkpatrick, 1996). The research thus favors firmly convinced language, but it does not show that any definition gives jurors a stable, shared threshold.

Arizona adopted the firmly convinced formulation in State v. Portillo (1995). The Arizona Supreme Court directed trial courts to give, in all criminal cases, an instruction based on the Federal Judicial Center model, which explains that proof beyond a reasonable doubt leaves the juror firmly convinced of guilt, that the law does not require proof that overcomes every doubt, that a juror who is firmly convinced of guilt must find the defendant guilty, and that a juror who thinks there is a real possibility that the defendant is not guilty must give the defendant the benefit of the doubt. The Military Judges’ Benchbook’s Air Force and Navy–Marine Corps definitions of reasonable doubt use a similar firmly convinced formulation, defining proof beyond a reasonable doubt as “proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the accused’s guilt,” while its Army and Coast Guard definition is framed in terms of an “evidentiary certainty” (Department of the Army, 2025, Instructions 2-5 and 2-5-13), and the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has held that an instruction telling members that they “must” find the accused guilty if firmly convinced of guilt did not direct a verdict and was not plain error (United States v. McClour, 2017). Neither the Arizona nor the military instruction has been the subject of a published comprehension study using actual jurors or members in those systems.

Timing and Written Instructions

Traditional practice gives most substantive instructions only at the end of trial, after jurors have heard all of the evidence. Research suggests that jurors benefit from receiving a framework at the start. In an early experiment, an instruction on the requirements of proof affected verdicts when given before the evidence but not when given only afterward, consistent with the view that jurors form impressions as evidence is presented and need the legal framework to organize it (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1979). In a civil experiment, jurors who received substantive instructions before the evidence recalled more probative information and better distinguished among the parties in their awards (ForsterLee et al., 1993). Rewritten instructions given both at the start and at the end of a case also helped jurors focus on and remember relevant evidence (Elwork et al., 1977). In a transcript study of a child sexual abuse case (child complainant) with 388 mock jurors, specialized pre-evidence instructions changed jurors’ endorsement of some common misconceptions about child sexual abuse, and jurors’ knowledge about such abuse was associated with how credible they rated the child on average (Call & Wingrove, 2022); the study does not show that the instruction changed verdicts, and it does not bear on whether any particular child’s account is accurate.

Field research is more modest. In a randomized field experiment in 67 Wisconsin trials, preliminary instructions did not measurably improve jurors’ recall of the instructions or evidence, but they did help jurors report following the legal guidelines and increased satisfaction, without burdening judges. Written copies of the instructions did not improve recall or satisfaction but appeared to reduce jurors’ disagreements about what the judge had said, without lengthening deliberations (Heuer & Penrod, 1989). The English study likewise found better understanding when a written summary accompanied an oral direction (Thomas, 2010, p. vi). Taken together, the evidence suggests that preliminary substantive instructions and written copies are low-cost practices with modest benefits and no demonstrated harm, rather than complete solutions.

Juror Note-Taking and Juror Questions

Two related reforms change jurors from passive listeners into more active participants: allowing jurors to take notes and allowing them to submit written questions for witnesses. Larry Heuer and Steven Penrod tested both in randomized field experiments, first in Wisconsin and then in a national sample of state and federal trials. Across these studies, the harms critics predicted, such as distraction, undue influence of note-taking jurors in deliberations, advantage to one side, slower trials, or jurors becoming advocates, largely did not appear. Several of the hoped-for benefits did not appear either: in the Wisconsin experiment, note-taking did not measurably improve jurors’ recall of the evidence or the instructions, although it increased jurors’ satisfaction. Juror questions reduced jurors’ doubts about the testimony and gave counsel insight into how jurors were perceiving the trial (Heuer & Penrod, 1988, 1994).

The Arizona Jury Project provides direct evidence on juror questions in real trials. In the 50 videotaped civil trials, jurors submitted 829 questions, an average of about 17 per trial; about three-quarters were permitted, and the process added about half an hour per trial. Most questions related to the legal issues in dispute, many sought clarification or background, and about four in ten “cross-checked” testimony against other evidence or common standards to assess plausibility. Questions that appeared aimed at proving a point rather than gathering information were rare, and jurors generally accepted the fact that some questions went unanswered (Diamond et al., 2006). The study was limited to civil cases in one county, and only about a fifth of eligible trials participated. In interviews from 55 Australian criminal trials, most jurors, judges, experts, and lawyers supported juror questions about expert evidence, but some jurors were too intimidated to ask or did not know they could (Horan, 2024).

