Snap Shot
- The question: What do jurors believe about sexual assault and child abuse, and do those beliefs affect verdicts?
- What the research shows: Mistaken beliefs run in more than one direction. In a survey of 771 real jurors in England and Wales (using items that critics said were not validated), crude misconceptions were rare, but substantial minorities expected visible emotion from a complainant or were unsure about intoxication and delay. In one study of child cases, many participants also believed that growing detail signals truthfulness or that a psychologist can tell whether a child’s account has been influenced. Some mock jurors drew inferences from other-act evidence despite limiting instructions; effects depended on similarity, seriousness, and case ambiguity.
- What it does not show: A 2026 meta-analysis found these attitudes strongly associated with blaming complainants (r = .52) but only weakly with guilt judgments (r = −.16). All verdict evidence comes from simulated trials, and no study can show what the jurors in a particular case believe or whether a complainant or defendant is truthful.
- The law: Voir dire on attitudes is within the court’s discretion, and selection by sex or race is barred (Batson, J.E.B.). Rules 413 and 414 and Arizona Rule 404(c) permit propensity evidence subject to safeguards (Aguilar), and Hills and Guardado limit using charged offenses as propensity for one another; testimony quantifying truthfulness is vouching (Brooks, Lindsey).
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors are likely to encounter the issue in attitude-focused voir dire on the expectations a case actually raises, where claims that jurors are generally biased go beyond the research; defense counsel are likely to encounter it in reactions to the charge, other-act evidence, and beliefs about children’s accounts, where misconceptions about complainants also exist.
Sexual assault and child sexual abuse trials often turn on the testimony of a complainant and a defendant, with little independent evidence. The decision then depends heavily on how jurors interpret behavior, demeanor, delay, and memory, and those interpretations draw on what jurors already believe about sexual offenses, about people who report them, about children, and about people accused of them. In courts-martial, the members of the panel serve the jury’s function, and the same questions apply to them.
Two papers in the Counterintuitive Testimony hub, Juror Beliefs About Sexual Assault: What the Research Shows and Correcting Juror Misconceptions: Directions, Expert Evidence, and Juror Screening, review in detail the survey evidence on adult rape cases and the evidence on directions and expert testimony. This paper summarizes their core points and takes a different vantage point, following prior beliefs through selection, the evaluation of testimony, and deliberation, in child cases as well as adult cases.
The paper also gives separate attention to a point that is easy to lose in this literature: mistaken or untested beliefs run in more than one direction. Some beliefs can lead jurors to discount an accurate account. Others, such as emotional reactions to the nature of the charge, overconfidence in children’s resistance to suggestion, or the inference that a person accused of one sexual offense probably committed another, can disadvantage a defendant. Both are reviewed here, followed by the law on voir dire, propensity and rape-shield rules, and expert testimony.
Where Beliefs Enter the Trial
Prior beliefs can affect a sexual offense trial at three points. At selection, prospective jurors bring attitudes, experiences of victimization or of false accusation, and expectations about how victims and offenders behave, which voir dire may reveal. In evaluating testimony, jurors tend to construct a narrative and judge evidence by how well it fits, so expectations about how a genuine complainant, a child, or an innocent defendant would behave shape which details seem meaningful. In deliberation, beliefs can be voiced, challenged, reinforced, or left unspoken. At each point the research describes tendencies in groups; it cannot identify which juror holds a belief or show that any belief is decisive in a particular trial.
Measuring Beliefs About Sexual Offenses
Adult-case research relies mainly on attitude scales that measure what researchers call “rape myth acceptance,” principally the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance Scale (Payne et al., 1999), its update (McMahon & Farmer, 2011), and the 30-item Acceptance of Modern Myths About Sexual Aggression scale, or AMMSA (Gerger et al., 2007). Their limits, reviewed in the Counterintuitive Testimony hub paper on juror beliefs, are that they are self-reports vulnerable to socially desirable answering, as researchers on both sides of the current debate accept (Daly et al., 2023; Willmott et al., 2026); that some items lack an agreed empirical answer (Thomas, 2020); and, one critic argues, that the research gives too little attention to the possibility that empathy for complainants could also bias decisions (Waiton, 2024).
