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Jurors and Jury Decision-Making

Limiting Instructions, Inadmissible Evidence, and Instructions to Disregard

Published

Snap Shot

  • The question: Can jurors disregard inadmissible evidence, or use evidence only for a limited purpose, when the judge instructs them to?
  • What the research shows: A meta-analysis of 48 studies found that inadmissible evidence reliably influenced mock-juror verdicts and that instructions to disregard did not effectively eliminate that influence, though compliance appeared better when the judge explained why the evidence was excluded. In older mock-jury studies, jurors often used prior convictions to judge guilt rather than credibility, though a 2022 review found the overall effect small and dependent on moderators. Early experiments found that joinder increased convictions, but a more realistic Australian study attributed much of the difference to the added strength of cross-admissible evidence.
  • What it does not show: Most studies use mock jurors and a single salient item in an otherwise balanced case, and there are few studies of members. No study can show that a particular jury relied on evidence it was told to ignore, and the research does not show that instructions never work.
  • The law: Courts presume jurors follow instructions (Richardson, Taylor, Newell), with narrow exceptions such as Bruton and Gray; Samia upheld an “other person” redaction. In courts-martial, charged offenses may not serve as propensity evidence for one another (Hills, Hukill, Guardado). Arizona requires clear and convincing proof for other acts (Terrazas, Aguilar) and provides severance under Rule 13.4.
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors are likely to encounter these issues in in limine rulings, reasoned curative instructions, and the use of limiting instructions to admit marginal evidence; defense counsel are likely to encounter them in in limine and severance motions and requests for specific remedies; the research does not show that instructions never work.

Jurors routinely hear information they are told not to use, or to use only in a limited way. A witness blurts out an excluded fact; an objection is sustained after the answer is given; a codefendant’s confession is admitted against one defendant but not the other; a defendant’s prior conviction is admitted to impeach credibility but not to show guilt; evidence of other acts is admitted to show intent or identity but not character. In each situation the law relies on an instruction: the judge tells jurors to disregard the information, or to consider it only for a specified purpose. In courts-martial the same instructions are given by the military judge to the members, the panel of service members who serve the function a jury serves in civilian court.

These instructions rest on what the Supreme Court has called the almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions (Richardson v. Marsh, 1987). The assumption is tested every time a party asks for a mistrial instead of a curative instruction, moves to sever charges or defendants, challenges the admission of other-acts or propensity evidence, or argues on appeal that an instruction could not have cured the prejudice. Courts have also recognized exceptions, situations in which the risk that jurors cannot follow an instruction is considered too great to accept.

This paper summarizes the experimental research on whether jurors can disregard inadmissible evidence, the psychological explanations for why instructions often fall short, the conditions under which instructions appear to work, and the research on prior-record, propensity, and joined-charge evidence. It then reviews the legal presumption that jurors follow instructions and its recognized exceptions under federal, military, and Arizona law.

The Meta-Analytic Evidence

The central study is a meta-analysis by Nancy Steblay and colleagues of 48 studies, comprising 175 tests of the effect of inadmissible evidence and 8,474 participants. Inadmissible evidence reliably influenced verdicts in the direction of its content, and judicial instructions to disregard it did not effectively eliminate that influence. Two moderating findings were important. Jurors appeared more likely to comply when the judge’s admonition was accompanied by an explanation of why the evidence was inadmissible, and evidence that was objected to but then ruled admissible had a significant effect on verdicts, apparently because the dispute drew attention to it (Steblay et al., 2006). The meta-analysis thus supports neither the assumption that instructions cure exposure nor the view that they are useless; it supports the narrower conclusion that a bare instruction typically reduces the effect incompletely or not at all, and that how the instruction is given matters.

More recent work confirms that the problem is not easily solved. In a two-stage online study with jury-eligible adults, researchers tested four theory-based interventions, including inducing suspicion about why the evidence was offered, giving a substantive rather than procedural reason for exclusion, asking jurors to commit to disregarding it, and asking them to advise future jurors. A package combining all four produced fewer guilty verdicts than a standard instruction in the first study, but in a larger confirmatory trial the difference was small and reached statistical significance only under a one-tailed test, and in that trial the inadmissible evidence itself did not produce a significant effect (Sandberg et al., 2025). An unpublished preprint, not peer reviewed, reported an experiment on redacted codefendant confessions, with about 1,200 jury-eligible adults recruited online, asked participants how much more likely a codefendant’s confession made them to find the defendant guilty. On a 0–10 scale, a version referring to “the other person” was rated about as incriminating as one naming the defendant (6.46 vs. 6.75, not a significant difference), a version with a blank was rated somewhat lower than the named version (6.29, a significant difference), and a version that implicated the defendant only by inference was rated lowest (5.10). The study used a brief written vignette without deliberation or other evidence, did not report effect sizes or standard deviations, and did not test a limiting instruction; it measures perceived incrimination rather than compliance, so its results are preliminary and are not evidence about compliance with a limiting instruction (Stillwell, 2025).

