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Jurors and Jury Decision-Making

Pretrial Publicity, Social Media, and Juror Misconduct

Published

Snap Shot

  • The question: How do pretrial publicity and jurors’ outside research affect verdicts, and how well do the usual remedies work?
  • What the research shows: In mock-jury meta-analyses, negative publicity increased guilty verdicts and pro-defense publicity decreased them; the 2022 update’s authors characterized the overall effect as modest and found it larger for deliberating-jury verdicts than for individual verdicts. In one study, a continuance reduced bias from factual but not emotional publicity, deliberation did not reliably correct the bias, and in mock-jury studies instructions to disregard have not eliminated the influence of publicity.
  • What it does not show: Most studies use mock jurors, brief controlled exposure, and abbreviated trials, and few examine social media. A modest average effect does not mean any particular exposed juror is biased, and counts of detected juror internet use are not prevalence estimates.
  • The law: Presumed prejudice is confined to extreme cases (Rideau, Sheppard; compare Patton, Skilling); otherwise actual prejudice must be shown. Private outside contact with a juror about the case is presumptively prejudicial (Remmer). Courts-martial apply the same two-part test (Simpson); Arizona rarely presumes prejudice from publicity (Bible, Cruz) but presumes it when the jury considered extrinsic evidence (Hall).
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors can show a pool of jurors without fixed opinions and can limit extrajudicial statements, without relying on self-reported impartiality or instructions alone; defense counsel can document coverage and seek individual voir dire or a venue change, recognizing that the presumed-prejudice standard is demanding and misconduct claims need specific evidence.

A jury is supposed to decide a case on the evidence admitted in court. Before trial, however, many prospective jurors have already encountered information about the case: news reports of the arrest, statements by police or officials, accounts of a defendant’s record or a confession, commentary on social media, or simply the community’s reaction to a crime. During trial, jurors carry phones that put news coverage, legal definitions, maps, and the parties’ online lives a few seconds away. Information that reaches jurors from outside the courtroom has not been tested by cross-examination or screened by the rules of evidence, and it may favor either side.

These concerns reach court at several points. Before trial, parties seek continuances, changes of venue, expanded questionnaires, and individual voir dire, and they sometimes commission community surveys to show the extent of exposure and prejudgment. During trial, courts instruct jurors not to research or communicate about the case and must respond when a juror reports, or is discovered to have done, exactly that. After verdict, claims that jurors were exposed to extraneous information or outside contact are raised in motions for new trial and on appeal.

This paper summarizes the research on publicity effects, factual and emotional publicity, deliberation, and the remedies courts use, then reviews jurors’ internet research and social media use and the federal, military, and Arizona law on publicity, venue, and juror misconduct.

How Pretrial Publicity Affects Jurors

The foundational meta-analysis, by Steblay, Besirevic, Fulero, and Jimenez-Lorente (1999), combined 44 tests involving 5,755 participants. Mock jurors exposed to negative pretrial publicity about a defendant were more likely to judge the defendant guilty than those exposed to less or none. Effects were larger when participants were drawn from the jury pool rather than student samples, when the publicity was real and contained multiple negative facts, and when more time passed between exposure and judgment. Hoetger, Devine, Brank, Drew, and Rees (2022) updated that work with 77 effect sizes from 45 reports and 11,240 participants. Negative publicity increased individual guilty verdicts (r = .16) and deliberating-jury guilty verdicts (r = .35), and publicity favorable to the defendant decreased guilty verdicts (r = -.21); the authors characterized the overall effect as modest; the effect was larger for deliberating-jury verdicts than for individual verdicts, and larger in some other conditions. Some moderators did not replicate: in the update the effect was stronger with students and with delays under a week, so moderator findings remain unsettled.

