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Jurors and Jury Decision-Making

How Jurors Evaluate Expert Testimony

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Snap Shot

  • The question: How do jurors weigh expert testimony, and can they tell strong science from weak when cross-examination or an opposing expert points out the flaws?
  • What the research shows: In several mock-juror studies, participants often did not detect methodological flaws on their own. Older studies found that complex testimony shifted attention toward credentials, but in three recent studies satisfaction with the expert’s explanation was the only consistent predictor of perceived expertise and verdicts. In one study an opposing expert increased general skepticism and convictions rather than helping jurors spot the flaw; targeted cross-examination, and in one study a pretrial educational video, sometimes helped. Another study found qualified confidence rated more credible than absolute certainty. Statistical framing can produce errors favoring either side, and the “CSI effect” has not been consistently supported.
  • What it does not show: Most findings come from mock jurors, several rest on one or two studies, and effects on credibility are more consistent than effects on verdicts. No study can show how a particular juror weighed a particular expert, or whether that expert’s testimony was reliable.
  • The law: Judges act as gatekeepers under Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho Tire; amended Rule 702 (2023) requires the proponent to show reliability by a preponderance, and Military Rule of Evidence 702 and Arizona Rule 702 now incorporate the same change. Military judges also apply Houser. Bernstein leaves many challenges to application for Arizona juries to weigh.
  • Issues for each side: Prosecutors are likely to encounter the issue in how forensic experts state conclusions and in the prosecutor’s fallacy; defense counsel are likely to encounter it in pretrial reliability challenges and in how specific flaws are explained to jurors, where an opposing expert may not produce the expected effect.

Expert witnesses appear in a large share of serious criminal trials and courts-martial. Forensic scientists testify about DNA, fingerprints, toxicology, and digital evidence; physicians testify about injuries; psychologists testify about memory, intoxication, risk, and behavior. Each asks the factfinder to rely on knowledge the factfinder does not have, which creates a basic problem: jurors must decide how much weight to give testimony they are, by definition, not trained to evaluate.

The legal system manages that problem in two stages. Before trial, the judge acts as gatekeeper, admitting expert testimony only if it is reliable and will help the trier of fact. At trial, the adversary process is expected to expose weaknesses through cross-examination, opposing experts, and instructions. Both stages rest on assumptions about jurors: gatekeeping partly reflects a concern that jurors may overweight expert testimony, and the adversarial safeguards assume jurors can recognize weak science when it is pointed out. Psychological research has tested both assumptions.

This paper summarizes how jurors process expert testimony, how well they detect flawed methodology, what affects perceived credibility, how they respond to retained, court-appointed, and competing experts, and how they handle forensic and statistical evidence, including the so-called “CSI effect.” It briefly addresses expert testimony on misconceptions in sexual assault cases and reviews the federal, military, and Arizona rules. Throughout, “juror” refers to civilian jurors and “member” to court-martial members, who serve the jury’s function in a court-martial with members.

How Jurors Process Expert Testimony

Persuasion research distinguishes central processing, in which people able and motivated to think carefully evaluate an argument’s content, from peripheral processing, in which people facing a difficult message rely on cues such as the speaker’s status. Applied to expert testimony, the model predicts that jurors will evaluate the substance of testimony they can understand and lean on credentials, demeanor, and other cues when they cannot.

Cooper, Bennett, and Sukel (1996) tested that prediction in a mock civil trial in which experts testified about whether exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) could have caused the plaintiff’s illness. When the testimony was highly complex, mock jurors were more persuaded by an expert with strong credentials than by one with weak credentials. When the testimony was less complex, credentials had little effect and jurors relied mainly on the content of what the expert said. Cooper and Neuhaus (2000) found a related pattern for perceived bias: the tendency to distrust a well-paid expert who testified frequently was most likely to appear when the testimony was complex and hard to follow. These older studies suggest that complexity does not simply make jurors defer to experts; it changes what jurors attend to, shifting weight from the message toward the messenger. A more recent series qualifies that conclusion. In three mock-jury studies (N = 1,853), satisfaction with the expert’s explanation was the only consistent predictor of perceived expertise and, through it, of verdicts; the expert’s education, gender, and hands-on contact with the evidence had no consistent effect (Gittings et al., 2025).