Arizona also allows jurors in civil trials to discuss the evidence among themselves during trial, before formal deliberations, a reform evaluated in the same project. The researchers reported benefits for jurors’ understanding of the evidence along with imperfect adherence to the rules governing the discussions, and the reform remains debated (Diamond et al., 2003). Arizona has not extended pre-deliberation discussions to criminal trials.

Limits of the Evidence

Most instruction research uses mock jurors, often students or online participants, reading or watching abbreviated trials, and measuring comprehension with questionnaires rather than observing deliberation or verdicts. Comprehension scores depend heavily on how comprehension is measured; a juror who cannot paraphrase an instruction may still apply it correctly, or the reverse. In an online study of alibi instructions (N = 320), participants recalled the instructions poorly but answered recognition questions well, and the instructions still lowered guilt ratings (Allison et al., 2025). Improved comprehension does not always produce different verdicts, and studies that measure both are less common than studies that measure comprehension alone. Real-trial studies, such as the Arizona Jury Project, are rare, small, and concentrated in civil cases in a single jurisdiction. In the second study, standard instructions did not measurably reduce the gap; the confidence intervals overlapped in every comparison, so the study does not show whether the instructions had any effect (Rhodes et al., 2025). The online experiments used no deliberation and a deliberately ambiguous scenario. A Canadian experiment with 1,091 online community members tested anti-bias instructions recommended by the Supreme Court of Canada; most results showed no effect of the accused’s race or harsher outcomes for White accused, and the instructions produced unexpected effects, including harsher verdicts for White accused with racialized victims under the combined general and race-specific instruction. The authors urged further testing before such instructions are adopted (Maeder et al., 2026). There are almost no published studies of instruction comprehension among court-martial members. Most important, no study can determine whether the jurors or members in a particular case understood their instructions, and research on comprehension rates does not show that any particular verdict rested on a misunderstanding.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When the Arizona Jury Project is cited to show that real juries get the law mostly right (Diamond et al., 2012), ask who was studied and what was counted: about 79 percent of jurors’ comments on the instructions were accurate, but the data came from 50 civil juries in one county, and errors about technical legal meaning were corrected only about a quarter of the time. When the Michigan survey is cited to show that jurors understood fewer than half of the instructions tested (Reifman et al., 1992), ask whether the conclusion follows from the design, since scores depend on how comprehension is measured and do not show how a deliberating jury applied the law. When the reasonable-doubt experiment is cited (Horowitz & Kirkpatrick, 1996), ask how much evidence it rests on: it involved 80 mock juries, and neither the Arizona nor the military firmly convinced instruction has been tested in a published study with actual jurors or members. Ask also whether any finding applies to this case, because no study can show that a particular jury or panel misunderstood its instructions. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Jury Instructions and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30 governs requests for instructions and permits the court to instruct the jury before or after closing arguments, or both. The constitutional floor for reasonable-doubt instructions is set by Cage, Sullivan, and Victor. When a jury asks a question during deliberations, courts presume that jurors follow their instructions and understand a judge’s answer to their question; in Weeks v. Angelone (2000), the Supreme Court held that a trial judge in a capital case adequately answered a jury’s question about the sentencing options by directing the jurors to the paragraph of the instruction that addressed it, over a dissent arguing that the record showed continued confusion. The Arizona deliberation research, which found that rereading an instruction often did not resolve juror confusion, is relevant to how courts evaluate that presumption, which remains the law (Diamond et al., 2012).

In courts-martial, the military judge instructs the members under Rule for Courts-Martial 920, which permits instructions on findings before or after arguments, and may give preliminary instructions at the outset of trial under R.C.M. 913. Most instructions are drawn from the Military Judges’ Benchbook (Department of the Army, 2025), which functions as the military’s pattern instructions. Members play a more active role than most civilian jurors. Under Military Rule of Evidence 614, members may ask that a witness be called or recalled and may examine witnesses regardless of who called them; their questions are submitted in writing and reviewed by the military judge, with an opportunity for counsel to object, before being asked. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has described members’ questioning of witnesses as a long-standing practice that does not, as a matter of law, render members partial (United States v. Gray, 1999). Under R.C.M. 801(c), the members’ right to have additional evidence obtained is subject to the military judge’s ruling. Under R.C.M. 921, members deliberate in closed session, may request that the court-martial be reopened to have portions of the record read to them or additional evidence introduced, which the military judge may grant in the exercise of discretion (United States v. Clifton, 2013), and may take their notes, the admitted exhibits, and any written instructions into deliberations.

