Snap Shot
- The question: What do jurors believe about memory, eyewitness confidence, and confessions, and are they accurate?
- What the research shows: A meta-analysis found lay respondents gave the expert-consistent answer about two-thirds of the time. A 2017 review, whose reach others have questioned, concluded that under pristine conditions high-confidence initial identifications are highly accurate, but confidence expressed later or after feedback can be badly misleading. In mock-jury studies, confessions are among the most powerful evidence; coerced confessions still raised convictions in a 2024 meta-analysis, though about half as much as non-coerced ones, and jurors relied far more on exculpatory DNA than on a confession.
- What it does not show: Most studies use mock jurors without deliberation, and there are no data on court-martial members. The research cannot determine whether a particular identification is correct or a particular confession is true, and some corrective instructions increased skepticism toward all identifications without improving discrimination.
- The law: Suggestive police identifications are judged under Biggers and Manson; Perry relies on the jury and trial safeguards when police did not arrange the suggestion. Defendants may present the circumstances of a confession (Crane). Arizona requires a Dessureault hearing on a challenged pretrial identification and, in Chapple, found exclusion of eyewitness expert testimony an abuse of discretion on its facts.
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors can document the initial identification and its confidence and present recorded interrogations in full, recognizing that jurors discount coerced confessions only partly; defense counsel can develop the record on identification conditions and interrogation circumstances, without arguing that confidence never matters or that risk factors prove a confession false.
Eyewitness identifications, witnesses’ memories of events, and defendants’ own statements are among the most persuasive evidence a jury can hear. They are also the kinds of evidence most often found to have been mistaken in cases later overturned. Whether jurors evaluate them well depends partly on what jurors already believe about how memory works, how confidence relates to accuracy, and why a person might confess to something he or she did not do. In courts-martial, the members of the panel serve the jury’s function, and the same questions apply to them.
These beliefs reach court in several ways. They determine whether expert testimony on memory or interrogation is “helpful” under Rule 702, because testimony about matters within common knowledge does not assist the trier of fact. They shape how courts design jury instructions on eyewitness identification. And the Supreme Court has relied on the jury, aided by cross-examination, instructions, and expert testimony, as the primary safeguard against unreliable eyewitness evidence when police did not arrange the suggestive circumstances.
This paper reviews what surveys and experiments show about lay beliefs on memory, eyewitness factors, the confidence-accuracy relationship, confession evidence, and intoxicated witnesses. It gives equal attention to the ways in which lay beliefs are accurate and the ways in which corrective measures can overshoot, producing general skepticism rather than better discrimination. It then reviews the federal, military, and Arizona law that rests on assumptions about juror reasoning.
What Laypeople Believe About Memory
The most widely cited survey of lay beliefs questioned a nationally representative sample of American adults by telephone, with 1,838 respondents weighted to represent a sample of 1,500 (Simons & Chabris, 2011). Sixty-three percent agreed that human memory works like a video camera, 55% that hypnosis helps witnesses accurately recall details of crimes, 48% that a memory does not change once formed, and 37% that the testimony of one confident eyewitness should be enough to convict. A comparison group of memory researchers disagreed with each of these statements almost unanimously. On these figures, a substantial share of the public holds beliefs that would lead them to treat a vivid, confident memory as a reliable record.
That interpretation has been challenged. In three studies, researchers found that agreement with the video-camera statement depended heavily on wording and context: when respondents were offered alternatives, such as that memory is partly like a video camera, agreement with the original statement fell substantially, and large majorities endorsed statements consistent with research, such as that memory is incomplete and reconstructive (Brewin et al., 2019). Many respondents also said that their memories feel like connected scenes, which may explain their agreement with the metaphor without implying that they believe memory is infallible. The authors concluded that lay understanding of memory is more nuanced than the term “myth” implies.
Some contested beliefs are widely shared: in three UK samples (N = 717), more than 78% of lay, legal, and clinical participants endorsed repression and more than 87% dissociative amnesia, concepts disputed in the research literature (Radcliffe & Patihis, 2024).