Research with real jurors adds to this picture. In interviews with 55 jurors who had served on seven civil trials, Ivković and Hans (2003) found that jurors evaluated both the “messenger” (the expert as a person) and the “message” (the substance of the testimony), rather than judging experts mainly on subjective impressions. A study of 829 written questions submitted by jurors in 50 Arizona civil trials used those questions as a window into juror thinking during trial, including jurors’ efforts to understand and test the evidence (Diamond et al., 2006). Interviews with jurors, judges, experts, and lawyers from 55 Australian criminal trials found broad support for juror questions about expert evidence, but some jurors were too intimidated to ask or did not know they could (Horan, 2024). These data indicate that jurors try to understand technical testimony on its merits; whether they can recognize specific methodological problems is addressed next.

Detecting Flawed Methodology

A premise of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) is that shaky but admissible evidence can be tested through cross-examination, contrary evidence, and instruction. Experiments by Kovera and colleagues asked whether jurors can recognize research flaws that make a study’s conclusions unreliable. In one study, 248 jury-eligible community members read a case in which an expert described a study that was either methodologically valid or contained one of three threats to internal validity: a missing control group, a confound, or the possibility of experimenter bias (McAuliff et al., 2009). Participants rated the valid study higher in quality, and the expert more credible, only in comparison with the missing-control-group version, and internal validity did not affect verdicts. In a sexual harassment case, McAuliff and Kovera (2008) found that jurors high in “need for cognition,” a stable tendency to enjoy effortful thinking, rated the expert’s evidence higher and found for the plaintiff more often when the study was valid than when it lacked a control group; jurors low in need for cognition did not, and ecological validity and general acceptance had no effect. Chorn and Kovera (2019) gave 111 judges and 95 attorneys a proffer of intelligence-testing evidence that varied in reliability and in whether testing was blind; scientific quality did not affect judges’ admissibility decisions or attorneys’ decisions to move to exclude. In a companion simulation with 192 mock jurors, scientifically informed cross-examination did not help jurors evaluate the test’s reliability or validity. That legal professionals shared the difficulty in that study may reflect the general challenge of evaluating research design without training, not a deficit peculiar to lay jurors.

The research on adversarial safeguards is mixed rather than uniformly negative. Levett and Kovera (2008) found that an opposing expert did not help mock jurors identify the specific flaws in a defense expert’s study; instead, opposing testimony made jurors more skeptical of expert testimony generally and increased convictions whether or not the opposing expert addressed methodology. Austin and Kovera (2015), however, found that cross-examination designed to educate jurors about why a missing control group matters increased their sensitivity to that flaw, although the comparable approach did not work for reliability and nonblind testing in Chorn and Kovera (2019). In a study of 641 jury-eligible adults, those shown a short forensic-science video before trial rated an expert giving low-quality latent-print testimony less credible than one giving high-quality testimony (d = −0.52); without the video, ratings did not differ, and verdicts were unaffected either way (LaBat et al., 2023). Educational expert testimony does not always discriminate. In a meta-analysis of 83 samples of confession research, in mock-juror studies expert testimony lowered convictions whether or not the confession was coerced, while jury instructions lowered convictions only for coerced confessions (Mindthoff et al., 2024; the comparison is coerced against noncoerced confessions, not true against false ones, and the authors call for more research on the most effective instructions and expert testimony), and in two Australian experiments it did not change the lower credibility given a witness who missed a crime through inattentional blindness (Cullen et al., 2026). Taken together, the findings suggest that generic attacks on an expert tend to produce generalized skepticism, while targeted explanation of a specific design problem, or education given before the evidence, can sometimes, but not always, help jurors understand why it matters. Neither result shows that the adversarial process reliably sorts strong research from weak, which is consistent with Rule 702’s placing the initial reliability decision with the judge, although Daubert also names cross-examination as a traditional means of testing shaky but admissible evidence.

