Snap Shot
- The question: How do jurors reach verdicts, and how much do factors other than the evidence affect the outcome?
- What the research shows: Under the story model, jurors build a narrative from the evidence and choose the verdict that best fits it. In the real-trial studies reviewed, evidence strength was the strongest predictor of verdicts, and judges and juries agreed in about 75% of cases in two major studies. In mostly experimental research, pretrial publicity, defendant race, and identity cues have typically small-to-moderate average effects, larger in some conditions and most likely to matter in close cases; juror demographics are weak predictors.
- What it does not show: Most findings come from mock jurors, often without deliberation, and no published study found has examined court-martial members’ deliberation or command influence using actual members. No method can establish that a particular juror was biased or that a particular verdict was influenced by an extralegal factor or was correct.
- The law: The Sixth Amendment guarantees an impartial jury (Duncan), and Ramos requires unanimity to convict of a serious offense in federal and state courts. The jury right does not apply to courts-martial (Ex parte Quirin); members convict by three-fourths, and Anderson held Ramos does not apply. Arizona requires unanimous criminal verdicts and abolished peremptory challenges in 2022.
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors are likely to encounter the research showing juries generally decide on the evidence, which does not establish that bias had no effect in a close case; defense counsel are likely to encounter documented effects of publicity and identity cues in close cases, where average effects are modest and demographic assumptions are barred.
Every contested criminal trial ends with a group of laypeople deciding what happened. Jurors, and in courts-martial the panel members who serve the jury’s function, hear evidence presented out of chronological order, through competing witnesses, under rules they did not write, and then must agree on a verdict. How they do that has been studied by psychologists, sociologists, and legal scholars since the 1950s. The research bears on almost every stage of trial practice: what questions are asked in voir dire, how evidence is organized, what instructions are given, whether expert testimony will help, and how courts assess claims of bias or misconduct after a verdict.
The questions reach court in several ways. Courts rely on assumptions about juror behavior when they presume that jurors follow instructions, rule on challenges for cause, and decide whether pretrial publicity requires a change of venue, and experts are sometimes asked to explain what research shows about jurors in motions concerning venue, voir dire, or unusually prejudicial evidence.
This paper, the starting point for the hub, describes the principal models of juror reasoning, the research comparing jury and judge verdicts, the evidence that evidence strength is the main determinant of verdicts, and where attitudes, bias, publicity, and demographics enter and how large their effects are. It then explains how court-martial panels differ from civilian juries, outlines the hub, and reviews the governing law.
How Jurors Organize Evidence: The Story Model
The most influential account of juror reasoning is the story model of Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie. Jurors do not simply tally items of evidence; they construct a narrative of what happened, drawing on the evidence, on their own knowledge of how people behave, and on the general structure of stories: initiating events, goals, actions, and consequences. Jurors then learn the verdict categories from the judge’s instructions and choose the verdict that best fits the story they have accepted (Pennington & Hastie, 1986, 1992).
The model specifies how jurors choose among competing stories. Confidence in a story depends on its coverage (how much of the evidence it explains) and its coherence (whether it is internally consistent, plausible in light of the juror’s world knowledge, and complete). Confidence increases further when only one coherent story is available, and decreases when two stories fit the evidence comparably well (Pennington & Hastie, 1992; Hastie & Pennington, 1996). In interview studies, mock jurors who reached different verdicts after watching the same filmed trial had constructed different stories, and the elements of their stories that were inferred rather than testified to tended to support the verdict they chose (Pennington & Hastie, 1986).
The model has been tested experimentally. When the same evidence was presented either in an order that made a story easy to construct or in the order in which witnesses would testify, the side whose evidence was easier to assemble into a story gained a substantial advantage in mock-juror verdicts (Pennington & Hastie, 1988). These studies used mock jurors and individual rather than group decisions. The model also describes how jurors reason, not whether their conclusions are accurate: a coherent story can be wrong, and the emphasis on coherence explains both how jurors integrate large amounts of evidence and why gaps may be filled with assumptions.
Other Models: Probability, Averaging, Coherence, and Two Modes of Thinking
Earlier models treated jurors as processors of quantities. Bayesian models describe a juror who revises a prior belief about guilt in proportion to the diagnostic value of each item of evidence; algebraic models describe a juror who weights and averages items into an overall impression compared with a threshold; stochastic models treat belief as moving with some randomness until it crosses a decision point (Pennington & Hastie, 1981; Hastie, 1993). These models remain useful benchmarks for how evidence should combine, but the research collected by Hastie (1993) found that mock jurors depart from Bayesian prescriptions in systematic ways and that a single running tally does not capture the structure jurors impose on complex evidence (Hastie & Pennington, 1996).