Child cases use different instruments. Researchers have built questionnaires that compare lay beliefs about children’s memory, suggestibility, and disclosure with the research consensus (Quas et al., 2005), and scales measuring empathy for child victims, belief in children’s reports generally, and opposition to adult-child sexual contact (Bottoms et al., 2014). These measures share the limitations of self-report and have been used mainly with student and community volunteers.
How Common Are These Beliefs?
The Counterintuitive Testimony hub paper on juror beliefs sets out the adult evidence item by item. In brief, the largest survey of people who had actually served on juries that this review identified questioned 771 of 773 jurors (99.7%) in England and Wales immediately after their verdicts (Thomas, 2020). Agreement with crude statements was very low (2% agreed that men cannot be raped; 3% that no bruises means no rape), but 43% expected a person who had been raped to be very emotional when giving evidence, and 25% agreed, with 36% unsure, that it is hard to know whether a rape occurred when both people were drunk. Thomas concluded that claims of widespread juror bias in sexual offense cases were not valid. She also argued that mock-jury volunteers cannot stand in for real jurors, noting that 87% of her respondents would have opted out of service had it been voluntary.
Eleven researchers responded that the items were not drawn from a validated scale, that the three-point format and “not sure” option may conceal socially undesirable views, that a near-complete response rate inside a courthouse may reflect institutional pressure, that the survey measured abstract beliefs rather than reasoning in deliberation, and that the conclusions underweighted items with substantial agreement or uncertainty (Daly et al., 2023). A 2025 evidence review by several of the same authors concluded that surveys, mock-jury deliberations, and interviews with real jurors all show that at least some jurors hold false beliefs, while acknowledging that their effect on verdicts cannot be known with certainty (Leverick et al., 2025). Both positions rest on real evidence: Thomas’s study used actual jurors with near-complete participation but measured no deliberation or verdicts, while the mock-jury studies her critics rely on capture deliberation but use short simulated trials and volunteer samples. A fair summary is that overt misconceptions appear rare among serving jurors, while expectations about demeanor and uncertainty about intoxication, delay, and false allegations are held by substantial minorities.
For child cases, a study of 169 college students and 148 people who had reported for jury duty in California compared their answers with the research literature (Quas et al., 2005). Participants answered many items consistently with the research (about 70% agreed that children can distinguish truth from lies); errors on others pointed in different directions, and jury-pool members and students did not differ in overall accuracy.
Beliefs That Can Disadvantage Complainants
Four expectations about adult complainants are best documented. On demeanor, a meta-analysis of 20 studies found that complainants who displayed distress were judged more credible than those who appeared controlled (Nitschke et al., 2019), although calm demeanor occurs in true cases and demeanor is an unreliable indicator either way. On delay, only 7% of Thomas’s jurors agreed that allegations not reported immediately are hard to believe, but another 20% were unsure (Thomas, 2020). On resistance, explicit agreement that a genuine victim would fight back is low, yet the expectation was voiced in 28 of 32 Scottish mock juries and by real jurors in 11 of 18 New Zealand trials (Leverick et al., 2025). On intoxication, responses mix a misconception with a genuine evidentiary difficulty, because intoxication can impair memory and complicate questions of consent and capacity.
Beliefs about male complainants have been studied less. A systematic review of 21 experimental sources found mock jurors typically more lenient toward defendants when the complainant was male, although half the sources found no effect of complainant gender on verdicts, and harsher attitudes toward Black, gay, or transgender male complainants (Millar et al., 2026). Only 9 of the 21 sources controlled for participant gender, and several found that differences between men’s and women’s attitudes did not carry over into verdicts. In an online study (N = 437), a case with a male complainant and a female defendant was seen as less typical of sexual assault, which lowered the probability of conviction, and male rape myths predicted decisions in male-complainant cases (Starosta et al., 2025). Neither involved court-martial members.