Expert Credibility: Likeability, Trustworthiness, Confidence, and Knowledge

Brodsky et al. (2010) developed the Witness Credibility Scale, a 20-item measure of how factfinders perceive expert witnesses, with four five-item factors: confidence, likeability, trustworthiness, and knowledge. The scale has since been used in a number of mock-trial experiments, most using undergraduate participants and simulated capital-sentencing testimony about a defendant’s future dangerousness.

Those studies find that credibility depends on more than expertise. Neal et al. (2012) manipulated an expert’s likeability and knowledge and the expert’s gender. Likeability accounted for most of the explained variance in credibility ratings, with knowledge adding a smaller contribution. When experts were low in likeability or knowledge, the male expert was rated more favorably than the female expert in that study, a pattern the authors attributed to gender-role expectations. In a study of 182 mock jurors in England and Wales, expert gender and profession interacted, with male psychiatrists and then female clinical psychologists rated most credible, and credibility predicted guilt judgments (Kipoulas et al., 2024); gender had no consistent effect, however, in the three studies by Gittings et al. (2025). Parrott et al. (2015) found that participants noticed differences in an expert’s knowledge, but knowledge did not significantly affect trustworthiness, confidence, agreement, or sentencing recommendations; the less knowledgeable expert was rated more likeable. Cramer et al. (2009) found a curvilinear effect of confidence: an expert who expressed moderate, qualified confidence was rated more credible than one who appeared nervous and uncertain, and also more credible than one who made absolute claims of certainty.

Two features of this research matter. First, changes in perceived credibility do not always change outcomes: in Neal et al. (2012) the manipulations affected credibility but not sentencing decisions, while in Cramer et al. (2009) overall credibility did predict sentencing recommendations. Second, the finding that qualified confidence is more credible than certainty is consistent with the 2023 committee note to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which cautions forensic experts against assertions of absolute certainty when a method is subjective and potentially subject to error.

Hired Guns, Court-Appointed Experts, and the Battle of the Experts

Most experts are retained and paid by a party. Cooper and Neuhaus (2000) found that experts who were highly paid and testified frequently were perceived as “hired guns” and were liked and believed less, particularly when their testimony was complex.

Court-appointed experts have been studied less. Brekke et al. (1991) showed 686 registered voters, most of whom deliberated, a videotaped rape trial with rape trauma syndrome or polygraph testimony presented by a party or by a court-appointed expert. Jurors did not give more weight to the court-appointed expert’s testimony, and the nonadversarial presentation did not lower perceptions of the trial’s fairness. Deliberating jurors were, however, less responsive to the content of the court-appointed testimony than to the content of the adversarial testimony. The single study does not support assuming that a neutral expert will be either decisive or closely scrutinized.

When both sides call experts, the research does not show that jurors simply split the difference or that the stronger science prevails. As noted above, opposing expert testimony in one study produced generalized skepticism and more convictions rather than better discrimination between valid and invalid research (Levett & Kovera, 2008). Older research suggested that competing experts in complex cases may increase reliance on peripheral cues such as credentials (Cooper et al., 1996), while more recent research found that satisfaction with an expert’s explanation predicted verdicts more consistently than credentials did (Gittings et al., 2025). For all parties, a contest between experts may turn partly on how clearly each explains the basis for the opinion, not only on the quality of the underlying work.

Forensic Science, Statistics, and the “CSI Effect”

A frequently voiced concern is that crime dramas lead jurors to expect forensic evidence in every case and to acquit when it is absent. Empirical tests have generally not supported that concern in its strong form, in the studies reviewed here. In a survey of 1,027 people summoned for jury duty in Washtenaw County (Ann Arbor), Michigan, before voir dire, Shelton et al. (2006) found high expectations of scientific evidence: 46 percent expected some form of scientific evidence in every criminal case, and 73 percent expected DNA evidence in rape cases. Frequent viewers of crime dramas had slightly higher expectations than non-viewers, but viewing had no meaningful relationship to demanding scientific evidence before convicting; differences appeared in only 4 of 13 scenarios and were inconsistent in direction (Shelton et al., 2006; Shelton, 2008). The authors proposed instead a broader “tech effect” of public exposure to technology. Podlas (2006), whose title uses the phrase “media myth,” concluded that her data did not support an anti-prosecution effect and that any effect may instead be to increase confidence in forensic evidence. The research thus identifies two concerns pointing in opposite directions, unrealistic expectations that forensic evidence will be present and unrealistic confidence in it when presented, neither shown to affect verdicts consistently.

