Snap Shot
- The question: Does jury composition affect deliberation and verdicts, and when does underrepresentation in jury pools violate the law?
- What the research shows: In one mock-jury experiment (29 six-person juries, one sexual assault case), racially diverse juries deliberated longer, discussed more case facts, and made fewer factual errors than all-White juries; later experiments replicated higher-quality discussion in diverse juries but not, in one civil case, longer deliberation. In a study of Florida felony trials, Black defendants were convicted about 16 percentage points more often than White defendants when the jury pool had no Black members, a gap that was not observed when the pool had at least one Black member. Larger juries are more likely to include minority members. Underrepresentation is common and arises at identifiable stages of jury administration.
- What it does not show: The research concerns groups and processes, rests on few studies, and comes from particular jurisdictions. It does not show that a diverse jury favors either side, how any juror will vote, or that composition affected a particular verdict; Arizona and post-randomization court-martial data are limited or absent.
- The law: Venires must reflect a fair cross section (Taylor, Duren), proven by systematic exclusion (Berghuis, Sanderson); the requirement does not reach the seated jury (Holland). Courts-martial carry no cross-section right, but members may not be selected by sex or race (Riesbeck, Jeter), and the absence of minority members alone does not show a violation (Bess).
- Issues for each side: Prosecutors are likely to encounter cross-section challenges where accurate data and careful disparity measures, rather than assumptions, decide the question; defense counsel are likely to encounter them where the specific stage at which a disparity arises must be identified; diversity research points mainly to more thorough deliberation, not to a consistent advantage for either side.
The American jury is meant to be drawn from the community, and the Sixth Amendment requires that the pools from which criminal juries are chosen reflect a fair cross section of it. In practice, jury pools often fall short of that ideal, and the juries seated from them are frequently less diverse than the communities they serve. Two questions follow. The first is empirical: does the composition of a jury affect how it deliberates and what it decides? The second is both empirical and legal: why are some groups underrepresented in jury pools, and when does underrepresentation violate the Constitution or a statute?
These questions reach court in fair-cross-section challenges, debates about jury size, and claims of improper panel selection in courts-martial. Unlike research on individual juror demographics, which predict individual votes only weakly, diversity research asks how the mix of people in the room affects the group’s process and outcome.
This paper reviews research on diversity and deliberation, jury composition and verdicts, jury size, and the causes of underrepresentation, then Arizona jury pools, court-martial panels, the limits of the evidence, and the governing law. The research concerns groups and processes. It does not support assumptions about how any individual juror will decide a case, and the law forbids selecting or excluding jurors because of race, ethnicity, or sex.
Diversity and the Quality of Deliberation
The most influential experiment on jury diversity assigned 200 jury-eligible adults, most drawn from a Michigan courthouse jury pool and the rest recruited through newspaper advertisements, to 29 six-person mock juries that were either all White or included four White and two Black members (Sommers, 2006). After watching a video summary of a sexual assault trial of a Black defendant, diverse juries deliberated longer, discussed a wider range of case facts, made fewer factually inaccurate statements, and were more willing to discuss race-related issues raised by the case. The differences were not explained solely by the Black participants: White participants in diverse juries cited more facts, made fewer inaccurate statements, and were more willing to discuss racism than those in all-White juries. The presence of Black members also predicted fewer guilty votes before deliberation began, which has been interpreted as possibly reflecting an expectation of deliberating in a diverse group; the study cannot confirm that explanation. The study had limits: it involved a single case, one form of racial diversity, a modest number of juries, and mock jurors who knew their decision had no consequences.
Later experiments have partly replicated these findings. In a study of 433 community members, Black and White jurors made higher-quality contributions to discussion in diverse juries than in non-diverse juries when the evidence was ambiguous; in a second study, of 369 undergraduates, diverse juries were less likely to convict and their members again made higher-quality contributions (Bergold & Kovera, 2022). By contrast, in 30 mock juries deciding a civil retail discrimination case, juries with two Black members did not deliberate longer or consider more case facts than juries with none, although they found for the plaintiff more often and awarded more (Hakstian et al., 2022). In 70 mock juries made up mostly of students, jury composition did not predict which jurors changed their votes during deliberation (Maeder et al., 2026). Each study used a single case without real consequences.