Arizona

Arizona’s reforms followed the November 1994 report of the Arizona Supreme Court’s Committee on More Effective Use of Juries, Jurors: The Power of 12, which made recommendations covering the entire jury process, including plain-English preliminary instructions, juror note-taking, and juror questions (Arizona Supreme Court Committee on More Effective Use of Juries, 1994). Rule amendments that took effect in the mid-1990s permit jurors in civil and criminal trials to take notes and to submit written questions to witnesses, and permit civil jurors to discuss the evidence during trial. The current civil rule lets jurors discuss the evidence in the jury room during recesses when all are present, reserving judgment on the outcome until deliberations (Ariz. R. Civ. P. 40(h)(1)(B)), and governs written juror questions in civil trials (Rule 40(i)(2)). In criminal cases, Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 18.6(c) requires preliminary instructions after the jury is sworn, including the governing legal principles, and directs that they be as readily understandable as possible to people unfamiliar with the legal system. Rule 18.6(d) requires the court to tell jurors they may take notes, permits juror notebooks, and gives jurors access to their notes during deliberations; Rule 18.6(e) requires the court to tell jurors they may submit written questions to witnesses or the court, subject to the parties’ objections and the court’s power to limit questions for good cause. Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 22.4 permits the court, when a jury reports an impasse and in the presence of the parties, to ask the jurors whether and how the court and counsel can assist their deliberations and then to direct further proceedings as appropriate. In the Arizona civil juries studied, each juror received a written copy of the final instructions (Diamond et al., 2012); the current Arizona criminal rules should be checked.

State v. Portillo (1995) requires the firmly convinced reasonable-doubt instruction in Arizona criminal trials. Arizona courts, like federal and military courts, presume that jurors follow the instructions they are given.

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports the view that deliberating juries take instructions seriously, correct many of their own errors, and reach verdicts that agree with judges’ assessments in most cases. It also supports the firmly convinced reasonable-doubt formulation required in Arizona and used in the Benchbook’s Air Force and Navy–Marine Corps definitions, under which mock juries’ verdicts tracked the strength of the evidence. Prosecutors are likely to encounter this research when it is argued that jurors cannot apply the law, and it is relevant to practices, such as preliminary instructions, written copies, and responsive answers to jury questions, that the research associates with fewer errors.

The research also counsels caution. Comprehension of technical legal terms, multi-element offenses, and the burden of proof is often incomplete, and errors about technical meaning are the ones least likely to be corrected in deliberation. Argument that recharacterizes or quantifies reasonable doubt may conflict with the instruction the court gives and could invite instructional error; the instruction research does not test argument directly. When a jury’s question shows confusion, the research suggests that simply rereading the instruction may not resolve it, and a responsive clarification, agreed upon by the parties where possible, is consistent with the research.

Special Issues for Defense

The research is relevant to concerns that pattern instructions on mental states, defenses, and the burden of proof are often imperfectly understood, that jurors’ working thresholds for reasonable doubt may shift with the strength of the case (Horowitz & Kirkpatrick, 1996), and that instructions aimed at bias have not been shown to neutralize it reliably, with no measurable effect or unintended effects in recent experiments (Rhodes et al., 2025; Maeder et al., 2026). Counsel for either side may request clarifying instructions grounded in the record, ask that substantive instructions on the presumption of innocence and burden of proof be given at the start of trial, and ask that responses to jury questions actually address the question asked.

The research also counsels caution about the limits of these arguments. Comprehension research describes groups of mock jurors and cannot show that a particular jury misunderstood its instructions, and courts apply a strong presumption that jurors follow and understand the law they are given. The same research shows that real juries get most of the law right and correct many of their own errors. Reform requests framed as improving accuracy for both sides, and supported by the specific research on timing, written copies, and plain language, are more consistent with the evidence than arguments that jurors cannot be trusted to apply the law.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

Allison, M., Caluri, G., Jordoson, J., & Solan, S. (2025). Judicial instructions on alibis: Impact on mock jury decision-making. Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 32(4), 594–615. https://doi.org/10.1080/13218719.2024.2362145

Arizona Supreme Court Committee on More Effective Use of Juries. (1994). Jurors: The power of 12. Supreme Court of Arizona.

Call, A. A., & Wingrove, T. (2022). Factors that influence mock jurors’ perceptions of child credibility. Journal of Child Sexual Abuse, 31(6), 726–742. https://doi.org/10.1080/10538712.2022.2100027

Daftary-Kapur, T., Dumas, R., & Penrod, S. D. (2010). Jury decision-making biases and methods to counter them. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 15(1), 133–154. https://doi.org/10.1348/135532509X465624

Department of the Army. (2025). Military judges’ benchbook (DA Pamphlet 27-9, 29 July 2025).