These findings bear on court. Some jurors do hold beliefs about memory that research does not support, and those beliefs can affect how they weigh a vivid account. But survey agreement with a single statement can overstate the extent of misunderstanding, and jurors who reject the most extreme claims about memory may still need help applying general knowledge to the specific factors in a case.
Juror Knowledge of Eyewitness Factors
Several surveys have compared jurors and other legal actors with eyewitness experts. In one, jury-eligible adults, judges, and police officers differed from experts on many eyewitness issues; for example, about 41% of jurors, compared with 98% of experts, agreed that the wording of lineup instructions can affect identification accuracy, and about 50% of jurors, compared with 95% of experts, agreed that an eyewitness’s confidence can be influenced by factors unrelated to accuracy (Benton et al., 2006). A meta-analysis of 23 surveys, covering more than 4,600 respondents, found that lay respondents gave the expert-consistent answer about two-thirds of the time, with substantial variation across eyewitness factors and question formats (Desmarais & Read, 2011). Lay knowledge, in other words, is neither absent nor complete.
Method matters. In a study comparing response formats, jury-eligible adults answering multiple-choice questions gave more expert-consistent answers than those asked to generate their own responses to case scenarios, and a sample of judges showed a reasonable level of knowledge of general eyewitness issues (Houston et al., 2013). Recognizing a correct statement on a questionnaire is easier than applying the principle unprompted to a particular witness, which is what jurors must do.
Confidence and Accuracy
Juror reliance on eyewitness confidence has been documented repeatedly, although a meta-analysis of 35 studies found the average effect modest in size (g = .21 to .36, a standardized effect size across studies; Slane & Dodson, 2022). The scientific view of confidence has also changed. For many years, the dominant message from researchers and courts was that confidence is a weak indicator of accuracy. In Perry v. New Hampshire (2012), Justice Sotomayor’s dissent cited research finding that jurors routinely overestimate the accuracy of eyewitness identifications and give heavy weight to confidence even though confidence is a poor gauge of accuracy.
A 2017 review reached a more qualified conclusion (Wixted & Wells, 2017). Under what the authors call pristine conditions, which include a fair lineup, an administrator who does not know which person is the suspect, unbiased instructions, and a confidence statement recorded immediately at the initial identification, laboratory and police field studies show that confidence and accuracy are strongly related and that high-confidence initial identifications are highly accurate. When those conditions are absent, as with an unfair lineup or a confidence statement made after feedback or at trial, even high confidence can be badly misleading. Confidence expressed in court months after an identification can reflect intervening influences rather than the original memory, and an initial low-confidence identification is error prone even if the witness later becomes certain (Wixted et al., 2015; Wixted & Wells, 2017). Other researchers, commenting on a related review, have questioned how often real cases meet the pristine conditions and how far laboratory findings transfer to them, and that debate continues (Wade et al., 2018). A 2021 review takes a middle position: initial confidence is informative when a witness picks someone, but some datasets show error rates above 20% even among witnesses who were 100% confident, and post-identification influences, including preparation for cross-examination, can inflate confidence (Lane & Houston, 2021, pp. 89–90).
This view has implications for both sides. A juror who treats trial confidence as a measure of accuracy may overvalue an identification that began with hesitation. A juror who has been taught that confidence never matters may undervalue an initial, high-confidence identification obtained under sound procedures. The relevant question for jurors is not simply how confident the witness is, but when and under what conditions the confidence was expressed.
Juror Sensitivity to Eyewitness Evidence
Knowledge on a survey does not guarantee that jurors use it. In a mock-trial experiment in which experienced, jury-eligible adults watched a videotaped trial that varied ten witnessing and identification conditions, the witness’s confidence was the strongest predictor of verdicts, and the conditions known to affect accuracy had comparatively little influence; the results closely resembled those of an earlier study using the same materials with students (Cutler, Penrod, & Dexter, 1990). The study is dated and used a single videotaped trial, but later research has generally found that jurors have difficulty distinguishing accurate from inaccurate eyewitnesses on the basis of the factors that predict accuracy. In the 2022 meta-analysis, confidence expressed at trial and at the initial identification were about equally persuasive (Slane & Dodson, 2022). Mock jurors discounted a rise in confidence between identification and trial only when defense counsel pointed it out, and an explanation for the rise, such as a sudden recollection, weakened that effect (Lane & Houston, 2021, p. 97). In one experiment (N = 422), an in-court identification, which adds little evidentiary value, increased guilty verdicts and made a suggestive prior lineup seem fairer, although participants were sensitive to the quality of the out-of-court lineup (Katzman et al., 2025).