Why Instructions to Disregard Often Fall Short

Reviews of the research identify several overlapping explanations (Lieberman & Arndt, 2000). The first is that jurors build a story of the case as evidence comes in, and information that has been integrated into that story is difficult to extract later; jurors cannot simply unlearn what they now believe. The second is ironic mental control. Laboratory research by Daniel Wegner showed that trying to suppress a thought can increase its accessibility, especially when people are under mental load (Wegner, 1994). That research was conducted on thought suppression generally rather than on jurors, but it offers one explanation for findings that admonitions sometimes increase attention to the forbidden information. The third is reactance, which reviews have proposed: a strong instruction can be experienced as a restriction on jurors’ freedom to consider relevant information, prompting some jurors to give it more weight. The fourth is that jurors’ sense of justice may conflict with the rule; jurors who believe a piece of evidence is true and important may be unwilling to ignore it for reasons they regard as technical.

The last explanation is supported by research showing that jurors respond to the reason evidence is excluded. In one experiment, mock jurors who heard that a wiretap had been excluded because it was unreliable reached verdicts similar to jurors who never heard it, while jurors told it was excluded because it had been obtained illegally were influenced by it nearly as much as jurors who heard it admitted (Kassin & Sommers, 1997). A follow-up study found this selective compliance only among participants high in need for cognition, some of whom appeared to overcorrect, rating the defendant’s guilt as less probable after hearing unreliable excluded evidence than jurors who never heard it (Sommers & Kassin, 2001). An explanation of the legal reason for exclusion does not always help, however. In a set of experiments with student participants, a judge’s legal explanation for excluding a prior conviction failed to help jurors disregard it and appeared to backfire, while the same approach did not backfire for hearsay; the author attributed the difference to jurors’ differing views about whether it was fair to use each kind of evidence (Pickel, 1995). Some of the oldest studies also found that a highly salient admonition can draw attention to the excluded information (Lieberman & Arndt, 2000).

When Instructions Appear to Work

The research also identifies conditions under which jurors do disregard information. When jurors are given a reason to doubt the reliability of excluded evidence, their verdicts often approach those of jurors who never heard it (Kassin & Sommers, 1997). In two experiments, jurors who had been made suspicious about the motives behind the introduction of incriminating pretrial publicity or inadmissible testimony reached verdicts that did not differ from those of jurors who were never exposed to the information, while jurors who simply received the instruction were affected by it (Fein et al., 1997). The meta-analysis found that explanations accompanying the admonition were associated with better compliance (Steblay et al., 2006). These findings suggest that instructions are more likely to succeed when they give jurors a reason, consistent with their own sense of fairness and accuracy, for setting the information aside. They do not suggest that a standard instruction reliably cures exposure to vivid or probative information that jurors believe to be true.

Prior Convictions, Other Acts, and Propensity

The law draws a fine distinction between using a prior conviction to judge a testifying defendant’s credibility and using it to infer that the defendant committed the charged crime. Several studies, most of them older, find that jurors do not maintain that distinction, although a 2022 review found the overall effect small and dependent on moderators. In an early experiment, a defendant’s prior record did not change mock jurors’ ratings of his credibility as a witness, but it did change conviction rates, which were highest when the prior conviction was for the same crime as the one charged (Wissler & Saks, 1985). In another study, a prior conviction increased the likelihood of conviction relative to a prior acquittal or no record; the effect operated through jurors’ inferences that the defendant was the kind of person likely to commit crimes, and limiting instructions did not effectively guide jurors’ use of the evidence (Greene & Dodge, 1995). An English simulation found similar effects, including elevated guilt ratings when the prior conviction was for a sexual offense against a child (Lloyd-Bostock, 2000). Analysis of real criminal trials found that juries’ learning of a defendant’s prior record was associated with a higher probability of conviction, particularly in cases in which the other evidence was weaker (Eisenberg & Hans, 2009). A 2022 literature review qualifies the experimental picture: effects of prior-conviction evidence have ranged from increased to decreased judgments of guilt, the overall effect appears small, and it depends on moderators such as the similarity and seriousness of the prior offense, the number of prior convictions, limiting instructions, the ambiguity of the case, and study methods (Schmittat, 2022).