Statistical testimony raises distinct problems. Thompson and Schumann (1987) identified two reasoning errors: the “prosecutor’s fallacy,” which treats the probability that a random person would match as the probability that the defendant is not the source, and the “defense attorney’s fallacy,” which treats a match as nearly worthless because many people in a large population might also match. In their experiments with undergraduates, presenting a statistic as a conditional probability produced errors favoring the prosecution, and presenting it as a percentage produced errors favoring the defense. Koehler (2001) found that mathematically equivalent presentations of DNA match statistics produced different judgments: a probability focused on the individual suspect was more persuasive than a frequency referring to a broader population. He attributed the effect to how easily people can imagine others who might match by coincidence. Thompson and Newman (2015), with 541 online adult participants, compared random match probabilities, likelihood ratios, and verbal equivalents for DNA and shoeprint evidence. Verdicts tracked the strength of DNA evidence in every format but tracked shoeprint evidence only with random match probabilities, and many participants made fallacious interpretations in both directions. In two fingerprint studies, the examiner’s match phrase had little effect on judgments of guilt, while acknowledging that error is possible reduced the weight given the evidence (Garrett & Mitchell, 2013). In two studies using written trial summaries (N = 147 and 328), a court-imposed “consistent with” phrasing for firearm comparisons produced about as many convictions as a declared identification (57.4 vs. 65.3 percent; 47.6 vs. 47.3 percent), while “cannot be excluded” produced fewer (39.2 and 32.7 percent) (Scurich et al., 2025). In a study of actuarial risk testimony, 206 U.S. adults overestimated an evaluee’s risk of sexual reoffending relative to the expert’s probabilities in every format, though they generally agreed with the expert’s categorical risk level (Coaker et al., 2024).

These findings favor neither side. Framings that make a match statistic more or less persuasive can both describe the same number accurately. The research supports presenting such evidence in a form that is accurate, consistent with the laboratory’s methods, and not designed to exploit a known reasoning error in either direction.

Expert Testimony on Juror Misconceptions in Sexual Assault Cases

Expert testimony is often offered to explain behaviors jurors may find counterintuitive, such as delayed reporting. Whether it changes juror reasoning is reviewed in this hub’s paper Juror Beliefs in Sexual Assault and Child Abuse Trials and in “Correcting Juror Misconceptions: Directions, Expert Evidence, and Juror Screening” in the Counterintuitive Testimony resource. In brief, reviews find small and variable effects overall (Flynn Hudspith et al., 2024; Walters et al., 2025); in the Walters meta-analysis, expert testimony and juror education were more effective than judicial instruction for biases about complainants (the meta-analysis covered 44 studies). A recent review concluded that whether directions or expert evidence reliably correct false beliefs remains unresolved (Leverick et al., 2026). Individual studies show the role of the adversarial context: in Brekke and Borgida (1988), expert testimony raised ratings of the complainant’s credibility, but the expert’s statement that few false accusations occur went unchallenged, and in Spanos et al. (1991), expert testimony increased guilty verdicts only when the expert was not cross-examined. In a more recent summarized trial involving a child complainant of sexual abuse, a psychologist’s expert testimony had no measurable effect on 235 online mock jurors’ judgments (Wang & Stevenson, 2025). These findings parallel the general research: expert testimony can influence jurors, cross-examination can reduce that influence, and neither effect is uniform.

Limits of the Evidence

Most of the research reviewed here is mock-jury research. Many studies used undergraduate participants, written summaries or brief videotaped testimony, and individual ratings without deliberation; several credibility studies used a single simulated capital-sentencing scenario. Real trials involve longer testimony, live cross-examination, instructions, deliberation, and real consequences. Real-jury studies show what jurors attend to but cannot isolate cause and effect.