A related line of research on coherence-based reasoning finds that decision-makers do not evaluate each item of evidence independently. As a tentative conclusion forms, the evaluation of ambiguous evidence shifts to fit it, so that the final decision appears better supported than the evidence considered item by item would warrant (Simon, 2004). In mock-juror studies, participants who had begun to favor one side interpreted later evidence as more supportive of that side (Carlson & Russo, 2001), and participants exposed to pretrial publicity evaluated later trial evidence in a manner consistent with the publicity (Hope et al., 2004). The same process allows people to integrate large amounts of information into a usable judgment, but it means that information arriving early, including before trial, can affect how later evidence is weighed.
Dual-process models distinguish fast, intuitive, emotionally influenced processing from slower, deliberate, rule-based processing, and predict that legally irrelevant information will matter more when jurors rely on intuition. In one study, mock jurors who characteristically relied on intuitive processing were more influenced by legally irrelevant information than those who favored analytic processing (Gunnell & Ceci, 2010). Dual-process accounts are better understood as a framework than as a single tested model of juror decisions, and individual-difference measures of processing style have not been validated for use in jury selection.
Most of these models describe individual jurors, but verdicts are group decisions. Reviews of the deliberation research conclude that the distribution of jurors’ initial preferences is a strong predictor of the jury’s verdict, that deliberation is often organized around reviewing evidence and constructing a shared account, and that the evidentiary and procedural rules jurors are given shape the course of discussion (Devine et al., 2001; Salerno & Diamond, 2010).
How Often Do Juries and Judges Agree?
The best-known test of juror competence compares jury verdicts with the verdicts judges would have reached in the same cases. In The American Jury, Kalven and Zeisel asked trial judges, in 3,576 criminal jury trials in the 1950s, how the jury decided each case and how the judge would have decided it (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966, as cited in Eisenberg et al., 2005). Judge and jury agreed in about three of every four trials (75.4% in the raw data; 78% when hung juries were allocated evenly between conviction and acquittal), and about one jury in twenty hung (5.5%). The disagreement was asymmetric: the jury acquitted where the judge would have convicted far more often than the reverse. In the raw data the judge would have convicted where the jury acquitted in 16.9% of trials and the reverse occurred in 2.2%; allocating hung juries as Kalven and Zeisel did, the figures were 19% and 3% (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966, as cited in Eisenberg et al., 2005). Kalven and Zeisel attributed most disagreement to different interpretations of the reasonable-doubt standard and also pointed to jurors’ sentiments about the defendant, which they believed influenced juries when the judge regarded the case as close (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966, as cited in Eisenberg et al., 2005).
A partial replication drew on 318 felony trials tried in 2000 and 2001 in four jurisdictions, one of them Maricopa County, Arizona, and surveyed judges, jurors, and attorneys (Eisenberg et al., 2005). The authors found essentially the same rate of judge-jury agreement as Kalven and Zeisel had, and the asymmetry persisted: when judge and jury disagreed, it was usually the judge who would have convicted. Disagreement was most common in cases of middle evidentiary strength, the authors found little support for the idea that complexity explained it, and judges more often would have convicted where the jury acquitted, a pattern the data were consistent with differences between judges and juries in the thresholds for conviction.
These studies support two conclusions. Juries and judges deciding independently usually reach the same result, which is evidence that jurors as a group understand and respond to the evidence; and where they differ, the difference reflects at least in part a different conception of how much evidence is enough. Agreement is not the same as accuracy, because judges can be wrong as well, and neither study could determine which adjudicator was correct in the cases of disagreement.
Evidence Strength as the Dominant Predictor of Verdicts
Studies of real trials have generally found that the strength of the evidence is the most important determinant of verdicts. In a study of jurors who had decided 38 sexual assault trials, jurors’ decisions were driven mainly by the evidence, particularly evidence about the use of force and physical evidence; characteristics of complainants and defendants had less influence, although some had significant effects (Visher, 1987). Analyzing the same trials, Reskin and Visher (1986) found that extralegal factors did influence jurors, but that these effects were largely confined to weak cases in which the prosecution presented little physical or other corroborating evidence.