Some attempts to correct this have produced a problem: in several experiments, interventions lowered convictions without improving discrimination between strong and weak identifications. In a study of 335 online mock jurors who watched a 35-minute murder trial, an enhanced eyewitness instruction modeled on one adopted in New Jersey reduced guilty verdicts compared with a standard instruction, but it did so equally whether the identification was strong or weak; conviction rates were 9% and 12% under the enhanced instruction, compared with 23% and 26% under the standard instruction (Papailiou et al., 2015). The authors concluded that the instruction induced skepticism but not sensitivity. In that study, the instruction lowered convictions for the strong identification as well as the weak one, shifting the threshold without improving discrimination. Not every intervention has this effect. In single experiments, instructions emphasizing the initial identification led mock jurors to convict more often after an immediate high-confidence identification than after an initial lineup rejection, a difference absent under control instructions (N = 289; Huang et al., 2026), and a training aid on witnessing conditions and identification procedures improved discrimination between a strong and a weak witness (Pawlenko et al., 2013, as cited in Lane & Houston, 2021, p. 159). Whether expert testimony avoids the skepticism problem appears to depend on how it is presented, and the evidence is mixed.
Confession Evidence
Mock-jury research generally finds that confessions are among the most powerful forms of evidence. In a series of experiments comparing confessions with eyewitness identifications and character testimony, confessions produced the highest conviction rates and were rated the most incriminating (Kassin & Neumann, 1997). In another set of experiments, a confession obtained under high pressure increased conviction rates even when mock jurors judged it to have been coerced, when the judge ruled it inadmissible and instructed them to disregard it, and when jurors said it had not influenced them (Kassin & Sukel, 1997). Reviews of this research have concluded that people have difficulty discounting confessions even when they recognize the circumstances that produced them, in part because they believe they themselves would not confess falsely and because confessions often contain details that it seems only the perpetrator could know (Kassin, 2012; Kassin et al., 2010). A 2024 meta-analysis of 83 samples (N = 24,860) refines this picture: confession evidence was persuasive, and coerced confessions raised convictions (g = 0.34) about half as much as non-coerced confessions (g = 0.70), so mock jurors recognized that coercive interrogation reduces reliability but did not fully discount unreliable confessions; jury instructions were associated with lower convictions only for coerced confessions, while expert testimony was associated with lower convictions whether or not the confession was coerced. Neither result is a finding that jurors better distinguish true from false confessions, and the authors call for more research on the most effective instructions and expert testimony (Mindthoff et al., 2024).
Content plays a role. A content analysis of 20 confessions that were later shown to be false found that all of them contained details about the time, place, and scene of the crime and references to the victim, and most contained a statement of motive and the confessor’s own reflections on his thoughts and feelings; a companion mock-jury experiment found that adding crime details or a motive to a simple admission made mock jurors more confident in a guilty verdict (Appleby et al., 2013). When the source of such details is contested, for example because they may have been supplied during questioning, jurors without a recording of the full interrogation have little basis for evaluating that claim.
The research also shows limits to the power of confessions. In three experiments in which a defendant confessed but DNA evidence excluded him, participants relied far more on the DNA than on the confession; conviction rates were 10% and 15% in two studies when the confession was paired with exculpatory DNA, and in one study were no higher than when the defendant had denied the offense (Appleby & Kassin, 2016). Conviction rates rose substantially, to 33% and 45%, when the prosecutor offered a theory reconciling the confession with the DNA. Mock jurors, in other words, do not treat confessions as conclusive against strong scientific evidence, but a coherent reconciling account can restore much of a confession’s weight.