Diamond, S. S., & Levi, J. N. (1996). Improving decisions on death by revising and testing jury instructions. Judicature, 79(5), 224–232.

Diamond, S. S., Murphy, B., & Rose, M. R. (2012). The “kettleful of law” in real jury deliberations: Successes, failures, and next steps. Northwestern University Law Review, 106(4), 1537–1608.

Diamond, S. S., Rose, M. R., Murphy, B., & Smith, S. (2006). Juror questions during trial: A window into juror thinking. Vanderbilt Law Review, 59(6), 1925–1972.

Diamond, S. S., Vidmar, N., Rose, M. R., Ellis, L., & Murphy, B. (2003). Juror discussions during civil trials: Studying an Arizona innovation. Arizona Law Review, 45(1), 1–81.

Eisenberg, T., Hannaford-Agor, P. L., Hans, V. P., Waters, N. L., Munsterman, G. T., Schwab, S. J., & Wells, M. T. (2005). Judge-jury agreement in criminal cases: A partial replication of Kalven and Zeisel’s The American Jury. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 2(1), 171–207. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1740-1461.2005.00035.x

Ellsworth, P. C., & Reifman, A. (2000). Juror comprehension and public policy: Perceived problems and proposed solutions. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 6(3), 788–821. https://doi.org/10.1037/1076-8971.6.3.788

Elwork, A., Sales, B. D., & Alfini, J. J. (1977). Juridic decisions: In ignorance of the law or in light of it? Law and Human Behavior, 1(2), 163–189. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01053437

ForsterLee, L., Horowitz, I. A., & Bourgeois, M. J. (1993). Juror competence in civil trials: Effects of preinstruction and evidence technicality. Journal of Applied Psychology, 78(1), 14–21. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.78.1.14

Heuer, L., & Penrod, S. (1988). Increasing jurors’ participation in trials: A field experiment with jury notetaking and question asking. Law and Human Behavior, 12(3), 231–261. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01044383

Heuer, L., & Penrod, S. D. (1989). Instructing jurors: A field experiment with written and preliminary instructions. Law and Human Behavior, 13(4), 409–430. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01056412

Heuer, L., & Penrod, S. (1994). Juror notetaking and question asking during trials: A national field experiment. Law and Human Behavior, 18(2), 121–150. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01499012

Horan, J. (2024). Empowering jurors to ask questions about the expert evidence in criminal trials. The International Journal of Evidence & Proof, 28(4), 312–328. https://doi.org/10.1177/13657127241235946

Horowitz, I. A., & Kirkpatrick, L. C. (1996). A concept in search of a definition: The effects of reasonable doubt instructions on certainty of guilt standards and jury verdicts. Law and Human Behavior, 20(6), 655–670. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01499236

Huang, J., Izadshenas, M., & Wixted, J. T. (2026). Initial lineup rejections evolving into confident identifications at trial: The role of jury instructions in keeping the focus on the first test. Law and Human Behavior. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000670

Kassin, S. M., & Wrightsman, L. S. (1979). On the requirements of proof: The timing of judicial instruction and mock juror verdicts. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37(10), 1877–1887. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.37.10.1877

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Maeder, E. M., Franks, S., & Yamamoto, S. (2026). Race-based jury instructions: An empirical test of recommendations from R. v. Barton (2019) and R. v. Chouhan (2021). Psychology, Public Policy, and Law. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1037/law0000495

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Rhodes, J., Nteta, T., & Rice, D. (2025). Partisan bias in juror decision-making. Journal of Law and Empirical Analysis, 2(2), 308–323. https://doi.org/10.1177/2755323X251366728

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Thomas, C. (2010). Are juries fair? (Ministry of Justice Research Series 1/10). Ministry of Justice.

Wiener, R. L., Pritchard, C. C., & Weston, M. (1995). Comprehensibility of approved jury instructions in capital murder cases. Journal of Applied Psychology, 80(4), 455–467. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.80.4.455

Legal Authorities

Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (per curiam).

State v. Portillo, 182 Ariz. 592, 898 P.2d 970 (1995).

Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993).

United States v. Clifton, 71 M.J. 489 (C.A.A.F. 2013).

United States v. Gray, 51 M.J. 1 (C.A.A.F. 1999).

United States v. McClour, 76 M.J. 23 (C.A.A.F. 2017).

Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994) (decided with Sandoval v. California).

Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225 (2000).

U.S. Const. amend. V, VI, XIV.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 30.

Rules for Courts-Martial 801(c), 913, 920, 921.

Mil. R. Evid. 614.

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.6, 22.4.

Ariz. R. Civ. P. 40(h)(1)(B), 40(i)(2).

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.1050.

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