A 2008 review by the author of the foundational experiment described the obstacles to seating diverse juries and the consequences of failing to do so, for public attitudes toward the legal system and for jury performance, and called for further research (Sommers, 2008).
These findings concern process quality, not which verdict is correct. A more thorough deliberation can lead toward conviction or acquittal depending on the evidence. Where verdicts differed, as with fewer convictions in one student study and more plaintiff verdicts in the civil discrimination study, the differences came from single cases, so the research does not show that diverse juries generally favor either side.
Jury Composition and Verdicts in Real Trials
Field research uses real trials to examine whether composition affects outcomes. A study of about 700 felony trials in Sarasota and Lake Counties, Florida, with jury selection between 2000 and 2010, took advantage of day-to-day variation in the composition of jury pools (the group of prospective jurors, averaging about 27 people, from which a jury is seated) to estimate the effect of pool composition in 712 felony jury trials in two Florida counties (Anwar et al., 2012). When the pool included no Black members, Black defendants were convicted about 16 percentage points more often than White defendants (81% versus 66%); when the pool included at least one Black member, the gap was not observed (71% versus 73%). Because the variation in pool composition was treated as effectively random, the study is among the stronger real-world designs on composition effects. It concerns two counties in one state, few pools contained more than two Black members, and its causal estimates concern the pools rather than the seated juries, which are shaped by challenges, so it cannot isolate the contribution of any individual juror.
The same researchers, using Florida felony trials, reported that the age composition of the pool and jury was also related to conviction rates, with older jurors more likely to convict on average (Anwar et al., 2014). Such effects suggest that when a pool systematically underrepresents a group, expected outcomes can shift, although these studies cannot show whether the shift reflected the evidence or other influences.
In an online experiment with a census-matched sample of 1,462 U.S. adults evaluating a civil patent case, Asian participants were less likely than others to find an Asian company liable and White participants more likely, a similarity-leniency pattern, although the company’s country of origin had no overall effect (Huang, 2025). The author suggested that diverse juries could offset such tendencies, but the study had no deliberation and a small Asian subgroup, so it does not show how diverse deliberating juries would perform.
Jury Size and Diversity
Jury size affects diversity through simple arithmetic: the smaller the jury, the less likely it is to include members of groups that are a minority in the community. Williams v. Florida (1970) upheld six-person criminal juries, reasoning in part that smaller juries would not perform differently. Ballew v. Georgia (1978) held five-person criminal juries unconstitutional, relying on research indicating that smaller juries deliberate less effectively, produce less consistent results, and are less likely to include members of minority groups.
Subsequent research supports the concerns expressed in Ballew. A meta-analysis of 17 studies comparing six- and twelve-member juries, covering about 2,000 juries, found that larger juries were more likely to include members of minority groups, deliberated longer, hung more often, and may recall trial testimony more accurately (Saks & Marti, 1997). An analysis of jury selection in 277 civil jury trials found that peremptory challenges were related to juror race and ethnicity but that the opposing parties’ challenges largely cancelled each other out, producing no net effect on jury composition, whereas jury size had a substantial effect on minority representation; the authors concluded that diversity would be most effectively promoted by twelve-member juries (Diamond et al., 2009). That study involved civil trials and may not generalize to criminal trials.
These findings are relevant in Arizona, where criminal juries consist of eight jurors unless the offense carries a possible sentence of death or imprisonment for 30 years or more, in which case twelve jurors are required, and where civil juries in courts of record have consisted of eight jurors since January 1, 2023 (A.R.S. § 21-102). The comparisons bracket rather than directly measure eight-person juries.