Similar patterns appear in child cases. Only 43% of participants in the California study recognized that abused children may deny abuse if asked by a trusted adult (Quas et al., 2005). In mock trials, adolescent complainants (14 years old) were blamed more than younger children (5 years old) for their own abuse, although perceptions of 5- and 10-year-olds were largely similar (Bottoms et al., 2014). California participants also estimated that a mean of 28% of young children’s abuse reports are false, with higher estimates from men than women (Quas et al., 2005); the true rate is uncertain, so this is a perception rather than a measured misconception, but it indicates considerable skepticism toward child reports. Delay matters in child cases too: in an experiment with 328 jury-eligible adults, a 10-month delay in a 7-year-old’s disclosure, compared with one day, produced fewer guilty verdicts and lower ratings of the child’s believability and memory, with some effects depending on whether the defendant was a neighbor or a stepfather (Miller et al., 2022).
Beliefs and Reactions That Can Disadvantage Defendants
The same California study identified beliefs that could lead jurors to overvalue a child’s account. Forty-eight percent believed that children can remember painful abuse suffered in infancy, which the research does not support; only 55% correctly disagreed that children are no more influenced by leading questions than adults; only 30% agreed that asking children to show “what bad things happened” with anatomically detailed dolls is likely to lead to false reports, a classification the authors acknowledged is debated; 52% believed that increasingly detailed disclosures over time indicate truthfulness; and 68% believed that a psychologist can tell whether a child’s account has been influenced by an adult (Quas et al., 2005). The last item may indicate that some jurors credit an expert’s claims about a child’s account more than the science warrants, whichever party calls the expert; it is a survey belief from one 2005 sample, not a finding about how jurors treat testimony. Because errors ran in both directions, a juror’s overall level of knowledge says little about which way his or her particular misconceptions lean.
The nature of the charge can itself affect reasoning. In one experiment, gruesome evidence increased mock jurors’ anger toward the defendant and their willingness to convict, with anger contributing to the effect (Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, 2006). That case was a homicide, but two later experiments examined child sexual abuse testimony directly (N = 143 and 169): anger, sadness, and disgust all rose after participants read a child’s testimony, disgust most, and moral outrage linked disgust to longer recommended sentences and, in one study, to witness credibility ratings (Olaguez et al., 2025). The studies used written transcripts and did not show that the emotions produced wrong verdicts, but they identify a mechanism by which the emotional weight of an allegation could lower the threshold for conviction.
Evidence of other sexual misconduct presents a related risk. Mock-jury research has found that learning of a defendant’s prior conviction, particularly for a similar offense, raised conviction rates, and that instructions limiting the evidence to credibility did not prevent jurors from using it to infer guilt (Wissler & Saks, 1985). A British simulation found that a prior conviction for indecent assault on a child increased ratings of the likelihood of guilt (Lloyd-Bostock, 2000). Several jurisdictions permit propensity reasoning in sexual offense cases, as described below; the research indicates that some mock jurors drew inferences from such evidence despite limiting instructions, with effects that depended on similarity, seriousness, and case ambiguity.
Juror experience also matters. A meta-analysis of nine mock-trial studies with 2,447 participants found that jurors who reported their own sexual abuse histories were more empathic toward child victims, more likely to believe them, and more likely to favor guilt, with small to moderate effects (Jones et al., 2020). A smaller later meta-analysis (seven studies, 361 undergraduates) found that, among jurors with abuse histories, more severe abuse was associated with more empathy but not with verdicts, and its authors cautioned against questioning prospective jurors about the details of their abuse or disproportionately excluding survivors (Jones-Cieminski et al., 2026). The authors of the first stressed that decisions shaped by experience are not the same as bias.