Publicity is not inherently pro-prosecution. In a shadow-jury study built around an actual trial, Daftary-Kapur, Penrod, O’Connor, and Wallace (2014) compared 115 jury-eligible residents of the trial venue, who had been exposed to real coverage, with 156 participants exposed to coverage experimentally. Both the slant and the amount of publicity mattered: participants exposed to coverage favoring the prosecution leaned toward conviction, those exposed to coverage favoring the defense leaned toward acquittal, and heavier exposure produced stronger effects. The effects persisted through the presentation of trial evidence. Because naturally and experimentally exposed participants responded similarly, the study also addressed the judicial objection that laboratory findings do not generalize to real venues. Studebaker and colleagues (2002) pursued the same goal by using the internet to study publicity effects in a real trial while it was under way.

Factual, Emotional, and General Publicity

Not all publicity works the same way. Kramer, Kerr, and Carroll (1990) distinguished factual publicity, which conveys incriminating information such as a prior record or physical evidence, from emotional publicity, which contains no direct evidence of guilt but tends to arouse negative feelings, for example by describing a sympathetic victim or the defendant in inflammatory terms. The distinction mattered most for remedies: a continuance reduced the bias produced by factual publicity but not the bias produced by emotional publicity, which suggests that the affective impression of a case may outlast memory for specific facts.

Publicity can also operate at a general level. Kovera (2002) showed participants pro-prosecution, pro-defense, or unrelated news stories about rape before an ostensibly separate rape trial; the coverage changed how participants weighed evidence about the complainant’s behavior and the standard they applied to convict, with preexisting attitudes moderating the effects. General publicity of this kind cannot be addressed by asking jurors whether they have heard of the particular case.

Several studies have examined the mechanisms. Hope, Memon, and McGeorge (2004) found that mock jurors exposed to negative publicity evaluated subsequent trial evidence in a way that favored the verdict suggested by the publicity, a form of predecisional distortion. Ruva, McEvoy, and Bryant (2007) found that participants exposed to publicity sometimes misattributed information from news stories to the trial itself, a source-memory error. These findings help explain why jurors’ sincere assurances that they can disregard what they have read do not always predict their decisions: a juror may not be aware that a piece of information came from outside the courtroom, or that it shaped how trial evidence was interpreted.

Publicity and Deliberation

Courts sometimes assume that deliberation will correct individual bias because unexposed jurors will challenge those who rely on outside information. The research does not consistently support that assumption. Kramer and colleagues (1990) found that deliberation did not reduce publicity bias and in their data strengthened it; their analyses suggested that publicity made advocates of conviction more persuasive, or less persuadable, than advocates of acquittal. In 30 recorded mock-jury deliberations, Ruva and LeVasseur (2012) found that exposed jurors discussed the publicity despite instructions, interpreted ambiguous facts in its direction, and were rarely corrected. Ruva and Coy (2020), with 96 mock juries, found that in mixed juries deliberation transferred bias from jurors who had read publicity unfavorable to the prosecution to jurors who had read none. Ruva, Diaz Ortega, and O’Grady (2022), analyzing 63 deliberations, found that discussion of the evidence tracked the publicity jurors had seen, pro-defense after publicity unfavorable to the victim and pro-prosecution after publicity unfavorable to the defendant, and that deliberation did not fully remove the bias under any jury composition.

These findings come from mock juries, usually with student or community volunteers and abbreviated trials, and they do not show that every deliberating jury will be influenced. They do indicate that deliberation cannot be relied upon as a general safeguard against publicity effects, and that a small number of exposed jurors can affect the group.

The Effectiveness of Remedies

Studebaker and Penrod (1997) reviewed the legal remedies for prejudicial publicity against the empirical research and found that several rest on assumptions the research does not support well. The evidence on each remedy can be summarized briefly.

Continuance. Delay allows memories of specific facts to fade, and Kramer and colleagues (1990) found a benefit for factual publicity. Emotional impressions appear more durable, coverage often resumes as trial approaches, and delay carries costs to both parties and to complainants and witnesses.