How Underrepresentation Arises
Courts compile a master list from source lists, summon people from it, excuse or exempt some, and assemble venires from those who appear. National Center for State Courts research has identified losses at each stage (Hannaford-Agor, 2011). Voter registration lists alone omit many eligible adults, and registration rates differ across groups; most states therefore permit supplemental source lists, though combining lists raises problems of duplication. Nationally, about 12% of summonses are returned as undeliverable, the largest single factor reducing juror yield, and because roughly one in eight people moves each year, those losses fall more heavily on residentially mobile populations. Roughly 6% to 9% of those summoned neither respond nor appear, rates that follow-up programs have reduced substantially; nonresponse is associated with lower income and education. Hardship excusals are more common where terms of service are longer and juror pay is lower. The review also noted research finding that, once socioeconomic status was controlled, race and ethnicity no longer predicted nonresponse, suggesting that many losses operate through economic circumstances. Higher pay alone may not raise response: in four large Texas counties, the share of available jurors rose after daily pay increased from as little as $6 to $40, but the rise continued an earlier trend, and the authors found little evidence that the pay change caused it (Rose et al., 2026). Remote formats may change who serves; in a comparison of in-person and virtual mock juries recruited the same way, virtual jurors were younger, wealthier, and more educated (Reed et al., 2026), although that study used a civil case and volunteer participants.
An analysis of jury pool composition in 52 federal court areas, representing 764 counties, found that some amount of underrepresentation of minority groups was typical, that the expected loss was between one and three members of each minority group from venires of 40 to 60 people, that there was no evidence that attrition affected Latino communities more than African American communities, and that, unlike Latino representation, indicators of African American representation showed no improvement compared with published studies from the 1990s (Rose et al., 2018). A loss of one to three members is meaningful across many cases but small in absolute numbers in any single venire.
Measuring underrepresentation is itself contested. Courts commonly use absolute disparity, the difference between a group’s share of the jury-eligible population and its share of the venire, or comparative disparity, that difference expressed as a percentage of the group’s population share. Using census and state jury-operations data, researchers estimated that, given the demographic composition of U.S. counties and typical jury-pool sizes, a bright-line threshold using either measure would create safe harbors leaving courts in a majority of jurisdictions effectively immune from fair-cross-section challenges (Hannaford-Agor & Waters, 2011). Both measures can mislead when a group is a small share of the population, a point the Supreme Court acknowledged in Berghuis v. Smith (2010).
Arizona Jury Pools
Arizona’s master jury list is compiled from voter registration records and from Department of Transportation driver and identification license records, along with any other sources the Arizona Supreme Court specifies, and the jury commissioner must avoid duplicating names (A.R.S. § 21-301). Combining voter and licensing lists, as Arizona does, is a common way of improving coverage of people who do not register to vote (Hannaford-Agor, 2011).
To serve, a juror must be at least 18, a U.S. citizen, and a resident of the jurisdiction, must not have a felony conviction unless civil rights have been restored, and must not currently be adjudicated mentally incompetent (A.R.S. § 21-201). Jurors may be temporarily excused for documented medical conditions, inability to understand English, or undue or extreme physical or financial hardship, among other grounds; the statute specifies that missing work alone is not sufficient and requires documentation (A.R.S. § 21-202). A prospective juror who is 75 or older may request to be excused, and the request must be granted. Each rule serves legitimate purposes, and each can affect venire composition; the felony disqualification and hardship excuses can affect groups unevenly, and the age-75 excuse affects older residents.