Statistics Jurors May Hear About False Reports
Jurors’ beliefs about how often accusations are false can also be shaped by statistics offered at trial. When a witness or argument states that false reports are rare, the figure usually comes from studies that counted only reports shown to be false, which is far smaller than the share of reports that were never substantiated. In a ten-year study of 136 sexual assault reports to a university police department, 5.9% were coded as false, but 44.9% did not proceed to any prosecution or disciplinary action and 13.9% contained too little information to classify (Lisak et al., 2010). A juror told only the first figure may conclude that nearly all reports are proven true, and a juror told only that many cases are never prosecuted may conclude that many are false. Neither inference follows from the data. Courts have limited such testimony in both directions: testimony quantifying the likelihood that a complainant is truthful is treated as vouching (United States v. Brooks, 2007; State v. Lindsey, 1986), and courts may apply similar reasoning to non-prosecution or acquittal figures offered to suggest falsity. Jurors may also hear “unfounded” used in two different senses: in police Uniform Crime Reporting, a report is unfounded only when investigation determines it to be “false or baseless” (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2004, p. 77), whereas in child protective services an unfounded report is simply one that was not substantiated. The Child Abuse Allegations and Counterintuitive Testimony hubs discuss the founded, unfounded, and false categories in detail.
Juror Gender, Attitudes, and Demographics
The most consistent demographic finding in child sexual abuse research is that women, compared with men, make more pro-complainant judgments in mock trials (Bottoms et al., 2007). Experiments with student and community samples found that women were more empathic toward child victims and more inclined to believe children generally, that these attitudes largely explained the gender difference, and that the strength of the case evidence was a powerful determinant of judgments (Bottoms et al., 2014). In adult research, men score higher on average than women on these attitude scales (Suarez & Gadalla, 2010), and a 2025 review reports that men and older people are more likely to hold the beliefs (Leverick et al., 2025). Verdict differences are smaller and less consistent, and in one recent study they disappeared once attitudes were controlled, as described below. The Counterintuitive Testimony hub paper on juror beliefs reviews the adult findings on juror gender, including evidence that these attitudes relate to judgments similarly in men and women, and this hub’s paper Juror Demographics and Verdicts reviews gender effects across case types.
These findings carry three qualifications. First, group differences are modest, vary across studies, and cannot predict how a particular man or woman will vote. Second, the law forbids using sex, race, ethnicity, or similar characteristics to select or strike jurors (Batson v. Kentucky, 1986; J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 1994). Third, even attitude-based screening is disputed: Willmott et al. (2026) favor some pretrial screening, while Leverick et al. (2025) reject it as impractical, easy to answer in socially desirable ways, and likely to remove men and older people disproportionately; the Counterintuitive Testimony hub paper on correcting misconceptions reviews that debate. Because the research indicates that attitudes predict judgments better than demographics, questioning a prospective juror about his or her own views and experiences is both legally permissible and more consistent with the science than demographic assumptions.
From Beliefs to Verdicts
Most evidence on verdicts comes from mock-jury studies that measure attitudes and then record decisions. A review of 28 such studies found a significant relationship between scale scores and verdicts in 25, and the review described the three exceptions as poor quality (Leverick, 2020); the later meta-analysis described below found the average association with verdicts weak. In two English acquaintance-rape studies, one with an opportunity sample of 324 watching a filmed trial and one with 100 electoral-register participants watching a live three-hour re-enactment, higher AMMSA scores were associated with not-guilty votes before and after deliberation; the chapter reports significance but not effect sizes (Willmott et al., 2026). In an online recreation of a genuine intimate partner rape trial (N = 435), rape myth acceptance, ethnicity, and education predicted verdicts, and female jurors’ greater tendency to convict disappeared once rape myth acceptance was controlled (Lilley et al., 2026). A 2026 meta-analysis of 20 mock-jury studies (N = 7,682) qualifies these findings: scale scores were strongly associated with blaming the complainant (r = .52) but only weakly with guilt judgments (r = −.16), suggesting that these beliefs color perceptions of complainants more than they change verdicts (Bouillaut et al., 2026).