These findings bear on rules that admit other-acts evidence for limited purposes and rules that admit propensity evidence outright. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and its military and Arizona counterparts permit other-acts evidence for purposes such as motive, intent, plan, or identity, with a limiting instruction on request, and the research suggests that jurors may draw the forbidden character inference despite that instruction. Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414, Military Rules of Evidence 413 and 414, and Arizona Rule of Evidence 404(c) take a different approach in sexual-offense cases: they permit evidence of other sexual offenses to be considered for its bearing on propensity, subject to safeguards. Under those rules, the research question shifts from whether jurors can disregard propensity reasoning to whether they give propensity evidence appropriate weight. That question has received much less study. Readers concerned with juror beliefs about sexual assault and child abuse, and with directions and expert evidence designed to correct misconceptions, should consult the papers on those subjects in the Counterintuitive Testimony resource, which this paper does not duplicate.

Joined Charges and Spillover

When several charges are tried together, jurors are instructed to consider each separately. Early experimental research found that joinder increased the likelihood of conviction. In early experiments, mock jurors were more likely to convict on a given charge when it was tried with other charges, rated the defendant more negatively, and confused evidence across charges (Tanford & Penrod, 1982). In a study using evidence from real cases, a defendant tried for both murder and rape was more likely to be convicted of either crime than when tried for one, and an instruction to consider the charges separately did not reduce the effect (Greene & Loftus, 1985). A review of the legal and psychological literature identified accumulation of evidence, confusion of evidence, and inferences of criminal disposition as the main mechanisms (Bordens & Horowitz, 1985).

More recent and more realistic research presents a more qualified picture. A large Australian study for the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse used jury-eligible community members deliberating in juries after watching a realistic trial of institutional child sexual abuse. Joint trials involving several complainants produced somewhat higher conviction rates than separate trials, but the researchers found little evidence that jurors engaged in impermissible reasoning, and they attributed the difference largely to the added probative strength of the cross-admissible evidence (Goodman-Delahunty et al., 2016). In a transcript study with 752 mock jurors, allegations of sexual assault from five complainants rather than one produced more guilty verdicts and higher guilt ratings (Fraser et al., 2023), a design that cannot by itself show whether the increase reflected legitimate corroborative weight or propensity reasoning. The contrast with the earlier experiments may reflect differences in realism, deliberation, and the joined evidence; how much joinder effects reflect legitimate probative value rather than prejudice remains open.

Limits of the Evidence

Nearly all of this research uses mock jurors, many of them students or online participants, who read or watch abbreviated trials in which the inadmissible evidence is often a single, salient item and the rest of the evidence is deliberately balanced. Real trials contain more evidence, and the marginal effect of a single excluded item may be smaller when the other evidence is strong, as the real-trial prior-record findings suggest (Eisenberg & Hans, 2009). Many studies omit deliberation, and few measure how long the effect of excluded information lasts. Effect sizes vary widely across studies, and the meta-analysis could not eliminate the possibility that published studies overstate effects. There are few studies of court-martial members. Most important, no study can determine whether jurors or members in a particular case disregarded a particular item of evidence; research on groups of mock jurors shows tendencies under defined conditions and cannot establish that any verdict rested on evidence the jury was told to ignore.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When the meta-analysis is cited to show that instructions to disregard do not work (Steblay et al., 2006), ask who was studied and what the design can show: it pooled 48 studies and 8,474 participants, mostly mock jurors hearing a single salient item in an otherwise balanced case, and it found better compliance when the judge explained why the evidence was excluded. When the Australian study is cited to show that joint trials involve little impermissible reasoning (Goodman-Delahunty et al., 2016), ask how much evidence it rests on and whether it has held up, since it attributed higher conviction rates to cross-admissible evidence in one realistic trial, while earlier experiments found joinder effects despite instructions (Tanford & Penrod, 1982; Greene & Loftus, 1985). When the redacted-confession ratings are cited (Stillwell, 2025), ask what exactly was counted: scores of 6.46 and 6.75 on a 0–10 scale measured perceived incrimination in an unpublished written vignette, not compliance with an instruction. For each, ask whether it applies to this jury, because no study can show that a particular jury relied on excluded evidence. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Limiting Instructions and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