Published data on Arizona jury composition are limited. In 2021 the Arizona Supreme Court created a Task Force on Jury Data Collection, Practices, and Procedures (Admin. Order No. 2021-35), whose charge included demographic data collection and whether peremptory challenges reduce minority representation. A law review analysis using Arizona Judicial Council figures for Maricopa County, compared 2019 with 2022, the first year without peremptory challenges (McMurdie et al., 2024). The article reports two different kinds of figures. The first compares empaneled jurors with the county population before the change: measured against total county population, Black, Native American, and Hispanic residents were underrepresented on 2019 criminal juries by roughly 16%, 51%, and 21% of their population shares. The second compares the venire with the empaneled jury before and after the change, using a “loss rate,” defined as the percentage of a group in the venire minus its percentage on the seated jury: the non-White loss rate fell by about one-third in criminal cases and one-sixth in civil cases, while the Hispanic loss rate fell in criminal cases and rose in civil cases. The authors called the data preliminary, limited to one county and essentially one post-change year, and possibly confounded by increased juror pay and the COVID-19 pandemic. No comparable published analysis for Pima County was identified, so claims about a particular Arizona venire still depend on case-specific evidence.
Diversity on Court-Martial Panels
In a court-martial, members perform the role of a jury, but they are not drawn from the community at large. The convening authority details members who are, in the convening authority’s opinion, best qualified by age, education, training, experience, length of service, and judicial temperament (Article 25, UCMJ). An enlisted accused may request an all-officer panel or one at least one-third enlisted, and, when it can be avoided, no member may be junior in rank to the accused. Panels are of fixed size, eight members for a noncapital general court-martial and four for a special court-martial (Article 29, UCMJ), and conviction requires the concurrence of three-fourths of the members (Article 52, UCMJ).
These features make panels systematically different from civilian juries. Because members are chosen for age, education, experience, and length of service, and generally must be senior to the accused, panels may tend to be older and more senior than the force as a whole, although no published data on panel composition were identified for this paper, and the pool reflects the composition of the command rather than of a civilian community. Congress amended Article 25 in 2022 to require that, to the maximum extent practicable, members be detailed through randomized selection of qualified personnel under regulations prescribed by the President; Executive Order 14130 implemented the change for courts-martial convened on or after December 23, 2024. Randomization reduces the opportunity for selection choices to shape a panel, but because the pool remains defined by Article 25’s criteria and the command’s composition, it does not by itself make panels representative. No public data on panel composition after the change were identified, and its effect on diversity has not been studied.
In United States v. Riesbeck (2018), the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held that a panel selected in no small part on the basis of gender in a sexual assault case, producing a panel about 70% female from a pool less than 20% female, was improperly selected and amounted to court stacking; the court dismissed the charges with prejudice. It relied in part on United States v. Smith (1988), which rejected the intentional selection of women in a sex offense case. Riesbeck described a narrow exception for good-faith efforts to make a panel more representative, drawn from older precedent, but in United States v. Jeter (2023) the court abrogated the case that had approved race-conscious inclusion and held that race may be used neither to exclude nor to include members.
Limits of the Evidence
Experimental research on diversity and deliberation is limited: the foundational experiment used one case and one form of racial diversity, later deliberating experiments, each with a single case, have replicated some of its findings but not others, and other work relies on online samples or no deliberation. Field studies such as the Florida research use real verdicts but come from particular jurisdictions and periods and measure the pool rather than the seated jury. Research on jury size consists largely of older studies comparing six- and twelve-person juries. Data on underrepresentation come mainly from federal courts; the only published Arizona analysis identified is a preliminary, single-county comparison measured against total population rather than the jury-eligible population, and data on court-martial panel composition after randomization were not identified.
Most important, the research addresses groups and processes. It suggests that more diverse groups often deliberate more thoroughly, although not every study has found this, and that pool composition can shift aggregate outcomes. It does not show how any individual juror will vote, does not show that any particular verdict was affected by composition, and does not establish that a diverse jury will favor either party.