Several findings rest on one or two studies, and some have not been replicated in different case types or with community samples. Effects on perceived credibility are more consistently found than effects on verdicts, and the size of effects in the laboratory may not predict their size in court. Research on statistical testimony has largely examined DNA and pattern evidence, with only isolated studies of actuarial risk testimony, and may not generalize to other disciplines or to most behavioral science testimony. Finally, no study can determine how a particular juror or panel weighed a particular expert’s testimony, and research on jurors’ general difficulty with methodology says nothing about whether the expert testimony in a given case was reliable; that is a question for the court and the factfinder.

Questions to Ask About This Research

When the “CSI effect” is raised to support voir dire or explain an acquittal risk, ask what exactly was counted in Shelton et al. (2006): high expectations of scientific evidence, but crime-drama viewing had little relationship to demanding it before convicting. When McAuliff et al. (2009) or Chorn and Kovera (2019) are cited to argue that jurors cannot detect methodological problems and that exclusion is the only safeguard, ask who was studied and whether the finding applies to a real trial, since participants evaluated case summaries or simulations without deliberation, and Austin and Kovera (2015) found that targeted cross-examination sometimes helped. When Levett and Kovera (2008) is cited for the effect of an opposing expert, ask how much evidence the finding rests on, because it comes from one study. And when Cramer et al. (2009) is cited on qualified confidence, ask whether it applies to this expert, since several credibility studies used undergraduate participants and a single simulated capital-sentencing scenario. These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.

Expert Testimony and the Law

Federal and Military Standards

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993), the Supreme Court replaced the Frye general-acceptance test with a judicial duty to ensure that expert testimony is relevant and reliable, considering testability, peer review, error rates, standards, and general acceptance. The Court noted that expert evidence can be powerful and misleading because it is difficult to evaluate, while also stating that cross-examination, contrary evidence, and instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence. General Electric Co. v. Joiner (1997) held that a court may exclude an opinion connected to the data only by the expert’s assertion, and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999) extended the gatekeeping obligation to all expert testimony, including experience-based and behavioral expertise.

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 was amended effective December 1, 2023, to require that the proponent demonstrate to the court that it is more likely than not that the rule’s requirements are met, and to require that the expert’s opinion reflect a reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts. The committee note describes as an incorrect application of Rules 702 and 104(a) the decisions holding that the sufficiency of an expert’s basis and the application of the methodology are questions of weight, and grounds the amendment partly in juror capacity, observing that jurors may lack the specialized knowledge needed to evaluate the reliability of scientific testimony or to determine whether an expert’s conclusions go beyond what the basis and methodology can reliably support. The research summarized above, which found limited lay sensitivity to methodological flaws in several studies and some improvement with targeted cross-examination or pretrial education, is consistent with that rationale. Federal Rule of Evidence 706 authorizes the court to appoint its own expert and to disclose to the jury that it did so.

In courts-martial, Military Rule of Evidence 702 tracks the federal rule. Under Military Rule of Evidence 1102, amendments to the Federal Rules generally apply in courts-martial eighteen months after their effective date unless the President directs otherwise, and the December 1, 2023 amendment to Federal Rule 702 accordingly became part of Military Rule of Evidence 702 in 2025 (Joint Service Committee on Military Justice, 2025). The proponent of expert testimony in a court-martial must therefore establish each reliability requirement by a preponderance of the evidence. Military judges also apply the six factors of United States v. Houser (1993): the expert’s qualifications, the subject matter of the testimony, its basis, its legal relevance, its reliability, and whether its probative value outweighs the dangers listed in Military Rule of Evidence 403. Military Rule of Evidence 614 permits members to question witnesses, including experts, through written questions submitted to the military judge. As in civilian courts, an expert may not testify that a witness is or is not truthful (United States v. Brooks, 2007).

Arizona

Arizona amended Rule 702 effective January 1, 2012, to conform to the federal rule and Daubert, and amended it again effective January 1, 2024, to conform to the 2023 federal amendment, including the more-likely-than-not language (Order R-23-0004). In State v. Bernstein (2015), decided under the 2012 version, the Arizona Supreme Court addressed Rule 702(d) in aggravated DUI prosecutions in which a trial court excluded blood-alcohol results obtained by gas chromatography because of instrument “data drops,” vial mislabeling, and laboratory staff concerns. The court held that Rule 702(d) requires the trial court to consider whether a generally reliable methodology was correctly applied, but that errors in application warrant exclusion only if they so infect the procedure as to make the results unreliable. In close cases the evidence should go to the jury, which may consider the malfunctions and staff concerns in weighing the results; the court relied on the rule’s comment that gatekeeping is not intended to replace the adversary system. Bernstein thus leaves many challenges to application for the jury to weigh, and the research reviewed above suggests that jurors find abstract methodological challenges difficult to evaluate.