Archival research on 418 noncapital felony jury trials in two Texas counties found that strength of evidence was the most influential variable for verdicts, and found no support for theories predicting that juries treat defendants of their own ethnic group more leniently or more harshly; sentence lengths, however, were related to defendant ethnicity and jury composition as well as to case strength (Taylor & Hosch, 2004). A field study of 179 criminal jury trials, using post-trial questionnaires from judges, attorneys, and jurors, likewise found that ratings of evidence strength were strongly related to verdicts. Pretrial publicity, trial complexity, charge severity, and foreperson demographics were moderately related to verdicts and remained significant after evidence strength was controlled, but added only modestly to the accuracy with which verdicts could be predicted, and several case factors mattered only when the prosecution’s evidence was moderately strong (Devine et al., 2009). A comprehensive review of deliberation research reached the same overall conclusion: evidence is the strongest and most consistent influence on what juries decide (Devine et al., 2001).
This pattern is known as the liberation hypothesis (Devine et al., 2009). When the evidence clearly points to one verdict, jurors generally reach it. When the evidence is close, jurors are freer to be influenced by other considerations, including their attitudes toward the type of crime, their reactions to the parties, and information from outside the courtroom. The hypothesis has substantial though not uniform support; Devine et al. (2009) described their field data as partially supporting it. Findings that bias shifts verdicts do not mean evidence is unimportant, and findings that evidence dominates do not mean bias is unimportant, because some contested trials are close cases, and no study reviewed gives the proportion.
Where Extra-Evidentiary Factors Enter and How Large They Are
Extra-evidentiary factors can enter through jurors’ attitudes and experiences, information received before trial, reactions to the parties, and deliberation. The research is mostly experimental, and average magnitudes are typically small to moderate, larger in particular conditions.
Pretrial publicity is among the better-studied factors. A meta-analysis of 44 studies with 5,755 participants found that exposure to negative pretrial publicity was associated with a greater likelihood of a guilty judgment, with an overall correlation of about .16 (Steblay et al., 1999); a 2022 update of 77 effect sizes from 45 reports (11,240 participants) found r = .16 for individual verdicts and r = .35 for deliberating-jury verdicts (Hoetger et al., 2022). The average effect was modest in mock-jury studies and larger in some conditions, such as real publicity and community participants (Steblay et al., 1999). A meta-analysis of mock-juror studies found that participants were slightly more likely to convict, and gave somewhat longer sentences to, defendants of a different race, with small overall effects (d of about 0.09 for verdicts and 0.18 for sentences, as reported in Hunt, 2015) that varied considerably across conditions (Mitchell et al., 2005). Field data are consistent with the possibility that composition matters: an analysis of 712 felony jury trials in two Florida counties found that Black defendants were convicted at higher rates than White defendants when the jury pool had no Black members, and that the gap disappeared when the pool included at least one Black member (Anwar et al., 2012). In one mock-jury experiment (200 jury-eligible adults in 29 six-person mock juries, one sexual assault case), racially diverse groups deliberated longer, discussed more case facts, and made fewer factual errors than all-White groups (Sommers, 2006); the study has limits for generalization.
Recent online research shows identity-based effects outside the race context. In a survey experiment with a deliberately ambiguous self-defense scenario and no deliberation, respondents were roughly 20 to 25 percentage points more likely to find guilt when the defendant was identified with the opposing political party, a pattern found among both Democrats and Republicans (Rhodes et al., 2025). In the second study, standard instructions did not measurably reduce the gap; the confidence intervals overlapped in every comparison, so the study does not show whether the instructions had any effect. The studies included no cross-examination or deliberation, and their magnitudes should not be assumed to carry over to a contested trial.
Demographic characteristics of jurors are weak predictors. A meta-analysis of individual characteristics and guilt judgments found that demographic variables such as gender, race, age, and education were associated with very small differences, while certain attitudes and personality characteristics, such as attitudes toward the legal system and authoritarianism, showed somewhat larger but still modest associations (Devine & Caughlin, 2014). Research on sexual offense trials points in the same direction: attitudes specific to the type of case were the most consistent predictors of mock jurors’ verdicts, while gender and other demographics predicted inconsistently (Willmott et al., 2026). Those findings, and the law forbidding selection on race, ethnicity, or sex, are why this hub emphasizes questioning about attitudes and experiences rather than assumptions about groups. Group-level associations, even when real, cannot predict how a particular juror will vote.
Sexual assault and child abuse trials raise their own questions, including a published dispute between the largest survey of real jurors this review identified (Thomas, 2020) and researchers relying on mock-jury and deliberation studies (Daly et al., 2023; Leverick et al., 2025); the newest meta-analysis found misconceptions about sexual assault strongly associated with blaming complainants but only weakly with verdicts (Bouillaut et al., 2026). These questions are treated in the Counterintuitive Testimony resource (“Juror Beliefs About Sexual Assault: What the Research Shows” and “Correcting Juror Misconceptions: Directions, Expert Evidence, and Juror Screening”) and in this hub’s paper on juror beliefs in those trials.