In child cases, a study of 130 community volunteers in Australia found that endorsement of misconceptions about child sexual abuse was associated with lower ratings of the complainant’s credibility and fewer guilty verdicts, and that a judicial direction given before the child testified increased credibility ratings (Goodman-Delahunty et al., 2010). In a later study of 388 mock jurors, a child complainant’s credibility depended on jurors’ knowledge about child sexual abuse, and pre-evidence instructions affected endorsement of misconceptions (Call & Wingrove, 2022). In another (N = 235), mock jurors were more likely to convict when a child complainant was described as diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder rather than depression or no diagnosis, and a psychologist’s expert testimony had no effect (Wang & Stevenson, 2025). Reviews find small and variable effects overall (Flynn Hudspith et al., 2024; Walters et al., 2025); in the Walters meta-analysis, expert testimony and juror education were more effective than judicial instruction for biases about complainants, as the Counterintuitive Testimony hub paper on correcting misconceptions explains.
All of this evidence comes from simulated trials. No study has linked real jurors’ measured beliefs to real verdicts, and the research shows which participants leaned toward conviction or acquittal, not whether those outcomes were correct.
Deliberation
Deliberation might correct mistaken beliefs, since other jurors can challenge them; mock-jury research suggests this sometimes happens but cannot be assumed. In a rape trial reconstructed live before community participants, expectations about demeanor, delay, and resistance that jurors disclaimed in the abstract sometimes reappeared in discussion of the case (Ellison & Munro, 2009, 2010). The Scottish Jury Research, with 64 mock juries and nearly 1,000 participants who watched either a rape or an assault trial, found that the views that a genuine victim would resist and that false allegations are common were voiced in most of the 32 rape-trial deliberations; some jurors challenged these views, but challenges did not always occur (Ormston et al., 2019; Chalmers et al., 2021; Leverick et al., 2025). A companion analysis of the live-trial deliberations in the Willmott studies reported that jurors who invoked these beliefs tended to hold to them when challenged, although acquittals were usually explained by jurors saying they were not sure of guilt (Willmott et al., 2026). That explanation is consistent both with beliefs generating doubt and with jurors properly applying a demanding standard to a case with no independent evidence.
The Scottish research also indicated that the decision rule changes deliberation: asking juries to reach a unanimous or near-unanimous verdict was associated with more jurors favoring acquittal (Ormston et al., 2019). Verdict options may matter as well: with a staged rape trial filmed in a real courtroom (N = 180), a series of proven or not-proven verdicts produced a higher conviction rate than the two- or three-verdict systems once rape myth acceptance was controlled, and higher acceptance went with more favorable views of the accused and less favorable views of the complainant (Curley et al., 2024). The rules differ by forum. Federal and Arizona criminal juries must be unanimous (Ramos v. Louisiana, 2020), while a court-martial conviction requires the concurrence of three-fourths of the members (Article 52, UCMJ). The structural point applies in both directions: the more weight a rule gives a small number of jurors, the more a few jurors holding mistaken beliefs about complainants, or strong reactions against defendants, could affect the outcome.
Limits of the Evidence
Attitude surveys measure abstract endorsement and are vulnerable to social desirability effects; the largest real-juror survey this review identified used an unvalidated three-point instrument and did not examine deliberation or verdicts. Even the best mock-jury studies use short trials, simulated stakes, and volunteers, and their attitude-verdict relationships are correlational. Child-case research relies heavily on undergraduates and written scenarios. Much of the adult literature comes from the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand; very little involves American criminal juries, and none measures court-martial members, who are selected under Article 25, UCMJ, and receive mandatory sexual assault prevention training.