Federal Rule of Evidence 105 requires the court, on timely request, to restrict evidence admitted for a limited purpose to its proper scope and to instruct the jury accordingly. The presumption that jurors follow instructions is the rule, and the Supreme Court has recognized only narrow exceptions. In Bruton v. United States (1968), the Court held that admitting a nontestifying codefendant’s confession that names the defendant violates the Confrontation Clause despite a limiting instruction, because the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow the instruction is too great. Richardson v. Marsh (1987) held that Bruton does not reach a confession redacted to remove any reference to the defendant, even if other evidence links it to him; Gray v. Maryland (1998) held that a redaction replacing the defendant’s name with a blank or the word “deleted” remains within Bruton; and Samia v. United States (2023) held that a confession altered to refer to “the other person,” given with a limiting instruction, does not violate the Confrontation Clause, over a dissent arguing that the substitution pointed to the defendant as clearly as a name. The unpublished Stillwell (2025) preprint measured perceived incrimination under these redaction styles, not compliance with an instruction.

Other decisions show both the presumption and its limits. Jackson v. Denno (1964) held that a jury may not be the sole judge of whether a confession was voluntary, in part because jurors who find a confession involuntary may be unable to disregard it. Shepard v. United States (1933) held that a statement accusing the defendant could not be admitted for the limited purpose of showing the declarant’s state of mind, observing that such a fine distinction was beyond the ability of ordinary minds. Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Krulewitch v. United States (1949) called the assumption that instructions can overcome prejudice a naive one. On the other side, Spencer v. Texas (1967) upheld admission of prior convictions under a recidivist statute with a limiting instruction; Huddleston v. United States (1988) identified the Rule 105 limiting instruction as one of the protections against unfair prejudice from other-acts evidence; Zafiro v. United States (1993) held that limiting instructions will often suffice to cure the risk of prejudice from joint trials; and Weeks v. Angelone (2000) presumed that jurors understood the judge’s answer to their question.

In courts-martial, Military Rule of Evidence 105 parallels the federal rule, and military appellate courts presume, absent evidence to the contrary, that members follow the military judge’s instructions (United States v. Taylor, 2000). The Military Judges’ Benchbook includes a standard “spillover” instruction telling members to consider each offense separately and that proof of one offense carries no inference of guilt of another (Department of the Army, 2025, Instruction 7-17), and R.C.M. 906(b)(10) permits severance to prevent manifest injustice. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has held that evidence of one charged sexual offense may not be used under Military Rule of Evidence 413 as propensity evidence for another charged offense in the same trial. In United States v. Hills (2016), the court held that charged conduct is not the kind of evidence Rule 413 was written to admit, and that instructions telling members they could use charged conduct proven by a preponderance of the evidence as propensity evidence for other charged conduct, while also requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt for conviction, risked confusing the members and undermined the presumption of innocence. In United States v. Hukill (2017), the court held that the Hills rule applies regardless of the forum, including trial by military judge alone, and that the presumption that a military judge knows the law could not cure the error. In United States v. Guardado (2017), the court applied Hills to propensity instructions under Military Rules of Evidence 413 and 414, held that the members’ acquittal on some specifications did not show the error was harmless, and noted that a spillover instruction qualified by permission to consider propensity added to the risk of confusion. Military Rules of Evidence 413 and 414 continue to permit propensity use of uncharged sexual offenses, subject to Military Rule of Evidence 403.