Voir dire. Questioning can identify jurors who admit to fixed opinions, but it is less effective at identifying those whose judgments have been shaped without their awareness. In a study of 68 undergraduates, Dexter, Cutler, and Moran (1992) found that extended, attorney-conducted voir dire lowered perceived culpability overall but did not reduce the added effect of pretrial publicity. Voir dire nonetheless remains the principal tool for measuring exposure in a given venire, and its value depends on specific questions and on questioning jurors individually rather than in front of other panel members.

Instructions. In mock-jury studies, instructions to disregard publicity have not eliminated its influence (Kramer et al., 1990). A meta-analysis of instructions to disregard inadmissible evidence, a closely related but different problem, reached a similar conclusion, with possible improvement in compliance when the judge explains the reason for the ruling (Steblay et al., 2006). Fein, McCloskey, and Tomlinson (1997) found one exception: jurors who were given reason to be suspicious about the motives behind the release of incriminating information reached verdicts that did not differ from those of unexposed jurors. That finding is narrow and has not been translated into a tested standard instruction.

Change of venue. Moving the trial to a community with less exposure addresses the source of the problem rather than relying on jurors to correct for it, and reviewers have regarded it as the remedy most likely to be effective (Studebaker & Penrod, 1997). It is also the most expensive and disruptive, it may be ineffective when coverage is national or online, and most motions are denied. In 832 change-of-venue motions found in appealed state murder convictions from 2000 to 2020, 23.5% were granted, with wide variation among states. Motions succeeded more often in smaller jurisdictions and when the victim was a police officer, and in a subset of 360 motions Black and Latino defendants succeeded less often than White defendants (Goldschmied et al., 2025). The sample includes only convictions that were appealed, so it may not represent all motions.

Change-of-Venue Surveys

Parties seeking or opposing a change of venue often present community surveys comparing the trial venue with one or more alternative venues on awareness of the case, recall of specific facts, and prejudgment of guilt. Courts have also received content analyses of the volume and slant of coverage in each location; Studebaker and colleagues (2000) described one such approach, illustrated by the analysis prepared for the Oklahoma City bombing venue hearing, and noted that either side could use it. Posey and Dahl (2002) described obstacles survey researchers face in presenting this work in court, including pressure to depart from sound research practice. Vidmar (2002) presented case studies showing that prejudice can arise from general attitudes, gossip, community norms, and conformity pressure as well as news coverage, and that jurors’ self-reports sometimes minimized attitudes revealed elsewhere. Survey evidence can support either party: it may show widespread exposure and prejudgment, or it may show that awareness is low or that a substantial pool of jurors has not formed opinions.

Social Media, Internet Research, and Juror Misconduct

Internet access has changed the risk of extraneous information during trial. Hoffmeister (2012) analyzed why jurors research and communicate about cases, including curiosity, a desire to reach the correct result, and unfamiliarity with the reasons for evidentiary rules, reported a national survey of federal judges, prosecutors, and public defenders, and evaluated reforms such as juror questions and improved instructions. A study of the views of real jurors, judges, experts, and lawyers from 55 Australian criminal trials found broad support for juror questions about expert evidence, but some jurors were too intimidated to ask or did not know they could; the author suggested that making jurors comfortable asking questions may reduce their need to look for answers online (Horan, 2024). Zora (2012) reviewed case law on jurors’ social media and smartphone use and argued that existing safeguards did not adequately protect the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.

Detected misconduct of this kind was reported by a small share of responding judges, and detection is incomplete. In a Federal Judicial Center survey, 33 of 494 responding federal district judges (6.7%) reported detected instances of juror social media use during trial or deliberations, most commonly on Facebook; reported conduct included disclosing case information, contact with trial participants, and revealing details of deliberations (Dunn, 2014). Because these are incidents that judges detected and reported, the survey is not an estimate of how often jurors use social media. The most common preventive measures judges reported were explaining in plain language the reasons for the prohibition, repeating the instruction at multiple points during trial, reminding jurors at voir dire, and using the Judicial Conference’s model instructions.