No study can determine whether the jurors in a particular case hold a particular belief, whether that belief would affect their verdict, or whether a particular complainant or defendant is telling the truth.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When the 5.9% figure is cited to show that false reports are rare (Lisak et al., 2010), ask what exactly was counted: of 136 university police reports, 5.9% were coded as false, while 44.9% did not proceed to any prosecution or disciplinary action, and neither figure alone shows how many were true or false. When attitude research is cited to show that these beliefs drive verdicts, ask how large the effect is: a 2026 meta-analysis found them strongly associated with blaming the complainant (r = .52) but only weakly with guilt judgments (r = −.16) (Bouillaut et al., 2026). When the survey of 771 real jurors is offered to show that bias is uncommon (Thomas, 2020), ask whether the conclusion follows from the design, since its unvalidated three-point items measured abstract beliefs, not deliberation or verdicts. When the California findings are offered to show that jurors overvalue children’s accounts (Quas et al., 2005), ask who was studied and whether it applies to this panel: 169 college students and 148 people reporting for jury duty answered a questionnaire about beliefs, not about weighing testimony. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Juror Beliefs and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
The Constitution requires questioning about specific attitudes only in narrow circumstances; otherwise trial courts have broad discretion over voir dire (Mu’Min v. Virginia, 1991; Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 1981 (plurality opinion)). Mu’Min, decided 5-4, held that due process did not require the trial court to ask prospective jurors about the content of pretrial publicity when it asked about exposure and impartiality; it does not bar such questions. Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(a), the court may examine prospective jurors itself or let the parties do so, and questions about attitudes toward sexual offenses, experiences of victimization or accusation, and the presumption of innocence fall within that discretion. Courts-martial members may be challenged for cause under Rule for Courts-Martial 912(f)(1)(N) when serving would raise substantial doubt about the legality, fairness, and impartiality of the proceedings, a standard that encompasses actual and implied bias, and military judges must liberally grant defense challenges in close cases (United States v. Urieta, 2025). In United States v. Clay (2007), the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held that a challenge should have been granted against a senior member whose answers indicated he would be “merciless” in sentencing a person convicted of raping a young female, an example of a reaction to the nature of the charge reaching the level of disqualifying bias.
The rules of evidence reflect assumptions about juror reasoning. Military Rule of Evidence 412 and Federal Rule of Evidence 412 generally exclude evidence of a complainant’s other sexual behavior or predisposition, subject to enumerated exceptions, including evidence whose exclusion would violate the accused’s constitutional rights. Military Rules of Evidence 413 and 414 and their federal counterparts permit evidence of other sexual assaults or child molestation to be considered for any relevant purpose, including propensity, subject to Rule 403. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has held that using charged offenses as propensity evidence for one another, with instructions describing differing burdens of proof, risked confusing members and undermined the presumption of innocence (United States v. Hills, 2016), and applied the same reasoning under Rule 414 (United States v. Guardado, 2017), a concern consistent with the mock-jury research on prior-offense evidence.
Expert testimony addressing juror misconceptions must help the trier of fact under Federal and Military Rule of Evidence 702, and the research reviewed here bears on helpfulness by indicating which beliefs some jurors hold. Admissibility and its limits are treated in the Counterintuitive Testimony and Child Abuse Allegations resources.
Arizona
Arizona abolished peremptory challenges in criminal and civil trials effective January 1, 2022 (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-21-0020), so voir dire under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 18.5 and challenges for cause under Rule 18.4(b), which require excusal when there is a reasonable ground to believe that a juror cannot render a fair and impartial verdict, are now the only means of removing a prospective juror.