Arizona also permits jurors in criminal trials to submit written questions to witnesses, a practice adopted in the state’s jury reforms of the mid-1990s (Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.6(e)), and the Arizona civil-trial research on those questions is the principal real-jury source on what jurors ask (Diamond et al., 2006). Arizona’s anti-vouching decisions, which bar experts from opining on the truthfulness of a particular witness, are discussed in “Vouching, Profile Evidence, and the Human Lie Detector Rule” in the Counterintuitive Testimony resource.

Special Issues in Legal Practice

The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.

Special Issues for Prosecutors

The research indicates that jurors engage actively with expert testimony and find appropriately qualified confidence more credible than claims of certainty. For any expert, including a forensic expert, the research and the 2023 amendment to Rule 702 point to the same practice: testimony that explains the basis and limits of a method, states conclusions no more strongly than the method supports, and presents statistics consistently with the laboratory’s protocol is more likely to be credited and to withstand challenge. The survey research also indicates that concerns about a “CSI effect” on acquittals have not been consistently supported.

The research also counsels caution. Because several studies found limited juror ability to detect methodological flaws, the reliability of any party’s expert evidence depends in part on pretrial screening, and the amended rules place the burden on the proponent. The prosecutor’s fallacy is a documented reasoning error, and testimony or argument that converts a random match probability into a probability of guilt or innocence misstates the evidence. In sexual assault cases, one study found that the effect of counterintuitive-behavior testimony disappeared when cross-examination elicited concessions (Spanos et al., 1991), and, as with any expert, testimony confined to well-supported general findings is less likely to be undermined on cross-examination, whichever side calls the expert.

Special Issues for Defense

Several mock-juror studies found that jurors did not detect flaws in expert methodology on their own, and older studies found that complex testimony can shift attention toward credentials. Those findings bear on pretrial challenges under Rule 702 and Houser, and the 2023 amendment clarifies that the proponent must establish the reliability requirements by a preponderance of the evidence. At trial, one study found that cross-examination explaining concretely why a specific design problem matters increased jurors’ sensitivity to it, while generic attacks on experts as a class tend to produce generalized skepticism instead. The defense attorney’s fallacy is also a documented error, and the research supports presenting alternative interpretations of statistical evidence accurately rather than through framing that understates the evidence.

The research also counsels caution. One study found that opposing expert testimony increased general skepticism and convictions rather than helping jurors identify the flaws being challenged, so a defense expert may not produce the expected effect, and another study found that informed cross-examination did not help jurors evaluate test reliability (Chorn & Kovera, 2019). Bernstein indicates that Arizona courts will often leave challenges to application for the jury, and the research suggests such challenges are most likely to register when explained in concrete terms.

This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.

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Legal Authorities

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).

State v. Bernstein, 237 Ariz. 226, 349 P.3d 200 (2015).

United States v. Brooks, 64 M.J. 325 (C.A.A.F. 2007).

United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993).

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

Fed. R. Evid. 706.

Mil. R. Evid. 403.

Mil. R. Evid. 614.

Mil. R. Evid. 702.

Mil. R. Evid. 1102.

Ariz. R. Evid. 702.

Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order R-23-0004 (Aug. 24, 2023) (amending Ariz. R. Evid. 702, effective Jan. 1, 2024).

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.6(e).

Related topic papers: Juror Beliefs in Sexual Assault and Child Abuse Trials · Juror Beliefs About Memory, Eyewitnesses, and Confessions · Jury Instructions: Comprehension and Effectiveness · Mock Jury Research: Methods, Realism, and Limits · Deliberation, Unanimity, and Court-Martial Verdicts

Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Counterintuitive Testimony · Courts-Martial · Memory in the Courtroom