Those model instructions, issued by the Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration and Case Management and updated in June 2020, direct jurors not to research the case or communicate about it by any means, name specific platforms, address pop-up content and targeted advertising, ask jurors at the start of each day whether they have encountered or shared anything about the case, and explain that the rules protect the right to an impartial jury and guard against incomplete or inaccurate information and outside attempts at influence. The emphasis on reasons is consistent with research suggesting that jurors comply better with rules they understand, although the effect of particular wording on actual juror research has not been rigorously tested.

Limits of the Evidence

Most publicity research uses mock jurors, often students or online participants, who read news summaries and trial transcripts or watch abbreviated trial videos, and who know their decisions have no consequences. Exposure in these studies is usually brief and controlled, whereas real exposure is cumulative, varies widely among jurors, and is increasingly through social media, which few studies have examined. Shadow-jury and field studies improve realism but have smaller samples and cannot randomly assign exposure. Average effects on individual jurors are modest and vary across studies; a modest average effect can matter in a close case, but it does not mean that any particular exposed juror is biased.

Data on juror internet research and social media use rely on judges’ reports of detected incidents, published cases, and juror self-reports, all of which undercount conduct that is never discovered. Survey and case-count figures should not be read as prevalence estimates.

No study can determine whether a particular juror was influenced by publicity or outside information. The research describes risks at the group level and the general effectiveness of remedies. Whether a specific jury was impartial remains a legal determination made on the record of that case.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When the 2022 meta-analysis is cited to show that publicity has only a modest effect (r = .16 for individual verdicts; Hoetger et al., 2022), ask how large the effect is in absolute terms and at what level, because the same analysis reported r = .35 for deliberating-jury verdicts. When the same research is cited to show that a particular venire is prejudiced, ask who was studied: mostly mock jurors with brief, controlled exposure, so an average effect does not show that any particular exposed juror is biased. When the finding that a continuance reduced bias from factual but not emotional publicity (Kramer et al., 1990) is offered for or against a delay, ask how much evidence it rests on and whether it has held up, since it comes from one study and some moderator findings did not replicate. When the figure of 33 of 494 federal judges (6.7%) reporting detected juror social media use (Dunn, 2014) is cited to show that misconduct is rare, ask what exactly was counted: incidents judges detected and reported, which is not a prevalence estimate. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Pretrial Publicity, Juror Misconduct, and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

The Sixth Amendment guarantees an impartial jury, and the Due Process Clause guarantees a fair trial. The Supreme Court’s publicity cases distinguish presumed prejudice from actual prejudice. In Irvin v. Dowd (1961), the Court reversed a conviction after intense local coverage; 268 of 430 venire members were excused for fixed opinions of guilt, and 8 of the 12 seated jurors said they thought the defendant was guilty. The Court also stated that jurors need not be totally ignorant of the facts; the question is whether a juror can lay aside an impression and decide on the evidence. In Rideau v. Louisiana (1963), after a filmed jailhouse confession was broadcast three times to tens of thousands of viewers in the parish, the Court held that denial of a change of venue violated due process without examining the voir dire. In Sheppard v. Maxwell (1966), the Court held that the trial court’s failure to control the press and the courtroom denied a fair trial, and it identified tools including continuance or transfer when there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news will prevent a fair trial, sequestration, and limits on extrajudicial statements by lawyers, parties, witnesses, and officials.