Arizona

Arizona courts likewise presume that jurors follow the court’s instructions (State v. Newell, 2006), and the Arizona Supreme Court has described a mistrial as the most dramatic remedy for trial error, appropriate only when justice will be thwarted unless the jury is discharged; the trial judge, who observes the effect of an error on the jury, decides in the first instance whether a curative instruction suffices (State v. Adamson, 1983). The court has also recognized that curative instructions will not always remove the risk of bias, while holding in the same case that the trial court’s instructions cured any prejudice from improper prosecutorial remarks (State v. Gallardo, 2010). Other-acts evidence under Arizona Rule of Evidence 404(b) requires clear and convincing proof that the defendant committed the act (State v. Terrazas, 1997), a proper purpose, Rule 403 balancing, and a limiting instruction on request. In sexual-offense cases, Arizona Rule of Evidence 404(c) permits evidence of other sexual acts to show an aberrant sexual propensity if the court finds that the evidence is sufficient to permit the trier of fact to find that the defendant committed the act, which the rule’s 1997 comment and the Arizona Supreme Court have read to require clear and convincing proof, that it provides a reasonable basis to infer propensity, and that its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, with specific findings on each point, and the rule requires the court to instruct the jury on the proper use of the evidence (Ariz. R. Evid. 404(c)(1)-(2); State v. Aguilar, 2004). Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 13.4 entitles a defendant to severance of offenses joined only because they are of the same or similar character, unless evidence of the other offenses would be admissible if the offenses were tried separately.

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research supports the view that instructions can work under identifiable conditions: when jurors are given a reason grounded in reliability or fairness to set the information aside, and when the instruction is prompt and specific. Realistic research on joined trials also suggests that higher conviction rates in joint trials may reflect the added probative force of cross-admissible evidence rather than impermissible reasoning, and real-trial data on prior-record evidence indicate that its association with conviction was greater when the other evidence was weaker (Eisenberg & Hans, 2009); whether that applies to other kinds of excluded information has not been established. Prosecutors are likely to encounter these issues at the source of exposure, in preparing witnesses to avoid excluded subjects and in rulings in limine, and, when exposure occurs, in curative instructions that explain the reason for exclusion rather than relying on a bare admonition.

The research also counsels caution. Bare instructions to disregard often fail, prior-record evidence admitted for credibility is frequently used to judge guilt, and joinder tends to increase convictions in experimental studies. Hills, Hukill, and Guardado show that instructions permitting charged offenses to be used as propensity evidence for one another create reversible-error risk in courts-martial, and Arizona’s severance rule and Rule 404(c) findings impose comparable discipline. Relying on a limiting instruction to admit marginal evidence, or arguing other-acts evidence for an inference the instruction forbids, increases appellate risk.

Special Issues for Defense

The research bears on concerns that inadmissible information, prior records, and joined charges influence verdicts despite instructions, and the legal presumption of compliance rests on an empirical assumption that the research has tested with mixed results (Steblay et al., 2006; Lieberman & Arndt, 2000). Defense counsel are likely to encounter these issues before exposure occurs, in motions in limine, severance motions, and objections to other-acts evidence, where prevention does not depend on jurors’ ability to set the information aside. When exposure occurs, the research suggests that a curative instruction explaining why the evidence is unreliable or should not be used may be more effective than a bare admonition, while a highly emphatic admonition may draw attention to the information.

The research also counsels caution about the limits of these arguments. Most studies use mock jurors and single salient items in otherwise balanced cases, some realistic studies find little impermissible reasoning in joined trials, a 2022 review found the overall effect of prior-conviction evidence small and dependent on case and study features (Schmittat, 2022), and courts apply a strong presumption that jurors and members follow instructions, departing from it only in narrow categories such as Bruton. The research cannot show that a particular jury relied on excluded evidence. Arguments that request specific, research-supported remedies, such as severance where the rules provide for it, exclusion where unfair prejudice substantially outweighs probative value, or a reasoned curative instruction, are more consistent with the evidence than claims that instructions never work.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

References

Bordens, K. S., & Horowitz, I. A. (1985). Joinder of criminal offenses: A review of the legal and psychological literature. Law and Human Behavior, 9(4), 339–353. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01044475

Department of the Army. (2025). Military judges’ benchbook (DA Pamphlet 27-9, 29 July 2025).

Eisenberg, T., & Hans, V. P. (2009). Taking a stand on taking the stand: The effect of a prior criminal record on the decision to testify and on trial outcomes. Cornell Law Review, 94(6), 1353–1390.

Fein, S., McCloskey, A. L., & Tomlinson, T. M. (1997). Can the jury disregard that information? The use of suspicion to reduce the prejudicial effects of pretrial publicity and inadmissible testimony. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23(11), 1215–1226. https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672972311008

Fraser, B. M., Pica, E., & Pozzulo, J. D. (2023). Mock-jurors’ judgements in a sexual assault case: The influence of defendant race and occupational status, delayed reporting, and multiple allegations. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 38(13–14), 7964–7989. https://doi.org/10.1177/08862605231153873

Goodman-Delahunty, J., Cossins, A., & Martschuk, N. (2016). Jury reasoning in joint and separate trials of institutional child sexual abuse: An empirical study. Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse.