Lay Beliefs About False Confessions
A survey of jury-eligible adults found that most recognized that false confessions occur and believed that a confession should not be treated as absolute proof of guilt (Henkel et al., 2008). In that 2008 survey, their understanding of the dispositional and situational factors that increase the risk of false confession, and of interrogation practices, was incomplete, and respondents showed a marked belief that they personally would never confess falsely. Newer experiments qualify the first point: across four experiments (N = 1,319), mock jurors showed appropriate knowledge of the false-confession risk factors those experiments tested and distinguished coercive from noncoercive tactics fairly well (Perry et al., 2024); the two findings rest on different instruments, samples, and years, and neither shows that jurors apply that knowledge. Knowing the risk factors does not guarantee using them: after 253 mock jurors watched an actual coerced false confession, 53% voted guilty, and their deliberations rarely mentioned coercion, contamination, promises of leniency, or interrogation length (Stevenson et al., 2023). That gap between general awareness and application parallels the eyewitness findings. The American Psychology-Law Society’s 2025 scientific review paper on police-induced confessions, which updates its 2010 review, identifies situational risk factors, including lengthy detention and interrogation, presentation of false evidence, and minimization themes that imply leniency, and personal risk factors, including youth and the vulnerabilities of some adult suspects (Kassin et al., 2025). That research describes conditions that raise risk across groups; it cannot establish that any particular confession is false or true.
Intoxicated Witnesses
Intoxicated witnesses are common; law enforcement officers report frequent encounters with witnesses and suspects who were drinking (Evans et al., 2009). Experimental research on memory finds that, at the moderate doses used in laboratory studies (generally ending near a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08%, lower than in many real cases), intoxication often reduces the amount of correct information witnesses report without significantly increasing the number of errors (Jores et al., 2019), although field data at higher concentrations showed reduced accuracy and completeness, as discussed below, and in studies using hypothetical sexual assault scenarios, participants who had been drinking reported less but what they reported was generally as accurate as what sober participants reported (Flowe et al., 2016, 2019). Findings at moderate doses may not hold at severe intoxication: in a field study of bar patrons with concentrations up to 0.29%, intoxication reduced both the accuracy and the completeness of recall, though not lineup identification (Lane & Houston, 2021, pp. 33–34). Blackouts, which involve missing memory for events rather than errors in what is reported, are a separate question treated in the Alcohol Blackouts resource, and none of this research can show how well any individual’s memory worked.
Lay perceptions do not always track those findings. Mock jurors have rated identifications made by intoxicated eyewitnesses as less credible than those made by sober witnesses (Evans & Schreiber Compo, 2010), and in an online study of 281 participants, a witness shown drinking wine was rated less credible than one drinking a soft drink, yet participants were no less likely to adopt misinformation from the intoxicated witness (Bartlett et al., 2022). In a mock-juror study of 261 participants who read a short written summary of an assault in a park, neither the witness’s intoxication (alcohol, cannabis, or amphetamines, compared with sober) nor the witness’s role (victim or bystander) changed guilt judgments, although victims were rated lower than bystanders on credibility, cognitive competence, and honesty, and witnesses who had used amphetamines were rated less credible than sober witnesses; witnesses who had drunk alcohol or used cannabis did not differ from sober witnesses on any rating (Dilevski et al., 2024). The case was a brief summary with no deliberation, and the intoxication was described only as moderate. On the basis of these two studies, lay beliefs about intoxication may therefore lead jurors to discount an intoxicated witness’s account more than the memory research supports in some respects, and less than it supports in others. The same principles apply to a complainant, a defendant, or any other witness who had been drinking; they are treated more fully in the Alcohol Blackouts resource.
Limits of the Evidence
Most of this research uses mock jurors, often students or online participants, reading or watching brief simulated trials without deliberation, and few studies include the full range of evidence or the adversarial testing of a real trial. Several foundational studies, including the early confession and eyewitness sensitivity experiments, are now decades old. Surveys of lay knowledge vary in wording and format, which affects the results. Field data on real jurors’ beliefs and verdicts in eyewitness and confession cases are scarce, and there are no data specific to court-martial members.