Later cases confined presumed prejudice to extreme circumstances. Murphy v. Florida (1975) held that jurors’ exposure to news accounts of the crime or to a defendant’s prior convictions does not by itself presume prejudice, and that the totality of the circumstances controls. Patton v. Yount (1984) held that the passage of time can dissipate prejudice, that the relevant question is whether jurors held fixed opinions rather than whether they remembered the case, and that a trial court’s finding of juror impartiality is a factual determination entitled to deference. Mu’Min v. Virginia (1991) held that the Constitution does not require voir dire questions about the content of publicity a juror has seen. In Skilling v. United States (2010), the Court declined to presume prejudice in the Enron prosecution, weighing the size and diversity of the Houston jury pool, the absence of a confession or similarly vivid information in the coverage, the more than four years between the company’s collapse and trial, and the jury’s acquittal on nine counts, and it found no actual prejudice given an extensive questionnaire and individual voir dire.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 21(a) requires transfer on the defendant’s motion when so great a prejudice exists in the district that the defendant cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial there. In courts-martial, where panel members perform the jury’s function, R.C.M. 906(b)(11) authorizes a change of the place of trial when necessary to prevent prejudice to the rights of the accused, and voir dire and challenges under R.C.M. 912 are the primary means of addressing members’ exposure to publicity. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces applies the same two-part framework: presumed prejudice requires a showing that the publicity was prejudicial, inflammatory, and had saturated the community, and actual prejudice requires a showing that members held such fixed opinions that they could not judge impartially (United States v. Simpson, 2003). Members may be drawn from the same installation where the offense occurred, and information circulating within that community may reach them through official communications and social media; no study located examined publicity effects on court-martial members.

Juror Misconduct and Outside Influence

Remmer v. United States (1954) held that any private communication or contact with a juror during trial about the matter pending is presumptively prejudicial, that the government bears a heavy burden to show it was harmless, and that the court must hold a hearing with the parties present. Smith v. Phillips (1982) held that the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is ordinarily a hearing at which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias. Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) generally bars juror testimony about deliberations but permits testimony about whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention or whether an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on a juror; Tanner v. United States (1987) held that internal matters fall within the bar. A juror’s internet research about the case is the modern paradigm of extraneous information. Military Rule of Evidence 606(b) contains parallel exceptions and adds unlawful command influence.

Arizona

The Arizona Constitution guarantees the accused a trial by an impartial jury (Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24). Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 10.3 entitles either party to a change of the place of trial to another county if a fair and impartial trial cannot be had, and when the motion rests on pretrial publicity, the moving party must prove that dissemination of the prejudicial material probably will result in the party being deprived of a fair trial (Ariz. R. Crim. P. 10.3(b), as amended effective Jan. 1, 2025). The Arizona Supreme Court applies a two-part analysis. It rarely presumes prejudice, and does so only when publicity is so unfair, so prejudicial, and so pervasive that the court cannot give credibility to jurors’ answers during voir dire; otherwise, the defendant must show that seated jurors could not judge the case impartially, and jurors’ assurances that they can set aside what they have heard weigh against such a showing (State v. Bible, 1993; State v. Cruz, 2008). The court has applied that framework to reject venue claims in capital cases with extensive or long-running local coverage (State v. Kiles, 2009; State v. Forde, 2014). Because Arizona abolished peremptory challenges effective January 1, 2022, a juror with significant exposure who is not excused for cause will sit, which increases the importance of thorough questioning and of the trial court’s cause rulings.

Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 24.1(c)(3) lists juror misconduct as a ground for a new trial, including a juror’s receipt of evidence not properly admitted. When a defendant shows that the jury received and considered extrinsic evidence, prejudice is presumed and a new trial is required unless the State shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the extrinsic evidence did not taint the verdict (State v. Hall, 2003). Arizona Rule of Evidence 606(b) follows the federal rule on the admissibility of juror testimony concerning extraneous information and outside influence.

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports the proposition that publicity effects on individual jurors are, on average, modest, that they vary greatly across cases and jurors, and that coverage favoring the defense biases judgments in the same way as coverage favoring the prosecution. Voir dire and, where appropriate, survey evidence may show either widespread exposure and prejudgment or that a substantial pool of jurors without fixed opinions exists, and the law permits seating jurors who have heard of a case so long as they can decide it on the evidence. Limits on extrajudicial statements by police, officials, and counsel reduce the risk of the factual and emotional publicity that the research identifies as most damaging, and Sheppard identified such limits as a tool available to trial courts.