Questions to Ask About This Research
When the Florida study is cited for a 16-percentage-point conviction gap (Anwar et al., 2012), ask what exactly was counted: the estimate concerns jury pools averaging about 27 people in two counties, not the seated jury or individual jurors. When the diversity experiment is cited (Sommers, 2006), ask how much evidence it rests on, since it involved 29 mock juries, one sexual assault case, and one form of racial diversity, and whether it has held up, since a later civil-case experiment found no longer deliberation or broader discussion of facts (Hakstian et al., 2022) while another found higher-quality contributions in diverse juries (Bergold & Kovera, 2022). Ask also whether the conclusion follows from the design, because more thorough deliberation does not show that a diverse jury favors either side. When the Maricopa County comparison is cited (McMurdie et al., 2024), ask who was compared with whom: underrepresentation was measured against total county population rather than the jury-eligible population, over essentially one post-change year, and the authors called the data preliminary. When a shortfall in a venire is described as inconsequential, ask what the baseline is, because some underrepresentation was typical across 52 federal court areas (Rose et al., 2018), and bright-line disparity thresholds would leave a majority of jurisdictions effectively immune from challenge (Hannaford-Agor & Waters, 2011). These questions are explained in “Reading Research Claims: A Guide for Attorneys” on this site.
Representativeness and the Law
Federal Constitutional Standards
The Sixth Amendment requires that the venires from which criminal juries are drawn represent a fair cross section of the community. Taylor v. Louisiana (1975) struck down a system that excluded women unless they volunteered in writing. In Duren v. Missouri (1979), the Court set out the elements of a prima facie violation: the group alleged to be excluded is a distinctive group in the community; its representation in venires is not fair and reasonable in relation to its number in the community; and the underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. The state may then justify the disparity by showing that a significant state interest is manifestly and primarily advanced by the aspects of the process that produce it. The requirement applies to venires, not to the composition of the petit jury actually seated (Holland v. Illinois, 1990).
In Berghuis v. Smith (2010), the Court declined to adopt any single measure of underrepresentation. On federal habeas review, it held that the state court reasonably required the defendant to show that underrepresentation resulted from systematic exclusion, and it noted that no decision of the Court had clearly established that factors such as hardship excuses or lax enforcement of summonses could support a fair-cross-section claim. Williams v. Florida (1970) and Ballew v. Georgia (1978) set the constitutional floor on jury size.
The Jury Selection and Service Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861–1878, requires federal juries to be selected at random from a fair cross section of the community, prohibits exclusion on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status, requires names to be drawn from voter lists supplemented by other sources where necessary, and provides a procedure for challenging substantial failures to comply.
Military Standards
Courts-martial are not subject to the jury-trial requirements of the Sixth Amendment, and service members are not entitled to a panel drawn from a representative cross section of the military community (Riesbeck, 2018, citing United States v. McClain, 1986). The Fifth Amendment’s equal protection component nonetheless forbids purposeful discrimination in the selection and challenge of members. In United States v. Santiago-Davila (1988), the Court of Military Appeals applied Batson to the government’s peremptory challenge. In United States v. Bess (2020), in which the panel of an African American accused included no African American members, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held that an accused has no right to members of his own race, that the absence of minority members does not establish a violation without evidence of intentional exclusion or improper motive, and that convening authorities are presumed to act regularly. Jeter (2023) added that a prima facie showing of race-based selection shifts the burden to the government. The governing limits are therefore Article 25’s criteria, the prohibition on selecting members to influence the outcome (Riesbeck; Smith), the bar on using race to exclude or include members (Jeter), and, for courts-martial convened on or after December 23, 2024, the randomized-selection requirement of Article 25(e)(4).