Greene, E., & Dodge, M. (1995). The influence of prior record evidence on juror decision making. Law and Human Behavior, 19(1), 67–78. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01499073

Greene, E., & Loftus, E. F. (1985). When crimes are joined at trial. Law and Human Behavior, 9(2), 193–207. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01067051

Kassin, S. M., & Sommers, S. R. (1997). Inadmissible testimony, instructions to disregard, and the jury: Substantive versus procedural considerations. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23(10), 1046–1054. https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672972310005

Lieberman, J. D., & Arndt, J. (2000). Understanding the limits of limiting instructions: Social psychological explanations for the failures of instructions to disregard pretrial publicity and other inadmissible evidence. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 6(3), 677–711. https://doi.org/10.1037/1076-8971.6.3.677

Lloyd-Bostock, S. (2000). The effects on juries of hearing about the defendant’s previous criminal record: A simulation study. Criminal Law Review, 2000, 734–755.

Pickel, K. L. (1995). Inducing jurors to disregard inadmissible evidence: A legal explanation does not help. Law and Human Behavior, 19(4), 407–424. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01499140

Sandberg, P. N., Neal, T. M. S., & O’Hara, K. L. (2025). Can jurors disregard inadmissible evidence? Using the multiphase optimization strategy to test interventions derived from cognitive and social psychological theories. Behavioral Sciences, 15(1), Article 7. https://doi.org/10.3390/bs15010007

Schmittat, S. M. (2022). Prior conviction evidence: Harmful or irrelevant? A literature review. Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11896-022-09557-z

Sommers, S. R., & Kassin, S. M. (2001). On the many impacts of inadmissible testimony: Selective compliance, need for cognition, and the overcorrection bias. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27(10), 1368–1377. https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672012710012

Steblay, N., Hosch, H. M., Culhane, S. E., & McWethy, A. (2006). The impact on juror verdicts of judicial instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence: A meta-analysis. Law and Human Behavior, 30(4), 469–492. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-006-9039-7

Stillwell, H. (2025). The reasonable juror on trial: A Bruton-inspired reality check [Preprint]. SSRN. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5371115

Tanford, S., & Penrod, S. (1982). Biases in trials involving defendants charged with multiple offenses. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 12(6), 453–480. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.1982.tb00879.x

Wegner, D. M. (1994). Ironic processes of mental control. Psychological Review, 101(1), 34–52. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.101.1.34

Wissler, R. L., & Saks, M. J. (1985). On the inefficacy of limiting instructions: When jurors use prior conviction evidence to decide on guilt. Law and Human Behavior, 9(1), 37–48. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01044288

Legal Authorities

Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).

Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185 (1998).

Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988).

Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).

Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949).

Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987).

Samia v. United States, 599 U.S. 635 (2023).

Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933).

Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967).

State v. Adamson, 136 Ariz. 250, 665 P.2d 972 (1983).

State v. Aguilar, 209 Ariz. 40, 97 P.3d 865 (2004).

State v. Gallardo, 225 Ariz. 560, 242 P.3d 159 (2010).

State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 132 P.3d 833 (2006).

State v. Terrazas, 189 Ariz. 580, 944 P.2d 1194 (1997).

United States v. Guardado, 77 M.J. 90 (C.A.A.F. 2017).

United States v. Hills, 75 M.J. 350 (C.A.A.F. 2016).

United States v. Hukill, 76 M.J. 219 (C.A.A.F. 2017).

United States v. Taylor, 53 M.J. 195 (C.A.A.F. 2000).

Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225 (2000).

Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534 (1993).

U.S. Const. amend. VI.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 14.

Fed. R. Evid. 105, 403, 404(b), 413, 414.

Rule for Courts-Martial 906(b)(10).

Mil. R. Evid. 105, 403, 404(b), 413, 414.

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 13.3, 13.4.

Ariz. R. Evid. 105, 403, 404(b), 404(c).

Related topic papers: Jury Instructions: Comprehension and Effectiveness · Pretrial Publicity, Social Media, and Juror Misconduct · Juror Beliefs in Sexual Assault and Child Abuse Trials · Introduction to Juror Decision-Making · Mock Jury Research: Methods, Realism, and Limits

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Courts-Martial · Counterintuitive Testimony · Child Abuse Allegations