Civilian Juries and Court-Martial Members
Courts-martial do not use juries in the constitutional sense. The accused may choose trial by military judge alone or by members, a panel of officers and, at the accused’s request, enlisted personnel, who decide guilt and serve the function a jury serves in civilian court. Members are detailed by the convening authority under Article 25, UCMJ, which directs the selection of those best qualified by age, education, training, experience, length of service, and judicial temperament. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, Congress amended Article 25 to provide for randomized selection of members, to the maximum extent practicable, under regulations prescribed by the President. Panels are of fixed size, and conviction requires the concurrence of three-fourths of the members, so a court-martial cannot end in a hung jury on findings in a noncapital case. For offenses committed after December 27, 2023, sentencing in noncapital cases is by the military judge rather than members.
These differences may matter psychologically. Members are chosen in part for experience and temperament, share an institutional culture, may know the military context well, and may submit written questions to witnesses; they may also raise concerns less common in civilian courts, such as possible deference to rank and unlawful command influence, which the law addresses through Article 37 and the secret ballot; the research does not show that members cannot decide independently. This review identified very little published research on how court-martial members decide cases, and no published study using actual members’ votes or deliberations or measuring command influence on actual members. Applying civilian research to members is therefore an inference, stronger for basic cognitive processes such as story construction and weaker for group composition, voting rules, or demographics.
What the Rest of This Hub Covers
Beyond this paper and a companion paper on mock-jury methods, the hub addresses jury selection (voir dire, peremptory challenges and Batson, scientific jury selection and artificial intelligence tools, and court-martial panel selection); juror bias (explicit and implicit bias, pretrial publicity and social media, race, and political identity); demographics and diversity; case-specific juror beliefs about sexual assault, child abuse, memory, eyewitnesses, and confessions; and instructions, instructions to disregard, expert testimony, and deliberation and verdict rules.
Limits of the Evidence
Most of what is known comes from mock-jury studies, in which participants know the case is simulated, trials are shortened, stakes are hypothetical, and many samples are students or online participants without deliberation. Field studies of real trials avoid those problems but face others: researchers cannot observe deliberations in most jurisdictions, must measure evidence strength through ratings by judges, attorneys, or jurors after the fact, and cannot randomly assign cases to juries, so associations between juror characteristics and verdicts may reflect differences among cases. The classic judge-jury comparisons rely on judges’ reports, several major real-trial studies are decades old, and no published study found has examined court-martial members’ deliberation using actual members.
Meta-analytic effect sizes are averages that can conceal larger effects in particular conditions, and large effects in a single online experiment may not survive cross-examination, instructions, and deliberation. No research method can establish that a particular juror was biased, that a particular verdict was influenced by an extralegal factor, or that a particular verdict was correct. The research describes tendencies in groups of jurors under defined conditions.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When the judge-jury comparisons are cited to show that juries decide on the evidence, ask what exactly was counted: agreement of about 75% (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966, as cited in Eisenberg et al., 2005), a figure that shifts with how hung juries are counted, rests on judges’ reports and measures agreement, not accuracy, and disagreement was most common in close cases. When the pretrial publicity meta-analysis (Steblay et al., 1999) is cited, ask how large the effect is in absolute terms: an overall correlation of about .16 is a modest average effect that was larger in some conditions, including more realistic ones, and a 2022 update found r = .35 for deliberating juries (Hoetger et al., 2022). When the 20 to 25 percentage point partisan gap (Rhodes et al., 2025) is offered, ask whether it has held up and whether it applies to a contested trial, since it came from one online survey experiment with an ambiguous scenario and no cross-examination or deliberation. And when the Florida jury-pool data (Anwar et al., 2012) are cited, ask whether the conclusion follows from the design, because field associations may reflect differences among cases rather than the effect of composition. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Juror Decision-Making and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
Article III and the Sixth Amendment guarantee trial by an impartial jury in federal criminal prosecutions. In Duncan v. Louisiana (1968), the Supreme Court held that the right is fundamental and applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment for serious offenses, describing the jury as a safeguard against overzealous prosecution and biased judges. In Ramos v. Louisiana (2020), the Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires a unanimous verdict to convict of a serious offense in state as well as federal court. Justice Blackmun’s lead opinion in Ballew v. Georgia (1978), holding a five-person criminal jury constitutionally inadequate, relied heavily on empirical research on group size and deliberation, an approach Justice Powell’s concurrence criticized. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23 governs jury trial and jury size, and Rule 24 governs voir dire and challenges.
The Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial guarantee does not apply to courts-martial. In Ex parte Quirin (1942), the Supreme Court explained that the Fifth Amendment’s exception of “cases arising in the land or naval forces” from the grand jury requirement was understood to extend to the Sixth Amendment’s petit jury right. O’Callahan v. Parker (1969) limited court-martial jurisdiction to service-connected offenses, reasoning in part that military trial lacks grand and petit juries; Solorio v. United States (1987) overruled it and restored jurisdiction based on military status. The member panel is a statutory creation. Article 25, UCMJ, governs who may serve and how members are detailed; Article 29 sets fixed panel sizes; and Article 52 requires the concurrence of three-fourths of the members for a finding of guilty in noncapital cases. In United States v. Anderson (2023), the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held that Ramos does not apply to courts-martial and that non-unanimous verdicts do not violate the Fifth Amendment’s due process or equal protection guarantees, relying in part on the long history of non-unanimous military verdicts and on other safeguards such as secret ballots; the Supreme Court denied review in 2024. Rule for Courts-Martial 912 governs voir dire and challenges of members.
Arizona
The Arizona Constitution provides that the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, requires twelve-person juries in criminal cases in which death or imprisonment for thirty years or more is authorized, and requires unanimous verdicts in all criminal cases (Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 23). It also guarantees the accused a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the offense is alleged to have been committed (Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24). A.R.S. § 21-102 sets the number of jurors for the various categories of cases. Arizona abolished peremptory challenges in criminal and civil trials effective January 1, 2022 (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-21-0020), which makes voir dire and challenges for cause the principal means of addressing juror bias; that change and its research basis are addressed in the hub’s paper on peremptory challenges.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports the view that juries generally decide cases on the evidence. In the real-trial studies reviewed, evidence strength was the strongest predictor of verdicts, and judge-jury agreement studies find that juries reach the same result a judge would in most cases. The story model indicates that jurors understand evidence by assembling it into a coherent account, which is relevant to how evidence is presented and how individual items are explained. Prosecutors are likely to encounter this research when it is argued that jurors cannot evaluate complex evidence, and research on particular instructions is more mixed.
The research also counsels caution. The liberation hypothesis indicates that extra-evidentiary factors have their greatest influence in close cases, so the general reliability of jury verdicts does not establish that bias or publicity had no effect in a particular close case. Group-level demographic associations are small and inconsistent, and the law forbids using race, ethnicity, or sex in selection regardless; questioning about attitudes and experiences is both legally sound and scientifically better grounded. In courts-martial, the three-fourths rule and the absence of research on actual members mean that civilian findings about unanimity and deliberation should be applied with care.
Special Issues for Defense
The research is relevant to extra-evidentiary influences. Meta-analyses document measurable effects of pretrial publicity and of defendant race, and recent experiments show that identity cues, including political affiliation, can shift judgments in ambiguous cases. The liberation hypothesis indicates that these effects are most likely to matter in close cases. The judge-jury studies also show juries acquitting more often than judges where the two disagree, consistent with jurors taking the reasonable-doubt standard seriously. Counsel for either side may use the research to ask that voir dire address the attitudes and exposures research links to verdicts, and that courts ruling on venue or cause challenges have accurate information about these effects.
The research also counsels caution. Evidence strength is the strongest predictor of verdicts in each of the real-trial studies reviewed here, and the average effects of publicity, race, and demographics are modest. Many of the bias findings come from vignette or online studies without deliberation, and they cannot establish that a particular juror was biased or that a particular verdict resulted from bias. Arguments that rest on demographic assumptions about jurors are both legally barred and poorly supported by the data. In courts-martial, members’ selection criteria, institutional culture, and the absence of direct research mean that civilian findings about bias are inferences rather than established facts about members.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
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Legal Authorities
Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969), overruled by Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83 (2020).
Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
United States v. Anderson, 83 M.J. 291 (C.A.A.F. 2023), cert. denied, No. 23-437 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2024).
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
U.S. Const. amend. VI.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 23.
Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24.
10 U.S.C. § 825 (Article 25, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
10 U.S.C. § 829 (Article 29, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
10 U.S.C. § 852 (Article 52, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21-102.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 23.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 24.
R.C.M. 912.
Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-21-0020 (2021).
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