The research counsels caution about relying on jurors’ self-reported impartiality and on instructions alone. Exposed jurors may misremember the source of information or interpret trial evidence through the lens of coverage without awareness, and deliberation does not reliably correct those effects. In cases with intense local coverage, more searching voir dire, individual questioning, and a reasonable continuance are measures that courts and the parties may consider. Juror internet research is a risk to any verdict, and prompt investigation of reported misconduct under Remmer serves both parties.

Special Issues for Defense

The research supports the propositions that negative publicity is associated with a modest average increase in guilty judgments in mock juries, larger in some conditions, and that a few exposed jurors can influence a deliberating jury; a single older study found that emotional publicity was more resistant to delay than factual publicity (Kramer et al., 1990), and mock-jury studies indicate that jurors may be unaware of how publicity has shaped their views. Defense counsel are well positioned to document the volume and content of coverage, to seek questionnaires and individual voir dire focused on specific exposure, and to present community survey or content-analysis evidence in support of a change of venue under Fed. R. Crim. P. 21, R.C.M. 906(b)(11), or Arizona Rule 10.3.

The research also counsels caution. Average effects on individual jurors are modest, coverage favoring the defense can bias jurors as well, and the constitutional standard for presumed prejudice is demanding; Skilling and the Arizona cases show that substantial coverage alone rarely suffices. Survey evidence is subject to challenge on sampling, question wording, and the gap between expressed opinions and juror behavior. Claims of juror misconduct are strongest when they rest on specific evidence that extraneous information reached the jury, which Rule 606(b) and its counterparts permit courts to consider, rather than on general concerns about jurors’ phone use.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

Daftary-Kapur, T., Penrod, S. D., O’Connor, M., & Wallace, B. (2014). Examining pretrial publicity in a shadow jury paradigm: Issues of slant, quantity, persistence and generalizability. Law and Human Behavior, 38(5), 462–477. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000081

Dexter, H. R., Cutler, B. L., & Moran, G. (1992). A test of voir dire as a remedy for the prejudicial effects of pretrial publicity. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 22(10), 819–832. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.1992.tb00926.x

Dunn, M. (2014). Jurors’ and attorneys’ use of social media during voir dire, trials, and deliberations. Federal Judicial Center.

Fein, S., McCloskey, A. L., & Tomlinson, T. M. (1997). Can the jury disregard that information? The use of suspicion to reduce the prejudicial effects of pretrial publicity and inadmissible testimony. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23(11), 1215–1226. https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672972311008

Goldschmied, N., Ancona, A., & Yap, A. (2025). Survey of change-of-venue motions in appellate court transcripts of murder trials (2000–2020): Which factors make a difference? Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 43(1), 135–148. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.2700

Hoetger, L. A., Devine, D. J., Brank, E. M., Drew, R. M., & Rees, R. (2022). The impact of pretrial publicity on mock juror and jury verdicts: A meta-analysis. Law and Human Behavior, 46(2), 121–139. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000473

Hoffmeister, T. (2012). Google, gadgets, and guilt: Juror misconduct in the digital age. University of Colorado Law Review, 83(2), 409–470.

Hope, L., Memon, A., & McGeorge, P. (2004). Understanding pretrial publicity: Predecisional distortion of evidence by mock jurors. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 10(2), 111–119. https://doi.org/10.1037/1076-898X.10.2.111

Horan, J. (2024). Empowering jurors to ask questions about the expert evidence in criminal trials. The International Journal of Evidence & Proof, 28(4), 312–328. https://doi.org/10.1177/13657127241235946

Kovera, M. B. (2002). The effects of general pretrial publicity on juror decisions: An examination of moderators and mediating mechanisms. Law and Human Behavior, 26(1), 43–72. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1013829224920

Kramer, G. P., Kerr, N. L., & Carroll, J. S. (1990). Pretrial publicity, judicial remedies, and jury bias. Law and Human Behavior, 14(5), 409–438. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01044220

Posey, A. J., & Dahl, L. M. (2002). Beyond pretrial publicity: Legal and ethical issues associated with change of venue surveys. Law and Human Behavior, 26(1), 107–125. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1013833325829