No survey or experiment can determine whether a particular witness’s memory is accurate, whether a particular identification is correct, or whether a particular confession is true. The research describes tendencies among groups of participants and identifies conditions that raise or lower the risk of error.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When the survey finding that 63% of respondents agreed memory works like a video camera (Simons & Chabris, 2011) is cited, ask what exactly was counted, since Brewin et al. (2019) found that agreement depended heavily on wording and fell when respondents were offered alternatives. When the finding that lay respondents gave the expert-consistent answer about two-thirds of the time (Desmarais & Read, 2011) is cited to argue that eyewitness factors are common knowledge, ask the same question: recognizing a correct statement on a questionnaire is easier than applying it to a particular witness (Houston et al., 2013). When Wixted and Wells (2017) is cited for the accuracy of high-confidence identifications, ask whether it applies to this identification, because it depends on pristine conditions, and others have questioned how often real cases meet them (Wade et al., 2018). And when an enhanced instruction is sought, ask whether the conclusion follows from the design of Papailiou et al. (2015): convictions fell as much for strong identifications as for weak ones, reflecting skepticism rather than better discrimination. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Juror Beliefs and the Law
Federal and Military Standards
The Due Process Clause requires exclusion of an eyewitness identification only when police used an unnecessarily suggestive procedure that created a substantial likelihood of misidentification, judged under the totality of the circumstances, including the witness’s opportunity to view, degree of attention, accuracy of prior description, level of certainty, and the time between the crime and the confrontation (Neil v. Biggers, 1972; Manson v. Brathwaite, 1977). In Perry v. New Hampshire (2012), the Court held that no preliminary judicial inquiry into reliability is required when the suggestive circumstances were not arranged by law enforcement, relying instead on cross-examination, jury instructions, rules of evidence permitting exclusion of unduly prejudicial evidence, expert testimony where permitted, and the reasonable doubt standard. That reliance rests on the assumption that jurors, so aided, can evaluate eyewitness evidence; the research reviewed above bears directly on that assumption. Manson‘s use of witness certainty as a reliability factor is also the point on which the confidence research has the most to say, because certainty measured at trial and certainty measured at the initial identification carry different information.
For confessions, the judge decides voluntariness, but the defendant has a constitutional right to present evidence about the physical and psychological circumstances of the confession to the jury, because those circumstances bear on its credibility (Crane v. Kentucky, 1986). Once a confession is admitted, federal law requires that the jury be permitted to hear relevant evidence on voluntariness and be instructed to give the confession such weight as it deserves under all the circumstances (18 U.S.C. § 3501(a)). Expert testimony on eyewitness memory or interrogation is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702, and its helpfulness depends on whether the specific points at issue go beyond jurors’ common knowledge.
In courts-martial, Military Rule of Evidence 321 governs eyewitness identification and Military Rule of Evidence 304 governs confessions and admissions, including the requirement of independent corroboration and the defense’s ability to present evidence bearing on the weight of a statement admitted against the accused. Expert testimony must satisfy Military Rule of Evidence 702 and the Houser factors. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has upheld exclusion of a defense psychologist’s testimony that an accused’s confession was coerced or false, reasoning that an expert may not opine on whether a particular confession is true and that the coercion opinion lacked a reliable fit to the accused (United States v. Griffin, 1999) and, over a dissent, has upheld denial of government-funded expert assistance on false confessions where the defense did not show necessity, such as evidence that the confession was false or that the accused had a condition affecting its reliability (United States v. Bresnahan, 2005). Those decisions turn on the showing made in each case and do not hold that such testimony is inadmissible.