Arizona
The Arizona Constitution guarantees an impartial jury of the county in which the offense is alleged to have been committed (Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24) and preserves the right of trial by jury, with twelve jurors required in cases in which death or imprisonment for 30 years or more is authorized (Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 23; A.R.S. § 21-102). Fair-cross-section claims in Arizona courts are evaluated under the Sixth Amendment framework of Duren. In State v. Sanderson (1995), the Court of Appeals found that Native Americans, about 75% of Apache County residents but 59% of the defendant’s panel, were a distinctive group and were underrepresented by an absolute disparity of about 16 percentage points, but it rejected the claim because the defendant did not show systematic exclusion; granting excusals under neutral criteria, the court held, is not systematic exclusion. The court noted the Arizona Supreme Court’s earlier suggestion, without deciding, that an 11-point absolute disparity may satisfy the second Duren element in appropriate cases (State v. Gretzler, 1980). Arizona’s elimination of peremptory challenges effective January 1, 2022 (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order No. R-21-0020) removed one stage at which composition could change between venire and jury, but the fair-cross-section requirement continues to apply only to the venire.
Special Issues in Legal Practice
The principles described above apply with equal force to every party in a legal proceeding. The science operates the same way regardless of who is asking the questions, and the research summarized here does not by itself favor either side. What differs between the parties is not the science but the vantage point — the particular places where these issues tend to surface, and the particular errors each party is best positioned to guard against. The two summaries below identify those recurring issues. They are offered for orientation, not as litigation strategy; in every case the controlling question is what the evidence in that case will, and will not, support, and the expert’s role is to inform the trier of fact rather than to advocate for either side.
Special Issues for Prosecutors
Research suggests that more representative jury pools may improve the thoroughness of deliberation; separately, a verdict from a well-documented selection process is easier to defend on review. Prosecutors are likely to encounter fair-cross-section challenges, where accurate data on the jury-eligible population and venire composition bear on whether disparities result from factors outside the selection process or are within the range the case law has tolerated. The research on measurement supports careful attention to which population base and which disparity measure are used.
The research also counsels caution. Underrepresentation of some groups in jury pools is common, losses arise at identifiable stages such as undeliverable summonses and hardship excuses, and real-trial evidence shows that pool composition can affect outcomes. Arguments that a disparity is inconsequential should rest on data rather than assumption, and in courts-martial, panel selection that departs from Article 25’s criteria or the randomized-selection procedure creates appellate risk regardless of motive; after Jeter, even well-intended race-conscious efforts to make a panel more representative are impermissible.
Special Issues for Defense
Research suggests that jury composition can affect the thoroughness of deliberation and, in some settings, outcomes, and that underrepresentation arises from identifiable features of jury administration. Defense counsel are likely to encounter the same challenges from the other direction, where jury-administration records, source-list information, and venire data bear on the specific stage at which a disparity arises, which Duren and Berghuis require. In courts-martial, the question is whether the convening authority’s selection followed Article 25 and the randomized-selection procedure and whether the record shows any use of an improper characteristic.
The research also counsels caution. Underrepresentation in a typical venire is often small in absolute numbers (one to three members of a group in venires of 40 to 60; Rose et al., 2018), and the measures courts use often will not show a constitutional violation even where some underrepresentation exists. Diversity research does not show that a diverse jury will favor the defense; its main finding is that deliberation is often more thorough, and even that has not replicated in every study. Courts-martial carry no fair-cross-section right, and the Florida and experimental findings describe groups and cannot establish that composition affected the verdict in a particular case.
This paper is for educational purposes only and is not legal advice. The author is a psychologist, not an attorney; summaries of law are general and must be verified against current authority or with a licensed attorney.