Ruva, C. L., & Coy, A. E. (2020). Your bias is rubbing off on me: The impact of pretrial publicity and jury type on guilt decisions, trial evidence interpretation, and impression formation. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 26(1), 22–35. https://doi.org/10.1037/law0000220

Ruva, C. L., Diaz Ortega, S., & O’Grady, K. A. (2022). What drives a jury’s deliberation? The influence of pretrial publicity and jury composition on deliberation slant and content. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 28(1), 32–52. https://doi.org/10.1037/law0000310

Ruva, C. L., & LeVasseur, M. A. (2012). Behind closed doors: The effect of pretrial publicity on jury deliberations. Psychology, Crime & Law, 18(5), 431–452. https://doi.org/10.1080/1068316X.2010.502120

Ruva, C., McEvoy, C., & Bryant, J. B. (2007). Effects of pre-trial publicity and jury deliberation on juror bias and source memory errors. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 21(1), 45–67. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.1254

Steblay, N. M., Besirevic, J., Fulero, S. M., & Jimenez-Lorente, B. (1999). The effects of pretrial publicity on juror verdicts: A meta-analytic review. Law and Human Behavior, 23(2), 219–235. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022325019080

Steblay, N., Hosch, H. M., Culhane, S. E., & McWethy, A. (2006). The impact on juror verdicts of judicial instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence: A meta-analysis. Law and Human Behavior, 30(4), 469–492. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-006-9039-7

Studebaker, C. A., & Penrod, S. D. (1997). Pretrial publicity: The media, the law, and common sense. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 3(2–3), 428–460. https://doi.org/10.1037/1076-8971.3.2-3.428

Studebaker, C. A., Robbennolt, J. K., Pathak-Sharma, M. K., & Penrod, S. D. (2000). Assessing pretrial publicity effects: Integrating content analytic results. Law and Human Behavior, 24(3), 317–336. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005536204923

Studebaker, C. A., Robbennolt, J. K., Penrod, S. D., Pathak-Sharma, M. K., Groscup, J. L., & Devenport, J. L. (2002). Studying pretrial publicity effects: New methods for improving ecological validity and testing external validity. Law and Human Behavior, 26(1), 19–41. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1013877108082

Vidmar, N. (2002). Case studies of pre- and midtrial prejudice in criminal and civil litigation. Law and Human Behavior, 26(1), 73–105. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1013881208990

Zora, M. (2012). The real social network: How jurors’ use of social media and smart phones affects a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. University of Illinois Law Review, 2012(2), 577–610.

Legal Authorities

Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).

Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991).

Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975).

Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984).

Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954).

Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).

Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).

Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010).

Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982).

State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 858 P.2d 1152 (1993).

State v. Cruz, 218 Ariz. 149, 181 P.3d 196 (2008).

State v. Forde, 233 Ariz. 543, 315 P.3d 1200 (2014).

State v. Hall, 204 Ariz. 442, 65 P.3d 90 (2003).

State v. Kiles, 222 Ariz. 25, 213 P.3d 174 (2009).

Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987).

United States v. Simpson, 58 M.J. 368 (C.A.A.F. 2003).

U.S. Const. amend. VI.

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 21.

Fed. R. Evid. 606(b).

Mil. R. Evid. 606(b).

Rule for Courts-Martial 906(b)(11).

Rule for Courts-Martial 912.

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 10.3.

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 24.1.

Ariz. R. Evid. 606(b).

Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration and Case Management, Proposed Model Jury Instructions: The Use of Electronic Technology to Learn or Communicate About a Case (updated June 2020).

Related topic papers: Voir Dire and the Detection of Juror Bias · Explicit and Implicit Bias in Jurors · Limiting Instructions, Inadmissible Evidence, and Instructions to Disregard · Deliberation, Unanimity, and Court-Martial Verdicts · Court-Martial Panel Selection: Article 25, Random Selection, and Challenges

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Courts-Martial · Memory in the Courtroom