Arizona
When a defendant challenges a pretrial identification, Arizona requires a hearing outside the jury’s presence at which the state bears the burden, by clear and convincing evidence, of showing that the procedure was not unduly suggestive or, if it was, that the in-court identification is not tainted by it; on request, the jury is also instructed on the issue (State v. Dessureault, 1969). Applying Perry, the Court of Appeals has held that due process did not require a Dessureault hearing where the challenged suggestiveness was not arranged by the state (State v. Nottingham, 2012). Nottingham‘s further conclusion that Perry requires a cautionary identification instruction was rejected in State v. Bigger (2021), which abrogated Nottingham in part. In State v. Chapple (1983), the Arizona Supreme Court held that excluding expert testimony on factors affecting eyewitness reliability was an abuse of discretion in a case that turned on contested identifications without corroboration, while emphasizing that the decision was limited to its facts and that admission generally remains within the trial court’s discretion. Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 conforms to the federal rule, and State v. Salazar-Mercado (2014) permits general, educational expert testimony that satisfies Rules 702 and 403. Arizona law likewise provides that, once a confession is admitted, the jury may hear evidence on voluntariness and is instructed to give the confession such weight as it deserves (A.R.S. § 13-3988).
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
The research supports the view that initial, high-confidence identifications obtained under sound procedures are highly accurate, that lay knowledge of eyewitness factors is substantial on many points, and that mock jurors do not treat confessions as conclusive when they conflict with strong scientific evidence. Prosecutors are well positioned to document the conditions of an initial identification, including the procedure and the witness’s confidence at the time, and to present the circumstances of a recorded interrogation in full, which allows jurors to evaluate both.
The research also counsels caution. Confidence expressed at trial carries little information when it differs from confidence at the initial identification or follows feedback. An in-court identification can increase convictions while adding little to the initial identification. Confessions are powerful enough that jurors discount a coerced confession only partly, and detailed confessions can be persuasive even when the details may have come from questioning. Instructions and expert testimony that address these issues are consistent with Perry‘s reliance on the jury; whether a matter is within jurors’ common knowledge depends on the specific factors at issue, and the survey research shows partial knowledge and difficulty applying it.
Special Issues for Defense
The research supports attention to beliefs that can lead jurors to overvalue memory and confession evidence: that memory works like a recording, that trial confidence reflects accuracy, that suggestive procedures do not matter, and that people do not confess to crimes they did not commit. Defense counsel are well positioned to develop the record on the initial identification and its conditions, to present the circumstances of an interrogation under Crane, and to seek expert testimony or instructions on specific factors the case raises.
The research also counsels caution. Lay knowledge is substantial on many eyewitness issues and, in recent experiments, on the false-confession risk factors tested, so testimony on matters jurors already understand may be excluded as unhelpful, although knowing the factors does not guarantee applying them to a particular confession (Stevenson et al., 2023); in mock-juror studies, confession expert testimony was associated with lower convictions whether or not the confession was coerced, and neither that result nor the instruction result shows that jurors better distinguish true from false confessions (Mindthoff et al., 2024). The modern confidence research cuts both ways: an initial high-confidence identification under sound procedures is strong evidence, and arguments that confidence never matters overstate the science. Instructions that produce general skepticism rather than sensitivity have not been shown to improve accuracy, and the false-confession research identifies risk factors, not a means of determining that a particular confession is false.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
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Slane, C. R., & Dodson, C. S. (2022). Eyewitness confidence and mock juror decisions of guilt: A meta-analytic review. Law and Human Behavior, 46(1), 45–66. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000481
Stevenson, M. C., McCracken, E., Watson, A., Petty, T., & Plogher, T. (2023). An attribution theory-based content analysis of mock jurors’ deliberations regarding coerced confessions. Law and Human Behavior, 47(2), 348–366. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000529
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Legal Authorities
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986).
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228 (2012).
State v. Bigger, 492 P.3d 1020 (Ariz. 2021).
State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983).
State v. Dessureault, 104 Ariz. 380, 453 P.2d 951 (1969).
State v. Nottingham, 231 Ariz. 21, 289 P.3d 949 (App. 2012), abrogated in part by State v. Bigger, 492 P.3d 1020 (Ariz. 2021).
State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, 325 P.3d 996 (2014).
United States v. Bresnahan, 62 M.J. 137 (C.A.A.F. 2005).
United States v. Griffin, 50 M.J. 278 (C.A.A.F. 1999).
United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
18 U.S.C. § 3501(a).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3988.
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Mil. R. Evid. 304, 321, 702.
Ariz. R. Evid. 702.
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