Arizona Rule of Evidence 404(c) permits other-act evidence in sexual offense cases to show an aberrant sexual propensity to commit the charged offense if the court finds that the evidence is sufficient to permit the jury to find the other act, that it provides a reasonable basis to infer the propensity, and that its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice; the court must give a limiting instruction. The rule requires specific findings on each of these points, and its limiting-instruction and disclosure requirements are in Rule 404(c)(2) and (3). The clear-and-convincing standard is not in the rule’s text but in its 1997 comment, citing State v. Terrazas (1997); State v. Aguilar (2004) held that the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant committed the other act. Arizona’s rape-shield statute, A.R.S. § 13-1421, limits evidence of a victim’s prior sexual conduct. State v. Salazar-Mercado (2014) permits general, educational expert testimony about victim behavior that satisfies Rules 702 and 403.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports the view that some jurors hold expectations that can disadvantage complainants, particularly about demeanor, resistance and delay as applied to concrete cases, and children’s denial or reluctance to disclose, and that scores on scales measuring these attitudes predict mock-juror judgments of complainants and, more weakly, verdicts. Prosecutors are likely to encounter these expectations in voir dire about attitudes, in deciding which of them a case actually raises, and when educational testimony or a tailored instruction is considered.
The research also counsels caution. Overt misconceptions appear rare among serving jurors, the newest meta-analysis finds a weak average link between these beliefs and verdicts, and some jurors hold beliefs that favor complainants, such as overconfidence in children’s resistance to suggestion. Claims that jurors are generally biased, or that other-act evidence will necessarily be misused, go beyond the research; propensity evidence admitted under Rules 413, 414, or 404(c) calls for careful instructions because mock-jury studies show that such evidence can carry strong weight.
Special Issues for Defense
The research supports attention to beliefs and reactions that can disadvantage defendants: emotional responses to the nature of the charge, the inferences some jurors draw from other-act evidence, and mistaken beliefs that children’s memories of infancy are reliable, that children are no more suggestible than adults, that growing detail signals truthfulness, or that a psychologist can tell whether an account has been influenced. Defense counsel are likely to encounter these beliefs in voir dire on these subjects, in instructions on the limited use of other-act evidence, and where any expert’s claims about a child’s account may go beyond what the science supports.
The research also counsels caution. Misconceptions about complainants are documented across surveys, mock deliberations, and real-juror interviews, and the research does not support an argument that they do not exist. Jurors with abuse histories or particular attitudes are not, for that reason alone, unable to be fair, and research cautions against disproportionately excluding them. Challenges grounded in a prospective juror’s own answers, rather than in group characteristics, are both legally sound and consistent with the evidence.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
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Legal Authorities
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991) (5-4 decision).
Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83 (2020).
Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981) (plurality opinion).
State v. Aguilar, 209 Ariz. 40, 97 P.3d 865 (2004).
State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986).
State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).
State v. Terrazas, 189 Ariz. 580, 944 P.2d 1194 (1997).
United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
United States v. Clay, 64 M.J. 274 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
United States v. Guardado, 77 M.J. 90 (C.A.A.F. 2017).
United States v. Hills, 75 M.J. 350 (C.A.A.F. 2016).
United States v. Urieta, 85 M.J. 352 (C.A.A.F. 2025).
10 U.S.C. § 825 (Article 25, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
10 U.S.C. § 852 (Article 52, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1421.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(a).
Fed. R. Evid. 412, 413, 414, 702.
Mil. R. Evid. 412, 413, 414, 702.
R.C.M. 912(f)(1)(N).
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.4(b), 18.5.
Ariz. R. Evid. 404(c), 702.
Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order No. R-21-0020 (Aug. 30, 2021) (amending Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.4 and 18.5, effective Jan. 1, 2022).
Related topic papers: Juror Beliefs About Memory, Eyewitnesses, and Confessions · Voir Dire and the Detection of Juror Bias · Juror Demographics and Verdicts: What Predicts Guilt Judgments · Limiting Instructions, Inadmissible Evidence, and Instructions to Disregard · How Jurors Evaluate Expert Testimony · Deliberation, Unanimity, and Court-Martial Verdicts
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Counterintuitive Testimony · Child Abuse Allegations · Courts-Martial