References
Anwar, S., Bayer, P., & Hjalmarsson, R. (2012). The impact of jury race in criminal trials. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(2), 1017–1055. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjs014
Anwar, S., Bayer, P., & Hjalmarsson, R. (2014). The role of age in jury selection and trial outcomes. The Journal of Law and Economics, 57(4), 1001–1030. https://doi.org/10.1086/675257
Bergold, A. N., & Kovera, M. B. (2022). Diversity’s impact on the quality of deliberations. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 48(9), 1406–1420. https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672211040960
Diamond, S. S., Peery, D., Dolan, F. J., & Dolan, E. (2009). Achieving diversity on the jury: Jury size and the peremptory challenge. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 6(3), 425–449. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1740-1461.2009.01149.x
Hakstian, A.-M., Evett, S. R., Hoffmann, J. S., Marshall, J. M., Boyland, E. A. L., & Williams, J. D. (2022). Racial diversity and group decision-making in a mock jury experiment. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 19(4), 1253–1292. https://doi.org/10.1111/jels.12335
Hannaford-Agor, P. (2011). Systematic negligence in jury operations: Why the definition of systematic exclusion in fair cross section claims must be expanded. Drake Law Review, 59, 761–797. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/2343
Hannaford-Agor, P., & Waters, N. L. (2011). Safe harbors from fair-cross-section challenges? The practical limitations of measuring representation in the jury pool. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 8(4), 762–791. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1740-1461.2011.01240.x
Huang, L. (2025). Xenophobia in juror decision-making. Law & Social Inquiry, 50(1), 170–194. https://doi.org/10.1017/lsi.2024.36
Maeder, E. M., Yamamoto, S., & Wingrove, T. (2026). Investigating the predictive value of defendant race and jury racial composition on decision making in a criminal trial. Law and Human Behavior, 50(5), 421–435. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000669
McMurdie, P. J., Carroll, L., Freed, R., & Wilkins, E. M. (2024). Arizona’s elimination of peremptory challenges: A first look. Arizona State Law Journal, 56, 1793.
Reed, K., Hans, V. P., Rotenstein, V. N., McKendall, P., Rodriguez, A., Helm, R. K., & Reyna, V. F. (2026). Virtually the same? A comparison between in-person and virtual mock jury deliberations. Law and Human Behavior, 50(3), 225–239. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000643
Rose, M. R., Casarez, R. S., & Gutierrez, C. M. (2018). Jury pool underrepresentation in the modern era: Evidence from federal courts. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 15(2), 378–405. https://doi.org/10.1111/jels.12182
Rose, M. R., Lisch, M., & Husain, F. A. (2026). Increasing the incentive to serve: The effects of a juror pay increase in Texas. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 44(5), 820–828. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.70081
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Legal Authorities
Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314 (2010).
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
State v. Gretzler, 126 Ariz. 60, 612 P.2d 1023 (1980).
State v. Sanderson, 182 Ariz. 534, 898 P.2d 483 (Ct. App. 1995).
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
United States v. Bess, 80 M.J. 1 (C.A.A.F. 2020).
United States v. Jeter, 84 M.J. 68 (C.A.A.F. 2023).
United States v. McClain, 22 M.J. 124 (C.M.A. 1986).
United States v. Riesbeck, 77 M.J. 154 (C.A.A.F. 2018).
United States v. Santiago-Davila, 26 M.J. 380 (C.M.A. 1988).
United States v. Smith, 27 M.J. 242 (C.M.A. 1988).
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
U.S. Const. amend. V.
U.S. Const. amend. VI.
Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 23.
Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24.
10 U.S.C. § 825 (Article 25, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
10 U.S.C. § 829 (Article 29, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
10 U.S.C. § 852 (Article 52, Uniform Code of Military Justice).
28 U.S.C. §§ 1861–1878 (Jury Selection and Service Act).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21-102.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21-201.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21-202.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 21-301.
Exec. Order No. 14130, 2024 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 89 Fed. Reg. 105343 (Dec. 27, 2024).
Ariz. Sup. Ct. Order No. R-21-0020 (Aug. 30, 2021) (amending Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.4 and 18.5, effective Jan. 1, 2022).
Ariz. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 2021-35 (establishing the Task Force on Jury Data Collection, Practices, and Procedures).
Related topic papers: Juror Demographics and Verdicts: What Predicts Guilt Judgments · Race and Juror Decision-Making · Peremptory Challenges, Batson, and Arizona’s Abolition of Peremptories · Court-Martial Panel Selection: Article 25, Random Selection, and Challenges · Deliberation, Unanimity, and Court-Martial Verdicts
Related topics from Arizona Forensic Services: Courts-Martial